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Abstract 
My thesis examines moral and political responses to the character of work through 
critical evaluation of the work we do to sustain a stable social order suitable for 
human acting and being. My original contribution rests upon my application of 
Wolf’s (2010) distinct bipartite value of meaningfulness (BVM) to the structure of 
action in work, which integrates the objective and subjective dimensions of 
meaningfulness when subjective feelings of attachment are united to an 
assessment of the objective worthiness of the object. Work which is structured by 
the BVM is a fundamental human need, because it addresses our inescapable 
interests in autonomy, freedom, and social recognition, which are met when work 
is non-alienated, non-dominated and dignified. To realise the BVM, each person 
must possess the capabilities for objective valuing and affective attachment, in 
addition to their equal status as co-authorities in the realm of value. Being able to 
participate in creating and sustaining positive values through meaning-making 
alleviates concerns that meaningful work is a perfectionist ideal which 
undermines autonomy. But meaning-making gives rise to interpretive differences 
over values and meanings which often remain as pre-political potentials unless 
brought into public deliberation through deliberative practices. I argue that 
realising the BVM in work requires a politics of meaningfulness generated by a 
system of workplace democracy, where democratic authority at the level of the 
organisation is combined with agonistic democratic practices at the level of the 
task. Furthermore, capability justice requires the satisfaction of two principles – 
the principle of egalitarian meaning, such that all persons must be able to 
experience their work as meaningful, and the threshold of sufficient meaning, 
such that work is sufficiently meaningful when constituted by the values of 
autonomy, freedom and social recognition. I conclude that the relevant 
capabilities for meaningfulness are realised, indirectly, through institutional 
guarantees for the Capability for Voice. 
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Introduction 
 
‘Meaningful work, like a meaningful life, is morally worthy work 
undertaken in a morally worthy organization. Work has meaning 
because there is some good in it. The most meaningful jobs are 
those in which people directly help others or create products 
which make life better for people. Work makes life better if it 
helps others; alleviates suffering; eliminates difficult, dangerous, 
or tedious toil; makes someone healthier or happier; or 
aesthetically or intellectually enriches people and improves the 
environment in which we live. All work that is worthy does at 
least some of these things in some small or large way. Still, not 
all people will find worthy work personally meaningful to them’ 
(Ciulla, 2000: 226). 
 
In advanced industrialised societies, work occupies a peculiarly 
ambivalent position – simultaneously valued for providing the means for self-
realisation and disvalued for being burdensome and compulsory. Shershow (2005) 
describes work as consisting of a ‘double necessity’, whereby ‘we see ourselves 
both as working to live and as living to work’ (ibid: 13, original emphasis). Work 
is either a source of expressive human action, one of ‘the hopes of civilisation’ 
(Morris, 1993), fulfilled in a correctly ordered society which enables all persons to 
do decent, humane and dignified work; or it is an experience of oppressive 
degradation, from which we must escape, since the worker deprived of 
worthwhile activities ‘generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible 
for a human creature to become’ (Smith, 1999 [1776]), resulting in him or her 
becoming ‘a crippled monstrosity’ (Marx, 1978 [1867]). We can be in no doubt 
that our survival and our ability to flourish depend upon our being able to work 
together to produce the material and social goods which satisfy individual and 
collective human needs. But simply acknowledging that work, as a generalised 
human activity, is unavoidable for most people does not settle questions such as: 
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what activities count as work? Do we include only those activities for which we 
receive a payment, or do we also include unpaid labour in the home and in the 
community (see Bolle, 2009)?  Is work simply what is necessary to sustain life, or 
can it add positively to the experience of a full and meaningful human existence? 
For some, work is no longer a site of human action which is valuable for its own 
sake. But although we have become sceptical about the emancipatory potential of 
work, the meaning of work as compulsion has not crowded out entirely the 
meaning of work as free, expressive, and creative action (Spencer, 2009). The 
ideal of meaningful work, of activity which aims at a compelling purpose and uses 
the full range of a person’s distinctive capabilities, retains a strong hold upon our 
imagination, motivating us to seek work which adds to the personal meaning of 
our lives and to aspire to a society transformed by each person being able to work 
which he or she finds to be worth doing. This means that the contemporary 
organisation of work is a consequence of socio-historical contingencies, which are 
not natural inevitabilities from which meaningfulness has been eliminated, but are 
instead possibilities for a more humanised experience of work. 
I aim to show that to engage in the conceptual evaluation of meaningful 
work is not simply an exercise in remote abstraction, but directs us toward the 
pragmatic political possibility of ensuring that all work possesses the structure for 
meaningfulness. Furthermore, not only can the value of meaningfulness in the 
concept of meaningful work be described, but social institutions can be arranged 
according to normative principles conducive to enabling all persons to attribute 
meaning content to their lives because of the work they do. Following Kovacs 
(1986), I take work to be ‘a basic mode of being in the world’, where ‘to work 
means to humanise the world and to produce something’ (ibid: 198). In this sense, 
work functions to create and to sustain values and meanings beyond the realm of 
its economic productivity: work is a mode of being in the world which transcends 
the employment relation to include all the activities which contribute to producing 
and reproducing a complex system of social cooperation. But, if work is to 
humanise the world, it must at the same time humanise the one through whom the 
work takes place; in Morris’s terms: ‘Nothing should be made by man’s labour 
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which is not worth doing; or which must be made by labour degrading to the 
makers’ (Morris, 1884). Work cannot be meaningful if it requires the enslavement 
of the worker, the deformation of her human capabilities, or the misrecognition of 
her vital commitments. This means that some work is morally desirable and some 
work is not, requiring that the improvement of individuals and of society depends 
upon work having a certain interior content, which I argue is given by the value of 
meaningfulness. Furthermore, to aim at the meaningfulness of individual lives 
because of the work people do is a proper moral and political project – and a 
necessary element in addressing the many challenges of our times, including how 
increasingly unequal societies unevenly distribute the benefits and burdens of the 
work of social cooperation. 
I ground my reasons for making meaningful work for all a political project 
in a normative argument that being able to experience one’s life as meaningful is a 
fundamental human need, which, under present economic arrangements, is 
extremely difficult for most people to satisfy if their work lacks the structure for 
meaningfulness. In justifying meaningful work as an object of political action, I 
start by making the strong claim that, because being able to experience work with 
the relevant structure is of such importance for living a fully human life, then it is 
a fundamental human need, requiring the organisation of society to eliminate non-
meaningful work from the work of social cooperation. Meaningful work has 
always been available to the few who occupy social roles allowing them to 
exercise socially valuable capabilities in contexts of personal autonomy which 
aim at a worthwhile purpose. But a just social order will be concerned that 
meaningfulness in work is so unevenly distributed, and will seek to ensure, not 
only that there is equal opportunity in the competition for the most desirable roles, 
but that all work provides for the development and exercise of complex 
capabilities (cf. Gomberg, 2007). However, I shall not be proposing that society is 
organised to ensure that each person is able to access an elite ideal of exceptional 
meaning, but that everyday human action is structured to ensure that work 
provides the context for finding objects which are worth pursuing, and for 
developing human capacities for intersubjective meaning-making. Hence, I aim to 
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pursue an egalitarian conception of ordinary meaning which is already at hand in 
much of the work we do together, provided that we make certain adjustments to 
our institutional arrangements and the organisation of work in the basic structure 
of society.  
In making this argument, I challenge the commitment of liberal political 
theorists to the principle of liberal neutrality, which results in the subordination of 
the human need for meaningful work to liberal concerns to avoid substantive 
normative conceptions of living. As a consequence of the commitment to liberal 
neutrality, describing and evaluating the concept of meaningful work has been a 
lacuna in the intellectual endeavours of modern political and moral theorists. 
Since Arneson’s (1987) ‘Meaningful Work and Market Socialism’ and Elster’s 
(1986) ‘Self-Realisation in Work and Politics: the Marxist Conception of the 
Good Life’ in the late eighties, little has been written on the normative character 
of work, and its implications for political theory and social policy. And this, 
during a period when the experience of work has been the subject of extensive 
empirical investigation by sociologists, ethnographers and psychologists, leading 
to new treatments of the organisation of work in the disciplines of business ethics, 
political geography and critical sociology.  The disconnect between the normative 
description of work and the empirical investigation of work means that: firstly, the 
normative analysis of what morality or justice might demand with respect to the 
character of work, and how it contributes to a life of human flourishing, has not 
kept up with the accumulated empirical evidence, and secondly, the empirical 
literature has remained analytically under-developed.  
I engage with moral philosophers, critical social theorists and liberal 
political theorists for whom the concept of meaningful work, and its implications 
for public policy, has been of marginal interest. In moral philosophy, the 
normative content of work is rarely the object of analytical consideration, because 
work is dismissed as a norm-free zone of human activity governed by technical 
rationality.  In critical social theory, the interior content of work is seen as having 
been degraded to such a degree that it no longer supports the worthy objects 
necessary for us to find our lives to be meaningful. In liberal political theory, 
Ruth Yeoman                                        Meaningful Work and Workplace Democracy 
 
Page 13 
 
meaningful work is treated as a preference in the market, because the 
irredeemably subjective content of meaningfulness threatens the maintenance of 
neutrality between different conceptions of living. However, the centrality of 
work in modern societies makes construing meaningful work as a preference, 
dismissing it as irretrievably degraded, or treating it as a realm from which ethical 
considerations of value and worth are absent, normatively unsatisfactory. There 
has been some recent revival of theoretical interest in meaningful work from a 
Rawlsian perspective (Hsieh, 2008; Arnold, 2011), from within critical social 
theory (Smith, 2009; Breen, 2006), from a liberal perfectionist standpoint 
(Rossler, 2011), and from moral philosophy on the meaning of life (Levy, 2005). 
But even theoretical attempts to address the empirical literature, such as Dejours’s 
(2006) theory of work which draws upon ethnographic observations of the actual 
work which people do, remain incomplete in the absence of a positive critical 
conception of meaningful work enabling us to distinguish between morally viable 
and unviable forms of work. And the small liberal political theory literature 
remains, on the whole, committed to liberal neutrality, and therefore not able to 
account fully for how people experience their work. Moreover, commitment to 
liberal neutrality means that liberal political theory remains blind to the ways in 
which people’s attempts to recast their work as meaningful through the exercise of 
meaning-making capabilities are distorted, thwarted, and misrecognised, often 
leading to meaning-making capacities being appropriated to benefit others without 
reference to the meaning-maker’s inescapable interest in being able to experience 
autonomy, freedom and social recognition.  
In order to describe the conceptual content of meaningful work which will 
have critical purchase in specifying the social transformations required to ensure 
that all work is meaningful, I draw upon the moral philosophy of meaningfulness, 
making use of Wolf’s (2010) bipartite value of meaningfulness (BVM) to 
structure the interior content of morally acceptable work. Wolf’s BVM unites 
subjective and objective dimensions into a value which can be distinguished from 
welfare and morality: ‘meaning arises when subjective attraction meets objective 
attractiveness’ (Wolf, 2010: 9). The BVM integrates objective and subjective 
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dimensions of meaningfulness when affective feelings of attachment, satisfaction 
or fulfilment are united to an assessment of the worthiness of the object at which 
the feelings aim. I employ the BVM to retrieve a critical conception of work 
which enables us to distinguish normatively between meaningful and non-
meaningful work, extending the BVM beyond its conceptual evaluation in moral 
philosophy to a theoretical description of what each person requires in order to 
experience the value of meaningfulness in the work they do with others. I do so by 
arguing that meaningfulness is an intersubjective and institutional achievement, 
where social structures support the development of human capabilities for 
meaning-making, provided that there are widespread deliberative practices in all 
the associations which make up the system of social cooperation. As a result, I 
lend to empirical research more vigorous possibilities for understanding the 
evidence of how people use their sense-making capabilities to draw out positive 
meanings from the work they do with others; and I challenge liberal political 
theory’s commitment to liberal neutrality by claiming that, given the importance 
of meaningful work to the individual’s search for meaning, then liberal neutrality 
ought not to be maintained at the cost of rendering futile the efforts individuals 
make to find their experience of work to be meaningful.  
Although Wolf specifies the value of meaningfulness, she does not 
develop an account of how we come to experience our lives as meaningful. I 
suggest that we appropriate the BVM to our lives through capabilities for 
objective judging and subjective attachment, supported by social recognition of 
our equal status as co-authorities in the realm of value, where I understand 
appropriation to be an intersubjective process requiring the active orientation of 
one’s self to the particular value of worthy objects. In his recent hybrid account of 
the human good and preference formation, which draws close to the bipartite 
value of meaningfulness, Arneson (2006) says: ‘nothing that an individual does or 
gets contributes in itself to her well-being unless the thing is both objectively 
valuable and positively engages her subjectivity’ (ibid: 29). He adds that for 
individuals to experience genuine well-being, desires must be trained, such that 
they will ‘not desire the cotton candy of life’ (ibid: 31). There are some desires 
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that are better for us to have than others. And we can train our desires by 
developing and exercising the relevant capabilities for valuing and attachment, 
which means that, in order to experience their lives as meaningful, individuals 
must be situated in contexts rich in potential encounters with worthy objects. 
Furthermore, they must possess the relevant capabilities for affectively 
appropriating those objects to the meaning content of our lives. Thus, work 
acquires the requisite structure for meaningfulness when it provides the context 
for encounters with worthy objects expressing a range of attractive values, and for 
fostering the relevant capabilities for judging and feeling, where work is 
conceived, not only as those activities undertaken in the employment relation, but 
includes all those activities required to reproduce a system of social cooperation. 
Work with the requisite structure for meaningfulness provides the context for 
encounters with worthy objects because it expresses a range of attractive values 
and fosters capabilities for judging and feeling. The proliferation of positive 
values in a liberal perfectionist framework requires all individuals to be 
participants in the processes and practices of meaning-making from which 
purposes, values and meanings arise.  This means that work is more likely to 
enable all persons to experience the BVM when it is organised democratically in 
social practices containing subjectively attractive worthy objects. The aim is not 
to guarantee that all persons will find their work to be actually meaningful, but 
instead to support each person’s search for meaning by securing their membership 
of at least one social practice in a participatory society, where democratic 
practices, in themselves, are among the worthy objects making work susceptible 
to the BVM. 
I concede that organising the work of social cooperation to meet the 
regulatory ideal of meaningful work breaks with the principle of liberal neutrality, 
but suggest that a framework of liberal perfectionism, supported by democratic 
deliberation over the constitution of the interior content of work, provides a 
sufficiently wide range of attractive values to allow for plural conceptions of 
living (cf. Roessler, 2011). I argue that the values of autonomy, freedom and 
social recognition are constitutive of the meaningfulness of work, because they 
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are necessary for creating and sustaining a range of positive values in the work we 
do together. Autonomy as non-alienation, freedom as non-domination and social 
recognition as dignified work are realistic targets of a theory of capability justice, 
meaning that institutionalising the value of meaningfulness in the basic structure 
of society is both normatively legitimate and politically achievable. With respect 
to autonomy as non-alienation, I draw upon the empirical evidence which shows 
how, despite the unpromising nature of many of the activities they must undertake 
in their work, people exercise meaning-making capabilities in order to excavate a 
sense of purpose and identity from the work they do together. Following Dejours 
(2006), I argue that this indicates a floor-level of irreducible autonomy in all acts 
of work. Because people must exercise capabilities for meaning-making in uniting 
means and ends in order to get the work done, this level of irreducible autonomy 
cannot be eliminated by intensifying the technical division of labour or completely 
appropriated by management efforts to co-opt workers’ autonomy. Even though 
much of this autonomous action is rendered invisible, it is a potentially rich source 
of intersubjective encounter, solidarity and meaningful work, because it is 
productive of interpretive differences in meaning, which, if brought into public 
deliberation, have the potential to multiply the values which can be appropriated 
to the meaning content of a life. I evaluate dimensions of unfreedom in work 
using the concept of domination (Pettit, 1999), which I conceive, not only in the 
neo-republican sense of being subject to the capricious will of another, but also as 
exclusion from participating in developing the rules, social structures and 
intersubjective relations which frame our subjectivities. Non-dominating 
intersubjective relations in the work of social cooperation are secured within 
coordinating authorities which are legitimate when they are democratic 
authorities. Finally, I propose that social recognition in meaningful work is given 
by dignified work, where self-respect and self-esteem are united in a sense of 
one’s dignity as a particular person, who bears responsibilities of care for worthy 
objects (Honneth, 1995; Rawls, 1999).  
I acknowledge concerns that liberal neutralists may have with the way in 
which I make meaningfulness dependent upon taking part in democratic 
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deliberation, since not everyone has the taste for democratic participation – some 
people may be reluctant cooperators. Others may have limited opportunities for 
participation in publicly recognised practices because they undertake activities 
which they categorise as work in obscurity, such as the artist who remains 
unrecognised in her lifetime. If meaningfulness is realised only when individuals 
engage in activities which are valued through public deliberation, then this would 
seem to limit the opportunities for the unknown artist to experience her work as 
meaningful. In the case of the reluctant co-operator, much contemporary work is 
now organised along participatory lines, making participation an ordinary 
necessity for getting the work done. Although much of this participation may be 
of the pseudo-participatory variety (Pateman, 1970), such practices nonetheless 
sketch a line in the sand for ‘bleak houses’ organised through command and 
control (Brogger, 2010). In order to provide for the reluctant co-operator, 
however, I propose that participatory practices which are constitutive of the 
meaning content of work must be plural, including both direct/individual and 
indirect/representative forms of participation. This provides multiple channels for 
people to choose the form of their participation, perhaps delegating participation 
to their representatives, if they have no taste for direct involvement. In the case of 
the unknown artist, I argue that we must define work more broadly than paid 
work, so as to include an individual’s own identification of what counts as work. 
Since the unknown artist is part of an honourable tradition of the unrecognised 
innovator in all fields of human endeavour, this allows her to claim that her 
identification of her activity as work places her within an established public 
practice. 
In opposition to the preference argument, I construct meaningful work as a 
fundamental human need, arguing that it addresses our inescapable interests in 
autonomy, freedom and social recognition, which are met when work is non-
alienated, non-dominated and dignified. Therefore, it is not enough to privatise 
meaningfulness by claiming that we can satisfy the human need for meaning 
through non-market activities, such as hobbies, family life or voluntary 
participation, or placing the entire burden of finding their work to be meaningful 
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upon the psychological adjustment of the individual (Lips-Wiersma & Morris, 
2009). For a start, much of this non-market activity is a vital part of the economy 
of social cooperation, and is an indispensible component of what it means to 
work. Thus, understanding the meaning content of work depends upon: firstly, 
conceptualising society as a system of social cooperation between equals, 
secondly, identifying the whole range of activities which contribute to the 
reproduction of society, and thirdly, identifying the general features of these 
activities which enable a person to experience their life as meaningful. Many of 
these activities can be performed in meaningful or non-meaningful ways, 
depending upon how they are organised by the social circumstances which pertain 
in the basic structure of society. A society concerned to enable each person to 
satisfy their fundamental human need for meaning will arrange the basic structure 
of society to ensure that all persons are able to undertake work which is conducive 
to meaning attribution. Furthermore, relieving society of the need to maintain 
liberal neutrality permits the political pursuit of meaningful work as a regulatory 
ideal, including entitlements to the realisation of meaningful work, given by the 
Capability for Voice in a system of workplace democracy. 
I argue that work is more likely to enable all persons to experience the 
BVM when it is organised democratically in social practices containing 
subjectively attractive worthy objects, where agonistic democratic practices at the 
level of the task are combined with democratic authority at the level of the 
organisation. Agonism realises the emancipatory potential of the interior content 
of work by bringing into public deliberation interpretive differences which arise 
out of acts of work, but which are more likely to remain as pre-political potentials 
in hierarchically organised enterprises. Such practices are able to bring into public 
view the irreducible autonomy of workers by: firstly, enabling deliberation over 
acts of meaning-making which overcome technical reason by extending 
knowledge, developing skill, and re-uniting ends and means to complete 
necessary tasks, and secondly, enabling deliberation over the diversification and 
individualisation of the subjective formations which underpin positive self-
relations. By bringing invisibilised interpretive differences which arise from 
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meaning-making into conscious collective deliberation, we can make available to 
all enriched sources of positive values which can be incorporated into a person’s 
identity. Thus, to realise the value of meaningfulness in work for all requires a 
system of workplace democracy at the level of the task and at the level of the 
organisation. At the level of the task, a political mode of being structured by 
agonistic democratic practices has the potential to foster a form of workplace 
democracy which reveals the necessary autonomy in every act of work. At the 
level of the organisation, democratic authority contests the presumption of 
hierarchical authority. As a consequence, the individual worker is re-presented as 
an irreplaceable contributor imbued with expressive political agency, and situated 
in cooperative relations with others.  
Finally, I propose that the regulatory ideal of meaningful work is achieved 
through a capabilities for functioning framework (Nussbaum, 2001). And I 
suggest two rules for securing meaningfulness in the interior content of work: a 
principle of egalitarian meaning, that all persons should be able to attribute 
meaning content to their lives because of the work they do, and a threshold of 
sufficient meaning, that all work should meet a threshold standard of 
meaningfulness, given by freedom as non-domination, autonomy as non-
alienation, and social recognition as dignified intersubjective relations. That some 
people are able to experience more meaningful lives because of the work they do 
is due to arbitrary factors in the organisation of work which it is within our power 
to remedy. Each day, most people willingly take up significant responsibilities in 
the work of social cooperation, requiring capabilities of judgment, social 
interaction and creative action, where this willingness to contribute responsibly to 
cooperative joint working justifies each person being able to exercise the political 
mode of being in work. I argue that realising the relevant capabilities requires the 
conversion factor of a basic income which supports the recognition of a wide 
range of contributions to the reproduction of a system of social cooperation, 
therefore multiplying the range of attractive values which can be made available 
for appropriation to the meaning content of a life, in addition to a system of 
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workplace democracy which secures a wide variety of enterprises organised along 
democratic lines.  
The political object is not to guarantee that every person’s life will be 
actually meaningful, but that the organisation of work will secure for each person 
the Capability for Voice in the work they do with others, thus ensuring that the 
individual will not find her search for meaning unfairly hindered by social 
structures which benefit only a few. This means that realising meaningful work 
for all is not an unachievable ideal if the interior content of work is organised so 
that people can express the political mode of being through participation in 
democratic practices. I make democratic practices in the work we do together 
constitutive of the meaning content of work, arguing that they become the object 
of justice when we seek to institute the value of meaningfulness in the basic 
structure of society.  It is not fair that some people are able to accrue meaning 
content to their lives because of the work they do (even when they have acquired 
such work through competition for social roles in which the terms of fair equality 
of opportunity have been met), whereas others must endure a lifetime of 
meaningless activity. Therefore, it is a matter of justice that all work be organised 
so that its interior content is structured by the value of meaningfulness. Capability 
justice ensures our individual Capability for Voice, enabling us to become equal 
participants in the democratic practices which are constitutive of the meaning 
content of work. And this requires institutional guarantees to ensure that all work 
is structured to give each person the best chance to experience their work as 
meaningful, according to their own lights.  
 
In Chapter One, I undertake a descriptive analysis of the concept of 
meaningful work which I use to develop a normative justification for making the 
good of meaningful work the object of political action. My descriptive analysis of 
the concept of meaningful work is based upon the claim that, in order to 
contribute to the meaning content of a person’s life, an activity being undertaken 
by that person must possess a certain structure (Levy, 2005). This structure is 
given by the distinct value of meaningfulness which can be conceptually 
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described by bringing together the dimensions of objectivity and subjectivity into 
the ‘bipartite value’ of meaningfulness (Wolf, 2010). If the bipartite value 
meaningfulness is constitutive of work then activities must be structured to enable 
objectively attractive values to be actively incorporated via subjective attachment 
into a person’s self-conception for what makes their life worth living. However, 
although the bipartite value of meaningfulness describes the relevant structure of 
activities (including the structure of work activities) which have the potential to 
add to the meaning content of a life, it does not describe the process whereby 
persons actively appropriate meaning to their lives. For this, we need a theoretical 
account of the process of meaning attribution which is given by our capabilities 
and status as valuers (Raz, 2001). To incorporate meaningfulness into a life is to 
give that life a distinct narrative shape, formed by and in turn forming, the self-
concept of the person whose life it is. This is an active process, success in which 
requires us to see ourselves as the kind of person who has the authority and 
capabilities to be able to evaluate and judge the worthiness of objects we wish to 
appropriate to our lives (Raz, 2001; 2003). This means that becoming a valuer, 
and having the self-concept of being a valuer, is a developmental process 
requiring suitable sites for the formation of the relevant capabilities and sense of 
personhood. I make an ethic of care central to the development process of 
becoming a valuer because, through practices of care, we fulfil our responsibilities 
towards the worthy objects we have appropriated to the meaning content of our 
lives, and through practising care we make ourselves into the kinds of persons 
who are capable of being valuers. 
 
In Chapter Two, I evaluate what theoretical resources for analysing and 
evaluating the concept of meaningful work are to be found in critical social theory 
and liberal political theory. And I conclude that each source supplies a dimension 
which the other lacks. Although critical social theory directs us to considerations 
of work as a socialised activity containing the potential for individual 
emancipation and social change, it does not systematically address the objective 
dimension of the value of meaningfulness, because it is deeply sceptical that 
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contemporary work contains objectively worthy objects. Liberal political theory 
provides resources for a conceptual analysis of meaningful work, particularly with 
respect to the substantive normative requirement for autonomous action. But, 
although liberal political theory illuminates the individual in relation to the 
activity of work by placing the emphasis upon the experience of autonomy as self-
directed activity, it neglects the essential intersubjective dimensions of work, 
which are not merely side benefits, but are necessary for getting the work done. I 
develop a positive critical conception of meaningful work, which centralises the 
importance of intersubjective relations to the meaning content of work. I make use 
of Arendt (1958) to argue that acting in the political mode of being is constitutive 
of the meaning content of work; Habermas (1974) to identify how work takes 
place in multiple, overlapping timespaces; and Honneth (1995) to retrieve the 
material dimensions of our intersubjective relations. 
 
In Chapter Three, I evaluate the first constitutive element of meaningful 
work – autonomy. I argue that critical social theory is too pessimistic about the 
prospects for the emanicpatory potential for work because it characterises work as 
heteronomously governed by technical reason, and therefore lacking in the 
possibility for autonomous action. Although there is empirical evidence which 
supports such a view, it is not conclusive and is insufficient for sustaining the 
view that contemporary work is irredeemably degraded. Evidence from the 
ethnographic literature on what people actually do in work suggests that, even in 
outwardly Tayloristic organisations of work, there is a level of irreducible 
autonomy as people struggle to overcome rules, and thereby to unite means and 
ends, in order to get their work done (cf. Dejours, 2006). This struggle is 
constitutively intersubjective and relational, requiring interactions between self, 
others and the material world, and giving rise to interpretive differences over the 
purposes and meanings of work. These interpretive differences are a potentially 
rich source of social change and practical identity formation because they 
diversify the positive values which individuals might appropriate to the meaning 
content of their lives. But, these interpretive differences remain as pre-political 
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differences, unless activated by the political mode of being, that is by being able 
to exercise one’s status as a co-authority and one’s capabilities for objective 
valuing and subjective attachment, through democratic practices at the level of the 
task. I propose that interpretive differences arising out of acts of work can foster 
the meaning content of work when they are evaluated, not by technical reason 
dominated by pre-given technical determinants, but by using a practical rationality 
of caring, based upon Dunne’s (1993) concept of phronetic techne. This is 
because exercising phronetic techne, in order to address the needs of the situation, 
enables practitioners to form a sensibility for what is required to promote the good 
for worthy objects, through which they also develop the relevant orientations for 
legitimate affective appropriation of those worthy objects and generate intelligible 
reasons for acting and being. 
 
In Chapter Four, I argue that freedom in work is not fully captured by 
either the negative or the positive concepts of freedom, and that we need also to 
evaluate the possibilities for an emancipatory experience of work by applying the 
neo-republican concept of freedom as non-domination. Weil’s (1977 [1946]) 
account of unfree work reveals, from the inside of work, how distortion in the 
relations between persons acts to stifle human capabilities for thinking and 
feeling. Her account is useful to an analysis of the harms of contemporary work, 
where the complaint is that workers must submit to a management project of pre-
determined ontological formations, that is, ways of being which are useful to the 
extraction, not only of objective labour, but also of affective labour. And it also 
illuminates the mechanisms which undermine sources of solidaristic relations and 
the sense of worthiness to act which contributes to the meaning content of work. 
Workers are constrained to modes of being which serve the interests of others, 
because they are not involved in setting the terms for subjectification, nor can they 
exit from the demands to act and to be in particular ways without damaging their 
position as economic participants. This means that, in order for us to experience 
personal freedom, we require political freedom - the freedom to be equal co-
authorities, with a voice which will be attended to by others, combined with 
Ruth Yeoman                                        Meaningful Work and Workplace Democracy 
 
Page 24 
 
access to the rules framing the possibilities for acting and being. Thus, I extend 
Pettit’s concept of non-domination, as the absence of arbitrary interference 
without regard to the interests of the interferee, to having a share in creating and 
maintaining the framing rules governing the formation of subjectivities. This 
requires an account of how organisations frame the rules for acting and being, and 
I make use of McMahon’s (1994) theory of democratic authority which allows a 
coordinating authority to be legitimate only when it is a democratic authority. 
Coordinating authorities are necessary, but necessary coordinating authorities are 
legitimate only when they are democratic authorities. This is because a democratic 
authority is conducive to fostering the cooperative and solidaristic relations with 
others which condition the possibility for collective self-determination in rule-
making which render such relations non-dominating. Thus, the constitutive value 
of freedom as non-domination in a positive critical conception of meaningful 
work enables us to identify how the normative characteristics of cooperative 
relations are fostered by a system of workplace democracy, where democratic 
authority at the level of the organisation is allied to participatory practices at the 
level of the task.  
 
In Chapter Five, I evaluate the intersubjective dimensions of work in 
relation to the social recognition we need to secure the positive relations to the 
self, upon which a secure sense of practical identity depends. We have a 
fundamental human need for stable positive recognitive relations to others which 
are increasingly difficult to secure in contemporary work. But I show that the 
contemporary organisation of work, by privileging achievement over contribution, 
values esteem recognition over respect recognition, encouraging a destructive race 
for esteem recognition, and leading to unstable self-formations which undermine 
human dignity. Both Rawlsian (1979) self-respect and Honneth’s (1995) self-
esteem are limited in their potential to overcome the instability of social 
recognition in contemporary work, because they each mediate recognition through 
the achievement principle. I propose, instead, a partial solution such that, rather 
than continuing to encourage the pursuit of the diminishing goods of self-esteem, 
Ruth Yeoman                                        Meaningful Work and Workplace Democracy 
 
Page 25 
 
we secure a sense of our dignity, of our value as particular persons, because of our 
orientations and actions towards the worthy objects we have incorporated into the 
meaning content of our lives. When we allow our sense of valuable, worthwhile or 
useful contribution to be assessed against an ethic of care, then self-respect can be 
united to self-esteem. And these valuations, through democratic practices, can be 
made available for incorporation into a practical identity (cf. Korsegaard, 2009), 
provided that we understand a practical identity to be one which does not aim at 
unity or coherence, but at a constantly adjusting intersectional self (cf. Meyers, 
2000). 
 
In Chapter Six, I explore the prospects for democratic practices at the level 
of the task, where the experience of exercising the political mode of being enables 
a person to realise the value of meaningfulness in both the objective and the 
subjective dimensions. Interpretive differences remain pre-political potentials 
unless they are articulated and evaluated in public deliberation. Democratic 
practices are constitutive of both dimensions of the bipartite value of 
meaningfulness: in the objective dimension, such practices proliferate the positive 
values which inhere in worthy objects; in the subjective dimension, they foster 
affective attachments to worthy objects which are legitimate when they issue in 
correct orientations towards those objects. However, conventional justifications 
for workplace democracy are not, on the whole, grounded in its intrinsic value 
because it is transformative of the interior content of work. The parallel argument 
(Dahl, 1985) contends that economic enterprises are of the same kind as states; the 
spillover thesis (Pateman, 1979) proposes that workplaces are schools for 
democratic capabilities, and workers trained to democratic habits will apply their 
skills to an increasingly impoverished public sphere of action; the efficiency 
argument (Bowles & Gintis, 1993; Johnson, 2006) makes workplace democracy 
contingent upon its demonstrated ability to improve organisational effectiveness. 
These are instrumental arguments, where workplace democracy is valued for the 
benefits it brings to the enterprise or to society, rather than because it is 
intrinsically valuable for its own sake. Furthermore, deliberative democratic 
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theory has little to add to these arguments for workplace democracy, since the 
term itself is oxymoronic, making the attempt to apply it to action contexts 
governed by unified interests and technical rationality nonsensical. I argue, 
however, that democratic practices with agonistic dimensions provide the means 
for realising the full emancipatory potential of deliberation. Agonic democracy 
unsettles the tendency of deliberative practices towards an uncritical unity, which 
privileges rational consensus. And agonistic democratic practices can be specified 
with the help of Follett (1973 [1940]) and others to include a process of 
democratic dialogue staged by association, contestation, an ethos of enlargement, 
and decision. 
 
In Chapter Seven, I argue for the necessity of a politics of meaningfulness, 
which is realised by securing the Capability for Voice through democratic 
practices at the level of the task and democratic authority at the level of the 
organisation. I propose that the principle of egalitarian meaning requires a basic 
income guarantee and the threshold of sufficient meaning is filled out by 
democratic equality, that is, our equal status as co-authorities. In a capabilities 
context, this means putting work in the political, as well as the material, 
dimension of Nussbaum’s capability for ‘control over one’s environment’, and 
specifying a Capability for Voice which is understood as having a share in 
decision-making. Using the structure of Sen’s capabilities for functioning, a 
Capability for Voice is constituted by both an opportunity and a process 
dimension. In the opportunity dimension, individual agency, or the developed 
ablenesses of the individual, must be united to social agency, or the institutional 
mechanisms of workplace democracy. In the process dimension, people define in 
situ the criteria for decision-making over collective choices, which include the 
degree of control workers have over decision-making, the range of issue over 
which they exercise control, and the organisational level at which control is 
exercised. Many contemporary organisations seek to realise elements of a 
Capability for Voice in order to secure employee commitment to pre-determined 
organisational goals, but I argue that a full Capability for Voice is not given by 
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such programmes. In the end, a full Capability for Voice depends upon changing 
the governance arrangements of mediating institutions in the direction of co-
ownership (mutuals, employee ownership and cooperatives), so that the 
Capability for Voice is no longer in the gift of management, but is an entitlement 
due to those members who are recognised as co-authorities in determining the 
purposes and means of the enterprise. 
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Chapter One 
Meaningful Work as a Fundamental Human Need 
1.0.0 Introduction 
 
‘Working is about the search for daily meaning as well as daily 
bread, for recognition as well as cash, for astonishment rather 
than torpor; in short, for a sort of life rather than a Monday 
through Friday sort of dying’. (Terkel, 1975: 1) 
 
‘I think most of us are looking for a calling, not a job. Most of us 
[...] have jobs that are too small for our spirit. Jobs are not big 
enough for people’. (Terkel, 1975: 14) 
The central claim of my thesis is that meaningful work is a fundamental 
human need. Since being able to experience our lives as worth living is of first 
importance, our normative concern must be to ensure that all work is structured so 
that it possesses the requisite structure for meaningfulness, and that society is 
organised to give each one of its members a plurality of options for meaningful 
work. Furthermore, to realise the regulatory ideal of meaningful work requires the 
transformation of work, not only in its organisation, but also in our conceptual 
understanding of what is work. I take work to consist of those activities in which 
we must all participate to secure the benefits of a system of social cooperation, 
including paid work, voluntary work, caring labour, and social reproduction in its 
broadest sense. This means that working is an enormously diverse condition of 
participation in joint action which exceeds the employment relation, and is 
unavoidable for persons needing to survive and to flourish.  
In chapter one, I argue that meaningful work is a fundamental human need 
because it satisfies our inescapable interests in being able to experience the 
constitutive values of autonomy, freedom, and social recognition. In so doing, I 
distinguish my approach from liberal political theorists, for whom meaningful 
work, whilst an important ideal, is an individual preference which may or may not 
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be expressed in any particular conception of the good life, and thus cannot be a 
legitimate target of state intervention without coming into conflict with the 
principle of liberal neutrality. Instead, I propose that meaningful work is a 
fundamental human need within a liberal perfectionist framework, where 
institutional guarantees for meaningful work are guided by two principles – the 
principle of egalitarian meaning and a threshold of sufficient meaning (see 
Chapter Seven). I evaluate the conceptual content of meaningfulness using Wolf’s 
(2010) concept of a bipartite value of meaningfulness, arguing that, in order to 
experience our lives as meaningful, we require certain capabilities for objective 
valuing and affective attachment, supported by the recognition of our equal status 
as co-authorities in the realm of value. This means that being able to experience 
meaningfulness depends upon our becoming valuers, situated in enabling social 
structures which allow us to engage with others in interpretive meaning-making. I 
conclude by proposing that an ethic of care provides the standard against which 
we can evaluate how well we are doing in relation to the commitments which 
constitute the meaning content of our lives.  
2.0.0 Meaningfulness in Work: Preference or Need? 
I claim that meaningfulness is a fundamental human need which liberal 
political theorists have subordinated to their commitment to the principle of liberal 
neutrality. As a result, our need for work which is non-alienated, non-dominated 
and dignified has been relegated to the status of an individual taste or preference, 
which it is no business of the state to promote. This, I suggest, is normatively 
inadequate when the centrality of work in modern societies makes it increasingly 
difficult for individuals to remedy non-meaningful work in other action contexts. 
2.1.0 The Argument for Meaningful Work as a Preference 
Meaningful work, liberal political theorists complain, is an immodest 
ideal, because, by making work central to the possibility of a meaningful life, 
individual preferences for meaning in other action contexts, such as the family, 
community or political life, are crowded out. Moreover, since meaningful work is 
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constituted by substantive normative commitments to what it is to live a good life, 
variously including values such as autonomy (Schwartz, 1982), expressive 
freedom (Marx, 1844), complex activities (Rawls, 1999 [1971]; Elster, 1986a), or 
self-respect (Honneth, 1995), then it arbitrarily specifies the content of the good 
life for all. As a result, the substantive normative content of meaningful work 
violates the liberal principle of neutrality, which maintains that a liberal 
democratic state must remain neutral between different conceptions of living. 
Since people possess a diversity of subjective preferences for the kind of work 
they wish to undertake, then the state has no legitimate part to play in saying 
whether or not that work should be meaningful (Arneson, 1987).  
The liberal neutralist is concerned that to legislate for the character of 
work means that one kind of good will be prioritised over other equally valuable 
goods. If the state were to privilege meaningful work, then the range of values 
which people might incorporate into their conception of living would be 
narrowed. So, even though the importance of meaningful work for living a good 
life must be acknowledged, meaningful work must be restricted to the status of an 
individual preference (Kymlicka, 2002; Miller, 1999; Christman, 2002). To do 
otherwise is to support state sponsored perfectionism which promotes one 
conception of living, constraining options for finding meaning in other activities. 
In arguing against both a strong and a weak right to meaningful work, Arneson 
(1987) says: ‘implementing a right to meaningful work elevates one particular 
category of good, intrinsic job satisfaction, and arbitrarily privileges that good and 
those people who favour it over other equally desirable goods and equally wise 
fans of those other goods’ (ibid: 524-5). For Arneson, meaningful work is a 
perfectionist ideal which ‘assumes objective knowledge of the good life for 
human beings, the activities that constitute human flourishing’ (ibid: 520). Rawls 
(1999 [1971]) acknowledges the value of meaningful work (ibid: 463-4) from the 
point of view of human flourishing and autonomy (it is one of the human goods), 
but does not make meaningful work a primary good because to do so would result 
in the good of meaningful work being prioritised over equally valuable human 
goods. For Rawls, meaningful work is crucial to justice as fairness, because work 
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with the requisite structure supports the self-respect of citizens, but it need not be 
part of the good for everyone - and to make it so is to advocate perfectionism 
which breaches the priority of liberty. Since to legislate for the interior content of 
work would require interference in the available range of values which society 
allows to be constitutive of the good life, a liberal democratic state ought not to 
have an interest in the normative content of work, except to ensure that work 
meets basic humane standards, such as health and safety, employment rights, or 
welfare support for the unlucky, and to ensure that society is organised to secure 
justice in the equality of opportunity for the available supply of meaningful work. 
Where equality of opportunity pertains, we do not require guarantees for the 
interior content of work because the market will sort out individual preferences 
for meaningful or non-meaningful work (cf. Nozick, 1974). Thus, provided 
individuals are able to satisfy their preferences for meaning in other spheres of 
living, we need have no further concerns for the normative content of the work 
they choose to do.  
2.2.0 The Compensation Argument 
But constructing meaningful work as an individual preference which can be 
satisfied in the market does not entirely eliminate the intuition that liberal political 
theory ought to have something more to say about the interior content of work. 
We are uncomfortable concurring with Henry Ford’s conclusion that ‘to some 
types of mind [...] the ideal job is one where the creative instinct need not be 
expressed’ (Breen, 2011: 9). Surely preferences for some kinds of work over 
others do not extend to the desire to do work where no expressive human faculty 
need be exercised? I argue instead that it is incumbent upon a liberal democratic 
state to take seriously the moral concern that the interior content of much 
contemporary work stunts the human flourishing of workers by failing to meet 
their fundamental human interests in autonomy, freedom and social recognition. 
As I shall show, the empirical evidence, as well as our everyday experience of the 
work we do together, directs our attention to how non-meaningful work visits 
extensive harms upon those who have to do it, which for most people cannot be 
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offset by compensations in other spheres of action. If this is the case, then liberal 
complacency with respect to the availability and distribution of meaningful work 
becomes difficult to maintain. After all, despite the remarkable growth in varieties 
of work, as well as persisting expectations that work should be attractive or 
meaningful, work often fails to provide even a basic standard of living, let alone 
meets minimal standards for a humane and dignified experience of working. A 
common response to these concerns is some variant of the Compensation 
Argument: that work does not have to be meaningful, provided we can find our 
lives as a whole to be meaningful because of our activities in other spheres of 
living, such as our status in a community of interest (see Gomberg, 2007). Whilst 
I admit this to be a possibility, I argue that, in contemporary societies, such a 
strategy is extremely difficult for most individuals to pursue, because of the ways 
in which the burdens and benefits of the work we do shapes our lives as a whole. 
Work provides access to the roles, practices and social institutions of society 
which allocate resources for the development of the capabilities necessary to 
secure our social position and economic participation over the life course. 
Furthermore, such social structures embody the values we can potentially 
incorporate into our practical identities, grounding the sense that our lives have 
meaning (Roessler, 2012; cf. Korsegaard, 2009). This means that, in no small 
way, the work we do determines ‘the distribution of lives’ (Walzer, 1994). Indeed, 
to such an extent that, when our work lacks the requisite content in a system 
which restricts the supply of meaningful work, then we are less likely to develop 
the human capabilities necessary for equal participation over the life course, with 
the result that our lives as a whole are less likely to be structured for 
meaningfulness. 
I argue that the Compensation Argument fails to address three kinds of 
concerns arising from a social organisation of work which generates a scarcity of 
meaningful work: firstly, the injustice of an unfair distribution of the most 
attractive work; secondly, harms to the capability formation necessary for equal 
participation in making one’s contribution; and thirdly, the diminishing of human 
well-being.  
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Firstly, the injustice of an unfair distribution of attractive work - all 
societies provide forms of meaningful work, but it has been meaningful work for 
the few and not for the many: Lane (1991) comments that it is the ‘privileged 
class’ for whom work offers ‘self-direction, substantive complexity and challenge, 
variety, little supervision, and intrinsic satisfaction of excellence or self-
determination’ (ibid: 302). But liberal political theory has had little to say on the 
subject of elite expropriation of the most ‘attractive work’ (Fourier, 1983), nor has 
remedying the harms of non-meaningful work been central to theories of liberal 
egalitarian justice – and particularly of how social structures operate to shape an 
individual’s search for meaning by enabling or disabling his capabilities for 
experiencing meaningfulness. Schooler (2007) theorises that one way in which 
social structure directly affects psychological functioning is through occupational 
conditions, where she defines social structure as ‘the patterned interrelationships 
upon a set of individual and organisational statuses, as defined by the nature of 
their interacting roles’ (ibid: 371). Schooler concludes that being able to undertake 
complex work, that is, work requiring self-direction, thought and judgement, 
depends upon where the job is located in the social structure of society (ibid: 375). 
This means that, because it unfairly allocates and unnecessarily constrains the 
kind of work which is most likely to enable individuals to satisfy their 
fundamental human interests in exercising thought and judgement, the way in 
which society arranges the work of social cooperation is unjust. Given the 
importance of the nature of work for the development of human capabilities, then 
justice requires that all work ought to be organised to allow each person to 
experience beings and doings which foster vital human capacities for thinking and 
feeling. 
Secondly, the harms of non-meaningful work to the capability formation 
necessary to secure equal participation over the life course - such harms are not 
mere inconveniences to be remedied elsewhere, since, from poorly developed 
human capabilities to physical, mental and psychological deterioration, they affect 
the flourishing of an individual in every dimension of her life (Kohn & Schooler, 
1983). Drawing upon Kohn & Schooler, Schwartz (1982) argues that the 
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prevailing structure of work is degrading because it fails to provide for the 
exercise of autonomy which is vital to moral personhood (Schwartz, 1982: 636). 
Lack of autonomy whilst at work affects a person’s ability to lead an autonomous 
life as a whole, because the lack of autonomy at work cannot be made up for by 
full autonomy elsewhere: ‘When persons work for considerable lengths of time at 
jobs that involve mainly mechanical activity, they tend to be made less capable of 
and less interested in rationally framing, pursuing and adjusting their own plans 
during the rest of their time’ (Schwartz, 1982: 637). Autonomy is not simply 
having the capability to form one’s own plans and purposes - it is also being able 
to exercise those capacities throughout all aspects of one’s life. Schwartz (ibid) 
argues that action contexts cannot be artificially separated, and we cannot assume 
that if a person is able to practice autonomy in one sphere, then it does not matter 
if a person is deprived of autonomy in another. Kohn & Schooler (1978; 1983.) 
find that the structure of work affects the development of abilities to sustain 
thought and exercise judgement, and that the loss of these abilities carries over 
into the rest of the person’s life so that those who undertake challenging and 
creative market work also demonstrate a preference for leisure work with similar 
characteristics. Kornhauser (1965) in his study of factory workers in Detroit found 
that: ‘factory employment, especially in routine production tasks, does give 
evidence of extinguishing workers’ ambition, initiative, and purposeful direction 
toward life goals’ (ibid: 252). Specifically, the harms of non-meaningful work 
undermine an individual’s ability to participate in the work of social cooperation 
over a lifetime by: stunting the development of her capabilities for free and 
autonomous action; undermining her sense of self-esteem and self-worth, of her 
standing relative to others; and thwarting her sense of efficacy, of being able to act 
with others upon the world. Together, these harms to capabilities, status, and 
efficacy reduce a person’s ability to build the practical identity necessary to 
securing a sense that her life has meaning (cf. Korsegaard, 2009). Thus, work with 
the right content for avoiding harm is an essential experience for those living in 
contemporary societies who have an interest in the development of their human 
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capabilities, the securing of their social status, and their sense of being able to act 
with others – which is all people. 
Thirdly, the diminishing of human well-being - the psychology of work 
literature provides compelling empirical evidence that being involved in 
‘satisfying work’ is fundamental for psychological well-being ‘across various 
domains of human functioning’ (Blustein, 2008). Kohn and Schooler (1983; 
1978), in their studies of how occupational conditions affect cognitive and 
psychological functioning in a 1970s longitudinal research of male workers in the 
US, present evidence for the pervasive impact of the interior content of work upon 
an individual’s sense of competence and self-respect: ‘Hence, doing substantially 
complex work tends to increase one’s respect for one’s own capacities, one’s 
valuation of self-direction, one’s intellectuality (even in leisure-time pursuits), and 
one’s sense that the problems one encounters are manageable’ (ibid: 304). Kohn 
& Schooler (1983) looked at occupational self-direction in terms of substantial 
complexity, closeness of supervision, and routinisation, of which substantive 
complexity was the core concept. They define substantively complex work as 
‘work that, in its very substance, requires thought and independent judgement’ 
(ibid: 106), and identify a positive link between the substantive complexity of 
work and intellectual flexibility. They observed that job conditions shape 
personality (ibid: 47): jobs differing in complexity and self-direction were 
occupied by people with differing levels of cognitive functioning, but over time 
the nature of the job led to changes in the intellectual flexibility of job holders. 
Kohn & Schooler (1983) conclude: ‘The structural imperatives of the job – 
particularly those conditions that facilitate or restrict the exercise of self-direction 
in work – affect workers’ values, orientations to the self and society, and cognitive 
functioning primarily through a direct process of learning from the job and 
generalising what has been learned to other realms of life’ (ibid: 62-6, 126; see 
also Kornhauser, 1964). The Kohn-Shooler hypothesis receives strong 
confirmation from a 1978 study of Polish workers (Kohn & Slomczynski, 1990), 
and a Japanese study of employed males (Naoi & Schooler, 1985). More recently, 
Hauser & Roan’s (2007) evaluation of the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study shows 
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there are moderate, but significant, effects of work complexity upon abstract 
reasoning abilities in midlife. Moreover, Kornhauser (1965) identifies how the 
mental health of workers deteriorated ‘as we move from skilled, responsible, 
varied types of work to jobs lower in those respects’ (ibid: 75-76). Physical as 
well as mental health is affected by the interior content of work: for example, the 
Whitehall I and II studies showed that lack of control in the work environment, 
indicated by low job status, was associated with an increase in heart disease 
amongst government office workers (Bosma et al, 1997). Importantly, Bosma et al 
find that the objective state of low job control, independent of subjective reporting 
of the experience of low job control, had a deleterious impact upon health. They 
conclude that the harmful effects of disease could be ameliorated by increasing 
task variety and providing enriched opportunities for having a voice in decision-
making
1
.  
I conclude that the accumulated evidence from the empirical research 
supports my view that work affects the shape of a life, making the harms 
experienced at work difficult to remedy elsewhere: ‘When persons work for 
considerable lengths of time at jobs that involve mainly mechanical activity, they 
tend to be made less capable of and less interested in rationally framing, pursuing 
and adjusting their own plans during the rest of their time’ (Schwartz, 1982: 637). 
Taken together, evidence for the harms of non-meaningful work compels us to re-
consider the claims of liberal theory - that the promotion of meaningful work is 
not state business, because it violates liberal neutrality. Of course, such research 
does not allow us to claim that a particularly forthright, reflective and capable 
individual doing non-meaningful work cannot find their lives to be meaningful 
because of their activities in other action contexts. But, if the present organisation 
of work unjustly distributes, and constrains the supply of, meaningful work, 
resulting in distorted capabilities and diminished well-being, then having to do 
non-meaningful work does present formidable barriers to most people being able 
to do so. In sum, the Compensation Argument fails because, firstly, our 
                                                                
1
 See Council of Civil Service Unions/Cabinet Office (2004), ‘Work, Stress and Health: The 
Whitehall II Study’, London: Public and Commercial Services Union. 
Ruth Yeoman                                        Meaningful Work and Workplace Democracy 
 
Page 37 
 
experiences in work shapes the capabilities, status and identities which structure 
our lives as a whole and, secondly, the course of our life is influenced by the 
associations we belong to, and the social and economic positions we occupy 
(Young, 1990). Work is demanding, time consuming and, in complex societies, 
often requires skills to be developed over many years of training. Being able to do 
work with the requisite content structures an individual’s life as whole, but the 
supply of meaningful work is restricted. This means that a just society should seek 
to make available to everyone work which secures the opportunity to develop 
important human capabilities, and to be able to do something worthwhile in 
mutually respectful relations with others.  
 
2.2.0 The Need for Meaningfulness Argument 
 
I argue that institutional guarantees for meaningful work are justified by a 
fundamental human need for meaning, which, given the centrality of work in 
modern society, depends in important ways upon work possessing the requisite 
interior content, given by the value of meaningfulness. Frankl (1978; 1988) claims 
that the search for meaning, or the ‘will to meaning’, is a universal human 
motivation which addresses a fundamental need for a sense that one’s life is worth 
living (see also Maddi, 1971). He says that the need for meaning is satisfied by 
active engagement with ordinary human living: ‘Life ultimately means taking the 
responsibility to find the right answer to its problems and to fulfil the tasks which 
it constantly sets for each individual’ (Frankl, 1984: 98). In a similar vein: 
meaning is ‘the ontological significance of life; making sense of life situations, 
deriving purpose in existence’ (Martsoff & Mickey, 1998: 294). Frankl 
acknowledges that there is a givenness to everyday problems, which appears to 
undermine our personal autonomy, but this does not mean that we are not 
choosers, since it is incumbent upon us to take responsibility for resolving the 
struggles of everyday living, demanding that we make reflective judgements when 
choosing the modes of acting and being appropriate to the situations in which we 
find ourselves. However, the necessity for an individual to choose how she 
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responds to everyday situations does not imply that she bears all the responsibility 
for finding her life to be meaningful, since the Kohn-Schooler research shows us 
how social structures can enable or disable capabilities, status and efficacy, 
thereby determining the resources which society makes available to any particular 
individual in her search for meaning.  
Our need for meaning is confirmed by a number of difference sources. 
From the psychological literature, Baumeister (1991) identifies four needs for 
meaning: a sense of purpose; a sense of efficacy; being able to view oneself as 
having positive value or being morally justified; and a sense of positive self-
worth. Blustein (2006) identifies three fundamental needs for survival, self-
determination and relatedness, consistent with the harms of non-meaningful work 
already discussed: stunted capabilities, damaged self-worth, and an inhibited sense 
of efficacy in acting with others upon the world and in forming a practical 
identity. From moral philosophy, Wolf (2010) suggests that meaningfulness may 
be ‘felt to answer to a certain kind of human need’ (Wolf, 2010: 26), where we 
experience the need for meaningfulness as urgent and inescapable, because it 
addresses vital human interests which are necessary for human flourishing:  
 
‘Our interest in being able to see our lives as worthwhile from 
some point of view external to ourselves, and our interest in being 
able to see ourselves as part of an at least notional community 
that can understand us and that to some degree shares our point of 
view, then, seems to me to be pervasive if not universal. By 
engaging in projects of independent value, by protecting, 
preserving, creating, and realizing value the source of which lies 
outside of ourselves, we can satisfy these interests. Indeed, it is 
hard to see how we could satisfy them in any other way’ (ibid: 31, 
emphasis added). 
 
I argue that individuals who undertake non-meaningful work are less 
likely to be able to satisfy their need for meaning, and are made unacceptably 
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vulnerable to the harms of non-meaningful work. Remedying such harms 
demands a politics of meaningfulness, enabled by collective deliberation over the 
ways in which the interior content of work can be structured to alleviate 
heteronomy, unfreedom, and misrecognition. Holbrook (1977) describes the need 
for meaning as a ‘primary human need’ which he claims has been insufficiently 
recognised in political deliberation. According to Holbrook, reductionist 
philosophies have recast men and women into the roles of social functionaries in 
which our human worth has degraded into the value our roles and status positions 
have within the formal economy. Holbrook suggests that the frustrated will to 
meaning manifests itself in dysfunctions such as compulsive consumerism: ‘If we 
reduce men to their functions, both in their life and the predominant philosophy of 
their existence, they are doomed [...] For man reduced to functional man, there is 
no possibility of finding any meaning in his life (ibid: 183). Holbrook goes on to 
propose that the fundamental question for politics is: ‘what opportunities do 
societies provide for the satisfaction of the human need for meaning, and how 
should societies be organised in order to provide those opportunities?’ (ibid.). 
Workers are not motivated purely by external goods - they act also out of a 
fundamental need for living a human kind of life, which goes beyond the 
necessity for survival. In the absence of a functioning politics of meaningfulness, 
workers will seek some outlet for their frustrated will to meaning. For example, 
denied the experience of autonomy, workers will invent simulations of autonomy 
in the form of games, or even make deliberate mistakes, which Burawoy (1979) 
describes as the art of ‘making out’. Amongst numerous testimonies to such 
practices, is that of the worker who said: ‘Yes, I want my signature on ‘em too. 
Sometimes, out of pure meanness, when I make something, I put a little dent in it. 
I like to do something to make it really unique. Hit it with a hammer. I 
deliberately fuck it up to see if it’ll get by, just so I can say I did it’ (Mike 
Levevre, Steelworker, in Terkel, 1975: 22). In a liberal democratic society, the 
expressive need for self-determination must take the form of a politics of 
meaningfulness, which seeks to ensure that people are not prevented from 
experiencing their lives as meaningful because of the work they do. 
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2.2.1 A Fundamental Human Need 
 
My claim is that meaningfulness is a fundamental human need because it 
identifies and satisfies what is of profound importance for living a human kind of 
life: ‘human needs are the things that must be if human life is to be’ (Reader, 
2005: 135). Thomson (2005) defines a fundamental need as: 
 
‘a non-derivative […] inescapable necessary condition in order 
for the person A not to undergo serious harm’ (Thomson, 2005: 
175). 
  
A fundamental need directs us to what constitutes the normative outlines 
of a person’s life: ‘A person’s needs have a bearing on how he ought to live, but 
drives have no such relevance’ (Thomson, 1987: 14). A person is harmed when 
their fundamental needs remain unmet because, in such circumstances, they are 
‘deprived of activities and experiences that answer such interests’ (Thomson, 
2005: 177). Thomson (1987) argues that a fundamental need addresses vital 
interests that are characteristic of a person’s essential nature: vital interests are 
reasons which lie behind our ‘non-instrumental desires’ (ibid: 64), where an 
interest ‘defines the range and type of activities and experiences that partly 
constitute a meaningful, worthwhile life, and it defines the nature of their worth’ 
(ibid: 76). This means that harm is not be understand just in terms of thwarted 
desire satisfaction; instead, harm arises when the unavoidable interests a person 
has in her life being a certain way are ignored or misrecognised, independent of 
whether or not her desires have been met. Interests may be unfulfilled even when 
desires are satisfied, because people adapt their expectations to the constraints of 
their circumstances (Elster, 1983): ‘the poor who have never had money are 
deprived and harmed, even though their standard of living has never actually 
fallen’ (Thomson, 1987: 26). This is because a continuing, unchanging, low 
quality of living, whilst it may keep life going, damages a person’s potential to 
lead a life of human flourishing. Wolf (2010) suggests that the value of 
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meaningfulness addresses several important human interests: an aspiration to 
objectivity or being connected to something larger than ourselves; a need for self-
esteem or being able to judge ourselves and our projects as worthwhile; a sense of 
belonging or a wish not to be alone; and existential security (ibid: 28). Our self-
esteem depends upon being able to assess ourselves and our situation from an 
external point of view, and then being able to judge our lives as ‘good and 
valuable’ against the standards generated by that exterior standpoint (ibid.) which 
then becomes a ‘rightful source of pride’ (ibid.). Meaningful work is a 
fundamental human need in this sense because it addresses our inescapable 
interest in living a life of human quality, which includes activities structured by 
autonomy as non-alienation, freedom as non-domination, and social recognition as 
dignified work. And in modern societies, such inescapable interests are satisfied 
or thwarted in the work we do together in a system of social cooperation. 
Thus, fundamental human needs are not simply what are required 
(negatively) if harm is to be avoided, but are necessities (positively) for a 
flourishing life. Furthermore, the fundamental needs which we attribute to a 
person depend on what we understand to be their value as human beings. Reader 
(2005) defines entrenched needs as needs which are determined by relatively 
unchangeable facts of nature, facts which generate a need for work of a certain 
kind. She argues that what we understand by need is grounded in what we 
understand the human being to be: for example, in the same way that food is not 
simply what keep human physiology going, work is not simply what provides 
necessities for continuing to exist. If the human being is merely biological then 
work can be provided in any way which simply sustains life: it will not matter if 
the work is of poor quality. If, however, the human being is essentially free, 
rational and social, then this generates a demand that he is treated with respect in 
relation to work, which, given the kind of creature he is, requires that the work he 
does possesses the requisite interior content for autonomy as non-alienation, 
freedom as non-domination, and social recognition as dignified relations to others.  
I conclude that meaningful work is an ‘inescapably valuable’ (Thomson, 
2005: 84) fundamental human need, because it answers our unavoidable interests 
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in work being structured by autonomy, freedom, and social recognition. Thus, to 
argue for the political importance of meaningful work is to make the claim that 
each individual ought to be treated as a certain kind of being, one possessing 
dignity and worth. This means that, in contemporary societies, the centrality of 
work for securing a life of human flourishing makes evaluating how work inhibits 
the development of capabilities, status and efficacy a political priority. If we 
accept this claim, then meaningful work is not a mere preference in the market, 
but is a regulatory ideal, requiring societies to pay attention to how work meets 
the fundamental human needs of its members, by ensuring that the interior content 
of work has the requisite structure for meaningfulness. Therefore, I propose that a 
meaningful work standard is realised by the adoption of two principles as societal 
goals – the principle of egalitarian meaning and a threshold of sufficient meaning 
- where the principle of egalitarian meaning is met when each person’s 
contribution to the work of social cooperation has the requisite structure for 
meaningfulness up to a threshold level of sufficiency (see Chapter Seven).  
 
2.2.2 Liberal Perfectionism and a Politics of Meaningfulness 
 
Adopting institutional guarantees for the content of work breaks with 
liberal neutrality, but this does not entail that the state is entitled to impose a 
perfectionist ideal of work upon its members. Rather, several writers have 
identified that it is possible for a meaningful work ideal to operate within a 
framework of liberal perfectionism (Roessler, 2011; Keat, 2006, 2009b; Hsieh, 
2008; Muirhead, 2004), which Dzur (1998) describes as ‘an effort to escape the 
shortcomings of the predominant liberal conception of the state as neutral in 
matters of life-choices without falling into the overreaching perfectionism of 
neoconservative writings’ (ibid: 668; cf. Raz, 1986; cf. Sher, 1997). In a liberal 
perfectionist framework, meaningful work is an open-ended ideal containing an 
extensive range of values, allowing for the development of a diversity of 
capability formations and practical identities. Moreover, although a liberal 
perfectionist framework for meaningful work will ‘reject the role of state agents in 
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channelling a person into a particular life’ it will allow ‘the ‘mild illiberality’ of 
preventing the degradation or truncation of capabilities’ (Dzur, 1998: 678). 
However, the protection of capabilities does not prevent there being a very wide 
range of activities, embodying a plurality of values - although excluding those 
which are likely to result in capability deformation of self or others. 
Consequently, institutional guarantees for meaningful work will permit many 
worthwhile activities containing a plurality of attractive values, thereby making 
available a wide diversity of individual interpretations of meaningfulness.  
Since people can continue to pursue a broad range of options for living, 
with the added security of capability protection, then liberal concerns that 
institutional guarantees for meaningful work will limit those options are 
overstated. Instead, setting meaningful work within a liberal perfectionist 
framework ensures that no person’s efforts will be rendered futile by finding 
themselves in work which is structured by heteronomy, unfreedom, and 
misrecognition. But the concerns of liberal neutralists may not be so easy to set 
aside, because any kind of perfectionism runs the risk of compromising our 
autonomy. Dzur (1998) addresses these anxieties by making the legitimacy of a 
liberal perfectionist framework dependent upon a general capability for collective 
self-determination in forming the values embodied within the framework of acting 
and being. By allowing for deliberative engagement in the interpretation of what 
values add to the meaningfulness of an individual life, the form that meaningful 
work might take for any individual remains available for amendment, ensuring 
that individuals are not coerced into taking work which is subjectively 
unappealing or objectively valueless. Instead, deliberation provides, not only for 
the interpretation and multiplication of values, but also for engagement with 
others over the values which add to the meaning content of a life, disagreeing with 
them, being challenged and challenging in return. Through deliberative 
engagement over values, people develop and exercise the political mode of being, 
opening up possibilities for personal and social change, in the process finding that 
being able to express the political mode of being can add, in-itself, to the meaning 
content of a life.  
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Of course, simply securing institutional guarantees for the availability of 
meaningful work for all does not ensure that all individuals will experience their 
work as meaningful: ‘no one can make a success of another person’s life’ (Raz, 
1996: 8). Hurka (1993) calls this the problem of asymmetry where ‘governments 
can provide necessary but not sufficient conditions for the realization of good 
lives’ (Dzur, 1998: 677). In defending perfectionism, Hurka (1993) says that 
seeking the fulfilment of one’s human potential requires the deliberate 
engagement of one’s own self in projects and persons: it ‘involves doing things, 
forming goals and realizing them in the world. And each person’s doing must be 
largely her own, reflecting her energy and commitment’ (ibid: 64). But although 
the individual herself must engage actively with meaning possibilities, 
governments can ensure that social structures do not inhibit the individual’s search 
for meaning, and that they contain values conducive to meaning attribution. In 
sum, liberal perfectionism legitimised by a deliberative framework requires: 
firstly, an active orientation of the self towards the values embodied in substantive 
ideals, ensuring that values are not simply received, but interpreted, made, 
accepted or rejected, supported by secondly, state action to ensure that social 
structures enable people to develop the capabilities and acquire the status for 
becoming co-authorities in the creation and maintenance of positive values.  
 
3.0.0 The Value of Meaningfulness 
We might argue that, in the absence of God, or some transcendental 
standpoint, the individual search for meaning in life is nonsensical (Nagel, 1971; 
Hare, 1972), and our lingering need for meaning simply ‘a kind of hangover 
produced by overindulgence in the potent brew of metaphysics’ (Kekes, 1986: 
79). Whilst acknowledging that we can no longer rely upon a transcendental 
standpoint to satisfy our need for meaning, I argue, with Frankl (2004), Kekes 
(1986) and Wolf (2007), that this does not entail having to dispense with all 
possibility of being able to attribute meaning to our lives. Wolf (2007) says that 
‘an appropriate response to our status as specks in a vast universe is a concern and 
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aspiration to have one’s life wrapped up with projects of positive value’ (ibid: 19-
20; see also Metz, 2001; Wong, 2008). Frankl (2004) says that the search for 
meaning is satisfied by the ordinary, everyday experiences towards which we 
adopt positive and active orientations: ‘The perception of meaning boils down to 
becoming aware of a possibility against the background of reality, or, more 
simply, becoming aware of what can be done about a given situation’ (ibid: 84). 
This means that meaningfulness, if such exists, must be sought in the mundane 
realities of our human lives, in our acting and being together in the messy 
everyday of human experience: ‘Our lives have such meaning as we give to them. 
Meaning is made, not received or found; it is a human contribution to the world’ 
(Kekes, 1986: 75). Even though meaningfulness is not given, but must, instead, be 
patched together from our experiences of living together, this does not force us to 
conclude that the value of meaningfulness is either illusory or cannot be 
described. Nor is the search for meaningfulness a purely personal affair for which 
we have no collective responsibility, because we have already seen how social 
structures can inhibit or support meaning-making capabilities, rendering us more 
or less vulnerable to the harms of non-meaningful work, and unfairly distributing 
the available range of positive values. Despite the loss of a transcendental 
standpoint, I conclude that the search for meaningfulness remains a legitimate 
personal and social objective, where a politics of meaningfulness acts to ensure 
that all work has the requisite structure for meaningfulness (Levy, 2005)
2
. 
 
3.1.0 Structuring the Value of Meaningfulness 
 
 Because work with the structure for meaningfulness shapes our lives as a 
whole, an individual seeking to find her life meaningful will be concerned to 
ensure that work contributes to ‘the meaningfulness of her life, in virtue of the 
way it furthers her life story’, rather than simply ‘the sum total of good things in 
life’ (Kauppinen, 2008: 2). I show that activities with the structure for 
                                                                
2
 Recent work by Alfes et al (2010) shows that ‘the two most important drivers of [employee] 
engagement are meaningfulness of work and employee voice’ (ibid: 36).  
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meaningfulness combine objective valuing with subjective attachment in actions 
which promote what is good for the objects of our actions, whether a person, an 
animal, an institution, or a practice. In Wolf’s work on the value of 
meaningfulness, meaningfulness has an overarching structure, given by what has 
independent value beyond its value to the individual (Wolf, 2010; see also Wolf, 
1982; 1997a; 1997b; 2002; 2007). Wolf (2010) says: 
 
‘Our interest in living a meaningful life is not an interest in a life 
feeling a certain way, but rather an interest that it be a certain 
way, specifically, that it be one that can be appropriately 
appreciated, admired, or valued by others; that it be a life that 
contributes to or realizes or connects in some positive way with 
independent value’ (Wolf, 2010: 32). 
 
Wolf describes a bipartite value of meaningfulness which unites objective 
valuation with subjective satisfaction: ‘meaning arises when subjective attraction 
meets objective attractiveness’ (ibid: 9), where the experience of meaningfulness 
is more likely to occur when a person becomes actively connected to a worthy 
object, or something or someone of value, such that they are ‘gripped, excited, 
involved by it’ (Wolf, 1997, 2002, 2009; see also Starkey, 2006). She 
distinguishes the bipartite value of meaningfulness from morality (duty) or 
happiness (feelings of goodness), where meaningfulness is ‘a category of value 
that is not reducible to happiness or morality, and that is realized by loving objects 
worthy of love and engaging with them in a positive way’ (Wolf, 2010: 13). Wolf 
argues that a bipartite value for meaningfulness is necessary because the 
morality/self-interest distinction fails to describe all that is normatively significant 
about our actions and our relations. In particular, the morality/self-interest 
distinction is unable to account for the special ties we feel towards our ‘ground 
projects’ – projects which help us to answer the question ‘what reasons do we 
have for living?’ (Wolf, 2010: 56). Williams (1981) refers to ground projects as 
‘closely related to [one’s] existence and [...] to a significant degree give meaning 
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to [one’s] life’ (ibid: 12; see also Smart & Williams, 1983). The special 
significance for meaningfulness of ground projects comes from how they organise 
our values and frame our practical identities. Having ground projects provides us 
with the material for the narrative formation of our lives, directing us to the 
responsibilities we have to act appropriately towards the objects for the sake of 
which such projects exist. Thus, meaningfulness does not come from the 
aggregation of individual goods, but from long-lasting, appropriate orientations 
towards particular objects, such as persons, animals, or activities, where 
orientations are appropriate when they point us towards the responsibilities we 
have to further the good for those objects. 
But how ground projects add to the meaning content of a life is not given 
automatically by the values embodied in any particular project. Although a project 
may be acknowledged by all, including the one whose life is structured by the 
project, as valuable, this does not mean that the individual doing the project will 
have an affective sense of that project being meaningful. Objectively, there are 
‘many different kinds of lives that are good, many different activities and 
relationships that are valuable and can contribute to a life that is worth living’ 
(Keat, 2009b: 360), but, subjectively, there is ‘variability with respect to what is 
good for the different subjects’ (ibid.). Consequently, finding meaning in ground 
projects requires the exercise of ‘subjective judgement’ (Hicks & King, 2009: 
643), involving ‘a confirmatory search for information suggesting that one’s life is 
meaningful’ (ibid: 644). The search for information is the search for validation, 
for affirmation of one’s judgements, out of which we construct the objective value 
of our doings and beings. Wolf’s bipartite value of meaningfulness integrates the 
objective and subjective dimensions when affective feelings of attachment, 
satisfaction or fulfilment are united to an assessment of the worthiness of the 
object at which the feelings aim. This implies that in order to find our activities to 
be meaningful, then what we subjectively feel to be meaningful must be joined to 
considerations of what is of independent value: ‘A meaningful life is a life that a.) 
the subject finds fulfilling, and b.) contributes to or connects positively with 
something the value of which has its source outside the subject’ (ibid: 20). Wolf 
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argues that a purely subjective view of meaningfulness as the pursuit of feelings 
of fulfilment fails to address our intuitions concerning the meaningfulness of 
objects and activities. She illustrates her argument with Taylor’s (1970) adaption 
of  the figure of Sisyphus, condemned to stone rolling, but who is given a drug to 
change him into someone who enjoys the activity of stone rolling (Wolf, 2010: 
17). The reason Wolf gives for the continued meaninglessness of Sisyphus’ life is 
that his efforts are objectively futile and their futility cannot be redeemed simply 
because they have become subjectively satisfying (see also Joske, 1974). In 
Wolf’s bipartite view, the life of ‘Sisyphus Fulfilled’ cannot be meaningful 
without the objective dimension of being involved in activities which have 
independent value in a ‘source outside of oneself’ (Wolf, 2010: 19).  
Thus, subjective satisfactions contribute to a life of meaning when they 
arise from engagements with worthy objects: ‘what is valuable is that in one’s life 
we actively (and lovingly) engage in projects that give rise to this feeling, when 
the projects in question can be seen to have a certain kind of objective value’ 
(ibid: 27). Sisyphus fulfilled fails to meet the objective condition of the value of 
meaningfulness, but I suggest that the full explanation for the continued 
meaninglessness of Sisyphus’s activities lies, not just in the structure of the action, 
but in the appropriateness of the action for the kind of creature Sisyphus is. Even 
though Sisyphus is now subjectively satisfied, the pointlessness of the task makes 
it unworthy of a creature who is capable of more complex and meaningful feats, 
and to whom violence had to be done in order to make him into the kind of 
creature who would experience such work as fulfilling. It is disrespectful of our 
status as human beings if the meaning of our valued activities or ground projects 
is reduced to manipulated feelings of satisfaction. This suggests that fulfilment 
which is worth experiencing must contain ‘a cognitive component that requires 
seeing the source or object of fulfilment as being, in some independent way, good 
or worthwhile’ (Wolf, 2010: 24). Some actions are inappropriate for a creature 
whose fundamental needs are not to be met in any way whatsoever, but in a 
manner consistent with the kind of creature he is, that is, one who has a 
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fundamental human need to express free, autonomous acts directed towards 
worthy objects in respectful association with others. 
 
3.2.0 Worthy Objects in the Objective Dimension 
Whilst the bipartite value of meaningfulness provides us with the means to 
identify which activities have the structure for meaningfulness, it does not tell us 
how these activities translate into the actual experience of meaningfulness for any 
particular individual. I argue that to experience meaningfulness, we need to 
become valuers, able to recognise what has objective worth, and to affectively 
appropriate objective values to our lives. When we become valuers, we provide 
ourselves with the opportunity to become ‘appropriately related to what has 
worth’ (Wolf, 2010: 179) by developing the capabilities for objective valuation 
and subjective attachment, through which we learn to appreciate what objects 
have value, and to generate the relevant orientations towards those objects. I argue 
that the relevant orientations are those which motivate the right actions consistent 
with the nature of the object, for example, unconditional love when parenting a 
child or respectful care when looking after an aged relative. In addition, becoming 
a valuer must be incorporated into our practical identities, where we see ourselves 
as having the status as co-authorities entitled to make judgements upon the 
worthiness of objects, and to decide upon how to act towards those objects 
appropriately. But, developing the capabilities and practical identity necessary for 
becoming a valuer depends upon our being able to engage in activities which 
connect us to things that matter: ‘connecting with something of worth in a way 
that enables the direct appreciation of the value of one’s activity’ (ibid: 189). This 
is because, by investing their objects with meaning and positive values, and 
educating our capacities for judging and feeling, these connections are 
intrinsically valuable: ‘we flourish through (meritorious) activity such as 
parenting and music making, because these activities involve an appreciation of 
things that matter, things with worth’ (ibid: 179). In the following sections, I 
explore two possible avenues for learning to become valuers through encounters 
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with worthy objects – when activities contain purposes, or when they are 
structured as projects. 
 
3.2.1 Purposes 
A life of meaning is a life with a purpose: ‘A life has point when it is oriented 
toward goals which transcend the limits of the individual, goals which are more 
valuable than the subjective concerns of any one person’ (Levy, 2005: 178). But 
the life of a person does not reduce to her goals or purposes: ‘It is degrading for a 
man to be regarded as merely serving a purpose’ (Baier, 1957: 120). Besides, not 
all purposes are equally worthwhile - some goals are trivial, reprehensible or even 
wicked. Furthermore, a life defined by its goals is vulnerable to devaluation, as a 
consequence either of failure, or of over-achievement. For example, Wiggins’s 
(1998) farmer, trapped in a cycle of endless achievement in which the farmer buys 
land to grow corn to feed pigs, illustrates the pointlessness of the repetitious 
recreation of the same goal without resolution, unconnected to a wider structure of 
value. But, even though ‘lives do not acquire meaning just in case they achieve 
goals’ (Levy, 2005: 178), goals can add to the meaning content of a life. This is so 
even where the activities concerned lack intrinsic merit, as is the case with many 
kinds of hard work (Walzer, 1983), since those engaged in dirty, hard or menial 
work are not unjustified in claiming meaning for those activities when their ends 
benefit society; for example, cleaning sewers is vital for public health. In case 
study research of several workplaces from banks to retail, Doherty (2009) found 
that work interpreted from ‘the outside’ as unskilled, poor quality work, was often 
seen by workers themselves as invested in complex social interactions and 
meaning: ‘The job I’m doing now (customer service) is mostly pluses because I 
like dealing with people and I like arguing! I love the job I’m doing now 
(Deirdre)’ (ibid: 92). Thus, when sufficient political space is given to interpretive 
sense-making then even purposes judged as less worthwhile by society can 
acquire valuable meaning for those doing them – and I argue that when these 
judgements are brought into public deliberation through democratic practices, 
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they have the potential to reframe society’s valuation of the worthiness of 
activities. 
Democratic deliberation can not only provide one sense in which we can 
construct the objective basis for independent value, it can also encourage affective 
engagement in the subjective dimension. Affective engagement can be fostered by 
making purposes available for disagreement and negotiation, allowing individuals 
to deploy meaning-making capabilities in interpreting, shaping and ordering the 
values and actions necessary for achieving purposes. Interacting with purpose is a 
mode of political engagement with others, requiring confidence in one’s equal 
status in relation to others, and the capabilities for objective valuing and 
subjective attachment, where the political mode of being is, in and of itself, one of 
the worthy objects rendering an activity susceptible to meaningfulness. This, I 
suggest, directs us to democratic practices at the level of the task which bring into 
public view interpretive differences over values, meanings, and purposes. We 
should be careful, however, not to conclude that, just by filtering the meaning of 
poor quality work through deliberative public evaluation, we have satisfied all 
normative concerns with respect to the content of work, since ‘boring work is 
boring work’ (Carter, 2003: 179). If the work fails to meet the threshold of 
sufficient meaning in an objective sense, then it must be reorganised to ensure that 
it contains a sufficient range of worthy objects embodying attractive values, 
structured by autonomy, freedom, and social recognition.  
In sum, activities must be ordered around objects of worth which are 
valuable independent of the purposes at which they aim, since purposes alone, 
whilst necessary, are not sufficient for securing the value of meaningfulness. To 
be susceptible to meaning appropriation, purposes must be contained within wider 
structures of value, such as the roles, practices and institutions which make up the 
fabric of a system of social cooperation, where to be a practice participant is also 
to be afforded a vantage point for deliberation with others over the value of those 
objects, accessing information about the worthiness of objects, and of assessing 
whether our actions and orientations are appropriate for the objects in question. 
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3.2.2 Projects 
A life of meaning contains projects. I argue that purposes alone are insufficient 
for realising the value of meaningfulness, and that purposes must be embedded in 
wider structures of meaning. In particular, projects are structures for organising 
purposes which enable positive values to be promoted. Wolf ascribes meaning to 
lives when they involve ‘active engagement in projects of worth’ (Wolf, 1997: 
209), where to be meaningful, active engagement must be harnessed to the 
involvement of one’s self in worthwhile activities requiring hard work, 
commitment and long term planning which also generate a special sense of feeling 
alive. The concept of practices is useful for understanding how projects of worth 
need to be structured if they are to contribute to a life of meaning where ‘projects 
are practices in which supremely valuable goods are at stake’ (Levy, 2005: 185). 
MacIntyre (1981) defines a practice as: 
 
‘any coherent and complex form of socially established 
cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that 
form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve 
those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and 
partially definitive of that form of activity, with the result that 
human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of 
the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended’ 
(MacIntyre, 1981: 175). 
MacIntyrean practices are structured activities with the following features: 
internal and external goods; internal standards of excellence; and a community of 
fellow practitioners. Internal and external practice-related goods are among those 
objects of value we may find sufficiently subjectively attractive to appropriate to 
the meaning content of our lives, where external goods are goods such as social 
status and pay, and internal goods are goods which are particular to the practice 
and can be experienced only by those who become proficient in the practice (ibid: 
176) - the satisfactions of being a nurse, for example, are not the same as those of 
being a dancer. Practitioners are subject to the standards of excellence interior to 
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the practice, which have become accepted through the accumulation of experience 
and tradition: 
‘A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to 
rules as well as the achievement of goods. To enter into a practice 
is to accept the authority of those standards and the inadequacy of 
my performance as judged by them. It is to subject my own 
attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the standards which 
currently and partially define the practice’ (ibid: 177). 
When MacIntyre’s concept of practices is allied with Wolf’s concept of 
worthwhile projects then it generates a persuasive notion of how our activities can 
be structured for meaningfulness. Wolf (1997) warns, however, against over-
emphasising structured activities as sources of meaningfulness: she suggests that 
‘projects’ with their connotations of ‘well-defined and goal-oriented tasks’ are 
somewhat misleading, and that ‘meaning comes less from the individuated 
projects than from the larger involvements of which they are parts’ (ibid: 212). 
Her point is that, whilst structured projects do add to the meaning content of a life, 
so do the relationships and commitments which constitute the ‘ongoing strands of 
life’ of which projects, understood as structured practices, are only one part (ibid). 
Besides, practices can embody elitist or exclusionary values, and act to constrain 
rather than multiply the supply of meaningful work for all: for example, practices 
involving skilled workers often incorporate masculine identity as a value, 
frequently excluding women, constraining them to practices seen as essentially 
feminine, such as care work (cf. Frazer & Lacey, 1994). Moreover, when they 
become disconnected from wider public benefit, practices are vulnerable to 
distortion: Miller (1999), for example, distinguishes between self-contained and 
purposive practices, the latter being those practices which meet a wider social 
need, and can be judged against ‘an external purpose which gives the practice its 
point’ (ibid: 117). Consequently, practices cannot be divorced from wider 
structures of meaning, making them subject to judgements of value by the 
community of valuers beyond practice participants. Nevertheless, practices are 
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important sources for realising the bipartite value of meaningfulness when they 
are: conducted within a community; regulated by internal standards of excellence; 
enable the participants to acquire worthwhile internal goods, including being able 
to develop valuable qualities of character; and if the practice as a whole connects 
to objective value through societal endorsement.  
Practices are important social opportunities for realising the bipartite value 
of meaningfulness. When we participate in practices, we open ourselves up to the 
self-development essential to becoming a valuer, because the intrinsic goal of 
‘productive crafts […] is never only to catch fish, or produce beef or milk’, but ‘to 
do so in a manner consonant with the excellences of the craft, so that there is not 
only a good product, but the craftsman is perfected through her or his activity’ 
(MacIntyre, 1981; see also Breen, 2006).  Participating in practices forms the 
capabilities for evaluation, judgement and feeling necessary for becoming a 
valuer, because practices connect us to forms of public evaluation, giving us 
private confidence as a consequence of public endorsement that our efforts aim at 
worthy objects. Roessler (2007), for example, explains that family work is under 
recognised, not because it is unpaid, but because it has been relegated to an 
invisible, private sphere. This reduces the capacity of family work to be structured 
as a practice capable of providing us with the standards, information, and presence 
of co-valuers necessary to being able to validate our assessment of the values 
involved in family work, and of judging how we are doing against them. In 
addition, thinking of carework as a public practice helps us to distinguish between 
those intimate relations which form the basis of work and those which do not. 
Thus, caring relations become family work when the carer is connected to public 
practices, such as parenting or elder care. Nussbaum (2001) provides the example 
of two sisters who love their frail elderly mother equally, but one has chosen a 
work life at some distance from her mother, whilst the other sister has chosen to 
become her mother’s main carer. The distant sister may occasionally provide 
respite, but she has delegated her caring responsibilities to the caring sister – the 
caring sister is the family worker and her care work knits her into wider social 
practices of caring. When their mother dies, the life structure of the sister who is 
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the family worker is altered in a fundamentally different manner from that of the 
distant sister, requiring her to engage in a complex renegotiation of her practical 
identity. In this case, caring as a public practice helps to identify what is 
distinctive about the work of the caring sister over that of the distant sister. We 
must be cautious, however, not to conclude that caring as a practice can describe 
all that is significant about the relationship of the caring sister to her mother, a 
relationship which is invested additionally with affective ties transcending the 
sister’s satisfaction that she is performing well against the internal standards of the 
practice of care. To understand the importance of these affective ties for the shape 
of a life, we need to evaluate the subjective dimension of the bipartite value of 
meaningfulness. 
 
3.3.0 Affective Appropriation in the Subjective Dimension 
 
Recognition of the value of worthy objects, and even active involvement 
with those worthy objects through public practices, does not guarantee that a 
person will find those objects and activities to be personally meaningful, in the 
absence of their affective incorporation into the meaning content of that person’s 
life. Practices and projects are sources of worthy objects and sites for the 
development of the relevant capabilities for meaningfulness, but, to secure the 
value of meaningfulness to their lives, a person must also experience those worthy 
objects as subjectively attractive. Realising subjective attractiveness requires that 
a person be able to incorporate worthy objects into her life, such that her life is 
shaped by the orientations and actions promoting the good for the worthy objects 
in question. But there may be occasions when, although we may recognise the 
objective value of things, we may be unable to experience them as valuable for 
our own lives. Raz (2001), for example, says that the attempt to revive the mood 
of a depressed person by pointing out to them the beauties and treasures of the 
world is unlikely to be successful: ‘Their problem is not the absence of value in 
the world but the absence of meaning in their lives’ (ibid: 19). In short, without 
affective attachment, worthy objects cannot, on their own, add to the meaning 
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content of a life: ‘Concrete attachments are good for those whose attachments 
they are; their value is within the sphere of personal meaning. The uniqueness of 
an object or pursuit established by an attachment is uniqueness to one person, not 
uniqueness impersonally judged’ (Raz, 2001: 39). This means that, for worthwhile 
activities to add to the meaning content of our lives, we need to experience them 
as subjectively attractive: ‘A housewife and mother, a doctor, or a bus driver may 
be competently doing a socially valuable job, but because she is not engaged by 
her work (or, as we are assuming, by anything else in her life), she has no 
categorical desires that give her a reason to live’ (Wolf, 1997: 211). And this 
implies limits to public practices as a source of meaningfulness because, although 
public acknowledgement of value or worthiness reinforces our affective 
engagement with values, public acknowledgement will not compensate for a 
person finding an activity insufficiently attractive. An achievement can be 
objectively and publically valued as a genuine contribution, but still be 
subjectively disvalued by the individual whose achievement it is. Arneson (2000) 
claims that the slave’s achievements are not diminished by his state of slavery – 
they can still add to the perfection of his life, although he qualifies this by adding 
‘no doubt achievement does more to enhance an agent’s life, other things being 
equal, when the agent wholeheartedly endorses the doing and properly rates its 
value’ (ibid: 57). Arneson does not find that the absence of subjective 
endorsement prevents an exceptional achievement from counting towards the 
perfection of a person’s life, but, in my application of the bipartite value of 
meaningfulness to work, it would constitute a formidable barrier to the 
meaningfulness of that person’s life.  
 
3.3.1 Appropriation and Affective Attachment 
 
I argue that for persons, objects and activities of value to be constitutive of 
the meaning content of our lives, we must make them our own through a process 
of affective appropriation. Affective appropriation in the bipartite value of 
meaningfulness implies legitimate emotional engagement with worthy objects 
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where legitimacy is given by how our emotions direct us toward what is good for 
worthy objects. As a consequence of affective appropriation, we acknowledge 
them as ours because of the particular place they have within our lives which 
gives us reasons to regard our life as worth living; but we also acknowledge them 
as ours because their objective value confirms that we are right to give them such 
prominence in our lives: 
 
‘The personal meaning of objects, causes and pursuits depends 
upon their impersonal value, and is conditional upon it. But things 
of value have to be appropriated by us to endow our lives with 
meaning, meaning which is a precondition for life being either a 
success or a failure’ (Raz, 2001: 20). 
Drawing on Raz’s identification of the need for appropriation of ‘things of 
value’, I understand appropriation not in the pejorative sense of exploitation, but 
as an active orientation of one’s self to the particular value of worthy objects, 
requiring a form of emotional engagement which does not seek to secure in 
ourselves a satisfying state of mind, but seeks instead what is good for worthy 
objects. Consequently, not just any kind of emotional state will do for meaning 
appropriation - some emotions directed at worthy objects are not legitimate if they 
lead to abuse, or simply misrecognition of what constitutes the good for the 
object. I argue therefore that we need an account of emotional engagement which 
describes the kind of affective appropriation of worthy objects capable of 
fostering the correct orientations towards the objects in question. Nussbaum 
(2001) characterises emotions as ‘forms of judgement’ (ibid: 22) which, in their 
intensity and particularity, are ‘acknowledgements of neediness and lack of self-
sufficiency’ (ibid.). Because they are directed at objects (goals, projects, persons) 
constituting our vital interests in our conception of the good life, such emotions 
indicate where we are vulnerable to reversion, loss or harm: ‘The emotional 
importance of the projects that one values is revealed in the whole complex array 
of feelings to which one becomes vulnerable by virtue of one’s engagement with 
them’ (Scheffler, 2006: 254; see also Reader, 2007). Our sense of meaning, our 
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place in the world, is dependent upon the flourishing of the worthy objects we 
have appropriated to the meaning content of our lives, where the type and 
intensity of our emotions indicate the relative importance of various objects, and 
how they structure our lives as a whole. Nussbaum specifies the normative 
dimensions of the relevant emotions in relation to their objects which explains 
also the nature of our vulnerability: firstly, our emotions have an object (and in the 
value of meaningfulness, it is a worthy object); secondly, the kind of emotion 
which it is appropriate for us to experience is ‘internal’ to the object (Nussbaum, 
2001: 27), that is, the nature of the object, in addition to the place it occupies in 
our lives, specifies the correct emotional orientation; thirdly, our beliefs about the 
object generate types of emotions, for example, the anger we experience if a loved 
one is threatened (ibid: 29); and fourthly, the kind and intensity of our emotions 
signals the value of the object, they are ‘concerned with value, they see their 
object as invested with value or importance’ (ibid: 30). Thus, our emotions alert 
us to what is important in our lives, in their intensity and persistence they indicate 
the shape of our lives, and direct us to how the judgements we make are legitimate 
when they are structured by what is good for the worthy objects to which we are 
affectively engaged. 
But our emotions do not simply happen to us, rendering us out of control 
and unable to exercise choice of freedom (cf. Wallace, 1993). Instead, emotions 
are susceptible to change in the light of new evaluations and judgements, 
potentially leading to reassessments of the worthiness of objects: ‘Transformation 
in feeling for oneself is a transformation in judgements about the self’ (Gilligan, 
1982). Developed emotions are person-specific, as well as object-appropriate; that 
is, they are constituted by the place the object has in the life of the person whose 
emotions they are, as well as by the nature of the object: ‘they insist on the real 
importance of their object, but they also embody the person’s own commitment to 
the object as a part of her scheme of ends’ (Nussbaum, 2001: 33). They are 
eudaimonistic (ibid: 31) because they are concerned with both the person’s, and 
the object’s, flourishing, and they specify the appropriate actions we should take 
towards worthy objects, such as deciding, making, preserving, caring and 
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restoring (cf. Spelman, 2003). This means that emotions which enable legitimate 
affective appropriation of worthy objects are ‘merited emotions’ (Kauppinen, 
2008), that is, they are emotions which are structured by the recognition that the 
objective worthiness of the object merits our emotional engagement with the 
object (Kauppinen, 2008). In addition, they are merited because they reflect 
legitimate attachments; for example, unmerited emotions include feelings of 
attachment which keep us in destructive personal relationships, or foster 
misplaced loyalty to dysfunctional practices or institutions. ‘Merited emotions’ 
help us to forgo personal welfare maximisation: they support our recognition that 
our vulnerability to loss or harm of worthy objects is alleviated if we act to fulfil 
our responsibilities of care towards these objects, even if such actions are not 
maximally beneficial to ourselves. In sum, emotional engagement enables 
legitimate affective appropriation of worthy objects in two ways: firstly, when the 
objects are worthy of our emotional engagement, and secondly, when our 
emotions direct our attention and actions towards what is good for worthy objects. 
 
3.4.0 Equal Co-Authorities in the Realm of Value 
 
In my account of the bipartite value of meaningfulness, I argue that being 
able to experience meaningfulness depends not only upon our becoming valuers, 
able to exercise the capabilities for objective valuing and affective attachment, but 
also upon our equal status as co-authorities in the realm of value. This is because 
to be involved in the creation of new meanings which enable us to generate new 
possibilities for world-building, we need to experience ourselves to be worthy of 
the entitlement to speak and be heard, where participating in world-making is 
necessary for experiencing our lives as worthwhile: ‘human beings denied the 
opportunity to exercise their world-building capacities live an impoverished life, a 
life that is somehow less human, a life without freedom, without happiness’ 
(Honig, 1993: 112). Christiano (2005) proposes that the fundamentally relevant 
feature of the person which grounds the principle of egalitarian justice is ‘their 
authority in the realm of value’ (ibid: 49) and it is in virtue of each person’s status 
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as authorities that we give each person their due (ibid.). Potentially, all persons 
possess the capabilities for objective valuing and subjective attachment, including 
being able to appreciate, to engage with, and to produce values. This means that 
being a valuer applies to all persons with no distinctions which are relevant to a 
theory of justice: 
 
‘The humanity of a person is that person’s capacity to recognise, 
appreciate, engage with, harmonise with, and produce intrinsic 
goods. It is in virtue of this feature of human beings that they 
bring something unique and distinctive to the world [...] Humans 
do not merely cause these things to come about, as say a river 
causes the condition of life to come about; they bring about these 
things self-consciously and through their own activity because 
they appreciate them’ (ibid: 47-48). 
 
But, although developing one’s human potential contributes to an activity 
being meaningful, simply realising one’s capacities is not the same as having a 
sense of one’s life being worth living, since ‘a slave might be forced to do 
theoretical physics and to do it surprisingly well’ (Arneson, 2000: 44). For 
meaningfulness, we must also find the project to be subjectively attractive, as well 
as judged objectively worthwhile against the values we have incorporated into our 
practical identities – and we maintain a sense of meaning by continuing to care 
about what we are doing in relation to worthy objects. And it is in the interlocking 
of the objective and subjective dimensions of the bipartite value of 
meaningfulness that we ensure a meaningful activity is not only recognised as 
objectively valuable and subjectively engaging, but is experienced as such by the 
individual whose activity it is: ‘meaning consists of engagement in an activity that 
is not only subjectively engaging, but that is also subjectively experienced as 
being meaningful’ (Kekes, 1986:  97). This requires a ‘fittingness between certain 
kinds of activities and the potential for fulfilment’ which Wolf calls Fitting 
Fulfilment (Wolf, 1997: 216-7; see also Muirhead, 2004). Fitting fulfilment arises 
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when there is a match between activities with the requisite structure for capability 
formation and the individual’s own valuations of which activities and capability 
formations are worth pursuing. I argue that fitting fulfilment is more likely to be 
realised when we become valuers: that is, when we develop the capabilities 
relevant to realising the bipartite value of meaningfulness, given by the 
capabilities for objective valuing and subjective attachment, and where we possess 
a sense of our worthiness to be valuers. In sum, we need both the capabilities for 
meaningfulness and a sense of our status as co-authorities to give us confidence 
that we are entitled to engage with others in the co-creation of values; this means 
that we must be situated in social contexts which affirm our equal status as co-
authorities, and support our development of the ‘human capacity for building, 
preserving, and caring for a world that can survive us and remain a place fit to live 
in for those who come after us’ (Arendt, 1977 [1954], 95).  
 
4.0.0 Ethic of Care: Fulfilling Our Responsibilities Towards 
Worthy Objects 
 
But subjective attachment, even to worthy objects, is not enough - we must 
also be able to understand how we are doing in relation to promoting the good for 
worthy objects. Being responsive to and engaging with the particular value of 
worthy objects does not mean that we can have any kind of orientation we want 
towards them, just in case such orientations generate strong affective attachments. 
What is required also is that our appropriation of worthy objects to the meaning 
content of our lives gives rise to legitimate involvement, where I understand 
legitimate involvement to imply that we promote the good for the worthy objects, 
in other words, that we have a care for how well they are doing. I propose that we 
judge the good for worthy objects against an ethic of care, which implies, 
furthermore, that if they are to contribute to the meaningfulness of our lives, our 
relations to objects of value must orientate us beyond how worthy objects add to 
our own welfare, because meaningfulness depends upon, not only the fitting 
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together of the dimensions of subjectivity and objectivity, but also being ‘able to 
do something about it or with it’ (Wolf, 2010: 25): 
 
‘One must be able to be in some sort of relationship with the 
valuable object of one’s attention – to create it, protect it, promote 
it, honor it, or more generally to actively affirm it in some way or 
other’ (ibid: 9). 
One source of active relations to worthy objects is the numerous social roles 
which make up the work of social cooperation. But being able to take up the 
values inherent in social roles depends upon our accepting the relevant 
responsibilities, where consenting to take on responsibilities for worthy objects 
often requires us to expend discretionary, as well as remunerated, time and effort. 
Schumacher (1979) blames the introduction of modern technology into the 
technical division of labour for creating work without dignity which is ‘utterly 
uninteresting and meaningless’ (ibid: 27), resulting in a stunted personality, a 
corruption of human relations, and fostering ‘a spirit of irresponsibility’ (ibid: 28). 
Schumacher is critical of the social complexity which absorbs so much personal 
time and effort: ‘modern industrial society is immensely complicated, immensely 
involved, making immense claims on man’s time and attention’ (ibid: 24-5). But I 
disagree that the complexity of society dissociates people from a sense of 
responsibility, and therefore from a potential source of personal meaning. Every 
day, people willingly take up responsibilities in the work they do: 
 
‘Despite the many centrifugal forces of modern societies, despite 
their materialism and inequalities, despite the currency of 
ideological or self-serving notions of freedom and autonomy – 
despite all this it is striking that most of us not only depend upon 
one another but act in ways that allow others to depend on us. Most 
people take on extensive and demanding responsibilities, and – to 
their great moral credit – many of them act responsibly, often 
across all the roles they play. They thereby sustain a fabric of 
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relationships and institutions that [...] channels immense energies 
toward meeting one another’s needs and wants’ (Williams, 2008: 
19-20). 
 
Each day (and night), cleaners, call centre operatives, labourers and carers 
clean, make calls, and care for the sick and elderly – and they do not take up these 
responsibilities simply because they are paid to do so, but because they want to do 
good work. Indeed, many seek to extend their roles, excavating meanings from 
their work, meanings which motivate them to expend discretionary effort in order 
to meet the needs of fellow human beings. It is, of course, possible for people to 
train, to take up responsibility and to engage in complex, cooperative activities 
without those activities having the relevant structure for meaningfulness, but this 
is to instrumentalise persons with no regard for their fundamental need for 
meaning. One of the injustices of the modern organisation of work is the way in 
which organisations aim to increase worker’s responsibilities, without a 
commensurate increase in control over the resources and decision-making 
necessary to fulfil their responsibilities (Pot & Koningsveld, 2009). In many 
cases, work is organised to extract discretionary effort from workers to the benefit 
of organisations, without addressing normative concerns for asymmetrical power 
relations which may require changing the basis of decision-making. 
Being able to take responsibility requires ‘a context for agency based in 
relationships, developed and borne out intersubjectively or in conjunction with 
others’ (Borgerson, 2007: 479), where taking responsibility requires ‘an active 
willingness’ (ibid: 498) to take up the relevant activities for fulfilling 
responsibilities. I argue that unforced adoption of responsibilities implies that we 
also take up activities of care, where care is ‘an ability and a willingness to ‘see’ 
and to ‘hear’ needs, and to take responsibility for these needs being met’ 
(Sevenhuijsen, 1998: 83). Being able to fulfil our responsibilities is closely tied to 
our membership of practices and institutions, and the social roles we inhabit. 
Sciaraffa (2011) describes how our normative connection to our social roles 
means that we acquire also duties, which have the potential to contribute to a life 
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of meaning and purpose: ‘an agent can come to have a weighty and important 
justificatory reason for conforming to the duties of a role by virtue of identifying 
with the role’ (ibid: 2; see also Raz, 1989). For Sciaraffa, identification with the 
social roles we occupy gives us compelling normative reasons to meet the 
requirements of the attendant duties (ibid: 109). Identification with a role includes 
identification with the ‘comprehensive goals’ implied by the objectives, tasks and 
duties of the role: ‘If this comprehensive goal is rational, then she realises the 
fundamental goods of meaning and self-determination through generally 
conforming to her role’s duties’ (ibid: 110). This entails both a subjective and an 
objective dimension where, in order to enjoy the meaning goods contained within 
the role, the agent must experience an affective attachment to the values implied 
by the role and understand the independent value of the role: ‘realising a 
meaningful life requires not only that one perceives that one’s life is organised 
around a valuable point, but also that this point is actually valuable’ (ibid: 115).  
Thus, active relations are caring relations, which aim at fulfilling our obligations 
towards worthy objects. And discharging our responsibilities requires a 
‘proneness’ (Wolf, 2010: 33), or a readiness to have our actions guided by reasons 
of love, which ensures that we are ‘acting in a way that positively engages with a 
worthy object of love [...] even if it does not maximally promote either the agent’s 
welfare or the good of the world, impartially assessed’ (ibid.). Becoming 
susceptible to reasons of love means putting ourselves into an active relationship 
with objects of value, where we develop the capabilities for recognising what is of 
value and for acting appropriately towards worthy objects.  
I suggest that recognising value, and acting appropriately toward something 
of value, implies fulfilling responsibilities of care for worthy objects, and that the 
ability to evaluate how we are doing in relation to worthy objects is supplied by 
an ethics of care. An ethic of care provides the standard for evaluating how well 
we are doing in our actions and in orientations towards the worthy objects we 
have appropriated to the meaning content of our lives, where an ethic of care is 
concerned with ‘the compelling moral salience of attending to and meeting the 
needs of the particular others for whom we take responsibility’ (Held, 2006: 10). 
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In addition, an ethics of care recognises both relationships and responsibility 
(Borgerson, 2007), where taking up our responsibilities of caring for worthy 
objects may include having to acknowledge that our relations to worthy objects 
are not entirely chosen: ‘we may be given responsibility, assigned it, inherit it and 
then accept or refuse it’ (Card, 1996: 29). Furthermore, adopting the standards set 
by practices of care demands that we pay attention to how caring for worthy 
objects points us beyond ourselves to what is required to secure the good of the 
object in question, including, dialogue with others over what constitutes good 
care, including defining with those others what the relevant needs are, where 
needs interpretation is a fundamentally political undertaking (cf. Fraser, 1989). 
Thus, in the bipartite value of meaningfulness, fulfilling our responsibilities 
towards worthy objects means having a care for those objects, that is, acting 
towards them with the correct orientations for promoting and protecting their 
welfare. Affective appropriation of worthy objects in the subjective dimension is 
legitimate when it is consistent with what promotes the good of worthy objects, 
where our understanding of the good arises from our own and others’ judgement 
as to how we are doing with respect to caring for those objects.  
Fisher & Tronto (1990) define taking care as including ‘everything that we 
do to maintain, continue and repair our world, so that we can live in it as well as 
possible’ (ibid: 40). They identify four dimensions of care which imply four 
values in an ethic of care: caring about (attentiveness), caring for (responsibility), 
taking care of (competence), and care receiving (responsiveness) (Fisher & 
Tronto, 1990). Held (2006) distinguishes an ethics of care from an ethics of 
justice in what is morally relevant for ‘attending to and meeting the needs of the 
particular others for whom we take responsibility’ (ibid: 10). She rejects abstract 
reasoning as the only way to understand what morality requires, and proposes that 
practical reasoning, informed by attentiveness, trust, responsiveness to need, 
narrative sensitivity and cultivating caring relations, directs us to what is required 
for satisfying obligations (ibid: 15). For Held, care is both a value and a practice. 
Care is a value because it has critical purchase in enabling us to ‘pick out a more 
specific value to be found in persons’ and societies’ characteristics than merely 
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finding them good or bad, or morally admirable or not, on the whole’ (ibid: 38). 
And it is ‘probably the most fundamental value’ because ‘there can be care 
without justice’ (ibid: 17) - and without care there would be no people or other 
worthy objects which can be subject to principles of justice. Care is a practice 
because it involves ‘the work of care-giving and the standards by which the 
practices of care can be evaluated’ (ibid: 36). Held (2006) points out that activities 
can be performed without adhering to the values relevant to the practice: ‘An 
activity must be purposive to count as work or labor, but it need not incorporate 
any values, even efficiency, in the doing of it. Chopping at a tree, however 
clumsily, to fell it, could be work’ (ibid: 37). But Ruddick (1998: 4) suggests that 
caring practices can become a vantage point from which to evaluate a much wider 
range of human relations and social practices: ‘The ethics also extends beyond the 
activities from which it arises, generating a stance (or standpoint) toward ‘nature’, 
human relationships and social institutions’ (ibid: ).  
Work which incorporates positive values of care is meaningful work. And 
when work is done with care, then it can be evaluated against an ethic of care by 
asking what constitutes caring in relation to the particular worthy objects at which 
the actions aim. And this, I suggest, is a profoundly political question, because it 
involves disagreement, contestation and deliberation over what is meant by good 
care. Sennett (2008) evokes an ethic of care in his revival of the craft ideal when 
he says that when we engage with things we must learn to ‘care about the qualities 
of cloth, the right way to poach fish; fine cloth or food cooked well enables to 
imagine larger categories of ‘good’’(ibid: 8). Weeks (1998) argues for ‘intimate 
citizenship’ such that caring forms part of our status as citizens, where the 
recognition of the human need for intimacy and belonging form part of practices 
of care in each person’s everyday life. Caring relations produce people and 
reproduce societies, and practices of care are potentially transformative, rather 
than repetitive reproductions: ‘care has the capacity to shape new persons with 
every more advanced understandings of culture and society and morality and ever 
more advanced abilities to live well and cooperatively with others’ (Held, 2006: 
32). This demands an ethico-political understanding of care as the basis for 
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deliberating over the values and standards necessary to the work we do together, 
requiring the practice of ‘democratic caring’ (Sevenhuijsen, 2000: 22) in which all 
citizens have access to the spheres of social life, and the structures of belonging, 
necessary for them to be able to make their contribution to the work of social 
cooperation and to participate in the interpretation of values inherent to the work 
they do. Tronto (2010), for example, argues that ‘creating caring institutions’ 
(Tronto, 2010) is an unavoidably political process requiring us to evaluate power 
relations, ensuring that care remains both particular to the worthy objects in 
question and pluralist in the range of caring values, and that ‘care  has a clear, 
legitimate purpose’ (ibid: 162). To enable us to orientate ourselves to the needs of 
worthy objects, caring institutions must provide public space for needs-
interpretation, a ‘rhetorical space’ (Code, 1995) or a ‘political space’ (Walker, 
1998), in which each person can engage with values, finding them worthy or 
unworthy, attractive or unattractive, as they seek to satisfy the human need for 
meaningfulness. In this way, a politics of meaningfulness, grounded in an ethic of 
care, has the capacity to enable us to evaluate the extent to which social structures 
support our ability to fulful our responsibilities towards worthy objects by 
developing the relevant capabilities for objective valuing and subjective 
attachment.  
 
5.0.0 Conclusion 
 
In opposition to the liberal neutralist position that meaningful work is a 
preference in the market, I have argued that meaningful work is a fundamental 
human need, because it addresses inescapable human interests in freedom, 
autonomy and social recognition. Thus, meaningful work ought to be subject to 
institutional guarantees, ensuring that all persons can experience their work as 
meaningful up to a level of sufficiency. I base this claim upon the centrality of 
work in contemporary societies, and the empirical evidence of the harms done by 
non-meaningful work to persons in all areas of their lives. In order to avoid such 
harms, work must possess the requisite structure for meaningfulness, which I 
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propose is given by Wolf’s (2010) bipartite value of meaningfulness where the 
dimension of objective worthiness is united to the dimension of subjective 
attractiveness. I suggest that work can be made susceptible to the bipartite value 
of meaningfulness if it contains worthy objects in the form of practices in the 
objective dimension, and affective attachment in the subjective dimension. An 
ethic of care provides us with the standard for evaluating the correctness of our 
orientations towards worthy objects, and for understanding the inescapably 
intersubjective nature of the activities we do to fulfil our responsibilities. But 
accounts of meaningful work in liberal political theory marginalise the 
constitutive value of our inter-relations; in addition, critical social theory is 
sceptical of the possibility of work containing worthy objects sufficient for 
realising the meaningfulness of work. However, I argue in Chapter Two that 
critical social theory and liberal political theory can provide resources for 
developing a positive critical conception of meaningful work. 
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Chapter Two 
Meaningful Work in Critical Social Theory and Liberal Political 
Theory: Worthy Objects and Intersubjective Relations 
 
1.0.0 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I draw upon Wolf’s (2010) bipartite value of 
meaningfulness to construct a positive critical conception of work in which work 
has the requisite structure for meaningfulness when it contains subjectively 
attractive worthy objects, organised to realise the values of autonomy, freedom, 
and social recognition. I evaluate theoretical treatments of work in feminist 
theory, critical social theory, and liberal political theory in order to develop a 
positive critical conception of meaningful work. Firstly, I suggest that the feminist 
challenge to the standard economic conception of work provides resources for re-
imaging what work is within a positive critical conception of work. Secondly, I 
evaluate approaches to the experience of work from critical social theory and 
liberal political theory, arguing that each fails to offer a full account of one or 
other dimension of the bipartite value of meaningfulness. Critical social theory is 
characterised by scepticism in the objective dimension of the bipartite value of 
meaningfulness. The complaint of critical social theorists is that the contemporary 
organisation of work strips out worthy objects from the interior content of work, 
thereby undermining stable subjective formations which would sustain a sense of 
one’s life having purpose and value. Liberal political theory is characterised by 
incompleteness in the subjective dimension of the bipartite value of 
meaningfulness. Liberal political theorists have tended to import uncritically into 
their approaches the standard economic conception of work, in which work is a 
preference or disutility to be evaluated in terms of paid employment and market 
efficiency. The individual is treated as sovereign, and the intersubjective relations 
which constitute much of the work we do together are marginalised. Finally, I 
argue that a positive critical conception of work is able to retrieve worthy objects 
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and intersubjective relations when work is organised to allow workers to exercise 
the political mode of being. 
 
2.0.0 A Positive Critical Conception of Meaningful Work 
 
Throughout this chapter, I construe meaningful work as a positive critical 
conception of work which enables a normative inquiry into how the interior 
content of work adds to or detracts from the meaningfulness of our lives. Smith 
(2009) puts the motivation for a normative inquiry into work as follows: ‘the 
moral significance of work lies, to put it bluntly, in the contribution it makes 
(when not distorted) to a meaningful, fulfilled, dignified human life’ (ibid: 49). 
Cooke (2004) says that ‘critical social theory is a mode of reflection that looks 
critically at processes of social development from the point of view of the 
obstacles they pose for human flourishing’ (ibid: 418), and Fraser (1985) suggests 
that Marx’s 1843 definition of critical theory as ‘the self-clarification of the 
struggles and wishes of the age’ has not been bettered in its implicit call to 
political action. I claim that fostering work capable of contributing to a 
meaningful life is an ethico-political project, where the aim is to secure the value 
of meaningfulness by ensuring that the interior structure of work is given by 
worthy objects united to subjective attachments. Smith (2009: 47-53) identifies 
the features of a critical conception of work as follows: it defines  a ‘standard‘ by 
which it is possible to distinguish between different kinds of work; it possesses 
‘normative content‘ (Honneth, 1995) which enables critical evaluation; it has 
empirical validity as a fact about the world; and it indicates the direction of social 
and individual emancipation: ‘[...] the social reality of the norm must be manifest 
in a potential for the ‘transcendence‘ of actual work which is nevertheless 
immanent to work‘ (Smith, 2009: 47). A positive critical conception of 
meaningful work operates within a liberal perfectionist framework by providing 
an enriched and pluralised source of values we can appropriate to the meaning 
content of our lives, but bounded by deliberative agreement over what constitutes 
an independent value. This is not an unattainable ideal, but draws upon what we 
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already know about how people value and draw meaning from the work they do 
together.  
 
3.0.0 The Standard Economic Conception of Work 
  The standard economic conception of work is one of consumption rather 
than production, where work is ‘the sacrifice that makes the purchase of 
commodities possible’ (Lane, 1992: 48). In standard economics, work is 
understood positively as the maximum level of wages which a worker can 
exchange for their labour, and negatively as a disutility which workers will prefer 
to trade for leisure. But such assumptions shackle us to an understanding of work 
as paid employment, that is, as market work which is carried out in the formal 
economy: ‘the category of work generally continues to remain underdetermined 
and committed to the production paradigm’ (Gurtler, 2005: 124). Work in the 
production paradigm takes workers to be rationally self-interested individuals, and 
assumes that the social product issues from measurable economic activity: 
‘Economics conceives of social wealth only in the form of increasing GNP 
because it continues to hold to a representation of society as a mere collection of 
individuals’ (Meda, 1996: 640). Consequently, forms of human development 
which take place in other action contexts, such as the family and civic society, are 
ignored: ‘economics sees no value in an individual’s development towards a goal 
other than exchange, or in any form of ‘enrichment’ of society which has a truly 
collective (as opposed to aggregative) dimension or is measurable in terms other 
than those of ‘production’’ (Meda, 1996: 639). 
3.1.0 Neglecting the Interior Content of Work 
In the standard economic concept of work, once we have satisfied the 
requirements of justice for equality of participation in open competition for paid 
employment and desirable work, what goes on inside the experience of work is of 
little philosophical interest. In Nozick (1974), for example, market efficiency 
mediates the supply of meaningful work which is created by employers when they 
divide work into more satisfying segments, create work teams, and employ task 
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rotation (ibid: 248). Meaningful work will then become more or less available 
according to whether the organisation of work used to generate meaningful work 
promotes productive efficiency. If productivity rises, then owners will reorganise 
to make work meaningful; if productivity stays the same, then worker preferences 
for meaningful work will generate competition for labour, thereby forcing owners 
to reorganise work. There are no normative considerations in these two cases 
because market efficiency will determine sufficient availability of meaningful 
work to satisfy expressed preferences. The only case where normative 
considerations arise is when the reorganisation of work results in reduced 
efficiency, giving owners no incentive to create meaningful work. If the market 
fails to satisfy workers’ preferences for meaningful work, then normative 
considerations may direct us to compensatory mechanisms, such as: workers 
being able to trade off pay for more meaningful work; customers being prepared 
to bear the extra costs; or state prohibition of non-meaningful work (Nozick, 
1974: 247-9). But since the market will sort out preferences for meaningful work, 
supported by some compensatory mechanisms in cases of market failure, political 
theorists need have no further concerns for the interior content of work (Schwartz, 
1982: 635)
3
. 
 
4.0.0 The Feminist Challenge 
 
I argue that re-valuing work through deliberative evaluation is essential to 
pluralising the positive values in a liberal perfectionist framework. The standard 
                                                                
3
 The standard economic conception of work is susceptible to both negative and positive meanings 
of work. In public discourse and policy making there is by no means total indifference to the 
quality of the work that people do. The most important international standard for the quality of 
work is decent work which The International Labour Organisation defines as: ‘opportunities for 
women and men to obtain decent and productive work in conditions of freedom, equity, security 
and human dignity’ (Report of the Director General, 1999). Decent work assumes that what counts 
as work is formal employment and fails to recognise other kinds of work or the fundamental 
interest that people have in work which does more than simply satisfy material needs in reasonably 
humane conditions. The concept of decent work does not provide sufficient resources for a critique 
of the way in which we organise our economic lives, whereas the more demanding concept of 
meaningful work yields greater emancipatory potential. See Bolle (2009) for an evaluation of the 
incorporation of unpaid family work into formal economic conceptions of work. 
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economic conception of work does not contain a sufficiently wide range of 
attractive values consistent with what would be required for each person to 
experience the bipartite value of meaningfulness in a liberal perfectionist 
framework. However, the standard economic conception of work has been put 
under pressure by rapid changes in the way we work, as well as proliferation of 
the kinds of work we are paid to do. These changes have shifted our 
understanding of what activities are required to reproduce society, how those 
activities are to be organised, and who is to do them, in the process expanding the 
potential range of positive values in work. Technological developments enable 
many of us to work outside formally specified boundaries of space and time; the 
domestic labour of women makes up an important element of paid employment; 
and we now allow many different kinds of unpaid, informal activities, such as care 
work, emotional labour, civic work and serious leisure, to be counted as work. But 
in the same moment we acknowledge a greater range of activities under the 
designation of work, we also reveal an entrenched hierarchy of more or less 
valuable work, where the gendered division of labour in family work is replicated 
in paid work. Thus, one vital strand of contemporary feminist theory has consisted 
of the attempt to bring to public attention an unjust social organisation of work, 
constructed upon the unpaid or low paid reproductive labour of women. 
The work of reproduction, care-giving, and needs-meeting has been 
designated necessary, but inferior, activity from Aristotle through to Marx. The 
features of reproductive activity which contribute to its devaluation, include: it is 
gendered, it is unpaid or low paid, and it takes place in an inferior sphere of 
human action, the private family (Jaggar & McBride, 1985). Feminist revaluations 
of reproductive work are grounded in a critique of the now familiar female/male 
or nature/culture distinctions which find their classic expression in Marx’s 
productive/reproductive labour, where male activity is opposed to female 
passivity as men work with the mind and women with matter (Meagher & Nelson, 
2004: 117). For Marx, reproduction is ‘a fundamental necessity of human life’ 
(ibid: 187), which he makes a primarily female activity. He privileges production 
with an active role in social progression because it leads to the production of new 
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needs (ibid.) and the transformation of society through labour; reproduction, 
however, is a ‘historically repetitive activity […] insusceptible to historical 
progress’ (ibid: 189). Reproduction cannot be transformed, and so cannot form the 
basis for the development of human creative potential: ‘art and industry and 
government create new human reality, while mothering merely ‘reproduces’ 
human beings, their cultures and social structures’ (Held, 1987: 115).  Nature, and 
the realm of female activity, is associated with what is instinctual, lacking in 
reason, almost sub-human: ‘in accordance with the traditional distinction between 
the family and the polis, and the assumption that what occurs in the public sphere 
of the polis is distinctively human, it is assumed that what human mothers do 
within the family belongs to the ‘natural’ rather than to the ‘distinctively human’ 
domain’ (Held, 1987: 115). The designated inferiority of needs-meeting activities 
not only marginalises the reproductive labour of women, but shapes the meaning 
of all kinds of work as a degraded sphere of human activity, in competition with 
more worthwhile modes of human action such as political deliberation or private 
contemplation, thereby reducing the range of positive values we might appropriate 
to the meaning content of a life.  
 
4.1.0 Pluralising Values in Work 
 
Feminist theory has engaged in the difficult task of attempting to re-
imagine how work might transcend a hierarchy of valuation by drawing upon 
feminism’s enlarged understanding of the variety of activities constituting the 
work we do together in a system of social cooperation. In so doing, feminism has 
alerted us to the plurality of values and meanings in work, which are potentially 
available to enrich the possibility of work being meaningful within a liberal 
perfectionist framework. Cameron & Gibson-Graham (2010) argue that feminist 
strategies for re-ordering work take one of three directions: firstly, the separate 
spheres of economic activity are retained, but the sphere of reproduction is added 
on, often leading to calls for women’s unpaid work to be given a monetary value 
(cf. Waring, 1988); secondly, the range of activities which count as work are 
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expanded, but with the consequences that women’s work, although now publicly 
recognised, occupies a subordinate status in the formal division of labour; and 
thirdly, economics itself is redefined, so that the economic landscape is conceived 
as diverse, made up of a variety of capitalist and non-capitalist enterprises, in 
which ‘multiple and unfixed economic identities can be conceived’ (Cameron & 
Gibson-Graham, 2010: 151). Re-conceiving the work of social cooperation in this 
manner allows us to perceive the ‘positive social values and self-directed 
structure’ (Brandt, 1995: 55) of invisibilised work, making such values available 
for meaning appropriation through public deliberation which aims at proliferating 
positive meanings within a liberal perfectionist framework. 
In her revaluation of activities which contribute to a system of social 
cooperation, Gurtler (2005) advances a more capacious conception of work by 
identifying work with ‘an ethical dimension having to do with the needs of others 
and the common good’ (ibid: 120), which grounds a general entitlement to being 
able to make our social contribution. She draws out a category of ‘socially 
necessary work’ which she characterises as a ‘privileged mode of human activity’ 
(ibid: 120), by bringing together three moral motives for human action: firstly, 
‘the need for self-preservation through individual effort’; secondly, ‘the desire for 
social recognition in reasonably co-operative relations with others’; and thirdly, 
‘the aspiration to be useful to others’ (ibid: 129). People share a desire to fulfil 
their ethical obligation to participate in the work of social co-operation and, as a 
matter of participatory justice, society ought to be organised so that we can 
discharge this obligation. Given the importance to us of being participating 
members of society, this implies we have a general entitlement to make our 
contribution to a system of social cooperation; that is, we have a ‘right to carry out 
their ethical obligation to partake in useful and necessary cooperation in the 
sphere of socially organised communities’ (ibid: 130).  
Jaggar & McBride (1985) argue also for a more extensive conception of 
production (ibid: 188): they claim that there is no valid reason for maintaining the 
distinction between reproductive and productive labour because procreative and 
caring activities, which are largely undertaken by women, are as susceptible to 
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creative development as productive activities: ‘procreation and nurturing should 
be theoretically conceptualised as forms of human labour and more or less fully 
realised social expressions of human creative ability’ (ibid: 195). In an attempt to 
break down distinctions between formal employment and family work, Fraser 
(1994) identifies three models of work: the Universal Worker Model, based upon 
equal participation of men and women in paid work, supported by state funded 
caregiving; the Caregiver Parity Model, based upon providing those who 
undertake carework with sufficient reward; and the Universal Caregiver Model 
(UCM), in which everyone does both paid work and carework. The UCM 
‘dismantles the gendered oppositions between working [for money] and 
caregiving’ (ibid: 61); Perrons (2000) foresees the profound consequences such a 
model implies for our conception of what work is and what it is for: ‘There is a 
wealth of evidence that suggests that neither paid nor caring work are equated 
solely with negative utility [...] caring for people can be very pleasurable. When 
for example is walking in the park or watching a football match with a young 
child, care, and when is it leisure? In practice, distinctions between work, care and 
leisure are blurred. Correspondingly the division of people’s labor and time needs 
to be spread more evenly between these activities; in other words it is time to 
round this triangle’ (ibid: 110). Thus, realising a general entitlement to making 
our contribution depends upon societal acknowledgement of a wider range of 
activities as work, and social arrangements to enable everyone to participate in the 
roles, practices and institutions through which individual contributions are 
coordinated and made productive for the common good (cf. Gomberg, 2007). 
 
4.2.0 Re-Envisioning Economics 
 
I claim that by multiplying the range of positive values in the work we do 
together, we will increase the possibility that everyone will be able to find their 
work to be meaningful. This will require individual capabilities and social 
procedures which support collective deliberative meaning-making over the 
character of work, and of the economic forms which structure our interactions. 
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One example of the effort to redefine economics can be found in the concept of 
provisioning, which consists of the daily activities required to provide the 
necessities and goods that sustain families and individuals (Neysmith & Reitsma-
Street, 2005; see also Power, 2004): ‘Women are disproportionately affected 
because the multiple types of work they do inside and outside the formal economy 
restricts their capacity to sustain themselves today and develop options for the 
future [...] An emphasis on provisioning breaks down distinctions between 
market, familial and social activities; it includes production and distribution 
activities needed for human beings to survive and flourish’ (ibid: 381). 
Provisioning challenges the study of markets in conventional economics which 
treats citizens as undifferentiated labour or job holders (ibid: 382), thereby casting 
those who are without paid employment into the category of welfare dependents, 
or rendering their work invisible as a form of social contribution: ‘the centrality of 
the market in economic thinking throws into the shadows all other dimensions of 
citizen’s lives, dimensions that affect their surface appearance as workers and the 
decisions they make about engaging or not in paid work’ (ibid.). The concept of 
provisioning attends to the way in which people negotiate time/space boundaries 
in order to fulfil the requirements of their multiple social roles: ‘Boundaries may 
extend across several households and their shape changes over time. These 
relationships are also the basis for identity, participation and citizenship, all of 
which are part of understanding people’s sense of belonging’ (ibid: 386). Thus, 
provisioning is a complex, time consuming activity requiring the provisioner to 
form networks and relationships which secure, not only the material survival of 
provisioners and their dependents, but also a sense of identity and belonging.  
Furthermore, I suggest that provisioning is an instance of value 
pluralisation because provisioning brings into public view the invisible activities 
essential to sustaining life and human flourishing, making already extant values 
available for sense-making and meaning-interpretation. But although meaning-
making can be employed to realise the emancipatory potential of work, it can also 
be expropriated for the benefit of some at the expense of others. Emotional 
labour, for example, is the production of emotional and social affects in the work 
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people do together which, under capitalism, is made available for profit and 
accumulation. Hardt describes affective labour as a dimension of immaterial 
labour (Hardt, 1999), where immaterial labour is ‘labor that produces an 
immaterial good, such as service, knowledge or communication’ (Hardt, 1999: 
94). In affective labour, ‘desiring production’ (ibid: 89) and caring labour is 
transformed into value-producing forms of production. Other dimensions of 
immaterial labour include informationalised industrial production and work 
involving symbolic-analytic tasks. In contemporary work, emotional labour has 
become a key vehicle for value creating activities in the service industries in 
particular, and is subject to a variety of organisational forms which aim to extract 
their value (see Hoschschild, 1983).  
 
‘To one degree or another, this affective labor plays a certain role 
throughout the service industries, from fast-food servers to the 
providers of financial services, embedded in the moments of 
human interaction and communication. This labor is immaterial, 
even if it is corporeal and affective, in the sense that its products 
are intangible: a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, 
excitement, passion – even a sense of connectedness or 
community’ (Hardt, 1999: 95-96).  
Although affective labour has been used as a pejorative term for the 
exploitation by capital of human capabilities for emotional engagement, there has 
been a more liberatory tone in recent discourse which seeks to identify how 
affective labour can be appropriated by workers themselves in order to give voice 
to their own perceptions of what is valuable in their work (Weeks, 2007; Garetty, 
2008). For example, Gurtek (1995) distinguishes between relational and 
rationalised forms of service work where relational service work such as caring 
for the elderly is characterised by bonds of trust and inter-dependence, and 
rationalised service work such as call centre activities is characterised by highly 
structured interaction based upon standardised rules (see also Weeks, 1998). In 
particular, the feminist identification and revaluation of emotional labour and 
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caring practices has added the distinct value of care to our repertoire of meanings 
of work which can be appropriated to the meaningfulness of work (Isserles, 2010). 
Isserles argues that every kind of work contains a dimension of care and that 
exercising the practice of care in one’s work is a strategy for overcoming the 
harmful effects of estranged and heteronomous labour. Stacey (2005), for 
example, identifies how home care workers in California are able to derive 
support for their work being meaningful from the relational and emotional content 
of the work, which contributes to a sense of pride and dignity. Such workers 
experienced a greater degree of autonomy and control over the circumstances of 
their work, because they were taking care of others in their homes rather than 
institutions. This and similar examples encourage us to think about how work 
cannot be confined to conventional assumptions of time and place, and therefore 
how a broader understanding of how, when and where work takes place has the 
potential to enrich work as a source of positive values.  
 
4.3.0 Collapsing Public/Private Distinctions 
 
In order to attend to the emancipatory possibilities in all kinds of work, I 
argue that a positive critical conception of meaningful work must conceptualise 
work as a diverse realm of activity taking place in multiple negotiated timespaces, 
thereby making available more discursive resources for individuals to appropriate 
the positive values in their activities to the meaning content of their life. This 
means that we must re-imagine the distinctions inscribing some activities as 
nonwork, and therefore of lesser value. In particular, the empirical value of the 
public/private distinction has been reduced by new working patterns, such as 
homeworking and mobile communications, which cut across conventional lines of 
male/female work, and home/work boundaries, in the process complicating 
inequalities of gender and class: ‘such divisions may merely have been supplanted 
by other means of perpetuating sex inequalities, where spatial or otherwise 
(Armstrong & Squires, 2002: 279). Instead, Gal (2002) theorises the 
public/private binary using a process of ‘fractal distinction’ (ibid: 81), where the 
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same space, through continuous recalibration signalled by different physical 
behaviours or linguistic symbols, is recast as private or public: ‘whatever the 
local, historically specific content of the dichotomy, the distinction between 
public and private can be reproduced repeatedly by projecting it onto narrower 
contexts or broader ones’ (ibid). Cal proposes that we imagine public/private 
distinctions recurring repeatedly inside the same space, and, rather than 
visualising them as boundaries carving up a territory, think of them as 
subdivisions nested inside one another according to the relations between persons 
and their social, economic and political context. People must increasingly manage 
fluid spaces and unstable boundaries (where the very concept of boundaries is in 
doubt) as they move in and out of roles, or simultaneously occupy different roles 
– and such active management is a form of discursive and symbolic work. For 
example, a conversation in the playground may be about arranging a play date for 
children, the agenda for a meeting to campaign against a school/hospital closure, 
or the exchange of business ideas. Shifting relations between persons constitute 
the playground in one moment as a public space, or in the next moment as a 
private space: ‘in their everyday lives, individuals are therefore likely to find 
themselves traversing a number of ambiguously coded spaces, few of which could 
be definitively or usefully classified as public or private’ (Coole, 2000: 349). 
Ettlinger (2003) takes a relational and microspace approach to ‘the spaces of 
interaction among people and nodes (workplaces) in networks of social 
interaction’ (ibid: 146) which enables analyses across spheres of life and by doing 
so reveals the multiplicity of work timespaces, where ‘workplaces can be situated 
in a firm, in a state-supported or governed office, in one’s home, or some ‘place’ 
in the informal economy’ (ibid: 150).  Leach (1998) documents how meanings of 
work are ‘constructed and manipulated in the context of industrial homework’ 
(ibid: 99) where ‘the separation of home and work is largely a fiction’ (ibid: 107). 
Homeworking blurs conventional space/time boundaries, leading to long working 
hours for women who have domestic responsibilities during the day, and 
homeworkers being treated as flexible labour because all their work – paid and 
unpaid – is symbolically domestic labour (ibid: 114). Thus, what work means to 
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people cannot be captured by taking the formal work-place to be the only context 
in which work happens (see England & Lawson, 2005). In order to support new 
meaning-interpretations, new imaginings for how work takes place are required – 
and I suggest that the concept of work timespaces is a potentially fruitful 
discursive resource for proliferating the range of positive values. 
 
5.0.0 Resisting Conceptual Closure by Pluralising Values 
 
Raz says: ‘meaning comes through a common history and through work’ 
(Raz, 2001: 20). Part of our common history is our meanings of work repertoire, 
from which we source the values we may accept, reject or reinterpret in order to 
form our practical identities. But this repertoire of meanings is frequently 
employed by political ideologies or managerial discourse to achieve conceptual 
closure for the purpose of maintaining the existing hierarchy of valuations. 
Meanings of work are co-opted to distinguish between different kinds of activities 
so that some work is rendered invisible, demoted to mere leisure, or simply 
designated non-work, obscuring the fact that work encompasses an enormous 
diversity of activities necessary to the reproduction of society, many of which 
evade fixed categorisation, and over which there is no final agreement. For 
example, the meaning of work as a curse informs both the economic conception of 
work as a disutility and the various ‘end of work’ theses (cf. Granter, 2009), 
whereas the meaning of work as expressive, creative self-realisation informs 
concepts of work based upon the craft ideal (Sennett, 2008). How we use our 
meanings of work repertoire reflects our underlying normative assumptions: work 
can be presented as morally neutral when it is theorised as part of an 
instrumentalised system of economic exchange (Smith, 2009: 48), or as morally 
negative when it is conceived as degrading and unfit for human beings (Spencer, 
2009b). Normatively negative meanings of work allow work to be presented as 
irretrievably compromised as a source of moral action, competing with more 
meaningful forms of human activity, such as political action. Negative 
conceptions of work prompt propositions that work must be contained because it 
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has colonised too much of human life, or eliminated because it has failed to fulfil 
its promise to be a site of human expressiveness. In contrast, positive conceptions 
of work promote strategies to broaden work to undervalued human activities, or to 
advance work as the pre-eminent site for the formation of a virtuous citizenry 
(Spencer, 2009a).  
I argue that the concept of meaningful work allows us to retrieve a positive 
critical conception of work which can be distinguished from other conceptions of 
work, such as decent work or work as an economic activity. But, although a 
positive critical conception of meaningful work supports an enriched plurality of 
positive values in a liberal perfectionist framework, being able to experience work 
as actually meaningful depends also upon the individual meaning-making 
capabilities of workers, combined with the opportunity structure made available to 
them by society. A crucial dimension of the meaning-making opportunity 
structure is the deliberative democratic practices which promote disagreement and 
struggle over the meanings of work. Moreover, the process of deliberative 
engagement with others is productive of our sense of self, forming our subjective 
attachments (or de-attachments) to the work we do together, constituting a vital 
dimension of our practical identities, and making democratic participation in itself 
one of the worthy objects. But to participate in creating differences in meaning we 
must become valuers, that is, be able to form and to exercise the two capabilities 
for objective valuing and subjective attachment, in addition to having confidence 
in our equal status as co-authorities. This requires us to recognise that deliberating 
over meanings and values is a joint undertaking with others, for which we must be 
situated in social structures, such as practices, roles and institutions, conducive to 
supporting intersubjective relations with the relevant normative characteristics. 
When structured by democratic practices, work provides a value-rich 
environment, able to foster positive inter-relations, as a consequence of 
deliberative meaning-making through joint working, which are not merely 
functional or incidental, but are constitutive of the possibility of work being able 
to contribute to the meaning content of a life.  
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I want to emphasise that meaning-making does not issue in a set of values 
independent from acts of working, which are then made available for 
appropriation; instead, meaning-making produces values which are inherent to the 
structure of action, and to how we acquire skills, competences and knowledge. For 
example, Wrzesneswski, Dutton & Debebe (2003) describe how the engaged 
intersubjective sense-making activities of workers shapes their understanding not 
only of what they do, but also the significance of what they do: ‘Employees 
actively notice, interpret and seek out cues in the course of daily interaction that 
convey evaluation and worth [...] the creation, alteration and destruction of 
meaning at work occur in concert with others on a daily basis’ (ibid: 126-7). 
Making intersubjective encounters central to the meaningfulness of work is 
essential to recognising how dimensions of shared agency and cooperation 
contribute to the objective value and subjective attraction of the work. In my 
conception of meaningful work structured by the bipartite value of 
meaningfulness, I make intersubjective relations constitutive of the meaning 
content of work, where intersubjective relations are inherent to the formation of 
capabilities for objective valuing and subjective attachment. These capabilities 
underpin our ability to develop the correct actions and orientations of care towards 
worthy objects, thus allowing us to appropriate them legitimately to the meaning 
content of our lives. I argue, however, that meaningful work is recognised only 
partially in both critical social theory and liberal political theory: the former is 
sceptical of finding any worthy objects in the contemporary experience of work, 
and the latter neglects the inescapably intersubjective nature of work. Despite 
these limitations, I suggest we can develop a positive critical conception of 
meaningful work from critical social theory by considering how worthy objects 
can be retrieved in the experience of work through the exercise of the political 
mode of being, and from political liberal theory by considering the constitutive 
importance to work of intersubjective relations with the relevant normative 
dimensions. 
 
 
Ruth Yeoman                                        Meaningful Work and Workplace Democracy 
 
Page 84 
 
6.0.0 Objective Dimension: Worthy Objects and Critical Social 
Theory 
 
I argue that critical theory is characterised by an overly pessimistic critique 
of the emancipatory potential of the interior content of work, leading to a 
conception of work from which worthy objects consistent with the value of 
meaningfulness have been eliminated, and resulting in the unnecessary 
disvaluation of work as a sphere of expressive human action. Many writers would 
agree with Meda (1996) that, when work crowds out the possibility of engaging in 
more worthwhile activities, such as political action, then we must contain work 
and reduce the amount of time people have to spend doing it (ibid: 642). The 
instrumentalism of market work has caused many critical theorists to abandon 
work as a sphere of truly human action: ‘progress has stalled since Arendt (1958) 
and Habermas (1974) turned their back on work as being incompatible with, or at 
least indifferent to, individual and political freedom, and they offered conceptions 
of work reflecting this philosophical demotion’ (Deranty, 2009: 70). 
Consequently, in critical social theory, work has lost the immanent potential for 
expressive freedom, and the status of work as the pre-eminent action context for 
social and personal emancipation - an ideal once central to social critique - has 
been demoted to, at best, a source of instrumental benefits to support spheres in 
which truly human action may still be possible.  
I suggest that such pessimism, although not unwarranted, is excessive, and 
that, by using a positive critical conception of meaningful work, we have already 
to hand resources from within critical social theory to re-evaluate the 
emancipatory potential of work. But in order to revive a positive critical 
conception of meaningful work we need to engage imaginatively with the critical 
theory tradition. To this end, I employ Arendt (1958), Habermas (1974), and 
Honneth (1995) in order to develop three themes relevant to the transformation of 
the contemporary experience of work which extend work beyond paid 
employment in the standard economic model, thus presenting us with possibilities 
for pluralising values in work, and rediscovering already present worthy objects. 
Ruth Yeoman                                        Meaningful Work and Workplace Democracy 
 
Page 85 
 
These three themes are: firstly, acting in the political mode of being is constitutive 
of the meaning content work (Arendt, 1958); secondly, the work we do cannot be 
confined to particular spheres of activity, but transgresses time/space boundaries, 
prompting us to exercise multiple rationalities beyond the purely technical 
(Habermas, 1974); and thirdly, retrieving the material dimension of 
intersubjective relations brings into public view worthy objects already present in 
the work people do together (Honneth, 1995).  
6.1.0 Arendt - Retrieving the Political Mode of Being in Work  
 
I argue that, because all work requires us to be able to respond to evolving 
situations for which there is no pre-determined solution, the experience of 
working calls forth a variety of modes of being and acting. And I draw upon 
Arendt’s (1958) distinction between labour, work and action to describe how 
acting in the political mode of being can be realised in working. Arendt identifies 
three existential categories and three conditions describing what it means to be ‘in 
the presence of other human beings’ in the world (Dietz, 2002: 103); these are: 
labour and life, work and worldliness, action and plurality
4
.  Labour produces 
things for consumption and work produces things for use (ibid: 94), but labour 
and work do not consist merely in the kinds of objects produced, more 
fundamentally each enables different modes of being human, in the form of 
animal laborans and homo faber (ibid: 85). The realm of animal laborans is 
where the biological processes of the human body – of birth, decay and death - are 
managed. It replicates the processes of nature and is characterised by repetitive, 
ceaseless activity which produces consumable objects – it is the realm of the 
perishable, the ephemeral and the impermanent (Dietz, 2002: 103).  Labour is 
marked out by leaving ‘nothing behind, that the result of its effort is almost as 
quickly consumed as the effort is spent’ (Arendt, 1958: 87); it is necessary 
because it reproduces life and creates a private realm for renewal of mind and 
                                                                
4
 Arendt’s threefold distinction between labour, work and action is influenced by Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Aristotle’s distinction between praxis (acting) and poesis (making) (Dietz, 2002: 
169). 
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body, but to live one’s whole life within it is to experience a darkened, instinctual 
existence. The realm of homo faber contains activity which ‘corresponds to the 
unnaturalness of human existence’ (Dietz, 2002: 104). Things are produced 
through repetitive processes of fabrication which have a definite beginning and 
end, but these things are durable and permanent objects which, unlike the end 
results of labour, are produced to be used or enjoyed, not to be consumed. They 
have an existence beyond their makers; they break out of the biological processes 
of nature, and produce a stable world (Dietz, 2002: 104). The usefulness and 
enjoyment of things, however, encourages objectification and instrumentalism 
which leads to ‘a growing meaninglessness where every end is transformed into a 
means’ (Arendt, 1958: 157)5. The realm of homo faber, instead of being the site of 
emancipation and a fully human experience, has become colonised by the realm of 
animal laborans through the processes of automatism: ‘the automatism of labor 
and the instrumentalism of work – conspire in the modern world to obliterate the 
human capacity for action’ (Dietz, 2002: 131).  
For Arendt (1958), action is the only sphere in which it is possible to be 
fully human and fully free, and she privileges the realm of action for embodying 
the mode of being which is most expressive of what it means to be fully human: 
‘human beings express extraordinary capabilities that neither labor nor work 
encompass. They disclose themselves in speech and deed and undertake new 
beginnings, thereby denying the bonds of nature and moving beyond the means 
end confines of homo faber’ (Dietz, 2002: 104). But although in the realm of 
action, human beings are revealed, in their plurality, as persons possessing 
‘unique distinctiveness’, Arendt characterises the realm of action as lacking the 
means to institute politics with a practical purposefulness.
6
 As a result, Arendt’s 
concern with instrumentalism in the realm of work, and the rise of a society in 
                                                                
5
 Arendt would deny that meaningful work is a concept which makes any sense, since meaningful 
action can only be enacted in the realm of action. 
6
 Public spaces, which reveal unique and distinct identities and enable people to act together, have 
been overtaken by social concerns which carry with them conformity and unfreedom (Tsao, 2002: 
105). The corruption of these spontaneously emergent micro-spaces has diminished the public 
realm in which we appear to ourselves and to others, not as what we are (as functionaries or job 
holders in the division of labour), but as who we are (as distinct and unique persons) (Arendt, 
1958: 181). 
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which all human activity is subsumed under animal laborans and homo faber, has 
left her without the resources to see where the programmes for emancipatory 
change in the political arena are going to come from, and how they are going to be 
implemented. The realm of action depends upon our being able to satisfy the 
demands of life as animal laborans and being able to establish a stable world as 
homo faber, but, despite being indispensible, these realms pose a threat to the 
possibility of becoming fully human, either by absorbing us in biological 
processes leading to an eclipse of the mind, or by instrumentalism leading to 
objectification and ‘world alienation’. In order to overcome the tension between 
necessary working and humanising acting, Dietz (2002) retrieves a ‘making in 
politics’ based upon the collective wisdom of citizens in identifying problems and 
consideration of methods (ibid: 178), and a ‘freedom in work’ based upon the 
worker’s autonomous problem-solving capabilities (ibid: 167). This means that 
multiple modes of being – technical-rational and ethico-political – are implicated 
in both working and acting, such that workers must exercise capabilities for 
judging what is relevant to the particular situation in hand. But, if making can be 
retrieved in politics, then I argue acting can be retrieved in production, provided 
that labouring, working and acting are taken to be modes of being rather than 
categories of different kinds of action. Following Hinchman & Hinchman (1984), 
labouring, working and acting should ‘not be understood as empirical 
generalisations about what most people usually do. As existentials they seek to 
illuminate what it means to be-in-the-world’ (ibid: 197). Lenz (2005) describes 
Arendt’s triad as ‘three basic forms of how activity takes place’ (ibid: 143), and 
identifies an Arendtian theme of inter-dependence between the three modes of 
being: ‘the balance of all three types of activity is necessary for establishing a 
society grounded in choices and creative abilities’ (ibid: 145). Lenz suggests that 
understanding our inter-dependencies across spheres of action and between modes 
of being allows us to examine the role of gainful employment in our conceptions 
of the good life (ibid). 
In fact, despite privileging the mode of acting, it is not the case that Arendt 
denies that objective reality is a subject for action: she recognises that the 
Ruth Yeoman                                        Meaningful Work and Workplace Democracy 
 
Page 88 
 
flourishing vita activa requires a balance of labour, work and action, because each 
mode of being answers different human needs for the necessities of living, a 
structured human world, and the disclosure of our unique identities (Moynagh, 
1997: 29). Nor does Arendt cleanse objective purposes from acting, as many of 
her critics have supposed (Knauer, 1980: 731; Pitkin, 1981: 324): ‘Action and 
speech go on between men, as they are directed toward them, and they retain their 
agent revealing capacity even if their content is exclusively “objective”’ (Arendt, 
1958: 182). In fact, Arendt’s own insights into labouring, working and acting can 
be united to a practical rationality of caring consistent with the bipartite value of 
meaningfulness by identifying a mode of acting in the work we do together that is 
generative of new beginnings in meaning-making, and ensures that, through 
acting together in work, we evaluate our actions against having a ‘care for the 
world’ (Arendt, 1958). If work-places are conceived of, not as spatially bound 
sites, but as timespaces intersecting across different spheres of human action 
where boundaries are open, fluid and contestable, then we can conceptualise how 
different modes of being, such as making and acting, can be instantiated both 
within and without the employment relation. Exercising the mode of acting, or the 
political mode of being, in production and reproduction allows us to ask what are 
the relevant social needs to be met by a system of social cooperation, whereas 
exercising the mode of making allows us to answer the question of how we are to 
meet our own and others needs - where the activities of asking and answering 
constitute in themselves much of the work we do together. 
 
6.2.0 Habermas - Challenging the Separate Spheres Thesis 
 
Making creative use of Arendt shows us how differing modes of being can 
be exercised in a variety of action contexts. But if we think of labouring, working 
and acting as modes of being which can be instantiated in multiple, overlapping 
timespaces, then maintaining strict boundaries between action contexts becomes 
problematic – particularly when separate action contexts fix modes of rationality, 
such as technical reason in the economic realm or emotional expression in the 
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private realm. For example, in Habermas’s theory of work and interaction, the 
sphere of work is opposed firmly to the sphere of interaction. Eyerman & 
Shipway (1981) identify how Habermas’s separation between action contexts 
originates in his critique of Marx who reduces all relations to economic relations 
in which ‘human emancipation was developed along the single dimension of the 
interactive relationship between social labor and nature’ (ibid: 555). In order to 
avoid Marx’s reductionism, Habermas makes use of Aristotle’s distinction 
between praxis (acting) and poiesis (making) to raise the status of ‘intersubjective 
understanding as a type of action’ (Honneth, 1995: 45). He distinguishes between 
work/instrumental and interaction/communicative action (ibid: 47), extending 
communicative action to much of what we would include as social activity, but 
denying that the experience of work can give rise to anything other than 
instrumental reasoning (ibid: 49). Habermas grounds the spheres of instrumental 
action and communicative action in two unchanging and universal human 
interests of work and symbolic interaction, which are ‘analytically separate arenas 
in which self-conscious human subjects act, thereby transforming themselves and 
their world’ (Keane, 1975: 87). In the realm of work (instrumental action), we 
satisfy our ‘technical cognitive interest’ for purposive-rational action which 
enables us to harness productive forces and gain technical control over the natural 
world (ibid: 87). In the realm of interaction (communicative action), we satisfy 
our ‘moral-practical cognitive interest’ in the development of social norms and 
subjective formations which underpin the stability and reproduction of the social 
order (ibid: 88). Habermas’s distinction between a technical sphere of action, and 
a practical sphere of action, results in ‘his almost exclusive concern with 
developing an emancipatory program in the practical realm of human activity, 
without the simultaneous development of a program in the technical [realm]’ 
(Eyerman & Shipway, 1981: 557). The result is that Habermas strips technical 
reason of normative content, because: ‘[...] the technical interest in control over 
nature does not allow for any interpretation: technical rules are like signs, they 
point to a direct activity, but neither contain nor generate intrinsic meaning of 
their own’ (ibid.). However, the meanings of efficiency or productivity in 
Ruth Yeoman                                        Meaningful Work and Workplace Democracy 
 
Page 90 
 
technical reason are not normatively neutral, nor are they closed off from dissent 
and deliberation (ibid: 563). Furthermore, technical and practical reasoning do not 
take place in separate spheres of action, instead work is ‘simultaneously cultural 
and technical activity, and is never purely instrumental’ (ibid; 558).  
The Habermasian theory of separate action contexts has the unfortunate 
consequence of diminishing the importance of work as a site for emancipatory 
social progress: ‘work merely designates the action substrate – the development of 
social forces of production – from which the processes of communicative 
liberation are then normatively distinguished’ (Honneth, 1995: 50). Whereas 
Habermas talks about an ‘unforced act of understanding’ (ibid: 52) in the realm of 
communicative action, he has no equivalent concept in the realm of instrumental 
action. Consequently, Habermas has few resources to offer the diagnosis and cure 
of the ‘moral vulnerability which grows not from the suppression of 
communicative modes of mutual understanding, but from the expropriation of the 
workers’ own work activity’ (ibid: 54). In the end, he is unable to offer us a 
positive critical conception of work (Smith, 2009), which has particularly serious 
consequences for our understanding of the gendered social division of labour. For 
example, Fraser (1989) criticises Habermasian social theory, which ‘uncouples’ or 
separates ‘systems’ from ‘lifeworld’ (ibid: 119), for failing to expose the family as 
a site of unpaid labour, and for failing to recognise the gendered nature of the paid 
workforce which assigns women to feminised roles of caring and domestic labour, 
thereby disguising the subordination of women to men (ibid.): 
‘On the one side stand the institutional orders of the modern 
lifeworld, the socially integrated domains specialising in 
symbolic reproduction, that is, in socialisation, solidarity 
formation and cultural transmission. On the other side stand the 
systems, the system-integrated domains specialising in material 
reproduction. On the one side stand the nuclear family and the 
public sphere; on the other side stand the (official) capitalist 
economy and the modern administrative state’ (Fraser, 1989: 
119). 
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Fraser (1989) ascribes Habermas’s inability to take account of gender to 
two key distinctions in his social-theoretical categories: firstly, his distinction 
between ‘the symbolic reproduction and the material reproduction of societies’ 
(ibid) and, secondly, his distinction between ‘socially integrated action contexts’ 
and ‘system integrated action contexts’ (ibid: 116). In the first distinction, 
women’s unpaid childcare activities map onto symbolic reproduction, because 
they reproduce the norms and behaviours of social identities through socialisation 
of the young. In the second distinction, contexts of inter-subjective consensus, 
such as the family, are differentiated from contexts of competitive interaction 
(ibid: 116) in which ‘individual action is determined by self-interested, utility 
maximising calculations typically entertained in the idioms […] of power and 
money’ (ibid: 117). Two key institutions undertake the activities of symbolic 
reproduction – the private sphere of the family and the public sphere of political 
participation (ibid: 119). But categorising caring as symbolic reproduction fails to 
take account of the stubborn materiality of much unpaid domestic labour required 
to sustain and promote life. In addition, by confining consensual normative 
behaviour to the action context of the private sphere of family life, and self-
interested maximising behaviour to the action context of the competitive sphere of 
production, Habermas is unable to account for how we experience multiple modes 
of being within the same spheres of human action: ‘In few if any human action 
contexts are actions coordinated absolutely nonconsensually and absolutely non-
normatively. However morally dubious the consensus, and however problematic 
the content and the status of the norms, virtually every human action context 
involves some form of both of them’ (Fraser, 1985: 104). I use Fraser’s 
observation to argue that caring for worthy objects in the value of meaningfulness 
is not realised solely either by the automatic application of technical rationality, or 
by the natural consensus of reproduction, but instead by a rationality of caring 
which responds to particular needs in particular situations relevant to worthy 
objects. A rationality of caring demands that we actively engage with fulfilling 
our responsibilities for worthy objects, giving rise to imaginative interpretive 
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differences in meanings, which have the potential to become the material for 
‘acting in production’: 
 
‘While it is true that the human need to transform nature requires 
that people turn themselves into instruments, and leads them to 
act purposively as objects rather than communicatively as 
subjects, this is only one dimension of the labor process. To this 
dimension must be added another, reflected in the use of 
imagination and creativity which precedes, terminates, and 
weaves its way throughout the instrumental dimension of the 
labor process’ (Eyerman & Shipway, 1981: 558, original 
emphasis). 
 
In order to understand how we fulfil our responsibilities towards worthy 
objects through a rationality of caring, we need to appreciate that imagination, 
creativity and instrumentality are woven together in acts of work, giving rise to 
differences in meaning-making which transcend conventional space/time 
distinctions (cf. Massey, 1992). Davies (2001) evaluates the importance of a 
timespace approach for theorising the everyday experiences of women, which 
challenges accepted understandings of our relation to the boundaries between 
home and work, making the separate spheres thesis untenable: ‘the ideology of 
‘separate spheres’ has obscured the links between work and family’ (Ferree, 1990: 
871). Not only does it look to be theoretically redundant, but the separate spheres 
thesis, by invisibilising informal work in the voluntary sector or within the family, 
contributes to social injustice because it fails to explicate how the burdens of work 
fall disproportionately upon certain groups of people. Ferree (1990), for example, 
says that the undercounting of ‘invisible work’ in the informal economy is a 
perennial problem, contributing to social injustice (ibid: 872). The plurality of 
behaviours demonstrated by people in all spheres of action challenges the 
usefulness of maintaining rigid distinctions between action contexts, so that 
fulfilling our responsibilities of care towards worthy objects, requires us to 
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address the question: ‘what are the ‘normative principles to guide the structural 
intersections of institutional spheres?’ (Young, 2002). This is a political question 
for everyday living, as well as a theoretical task, because we must all make ethical 
decisions about how we fulfil our multiple social roles, necessitating deliberation 
with those others we seek to involve in our projects, who themselves have projects 
of their own requiring them to recruit the cooperative effort of their fellows. 
Thus, we need to theorise work in terms of how the multiplicity of work 
timespaces provide the action contexts for the exercise of the political mode of 
being. But neither Arendt nor Habermas have been able to leave us confident that 
there are any objects in work which are worthy of either the mode of making or 
the political mode of being. I turn, therefore, to Honneth’s early account of 
meaningful work as craft work for guidance in what is required for retrieving 
worthy objects in the interior content of work. 
  
6.3.0 Honneth - Retrieving the Material Dimension of Intersubjectivity  
 
In his essay, ‘Work and Instrumental Action’, Honneth criticises Arendt 
for separating work into two types of activity: firstly, reflexive bodily work, and 
secondly, experiential manual work (ibid: 42), resulting in a permanent divide 
which mirrors the Taylorisation of industrial work. He claims that, by purifying 
from the realm of ‘true action’ any contact with the production of things (ibid: 
40), Arendt has removed ‘any sort of potential emancipatory significance from the 
act of working’ (ibid: 42). In order to retrieve a normatively positive conception 
of work out of his critique of Arendt and Habermas, Honneth specifies two levels 
of action, which can be characterised as work: firstly, at the level of social 
practice, work includes social reproduction and the construction of the human 
world ‘out of its natural setting’ (ibid: 32), and secondly, at the level of action, 
work includes the release of knowledge in order to ‘transform the means of 
domination and thus also make possible the evolutionary expansion of social 
freedom’ (ibid.). But this is a ‘counting in’ strategy, which suffers from the same 
problem as all such strategies – it results in the creation of a hierarchy of gendered 
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work. By specifying a sphere of work based upon reproduction and a sphere of 
work based upon the generation and use of knowledge, Honneth has re-inscribed 
body/mind distinctions within work itself, and the errors of the separate spheres 
thesis have not been overcome.  
Despite his re-establishment of a hierarchy of valuation, Honneth (1995) 
directs us towards a critical conception of work in his description of ‘an 
undistorted act of work’ (ibid: 45) which is ‘complete in itself’ (ibid.), thereby 
enabling us to differentiate normatively between different kinds of work. 
Honneth’s conception of an undistorted act of work is shaped by the craft ideal 
which he associates with the pre-mechanisation period of labour, but which has 
been lost in the modern organisation of work, where whole acts of work have been 
divided into small, repetitive tasks in order to maximise efficiency and profit: 
‘most types of work have lost any resemblance to acts of artisanry which are 
complete in themselves’ (ibid: 38). In Honneth’s undistorted act of work, work 
consists in freely expressed action directed towards others and towards objects, 
which aim at uniting means and ends in the interior content of work as workers act 
upon objects. By re-uniting means and ends, undistorted acts of work overcome 
the modern fragmentation of instrumental processes where work has ‘been 
separated from the autonomous control and empirical knowledge of working 
subjects’ (ibid: 46). Honneth opposes an undistorted act of work to unfree work 
which subjects workers’ actions to imposed bureaucratic rules and norms. But at 
the moment when work appears to have become irredeemably unfree, Honneth 
turns our attention to an, as yet fully to be realised, emancipatory possibility – that 
of the intersubjective relation between the worker and the object, which, in order 
to get the work done, calls out of the worker capabilities for judging and thinking 
in interpreting the needs of the situation. Honneth proposes that workers must 
engage in a ‘process of emancipatory reflection’ (ibid: 47), so that work regains 
the potential to enable ‘a morally oriented process of action in the region of social 
labor which would reclaim the meaningful work content of instrumental action 
from out of the social forms established through domination’ (ibid: 47). As a 
consequence of encounters with the material realities of working, workers must 
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exercise both instrumental and communicative rationalities, breaking down 
Habermassian distinctions between instrumental and communicative action. When 
joined to the political mode of being, of acting in production, such encounters are 
capable of bringing to light the values interior to the experience of working, and 
permitting a normative evaluation of worthy and unworthy objects. 
But this material dimension of inter-subjective relations falls out of 
Honneth’s mature theory of social recognition (Honneth, 1995a), where action 
contexts are mediated by three forms of recognitive relations between self and 
others (confidence, respect and esteem), but not between self and objects. 
Honneth reduces the experience of work to struggles for recognition of identity or 
achievement, without acknowledging the independent value of autonomous action 
in the interior content of work (Smith, 2009; Moll, 2009). It would be possible, for 
example, to imagine situations where workers are recognised for their efforts or 
cultural status, but are still denied the opportunity to exercise their independent 
agency as they grapple with the ineliminable materiality of work: ‘[...] the 
relationship that arises between the subject and the object in the activity of work 
needs to be acknowledged as a normative process in itself, externally to 
intersubjective exchanges’ (Moll, 2009: 13, original emphasis). To sharpen our 
understanding of what is normatively significant about work, we need to re-
consider how the active agency of workers relates to the material dimension of 
working life, in addition to the dimensions of positive practical relations to self 
and others. Margalit (2001) describes how we arrive at self-knowledge in a 
Hegelian sense through triangulation of ‘the master, the slave and an instrument’ 
(ibid: 128). Retrieving materiality reveals workers’ irreducible autonomy in their 
relations to self, others and objects, demonstrating the limits of theorising an 
automatic technical reasoning to explain human action in work (see Chapter 
Three). Instead, in undistorted or meaningful work, workers apply a rationality of 
caring for worthy objects, where deliberation with others in the political mode of 
being gives rise to interpretive differences in the meanings of values, such as 
efficiency, productivity, caring, and needs-meeting. This is because deliberative 
evaluation of interactions with materiality surfaces interpretive differences, 
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opening up spaces for temporary agreements over positive the values which 
construct worthy objects. 
 
7.0.0 Subjective Dimension: Intersubjectivity and Liberal 
Political Theory 
 
 I argue that, in order to strengthen arguments that the concept of 
meaningful work is irredeemably substantive, and therefore inconsistent with the 
liberal commitment to neutrality, liberal political theory constrains the variety of 
positive values by which we conceptualise meaningful work. In particular, I 
suggest that liberal political theory’s narrow determination of the conceptual 
content of meaningful work marginalises, and even eliminates, the value of 
intersubjectivity from the meaning content of work. Consequently, not only does 
this reduce the plurality of values which might be made available for meaning 
appropriation, but it fails also to provide us with the theoretical resources to 
describe how intersubjective relations are inherent to the ability of workers to get 
their work done. 
 
7.1.0 Elster and Rawls: Meaningful Work as Complex Activity 
 
Using Wolf’s (2010) bipartite value of meaningfulness, I develop a 
positive critical conception of meaningful work which unites objective worthiness 
to subjective attraction. In a liberal perfectionist framework, this means that 
meaningful work must contain the widest possible range of positive values 
invested in worthy objects in order to allow for differences in individual 
attachments. And the multiplication of positive values depends upon workers 
being able to exercise interpretive meaning-making capacities in deliberative 
encounter with others. But in Elster’s (1986) account of meaningfulness, the range 
of positive values is restricted to complex activities, marginalising, in particular, 
intersubjective relations. In the attempt to distinguish between worthwhile and 
trivial activities, Elster (1986) characterizes the good life as ‘one of self-
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realization rather than passive consumption’ (ibid: 97) and identifies the following 
features of activities which promote self-realization
7
: they aim at a purpose or 
goal (‘spontaneous interpersonal relations’ are excluded), they have a certain 
content (the drudgery involved in cleaning streets, for example, lacks the right 
content), and they have a value which transcends the immediate action 
(consumption is excluded because it aims at immediate satisfaction).  
 
‘The central features that turn an activity into a potential vehicle 
for self-realization are that it has an internal goal and that it can 
be performed more or less well – i.e., the goal can be realized to a 
higher or lower degree – according to independently given 
criteria. If an activity is to be an actual vehicle of self-realization, 
its goal must be of suitable complexity – neither so simple as to 
produce boredom, nor so difficult as to produce frustration. The 
activity must offer a challenge that can be met’ (ibid: 100, 
emphasis added). 
 
Elster says that it is the element of ‘mental challenge’ (ibid: 113) which 
distinguishes work conducive to self-realisation from work which is not. Such 
work is best promoted under conditions given by: the possibility of engaging ‘in 
full-time concentration on one complex task’ (ibid: 113) rather than rotating 
amongst a number of simple tasks; matching workers to jobs (ibid: 114) in a 
social order where ‘for each individual there is some ability he can develop that 
will meet an effective demand’ (ibid: 115); and where work is freely chosen, 
autonomously carried out, and enables social recognition (ibid: 115). Elster 
discounts ‘spontaneous interpersonal relations’ on the basis that they ‘can be 
deeply satisfying but have no purpose beyond themselves’ (ibid: 100). But his 
                                                                
7
 Elster provides a list of activities he regards as meeting the essential features for activities which 
promote self-realization: ‘playing tennis, playing piano, playing chess, making a table, cooking a 
meal, developing software for computers, constructing the Watts Towers, juggling with a chain 
saw, acting as a human mannequin, writing a book, discussing in a political assembly, bargaining 
with an employer, trying to prove a mathematical theorem, working a lathe, fighting a battle, doing 
embroidery, organizing a political campaign and building a boat’ (Elster, 1986: 99). 
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argument that inter-relations cannot support self-realisation because they are not 
intrinsic to the purposes of work is not supported by the empirical evidence, 
which reveals how intersubjective relations are essential if workers are to get their 
work done. Marchand (2010), for example, recounts his work as a building 
inspector in which he says the ‘site carpenters carried out often-complicated tasks 
with a Spartan economy of words – typically with minimal reference to my 
carefully prepared plan drawings. I recall observing a junior carpenter eyeballing 
his supervisor for cue while endeavouring to co-ordinate the patter of his own 
activities after those of the old man’ (ibid: 7). Complex socio-technical settings, 
such as operating theatres, air traffic controllers, factory work teams, R&D labs, 
are characterised by collaborative working where ‘one encounters flows of 
choreographed attending, prescient anticipation, mutual adjustment, and entwined 
action, out of which routinely emerge without remark a stream of decisions that 
often have life or death implications’ (Barley & Kunda, 2001: 89). By removing 
intersubjective relations from the meaning content of work, Elster describes a 
conception of meaningful work which narrows unnecessarily the range of positive 
values available for appropriation to the meaning content of a life. And, moreover, 
it cannot illuminate the normative dimensions of how people work together to get 
their work done. 
Rawls (1999) fails also to account for how intersubjective relations are 
vital to the experience of working. Although Rawls gives more consideration than 
Elster to inter-relations, he makes complex activity the conceptual core of 
meaningful work. For Rawls, positive relations between persons are of theoretical 
importance for generating self-respect in the political conception of the person, 
and he recognises the relational dimensions of meaningful work in our 
membership of social unions and in the social bases of self-respect. In order to 
ensure that everyone experiences self-respect, Rawls argues that all persons must 
have the opportunity to belong to social unions, because it is in social unions that 
we have the opportunity to realise the Aristotelian Principle (AP) - a 
psychological fact about human nature which explains how our desire for the 
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primary goods motivates us to come together to form and sustain a just system of 
social cooperation. Rawls defines the AP as:  
 
‘The Aristotelian Principle states that, other things equal, human 
beings enjoy the exercise of their realised capacities (their innate 
or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the 
capacity is realised or the greater its complexity’ (Rawls, TJ 
1999: 374). 
 
When we realise the AP through our membership of social unions, then we 
receive social recognition through the formation, exercise and public display of 
our capabilities, and in turn recognise the accomplishments of others. 
 
‘[...] a well-ordered society does not do away with the division of 
labour in the most general sense. To be sure the worst aspects of 
this division can be surmounted; no-one need be servilely 
dependent on others and made to choose between monotonous 
and routine occupations which are deadening to human thought 
and sensibility. Each can be offered a variety of tasks so that the 
different elements of his nature find a suitable expression. But 
even when work is meaningful for all, we cannot overcome, nor 
should we wish to, our dependence on others [...] The division of 
labour is overcome not by each becoming complete in himself, 
but by willing and meaningful work within a just social union of 
social unions in which all can freely participate as they so incline’ 
(Rawls, TJ 1999: 463-464). 
 
In this passage, Rawls expresses his optimism that, simply by becoming 
just, a society will conjure out of the air a division of labour from which 
demeaning and poor quality work is eliminated. Yet he provides no explanation 
for how his principles of justice will constrain the tendency of the capitalist 
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system of production to create meaningless work. Rawls does identify important 
sources of meaning in work: that work can be meaningful because it is useful and 
necessary, it can be meaningful when it is done with others, and it can be 
meaningful when it employs cognitive, emotional and physical capacities which 
are subjectively valuable to the person undertaking the work (i.e. that choice of 
occupation and the development of the capacities have been freely chosen). The 
relational dimension of meaningful work, however, is confined simply to 
belonging, leaving under-developed the question of how the constitution of social 
unions and the content of the work enables or disables the intersubjective 
dimension of human action. But the desire to realise the AP means that we have 
an interest in meaningful work being made available to everyone, not just those 
who have won the competition for the limited range of meaningful work 
opportunities made available in market economies. This is because, firstly, our 
self-respect is dependent upon the social recognition of others, and secondly, we 
are not able to exhibit all desirable human capabilities in our own selves and 
therefore we need a social structure, or plurality of social unions, in which we are 
able to participate in and enjoy the mastered capabilities of others. For Rawls, ‘the 
collective activity of justice is the pre-eminent form of human flourishing’ (TJ: 
463), and the sentimental basis of the social union is enjoyment in one another’s 
achievements and excellences. We cannot enjoy the spectacle of somebody 
labouring under demeaning and meaningless work - to do so would be to do harm 
to ourselves as well as to others. But such harms are relevant only to the extent 
that they undermine the sentimental basis of social solidarity upon which political 
union depends, rather than because they indicate injustices in the economic 
division of labour. 
To avoid violating the priority of liberty, Rawls makes the opportunity for 
meaningful work instrumental to sustaining his scheme of justice, rather than a 
good which all persons need for a flourishing life. For Rawls, engaging in suitably 
complex activity ensures the social formation of individuals imbued with certain 
moral capabilities which are crucial for maintaining a just society over time. 
Participating in complex activities consistent with the AP is crucial for moral 
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learning which includes the development of the capacity for rational deliberation 
and sense of justice, both of which are required for sustaining a stable just society. 
Rawls asserts that the AP is a fact
8
 of human psychology which states that all 
human beings possess an innate desire for activities of progressive, increasing 
complexity guided by a principle of inclusiveness. It is a natural fact that we seek 
excellence through increasing mastery of complex skills: ‘I assume that human 
beings have a higher-order desire to follow the principle of inclusiveness. They 
prefer the comprehensive long term plan because its execution presumably 
involves a more complex combination of abilities’ (TJ, 364). The AP accounts for 
our major desires and preferences (ibid), including our desire for all purpose 
means in the form of primary goods. However, although it is innate in all human 
beings, the AP has to be realised through training and commitment (ibid.). 
Training of our capacities in line with the AP educates our preferences for 
increasingly complex activities: ‘Thus the principle implies that as a person’s 
capacities increase over time […], and as he trains these capacities and learns how 
to exercise them, he will in due course come to prefer the more complex activities 
that he can now engage in which call upon his newly realised abilities’ (Rawls, 
1999 TJ: 375). This formative process leads us to recognise what is admirable in 
others so that we desire to emulate them, and take pleasure in their excellences 
and achievements (ibid: 376-377).  
But by constraining the conceptual core of meaningful work to complex 
activities, Rawls is in danger of violating his own commitment to neutrality, 
opening him up to the charge that he has introduced a form of perfectionism into 
the AP itself. Proudfoot (1978) suggests that: ‘the determination of simplicity and 
complexity, or of richness and poverty among human activities, may well depend 
upon prior conceptions of the good’ (ibid: 265). Judgments about what activities 
are simple or complex are socially determined and subject to valuations based 
upon factors such as the social status of the kinds of people who normally 
                                                                
8
 Rawls characterises the AP as a ‘natural fact’ (Rawls, 1999: 376) which is rational and which 
requires no explanation, except that it may have been the result of genetic selection: ‘It is a fact 
(combined with other facts and concepts of rational plan) which accounts for our considered 
judgements of value’ (Rawls, 1999 TJ: 379), i.e. the AP regulates our judgements of what things 
are counted as human goods and what human goods should be made ends. 
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undertake those activities in particular societies (ibid: 266). If the AP cannot be 
taken to be an incontestable natural fact about persons, then it becomes a kind of 
capability which we may or may not include in a worthwhile plan of living, 
because it may not be the only meaningful way to lead one’s life. I conclude, 
therefore, that the determination of what is complex or simple, and how it 
contributes to a life which is worth living, is a value judgment, the determination 
of which requires the capabilities for objective valuing and subjective attachment 
in the bipartite value of meaningfulness. 
 
7.2.0 Arneson – Meaningful Work as Variety 
 
In a different understanding of the meaning content of work, Arneson 
identifies meaningfulness with variety, which he opposes to specialisation in order 
to argue that meaningful work contains substantive normative commitments, 
making it a perfectionist ideal. Arneson (1987) argues against a right to 
meaningful work, as proposed by Schwartz (1982) and Doppelt (1984), on the 
grounds that this would require the state to promote a perfectionist ideal of what it 
is to lead a good life. Under a regime of market socialism
9
, a right to meaningful 
work is unnecessarily paternalistic because people will form differing conceptions 
of living which may or may not include meaningful work. Some people may 
prefer non-meaningful work because the conceptions of living they have chosen 
include attributing meaning to their lives through activities other than work. Given 
the diversity of ways in which work can play a part in individual conceptions of 
living, it is illegitimate for the state to effectively promote only those plans which 
contain meaningful work
10
. But since market socialism is a system able to 
compensate those who must undertake unavoidable boring or dangerous work, 
state perfectionism is redundant because: ‘in a well-regulated market economy 
                                                                
9
 Arneson describes market socialism as an economy characterised by: a right to a job; a right to 
vote within the enterprise of which one is a member; a collective right to decide how to deploy 
capital and profit; state policy aimed at evening out the capital over which each citizen has some 
degree of control; equalised tax burden (Arneson, 1987: 534). 
10
 Market socialism may not eliminate all non-meaningful work but this unavoidable problem can 
be eased if we adequately compensate those who have to undertake boring or dangerous work on 
our behalf (Arneson, 1987: 536).  
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that fairly distributes the benefits and burdens of economic cooperation, there is 
no ground for assigning individuals a further right to meaningful work beyond 
whatever array of meaningful work options the market happens to generate’ (ibid: 
536). This does not mean, however, that Arneson rejects the ideal of meaningful 
work. He suggests rather that meaningful work be ‘considered as a regulative 
ideal that a socialist society – or any decent political economy – should regard as 
part of its mission gradually to fulfil’ (ibid: 537).  
In his conceptual understanding of meaningful work, Arneson employs 
what he characterises as a ‘narrow’ definition of meaningful work, where the use 
of the descriptor ‘interesting’ is understood to be dependent upon individual tastes 
and preferences: 
 
‘What I am calling ‘meaningful’ is work that is interesting, that 
calls for intelligence and initiative, and that is attached to a job 
that gives the worker considerable freedom to decide how the 
work is to be done and a democratic say over the character of the 
work process and the policies pursued by the employing 
enterprise. The term ‘meaningful work’ might rather be thought 
to suggest work that serves a good cause as contrasted with work 
that serves trivial or pernicious aims (making and marketing hula 
hoops or mustard gas). No doubt it is better that people’s work 
should objectively serve good causes and on the subjective side 
no doubt it is desirable that people should experience their work 
as making a contribution to the goals they support’ (ibid: 522-3). 
 
Describing the concept of meaningful work in terms of ‘interesting’ work, 
allows Arneson to identify the perfectionist ideal of meaningful work with the 
positive values of variety and the freedom to choose one’s occupation11. Arneson 
                                                                
11
 Arneson quotes Marx’s famous critique of the capitalist division of labour from The German 
Ideology: ‘For as soon as the division of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, 
exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a 
hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose 
Ruth Yeoman                                        Meaningful Work and Workplace Democracy 
 
Page 104 
 
reads the ideal of ‘meaningful work as variety’ from Marx’s critique of the 
division of labour: for Marx, the division of labour is harmful because it reduces 
our freedom to decide how to lead our life and frustrates our natural human 
preference for variety and challenge in work: ‘Owing to the extensive use of 
machinery and to division of labour, the work of the proletarian has lost all 
individual character, and consequently, all charm for the workman’ (Marx, 1848). 
But, by agreeing with Marx that the division of labour is harmful, we assume we 
can know what it is to experience the good life, where the good life consists in 
variety rather than specialisation: ‘Narrow specialization is bad whether or not 
people want it’ (Arneson, 1987: 520). Arneson claims, plausibly, that if we then 
try to maximise meaningful work as variety, we end up by reducing the scope to 
satisfy human desire for other forms of living which may include specialisation – 
and, for Arneson, this kind of perfectionism is harmful, independent of the harms 
engendered by the technical division of labour.  
From this position, Arneson critiques Schwartz (1982) for implying that 
we should have a ‘state-mandated meaningfulness standard for all jobs’ (Arneson, 
1987: 523), which is mediated by meaningfulness as democratic participation: ‘we 
are therefore committed to demanding that this hierarchical division be replaced 
by a meaningful or democratic, division of labour that will ensure that no one is 
employed mainly at routine operations’ (Schwartz, 1982: 644). Arneson 
characterises Schwartz’s proposal as unacceptable perfectionism which 
marginalises other kinds of goods people may wish to acquire from their work, 
such as those related to productive values where ‘a worker might derive 
satisfaction from being a contributing member of an enterprise that efficiently 
serves vital human needs’ (Arneson, 1987: 525)12. A worker adhering to such 
                                                                                                                                                                               
his means of livelihood; whereas in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of 
activity but each can become accomplished in an branch he wishes, society regulates the general 
production and makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in 
the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a 
mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic‘.  
12
 Arneson identifies some of the other kinds of goods that people may want from their work (apart 
from meaningfulness defined by non-specialisation), including: ‘(1) wages to be exchanged for 
consumer goods now or in the future; (2) pleasant companionship with work colleagues or 
customers; (3) the knowledge that in producing particular goods or services one is being humanly 
useful to others or even contributing to the fulfilment of their vital needs; (4) interesting and 
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values may find demands to participate in management decision-making in the 
democratic division of labour proposed by Schwartz a frustrating limitation upon 
achieving their preferences in work. Therefore, the value of meaningfulness, 
understood as the ‘satisfactions intrinsic to the laboring process’ (ibid: 525), 
competes with and, when embodied in a right to meaningful work, crowds out 
alternative values. But, in many contemporary work environments, participation is 
not a bolt-on, optional extra, but inherent to the joint action necessary for getting 
the work done. Achieving the goals of service, care and effectiveness depends 
upon the intrinsic content of work being shaped by participatory practices and 
solidaristic relations between persons (Smith & Laitenen, 2009). In sum, there is 
not the competition between the value of meaningfulness and other values which 
Arneson presumes, because part of what makes work meaningful is expressed 
through those other values of service, production or contribution. Moreover, in a 
liberal perfectionist framework, the value of meaningfulness is not narrowly 
described by non-specialisation, and includes subjective attachment to values, 
such as useful contribution, and indeed many of the other goods listed by 
Arneson, such as solidarity, inter-personal relationships and responsible, skilful 
work. As a result, by attempting to avoid the perceived harms of state 
perfectionism, Arneson has failed to describe an adequate account of meaningful 
work, and diminished meaningful work as a rich source of the values we might 
wish to appropriate to our lives. Rather than preserving the widest field for 
freedom of interpretation in our subjective preferences for work which we can 
legitimately claim to be meaningful, Arneson has reduced our scope to make such 
claims to one-dimensional ‘variety’, with the consequence that our freedom to 
appropriate meanings has been severely circumscribed. In sum, a positive critical 
conception of work will pluralise the range of positive values, increasing our 
freedom to appropriate meanings of work to the meaning content of our lives, 
whether based on variety, specialisation, complex activities or caring.  
                                                                                                                                                                               
challenging work that calls for discrimination, skill, and intelligence; (5) the thrill of taking 
financial or physical risks; (6) responsible work that requires for its successful execution the 
display of prized virtues; (7) solidarity with one’s work mates stemming from common 
commitment to a cause associated either with the enterprise product or the enterprise manner of 
operation; etc...’ (Arneson, 1987: 528). 
Ruth Yeoman                                        Meaningful Work and Workplace Democracy 
 
Page 106 
 
7.3.0 Walsh – Meaningful Work as Structured Occupations 
 
For some theorists, definitions of meaningful work, such as Arneson’s 
speculative list of interesting activities, are too broad to be useful. And Walsh 
identifies these concerns with what he calls the ‘Argument from 
Indistinguishability’ (Walsh, 1994: 233), where ‘the range of activities that may 
legitimately be thought of as forms of meaningful work is so diverse that it is 
unlikely that one could formulate a unified account of the kinds of work which the 
concept refers to’ (ibid, emphasis added)13. To distinguish meaningful work from 
other kinds of activities, Walsh formulates a ‘core definition’ for meaningful work 
as work which offers opportunities to pursue ‘eudaimonian activity’ (Walsh, 
1994: 244): 
 
‘Eudaimonian activity, then, is a form of meaningful activity that 
involves the development of skills and capacities. It is 
characterized by sets of intentional acts in which there is an 
interactive relationship between the agent’s process of intention-
formation and her observations of the consequences of relevant 
intentional acts’ (Walsh, 1994: 243). 
 
 Eudaimonian activity involves ‘activity processing’ (ibid: 241) in which 
there is an interactive relationship between theory and practice; this interactive 
relationship is characterised by acts of intention, the outcome of which is the 
development of human capacities. Walsh makes use of Habermassian distinctions 
                                                                
13
 If this argument holds, then the attempt to distribute meaningful work cannot succeed because 
we cannot know what it is that we are intending to distribute – there are simply too many 
interpretations of what meaningful work is to make sensible the notion of meaningful work as a 
distributive good. Walsh (1994: 234-5) identifies distributive goods in the following terms: firstly, 
they are ‘human goods which social institutions and arrangements allocate’; secondly, they are 
‘human goods whose occurrence is distributively determined’, that is, they are susceptible to 
distributive processes (air is not a distributive good, but money is); and thirdly, ‘distributive justice 
is justice as exhibited in the distribution of these goods’. This definition of ‘distributive goods’ 
constrains meaningful work to those elements of the work experience which can be abstracted 
from individual and subjective meaning attribution because it is impossible for social institutions 
and arrangements to fairly allocate subjective experiences such as solidarity or friendship. 
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to specify the content of eudaimonian activity: firstly, instrumental-strategic 
action, which involves the exercise of skill, and therefore excludes much factory 
work because the factory worker has ‘no theoretical input into the transformation 
of her practice’ (ibid: 243); and secondly, practical-rational action, which 
involves the deliberative interpretation of the goals of the instrumental activity 
and the proper distribution of collective goods, for example, it is not sufficient to 
count as eudaimonian activity if an engineer exercises great skill in building a 
bridge but his efforts result in severe damage to the environment. Consideration 
must also be given to the social goals of the work which transcend the goals 
inherent in the nature of the task. Institutional mechanisms for the distribution of 
eudaimonian activity which satisfies both instrumental-strategic, and practical-
rational action are required because ‘opportunities for the performance of 
eudaimonian activity do not fall into the laps of individuals like manna from 
heaven’ (ibid: 244). Eudaimonian activity gives meaningful work an objective 
content and diminishes subjective considerations of what is or is not meaningful, 
which avoids the danger that ‘any work at all could be considered meaningful, so 
long as one has the right psychological attitude towards it’ (ibid: 237). Walsh 
concludes that: 
 
‘A form of work is meaningful in the distributive sense, if and 
only if, its description as an occupation is the activity description 
of an activity that is structured in such a way that provides for the 
realisation of eudaimonian interests’ (Walsh, 1994: 247). 
 
In order to avoid the Argument from Indistinguishability, Walsh applies 
meaningful work containing eudaimonian activity to structured occupations. The 
meaningfulness of structured occupations have the capacity to contribute to 
meaning attribution in their core activity only, and not because of any incidental 
benefits which may accrue such as friendship or a sense of solidarity; ‘it is 
structured occupations that are distributed, not a sense of purpose nor 
companionship’ (ibid: 245). Subjective interpretations of what makes work 
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meaningful render the concept of meaningful work less useful to maintaining 
boundaries between different spheres of activity. The loss of subjective elements 
from the meaning content of work is not only the loss of what makes work 
distinctively valuable to individual persons, but also leaves us deficient in the 
theoretical tools needed to describe the necessity of intersubjective encounter for 
getting the work done.  
I identify three problems with Walsh’s account which are relevant to a 
positive critical conception of meaningful work. Firstly, the legitimacy of 
activities: if there are many activities which can legitimately be thought of as 
meaningful work (as the original quote from Walsh suggests), then why cannot 
we include them within a conceptual framework of what it means for that work to 
contribute to the meaning content of a life? If, by some criteria, these activities are 
legitimately meaningful, then their exclusion for the purpose of philosophical 
neatness does not do justice to our diverse experience of respecting and engaging 
with value in the work we do. A capacious ideal of meaningful work has general 
normative appeal because it brings within the reach of all the possibility that the 
work we do can add to the meaningfulness of our lives. Of course, meaningful 
work is not the whole of what constitutes the meaning content of a life but, under 
our current organisation of work and social cooperation, it plays a central part in 
shaping and structuring a life as a whole. I argue that it is not the task of states or 
institutions to guarantee meaning content but to provide substantive all purpose 
means for the development of a capability for meaning attribution which will 
enable individuals to pattern their own meaningful lives. 
Secondly, Walsh’s characterisation of skill development arising from the 
interaction between the agent’s intentions and her observations of the 
consequences of acting upon her intentions is not well supported by recent 
developments in our understanding of how human competence arises. Sandberg 
(2000) suggests rationalistic approaches (of which Walsh’s is an example) set up a 
false separation between the worker and the work, whereas in reality ‘worker and 
work form one entity through the lived experience of work. Competence is thus 
seen as constituted by the meaning of the work takes on for the worker in his or 
Ruth Yeoman                                        Meaningful Work and Workplace Democracy 
 
Page 109 
 
her experience of it’ (ibid: 11). Competence is arrived at through interpretative 
interaction with the context and with others. Sandberg illustrates his argument 
with an ethnographic study of machine optimisers who develop new model car 
engines. He found that machine optimisers developed different competences 
based upon what they understood to be the meaning of their work, so that, those 
who interpreted the meaning of their work to be about customer satisfaction 
developed different skills and knowledge bases from those who interpreted their 
work as keeping up with the latest technology. Key to the link between the 
interpretative meanings of work and the competency profile were the interpretive 
communities of practice which arose around differing understandings of the 
work
14
. 
Thirdly, Walsh’s concern to avoid the ‘incidental benefits’ of inter-
personal relations de-values reproductive, caring and affective labour. Walsh is 
oddly dismissive of caring labour; in commenting upon the work undertaken by 
the nuns of Mother Theresa on behalf of those dying of leprosy on the streets of 
Calcutta, he says: ‘obviously, in such cases, it is the idiosyncratic nature of such 
persons’ psychological states, rather than the nature of activity itself, which makes 
this work fulfilling for them’ (Walsh, 1994: 237). Clearly, such work is a 
particular kind of caring labour which only a few may wish to engage in, but 
marginalising such activities as indicative of an idiosyncratic, perhaps 
pathological, psychology, is to cast most caring labour, from nurturing small 
children to looking after the elderly, into the shadows of non-eudaimonistic or 
non-meaningful work. In addition to the exclusion of carework, Walsh’s exclusion 
of ‘incidental benefits’ fails to take into account what we know about how work 
gets done in a complex system of social cooperation
15
. The incidental benefits of 
companionship and trust in one’s colleagues are the result of completely necessary 
and unavoidable inter-dependences and affective relations without which it would 
                                                                
14
 See also, Sandberg & Pinnington (2009) for an integrative conception of what comprises 
professional competence based upon ‘three interrelated ontological dimensions, namely human 
way of being, others in human way of being and things in human way of being’ (ibid: 7) 
15
 Walsh says that ‘Repetitive factory work, for example, which people find meaningful because of 
their friendships, does not count as a form of ‘distributively determined’ meaningful work, because 
it is not meaningful under the activity description of it as an occupation’ (Walsh, 1994: 246). 
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be impossible for our modern society to function. The fact that these inter-
dependences and affective relations are also experienced as subjectively satisfying 
does not make them unqualified for the purposes of meaning appropriation. 
Finally, constraining the meaning of meaningfulness in work to ‘the activity 
description of it as an occupation’ (ibid: 246) seems to hand over what constitutes 
meaningfulness to those in organisations who define and distribute tasks, and who 
write job descriptions. It ignores struggles over the meaning of work, and the 
asymmetrical power relations this entails, for example care workers who contest 
job descriptions which fail to describe essential personalised caring labour. 
In sum, I propose that, in order to secure meaningful work as a rich source 
of worthy objects which can be subjectively appropriated to the meaning content 
of a life, we use the three themes from critical social theory to re-imagine work as 
taking place in multiple timespaces; as the exercise of different modes of being 
(and particularly, the political mode of being); and as constituted by 
intersubjective relations in joint action  - which will overcome also the narrowed 
conceptual understandings of meaningful work offered by liberal political 
theorists. The questions of what activities are work, when/where work takes place, 
and who does what work are ethico-political questions which do not admit of final 
resolution, but remain contested, therefore making it appropriate to subject them 
to collective deliberation over differences in meaning interpretation. To address 
the first question, a positive critical conception of meaningful work does not 
reduce work to the employment relation, but enfolds a wide range of productive 
and reproductive activities necessary to the work of social cooperation. To address 
the second question, meaningful work attends to how work traverses timespace 
boundaries, requiring the exercise of different modes of being within the same 
action context. Timespace boundaries can be thought of as a ‘container of 
meaning’ (Thompson & Bunderson, 2001: 18), allowing us to ‘address the nature 
of the activities that occupy our time, including the significance that they assume’ 
(ibid.). When Arendt’s labour, work and action are interpreted as different modes 
of being they become ‘three basic forms of how activity takes place. In this sense 
one might ask within which realms (for example, one’s own profession or life) the 
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activities of labor, work and action occur and whether, be this individually or 
socially, they are bound to certain spheres and time periods’ (Lenz: 2005: 143). 
Work timespaces as containers of meaning for plural modes of being enable us to 
conceive of workers as active agents, incorporating differing meanings of work 
into practical identities - and further, actively re-interpreting meanings of work in 
order to engage with positive values capable of lending significance to the 
activities they do. 
 
8.0.0 Conclusion 
To lack meaningful work is to be deprived of an essential social setting for 
encountering worthy objects and being able to affectively appropriate them to our 
lives. A positive critical conception of meaningful work in a liberal perfectionist 
framework operates to secure a plurality of values and meanings of work which 
can be made available for subjective incorporation into an individual’s practical 
identity. Both critical social theory and liberal political theory are challenged by a 
positive critical conception of work: in the former, the excessive pessimism 
towards the immanent potential of contemporary work is confronted by evidence 
of how people act to appropriate positive meanings to their lives, and in the latter, 
liberal political theory fails to capture important dimensions of the interior content 
of work by excluding intersubjective relations from conceptions of work which 
are constructed to maintain commitments to liberal neutrality. To counter the 
excessive pessimism of critical theorists and the narrowing of values interior to 
the meaning content of work on the part of liberal theorists, I argue for a positive 
critical conception of meaningful work which acknowledges the plurality of 
activities which goes to make up the work of social cooperation, and the 
intersecting timespace dimensions which require workers to engage in deliberative 
ethico-political decision-making over the relative priority of activities, their goals 
and means, the necessary relations between persons, and the encounters with the 
material dimensions of work. In the following chapter, I explore how 
intersubjective encounters with the material realities of working life reveal a level 
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of irreducible autonomy in every act of work which grounds the exercise of the 
political mode of being through democratic practices at the level of the task. 
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Chapter Three 
Overcoming Alienation: Irreducible Autonomy and A Practical 
Rationality of Caring 
1.0.0 Introduction 
Never has work appeared to be so divided, intense, separated from our 
personal control and divorced from our sense of who we are. From Blauner’s 
(1964) industrial blue collar workers labouring under changes to the division of 
labour as a consequence of automation to the ‘managed hearts’ of Hochschild’s 
(1983) airline attendants, the complaint is that the experience of work has been 
systematically deskilled and subjectified by a capitalist project which aims to 
increase profit by appropriating and controlling workers’ agency in the exercise of 
their skills and the formation of their identities. The critique that contemporary 
conditions of work are thoroughly alienating opposes deskilled and subjectified 
work to the mastery and secure identity of craft work, but, I shall argue, this 
dualism presents a narrative of work as irretrievably degraded which is not 
consistent with work as it is experienced by workers. I shall show the limits to the 
opposition between alienated work and craft work by describing a floor-level of 
irreducible autonomy in every act of work, which reveals that there is no 
completely alienated work from which the possibility of autonomous action has 
been eliminated. I shall propose that the identification of a level of irreducible 
autonomy enables us to conceptualise personal autonomy in work as 
fundamentally relational, and the pre-condition for the exercise of political 
autonomy.  
 
2.0.0 Alienated Work and the Craft Ideal 
 
In the ideal of craftsmanship, work has intrinsic value and is performed not 
just for the sake of external rewards, such as status or pay, but also for the sake of 
the actions and processes inherent to the work itself. The ideal act of work is a 
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complete act where completeness stands for a unity of means and ends in which 
the craftsman is recognised as having mastery over his skills, independence in his 
way of living and is respected for his display of the virtues relevant to his practice 
(See Murphy, 1993). Mills (1951) describes the craft ideal in the following terms: 
 
‘Craftsmanship as a fully idealised model of work involves six 
major features. There is no ulterior motive other than the product 
being made and the process of creation. The details of daily work 
are meaningful because they are not detached in the worker’s 
mind from the product of the work. The worker is free to control 
his own working action. The craftsman is thus able to learn from 
his work; and to use and develop his skills and capacities in its 
prosecution. There is no split of work and play, or work and 
culture. The craftsman’s way of livelihood determines and infuses 
his whole being’ (Mills, 1951: 220)16. 
 
Alienated work is the antithesis of craft work. In craft work, the craftsman 
achieves personal autonomy when he possesses control over the work process and 
its outcomes, and independence of self; by possessing skill in his own person and 
therefore a sense of personhood, the craftsman is able to choose when, how and 
for whom he employs his abilities. In alienated work, the worker is divorced from 
his skills and capabilities, because the content of his work inhibits his sense of 
autonomy over his actions, and he is separated from his own self when the 
relations and circumstances of work fail to support his sense of identity as an 
efficacious, distinct person. In his concept of estranged labour in the Economic 
and Philosophic Manuscripts (1844), Marx identifies four dimensions of 
                                                                
16
 Morris (1884), for example, idealised craftwork, from which the industrialised organisation of 
work represents a falling away. Macintyre’s attempt to revive the virtues through the device of 
practices also owes much to the intrinsic value of activity embodied in the craft idea. See Blauner 
(1964) for a Marxist approach to the loss of craftsmanship, and Inkson (1987) for an evaluation of 
the extent to which the craft ideal still retains a hold upon the imaginations of workers in his study 
of commercial potters in New Zealand. Sennett (2008) presents the most recent revival of the craft 
ideal, in which he also critiques the ways in which the craft ideal operates to designate forms of 
work as more or less valuable. 
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alienation: the worker can be alienated, firstly, from his product which appears as 
‘an alien object exercising power over him’ (Marx, 1978 [1844]: 74); secondly, 
from his activities in the production process which is ‘activity as suffering’ (ibid: 
75); thirdly, from his human and particular self which forces him to turn his 
capabilities for living a flourishing human life into ‘a mere means to his existence’ 
(ibid: 76); and fourthly, from others so that he no longer recognises others in their 
full expressive humanity, but ‘views the other in accordance with the standard and 
the position in which he finds himself as a worker’ (ibid: 77). When we are 
alienated from one another, we value the other person only for their position in the 
division of labour, making the mutual needs which should be a source of our 
solidarity ‘a source of tactical advantage’ (Miller, 2003). Alienation from our 
work, from our needs and from each other renders us vulnerable to exploitation: 
 
‘[...] man’s relation to himself only becomes objective and real 
for him through his relation to the other man. Thus, if the product 
of his labour, his labour is objectified, is for him an alien, hostile, 
powerful object independent of him, then his position towards it 
is such that someone else is master of this object, someone who is 
alien, hostile, powerful, and independent of him. If his own 
activity is to him an unfree activity, then he is treating it as 
activity performed in the service, under the domination, the 
coercion and the yoke of another man’ (Marx, 1978 [1844]: 78). 
 
Thus, alienation is the radical separation of the worker from the interior 
content of her work, given by purposes, processes, skills and products, and from 
the constitutive social relations to self, to others and to material objects which 
enable the formation of practical identities (Marchand, 2010; Dale, 2005). In the 
interior content of work, alienated work is deskilled, divided and objectified: by 
structuring their activities so that it does not require much initiative or exercise of 
human capabilities, capitalists can take unfair advantage of the inferior bargaining 
position of workers, thereby enabling the consolidation of efficiencies and profit-
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taking through hierarchical coordination (Miller, 2003). In the constitution of 
selves, alienated work under conditions of global capital leaves no dimension of 
human expressiveness untouched – management strategies encroach upon the 
formation of subjectivities for the purpose of increasing profit through the 
production of affects, requiring workers to work upon themselves to create a self-
conception and practical identity which aligns them with the interests of the 
organisation. ‘Alienation-as-subjection’ (Elster, 1986b: 56) is a conditioning 
factor for exploitation in which one person extracts benefits from another with no 
consideration for the welfare of the exploited individual. Alienation reduces the 
costs of exploitation to the exploiter because it operates in a framework which 
legitimises the social conditions under which the exploitation takes place: 
‘Alienation adds to exploitation a belief on the part of the workers that the 
capitalist has a legitimate claim on the surplus, by virtue of his legitimate 
ownership of the means of production [...] The efficacy of capitalist exploitation 
rests on its ability to perpetuate the conditions under which it appears as morally 
legitimate’ (ibid.). Thus, alienation and exploitation operate together to condition 
workers to the organisation of work under capital, interpreting and controlling the 
meanings of work so that the pre-determined interior content and subjective 
formations of work appear as necessary and without any alternative. These are 
heteronomous conditions which impoverish the field of values available for 
subjective appropriation, with the consequence that autonomy-promoting 
meanings of work necessary to joint action are marginalised or even extinguished. 
Thus, heteronomy in one or more of the four dimensions of alienation inhibits our 
ability to experience the bipartite value of meaningfulness in the work we do 
together, because such conditions of work reduce the range of values which can 
be appropriated to the meaning content of our lives or fix the acceptable meanings 
of values to serve the ideological interests of a dominant group. 
Elster (1985) identifies both an objective and a subjective condition of 
alienation, where alienation is understood as the loss of meaning consequent upon 
an organisation of work characterised by heteronomy: ‘spiritual alienation may be 
seen either as a lack of a sense of meaning, or as a sense of a lack of meaning’ 
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(ibid: 74; see also Braybrooke, 1998a). When we lack a sense of meaning we are 
objectively alienated because ‘the aggregate outcome of individual actions 
appears as an independent and even hostile power, not as freely and jointly willed’ 
(Elster, 1986b: 49) making the social structures consequent upon the accretion of 
past actions and power struggles appear unquestionable and unchangeable. The 
content of work may be objectively alienated, but this does not entail subjective 
alienation: workers may experience contentment despite the degraded content of 
work, because the expanding economic product allows greater satisfaction of 
needs (Braybrooke, 1998a). When we experience a sense of a lack of meaning, we 
are subjectively alienated because we have ‘the experience of one’s self and life as 
empty’ (Wood, 1981: 9). In his reading of Wood, Elster (1985: 75) identifies how 
Wood makes the objective condition of alienation the primary characteristic of the 
presence of alienation: ‘it is a matter of whether my life in fact actualizes the 
potentialities which are objectively present in my human essence’ and not ‘a 
matter of whether my conscious desires are satisfied or how I think about myself 
or my life’ (Wood, 1981: 23-24). Since objective alienation, however, is 
naturalised in social structures which appear not only to be insusceptible to 
individual and collective action, but also beyond critical discernment and 
reflective evaluation, then it is difficult to see how we will come to realise that we 
are living out our lives under conditions of objective alienation, if we lack the 
experience of subjective alienation. Elster asks, in the absence of the subjective 
condition of alienation, how are we to realise even the minimal expression of 
autonomy as political and personal self-determination upon which social change 
depends? If Wood is correct that the objective condition of alienation is the 
primary mark of alienated work, and individual affective responses to conditions 
of work cannot be taken as a guide to the presence of alienation in work, then it 
seems unlikely that alienated work can be a force for individual and social 
progress because the objective conditions of alienation operate beyond our 
subjective perceptions. 
I suggest that the way out of this impasse is to acknowledge that there is 
no realm of purely objective alienation, closed off from subjective affects, in 
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which self-reflexive practices are rendered sterile by the apparently immovable 
logic of hegemonic social and economic structures, practices and ideologies.  
Even in conditions of objective alienation people must act, and to do so they draw 
upon their meaning-making capabilities to create and promote values. Our 
unavoidable engagement with others in interpretive meaning-making allows 
values to become available for individual subjective appropriation. Our 
capabilities for interpretive meaning-making are part of the general preconditions 
for autonomous action, enabling us to mobilise our own and others’ agency in the 
work we do together. Ethnographic studies of what people actually do when they 
are engaged in work provide significant evidence that, even under conditions of 
extensive objective alienation, workers are motivated to seek autonomous 
expression in their working activities independent of rewards, such as status or 
pay (see Marchand, 2010; Dejours, 1998; Hodson et al, 1998; Hodson, 1998). 
This urge is enacted in forms of subversion, of resistance, of play and of humour 
in the workplace: the factory worker who deliberately damages a uniform product 
in order to mark it as his or her own; the mother who resists the model of full-time 
employment; the artisan who adapts organisational rules in order to nurture a 
machine to produce well; the call centre operative who coaxes a bureaucratic 
system to deliver good customer service; or the care workers who protest at a job 
description process which renders their emotional labour invisible.  Indeed, Elster 
indicates something of this kind when he says that social change may occur when 
‘objectively existing alienation at some point comes to be felt subjectively’ 
(Elster, 1985: 76). I argue that objective conditions of alienation cannot be 
maintained by those who have an interest in doing so without the recruitment of 
workers’ meaning-making capabilities, but that the very moment of successful 
recruitment also specifies the limit to the extractive power of some over others. 
Thus, the recruitment of workers’ subjectivities is never total – there is always a 
surplus, an immanent potential interior to the content of work, allowing for the 
possibility of interpretive differences which arise when meaning-making produces 
‘remainders’ (Honig, 1993) irreconcilable with the dominant culture’s way of life.  
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But interpretive differences often remain invisible and marginalised, even 
though they are constitutive of skill development and the renewal of 
organisational practices. I propose that these ‘difference potentials’ can be given 
voice and purchase as the pre-conditions of social change when they are mobilised 
through a system of workplace democracy which operates both at the level of the 
organisation and at the level of the task. Braybrooke (1998b) gives democratic 
participation a role in overcoming the objective and subjective conditions of 
alienation because democratic participation generates engagement with the values 
and purposes framing the work people do together. Braybrooke (1998a) says that 
we experience alienation when we lack ‘a purposeful commitment to doing X’ 
(ibid: 40), that is, when our activity lacks the objective condition of an intrinsic 
purpose and the subjective condition of ‘sense of purpose in doing X’ (ibid.). But 
even when doing X has an intrinsic purpose, we may not meet the subjective 
condition of a sense of purpose in two ways: firstly, we may believe there is an 
intrinsic purpose, but lack the information to confirm our belief (Braybrooke gives 
the example of somebody occupied in an undercover operation who may not have 
full knowledge of the context of their work); and secondly, we may have 
knowledge of an intrinsic purpose, but find the tasks involved subjectively 
repellent, boring, or in some way dissatisfying (ibid: 40-41). Democratically 
organised work may overcome the objective and subjective conditions of 
alienation because it provides the opportunity to determine whether there are 
‘socially more useful alternatives to N’s doing X’ (ibid: 40) and helps ‘to develop 
purposeful commitments’ (ibid: 48). Braybrooke points out, however, that, even 
where there are no democratic practices, people often work very hard to find an 
intrinsic purpose in their work, and he identifies the stubborn determination of 
workers to overcome alienation by constructing meaning out of unpromising 
work: ‘men make great efforts to convert themselves. They seek to rationalize 
their line of work in such a way that they can develop a purposeful commitment in 
following it. Certainly, it is very common for people to persuade themselves, once 
they find themselves doing X, that doing X is of great social importance’ (ibid: 
43). I suggest that the demonstrated determination of workers to find value in their 
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work supports my point that there is no pure objectively alienated work, from 
which all possibility of self-determination has been eliminated. The efforts that 
people make to appropriate values through the interpretation of meaning directs us 
to a floor-level of autonomy in all kinds of work which is not simply about 
psychological relief, but indicates how meaning-making is necessary to the 
possibility of any kind of human action at all. 
But undoubtedly conditions of objective alienation do enable elites to 
mobilise the agency of others, stunting the development of workers’ capabilities 
for meaning-making and thwarting their search for meaningfulness. Our 
normative concern should, therefore, be directed towards ensuring that workers’ 
efforts to appropriate meaning to their lives should be neither futile nor mistaken. 
Nor that society should force them through necessity ‘to take their chance on 
alienation’ (ibid: 46) by making being able to experience the bipartite value of 
meaningfulness in work a matter of personal taste. Braybrooke (1998a) cites 
Hegel, that ‘The individual has an ‘infinite right’ to find himself ‘satisfied in [his] 
activity and labour’ (ibid: 44). This seems to me correct, and not only necessary 
for every individual, but also an achievable regulative ideal in a society organised 
to realise the deliberative capabilities of its members in a system of economic 
democracy. Furthermore, the regulative ideal of meaningful work becomes a 
pragmatic possibility when workers’ meaning-making capacities are enabled by 
deliberative democratic practices. This is because when interpretive differences 
over values and purposes become publicly available for evaluation and judgement, 
they are made susceptible to generalised appropriation to the meaning content of 
lives through the exercise of the capabilities for objective valuing and subjective 
attachment. I shall argue that the floor-level of irreducible autonomy in every act 
of work is the pre-condition for being able to act as an autonomous being, where 
personal autonomy is understood to be a relational achievement. To begin with, I 
shall explore the loss of autonomy argument, and challenge the narrative that 
work is irretrievably degraded and alienated. 
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3.0.0 The Loss of Autonomy Argument 
 
The principal hypothesis of the loss of autonomy argument is that our 
modern organisation of work is inhospitable to autonomous action, because 
owners and managers have succeeded in undermining the independence of 
workers - seen as a barrier to increasing profitable productive output – by 
systematically deskilling work through the division of means from ends in the 
technical division of labour (Braverman, 1974; Wood, 1982). According to this 
thesis, autonomy, as the exercise of discretion, competence and initiative, has 
been subject to two kinds of loss in the contemporary experience of work: firstly, 
the objective condition of alienation is consequent upon progressive deskilling in 
the interior content of work and secondly, the subjective condition of alienation is 
consequent upon organisational control over the formation of subjectivities.  
 
3.1.0 Objective Alienation in the Interior Content of Work 
 
Proponents of the loss of autonomy argument claim that progressive 
deskilling in the modern organisation of work is relentlessly stripping work of its 
potential for enabling people to develop and exercise their capacities for personal 
autonomy. Such claims are grounded in the assumption that the autonomous 
‘hegemonising power of capitalist ideology and instrumental rationality’ has 
‘become internalised by the fragmented individuals as immutably ‘natural’’ 
(Eyerman & Shipway, 1981: 551). Internalising the present organisation of work 
as a natural inevitability makes it easy for everyone to agree that the goals of 
work, and the way that tasks are performed, are best determined, not by workers, 
but by managers and organisational experts: ‘workers are in effect paid for blindly 
pursuing ends that others have chosen, by means that they judge adequate’ 
(Schwartz, 1982: 635). Using process management practices, such as Taylorism, 
and its modern manifestations such as business process re-engineering, 
organisations have been able to break down the craft-based practices which 
sustained practical identities, disaggregating acts of work into isolated 
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components and integrating them into a system of production which operates 
beyond the control of workers. Workers no longer exercise autonomy of skill and 
judgement over the whole process of creating the product, causing them to 
become dependent upon the coordinating and unifying mechanisms of a 
hierarchical system of managerial control in order to get their work done. Such 
dependence eliminates the need for workers to exercise skill, eroding their human 
capabilities for autonomy. Braverman (1974), for example, characterises a 
specialised worker carrying out the plans of others as unskilled: 
 
‘typists, [...] receptionists [...] and clerks are subjected to routines, 
more or less mechanized according to current possibilities, that 
strip them of their former grasp of even a limited amount of office 
information, divest them of the need to understand and decide, 
and make of them so many mechanical eyes, fingers and voices 
whose functioning is, insofar as possible, predetermined by both 
the rules and machinery’ (Braverman, 1974: 34). 
 
In the loss of autonomy argument, objective alienation is exemplified by 
the use of techniques for the disaggregation and deskilling of work based upon the 
scientific management principles of Taylorism (Taylor, 1964), which Pruijit 
(2000) defines as ‘management strategies which are based upon the separation of 
conception from execution’ (Pruijit, 2000: 440). Taylorism generates standardised 
tasks which can be distributed among cheaper, unskilled workers, thereby creating 
a controllable, low cost, undifferentiated work force, and allowing management to 
claim that a Tayloristic organisation of work is justified by reason of coordinative 
efficiency. But, Taylorism tends to increase indirect labour costs by multiplying 
administrative and bureaucratic functions, generating additional costs in the form 
of inflexibility, loss of innovative capacity, poor quality work and conflict with 
values such as autonomy (Pruijit, 2000: 442-445). The use of Taylorist principles,  
characterised by a division of means and ends, lack of trust between workers and 
managers, reduced worker control over the purpose of the tasks they do or the 
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means they employ to do them, and increased arbitrary interference by managers 
and organisational experts, entrenches objective alienation into the organisation of 
work: ‘Deskilling is seen as an act of capitalism designed to transfer control over 
work to management by depriving the worker of his or her skill’ (Inkson, 1987: 
165). Thus, because Taylorism operates as an ideology to make the administration 
of work through the division of means and ends seem the natural and inevitable 
form of modern organisation to which there is no alternative, it meets the 
definition of objective alienation. 
Under Tayloristic techniques of work organisation, an objective loss of 
worker autonomy is united to a re-interpretation of the meaning of autonomy, 
which is employed to serve managerial interests: ‘In managerial discourse, the 
clash between Taylorism and autonomy gives rise to a language game in which 
the meaning of autonomy is emptied out’ (Pruijt, 2000: 6). Managerial discourse 
deploys flexibility, generalised skills, devolved decision-making and teamwork to 
construct a kind of worker autonomy, based upon serving the interests of capital. 
But, despite hopes that team-working would usher in new forms of autonomous 
work organisation, the objective conditions of alienated work remain present. The 
2001 Skills Survey, for example, showed a sharper decline in task discretion for 
those who worked in teams (Gallie et al, 2004: 255), depending upon the degree 
of scope over decision-making afforded to teams. Organisational forms 
embodying the simulacra of autonomy attempt to secure existing patterns of 
power and control by appropriating the irreducible autonomy of workers, but they 
do so at the cost of increasing objective alienation in the interior content of work. 
Team working, for example, can be used by management to capture the benefits 
of worker discretion based upon self-directed, semi-independent teams of 
workers.  However, whilst I acknowledge the potential for objective alienation in 
work, I argue that organisational forms are never entirely successful in 
appropriating workers’ autonomy, leaving the objective condition of alienation 
incomplete and available for the active engagement of workers’ meaning-making 
capabilities. Moreover, the objective condition of alienation cannot operate in 
isolation of the subjective condition of alienation, meaning that there is always a 
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surplus of subjectivity in objective alienation which cannot be incorporated into 
the ideological project of management control. 
 
3.2.0 Subjective Alienation in the Formation of Subjectivities 
 
 The management of subjectivities thesis claims that, in the contemporary 
organisation of work, the condition of objective alienation from one’s product and 
from the process of production has been extended by management strategy into 
alienation from one’s sense of self, one’s practical identity and one’s relations to 
others for the purpose of turning subjectivities into exchangeable products to 
generate profit. Work is becoming increasingly subjectified, both enabling and 
obliging workers to be subjects of work through psychotechniques which recruit 
the subjective potentials of individual workers to further capitalist interests. 
Subjectivities are formed, managed and exchanged so that ‘the prescription and 
definition of tasks transforms into a prescription of subjectivities’ (Lazzarato, 
1996: 135). Appropriation of subjectivities operates through the psychotechnical 
tools of organisational power where workers’ autonomy becomes a disciplinary 
project of control and extraction. The aim of psychotechniques of subjectification 
is to form the self according to a fixed set of characteristics, such as the 
entrepreneurial self (Wee & Brooks, 2011) or the enterprise self (McNay, 2009), 
which becomes the form for socially acceptable individual self-development in 
general: ‘work’s focus on precisely individual accomplishments and obligatory 
autonomy has changed its character to such an extent that it has been reduced to a 
tool by which to fulfil the objective of individual competencies, projects and 
strategies’ (Petersen & Willig, 2004: 342; see also Honneth, 2004). Workers are 
obliged to submit to this psychotechnical project of engineering selves in order to 
remain economic players, causing them to engage in ‘play acting’ activities of 
self-presentation, but leading to dissociation from their identities, rendering them 
vulnerable to psychological harms of anxiety and fragmentation (Goffman 1959; 
Sennett 1998; see Garrety, 2007). The conception of autonomy constituting the 
core of this project of appropriation is a very thin notion of autonomy, whereby 
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autonomy as control over work processes is transformed into a type of ‘pseudo 
autonomy’ (Petersen & Willig, 2004: 342), tied to heteronomously given 
objectives of efficiency and productivity: ‘The expectation of individual 
autonomy is devalued by the individual’s need to follow the requirements of 
efficiency and productivity and her/his exposure to constant efficiency tests’ (ibid: 
342). As a consequence, an individual’s ability to act from normative demands is 
undermined, and her autonomy in work is reduced to marketing the self as a 
bundle of exchangeable capacities (ibid.).   
But against inevitable submission to the forces of self-commodification, 
Garrety (2007) identifies a dualism in the management of subjectivities argument 
which opposes the vulnerable fragile self, under pressure from the management 
project, to the resilient self, resisting imposed formation of her subjectivity by 
carving out a private identity or using organisational identities for her own 
purposes. Hochschild (1983), for example, describes a process of ‘deep acting’, or 
self-management, where workers try to become the prescribed organisational self. 
And she advises that workers ‘reclaim the managed heart’ by forging a ‘‘healthy’ 
estrangement’ in which they ‘clearly define for themselves when they are acting 
and when they are not; they know when their deep or surface acting is ‘their own’ 
and when it is part of the commercial show’ (ibid: 187-188). However, many 
individuals possess a limited ability to foster a resilient self through healthy 
estrangement, because such strategies of resistance impose psychological 
penalties, making a resilient self difficult to maintain. This is because, in cases of 
‘too much acting’ (Garrety, 2007), resistance to manipulation is achieved only 
through workers offering a public presentation of the self which is not their real 
inner self, generating psychological costs to the worker in the form of strain, 
anxiety, and even depression. Consequently, the difficulty of maintaining an 
inauthentic self produces a ‘special kind of alienation from self’ (Goffman, 1959: 
229), in the form of internal conflicts, as workers are forced to work on 
themselves to produce and present inauthentic selves for public consumption. In 
sum, the conditions of subjective alienation support the entrenchment of objective 
alienation by aligning affective identity with the purposes of the organisation.  
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As a consequence of subjective alienation, being able to appropriate 
meaning content to one’s life because of the work one does is increasingly 
difficult in modern organisations, structured as they are by ‘a minimal ontology of 
a relatively pliable world susceptible to technical domination’ (Connolly, 1995: 
3). The management of subjectivity is a key feature of contemporary working life 
which Hancock & Tyler (2001) summarise in the following terms: 
 
‘the management of subjectivity has come to be recognised as 
fundamental to the pursuit of those essentially managerial 
imperatives of functional flexibility and the pursuit of cultural 
homogeneity often associated with so-called flexible or post-
Fordist modes of workplace organisation’ (Hancock & Tyler, 
2001: 565). 
 
 In many economic enterprises, public service organisations and civil 
society associations, intersubjective relations and the ways of being they engender 
are being shaped to an ever greater degree by a management ideology informed by 
the values of efficiency and profit, thereby excluding other values, such as well-
being and environmental sustainability. ‘Engineered corporate cultures’ (Ezzy, 
2001) are management strategies for cultivating consent through self-disciplining 
practices consequent upon employees internalising corporate-crafted modes of 
being, rather than compelling obedience through authoritarian mechanisms such 
as financial rewards and incentives: ‘workplaces with engineered cultures are an 
institutional site for the production of a culture of self-gratificatory narcisstic 
individualism consistent with more general consumerist social relations’ (ibid: 
631). Courpasson & Dany (2003) claim that in order to ensure obedience to 
management authority, ‘post-bureaucratic business firms’ have become 
‘individualised and subjectivized forms of organisation’ (ibid: 1231). Hancock & 
Tyler (2001) describe strategies aimed at the management of subjectivity as 
‘strategic interventions into the perpetual process of becoming a subject at work’ 
(ibid: 569) in which inter-subjective relations between employees – both 
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managerial and non-managerial – are manipulated to serve organisational 
interests, and values such as individual autonomy and trust are co-opted for the 
instrumental purpose of enhancing corporate performance, resulting in ‘a 
hypertrophy of the inner life of the subject’ and ‘eventually mitigates against their 
ability to engage in the kinds of social cooperation which remains central to any 
successful organisational project’ (ibid: 575). This means that the organisation of 
work has increasingly come to rely upon: 
 
‘the goal of an imposed unity – a false reconciliation – of 
corporate identity through the suppression or commodification of 
‘Otherness’ and its concomitant regimes of conflict through the 
management of, among other things, an ontology of 
‘intercorporation’. Difference is thus conflated into an inauthentic 
and alientated subjectivity’ (ibid: 581). 
 
As a result, the experience of autonomy in work has been pushed out by an 
all encompassing strategy to recruit capabilities and subjectivities into an 
organisation of work in which differences are not only suppressed, but made 
redundant by a closed, ‘naturalised’ agreement that there is no other way for the 
work of social cooperation to be organised. If we are to experience autonomy, 
then we had better look elsewhere to private or political life, for there is no 
possibility of it in an economic life dominated by the subjective and objective 
conditions of alienation. 
 
4.0.0 Challenging the Loss of Autonomy Argument 
 
I argue, however, that, whilst both objective and subjective conditions of 
alienation are present in the contemporary experience of work, there is no purely 
alienated work, because objective alienation itself depends upon harnessing the 
irreducible autonomy and subjective potentials in every act of work, thereby 
leaving permanently open the possibility that workers will be able to re-
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appropriate the meaning and content of the work they do with others, and by so 
doing to alter the objective and subjective content of their work. Empirical studies 
in sociology and psychology do show a decline in worker autonomy, defined as 
having a sense of control over one’s work. Using a concept of autonomy as 
control over work tasks, patterns in the Employment in Britain Survey (1992) and 
the Skills Surveys (1997-2001) show that there has been an overall reduction in 
employee task discretion from 1992-2001: the number who said they had a great 
deal of influence over how hard they worked fell from 71% in 1992 to 64% in 
1997 to 51% in 2001, and the number who said they had a great deal of influence 
over their choice of task fell from 42% in 1992 to 31% in 2001 (Gallie et al., 
2004). Studies show that where there are reduced opportunities for decision-
making then job satisfaction declines, indicating that workers continue to 
subjectively value the experience of being able to exercise autonomy in work 
(Blumberg, 1968; Patchen, 1970; Green, 2006). But, whilst these studies provide a 
degree of support for the loss of autonomy argument, they do not provide 
conclusive evidence for an irreparable loss of autonomy in work, consistent with 
critical theory’s abandonment of work as an arena for emancipatory action. Whilst 
I agree that contemporary work has multiplied the harmful characteristics of work, 
I argue also that the loss of autonomy argument presents a narrative of work as 
irredeemably degraded and devoid of autonomous action which does not stand up 
to the evidence of what people actually do in work. I propose that it is possible to 
identify a floor-level of irreducible autonomy in every act of work which, when 
revealed by workers themselves through engagement in democratic practices of 
public evaluation, provides the normative pre-condition for realising personal 
autonomy as constitutive of the meaning content of work.  
The loss of autonomy argument is motivated by Marx’s theory of 
estranged labour, but Marx’s theory contains a dualism opposing alienated work 
to craft work – a dualism which has been criticised for tying the concept of work 
to ‘a nostalgic ideal of pre-industrial artisanal work and to an essentialist ontology 
of labour’ (Weeks, 2007: 243; see also Adler, 2004). Consequently, the 
oppressions and power asymmetries of craft labour, as well as the potentials for 
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autonomy and self-development in industrialised work, are omitted from the 
critical evaluation of work (see Rosser, 1997). Pruijit (2000) points out that 
because Taylorism is a rule transparent bureaucratic system it was seen as a 
protection against arbitrary interference, hence the unions’ support of Taylorism 
in the 1920s. Adler (2004) argues that ‘Taylorism may well have been negative 
for craft workers; but just as plausibly it constituted a net improvement for the far 
greater mass of less skilled labourers and operatives’ (ibid: 8). Taylorism 
increases the need for coordination, inter-dependence and a broader understanding 
of the work process, thereby fostering the pre-conditions for the socialisation of 
production which workers can appropriate to advance their interests. And he 
identifies the ways in which work, organised according to the principle of 
Taylorism, retains possibilities for autonomous action which workers can 
appropriate for their own purposes: ‘Taylorism was also a progressive step in the 
socialisation of the forces of production, both objective and subjective’ (ibid: 8; 
see also Sohn-Rethel, 1978). Adler defines socialisation as ‘the process whereby 
people new to a culture internalise its norms’ (ibid: 6): thus, forces of production 
are socialised in an objective sense through an increasingly complex social 
division of labour, and in a subjective sense through the realisation of innate 
human capabilities for solidaristic social relations (ibid:6-7).Through processes of 
socialisation which aim at the conditions for personal autonomy as a pre-condition 
for political autonomy, Taylorism has the potential to make a positive contribution 
to the objective and subjective dimensions of non-alienated, autonomous 
production by: firstly, creating a body of socialised knowledge which workers can 
use to secure their interests, secondly, enabling workers to gain access to a wider 
variety of roles because an increasingly ‘differentiated and integrated division of 
labour’ requires specialist planning functions and a range of technical and support 
roles, and thirdly, requiring workers to engage in intentional coordination with 
others, thereby gaining a more complete understanding of the object of their work 
so that ‘when mobilised in these tasks, workers find their horizons broadened’ 
(ibid: 8). Therefore, whilst there can be no doubt that Taylorism is capable of 
generating alienated, heteronomous work, it is by no means inevitable that it 
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should do so in all circumstances, for instance, when a democratised coordinating 
authority employs such techniques with the knowledge and participatory consent 
of all those who will be subject to them. 
In my view, the dualistic opposition of heteronomous work, as divided 
alienated work, to autonomous work, as complete non-alienated craft work, fails 
to identify ways in which autonomy operates within even degraded, deskilled 
work. I suggest that identifying a floor-level of irreducible autonomy in every act 
of work allows us to specify the limits to the ability of some persons to impose the 
burdens of an unfavourable organisation of work upon others, and provides the 
grounds for a new organisation of work which meets the terms of a positive 
critical conception of meaningful work. Work can be more or less alienated, and 
no work is entirely autonomous or entirely heteronomous. Autonomy itself is 
never perfectly achieved. If autonomy is conceptualised in terms of the liberal 
ideal of the independent freely choosing sovereign individual, then the conditions 
of any work at all must be opposed to autonomy, because all work involves 
accepting the constraining conditions implicated in joining our actions to those of 
others. When we take up responsibilities to persons, animals and objects, we are 
required to form our decisions and actions according to already specified 
necessities, the nature of which is interior to the objects themselves.  
But, although our experience of autonomy is partial, this does not mean 
that we fail to be autonomous beings. If autonomy is conceptualised in terms of 
right actions in relation to the responsibilities of care we have towards worthy 
objects which we fulfil by engaging with others in acts of joint agency, then what 
it means to be autonomous becomes constituted by our substantive relations to 
self, others, activities and objects in the work we do together. I suggest that the 
concept of autonomy which best describes how autonomy, although a partial 
achievement, becomes constitutive of a life we have reason to value is the 
distinctly feminist concept of relational autonomy (Meyers, 2000). I argue that the 
possibility of personal autonomy in work, where personal autonomy is understood 
as relational autonomy, constituted by and exercised through intersubjective 
relations, is indicated by a floor-level of irreducible autonomy in every act of 
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work. The concept of irreducible autonomy provides the content for the immanent 
potential of work because, even in conditions of objective alienation, it gives rise 
to interpretive differences. Although many of these interpretive differences remain 
fallow as political potentials because they are invisible, misrecognised or 
appropriated by others, I propose that interpretive differences become the material 
for the exercise of the political mode of being in work when they are brought into 
public deliberation through democratic practices at the level of the task. To judge 
interpretive differences within the structure of the bipartite value of 
meaningfulness demands a kind of reasoning which allows us to evaluate our 
actions and orientations against the standard of an ethic of caring for the worthy 
objects one has appropriated to one’s life. However, the kind of reasoning we 
need to employ in interpretive meaning-making includes, but also exceeds, 
technical rationality, and I consider how a rationality of caring can be described 
using the concept of phronetic techne (Dunne, 1993). 
 
4.1.0 Theorising Irreducible Autonomy 
 
I argue that there is no work from which autonomy has been entirely 
eliminated.  Following the theoretical work of Dejours (2006), I use the idea of a 
floor-level of irreducible autonomy in every act of work to: firstly, justify the 
institution of democratic practices in work, and secondly, claim that such practices 
embody a relational concept of personal autonomy where, to be consistent with a 
positive critical conception of meaningful work, the relevant intersubjective 
relations must meet certain normative characteristics. Dejours draws upon the 
evidence from ethnographic studies which go beyond descriptions of work as 
given by organisational rules to examine the content of the work that people 
actually do, and to identify the active agency of workers in all acts of work (see 
Daniellou, 2005). In addition, Dejours employs Wisner’s (1995) conceptual 
understanding of the experience of work: Wisner (1995) concludes from his 
evaluation of ethnographies of work that work can be defined as ‘the coordinated 
activity deployed by men and women in order to face that which, in a utilitarian 
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task, cannot be obtained through the strict application of the prescribed 
organisation’ (Wisner, 1995). Dejours (2006) argues that all work requires the 
overcoming of rules in the confrontation between the agent and material realities, 
resulting in a struggle which is both a source of suffering and the grounds for the 
formation of subjectivity. The irreducible autonomy in every act of work 
overthrows assumptions that hierarchical authority administering impartiality, 
knowledge and coordination is the best way of ensuring that work gets done. It 
shows that the very nature of work is constituted by the actions of workers who 
seek to reunite means and ends at the level of the task by adapting, subverting and 
confounding constraining organisational rules. Even though much of this work is 
rendered invisible and put beyond deliberative evaluation, it is a potentially rich 
source of the intersubjective encounters which are constitutive of skill and identity 
formation. Thus: 
 
‘[...] even where work is well conceived, even when the 
organisation of work is rigorous, even when the instructions and 
procedures are clear, it is impossible to achieve quality if the 
orders are scrupulously respected. Indeed ordinary work 
situations are rife with unexpected events, breakdowns, incidents, 
operational anomalies, organisational inconsistency and things 
that are simply impossible to predict, arising from the materials, 
tools, and machines as well as from other workers, colleagues, 
bosses, subordinates, the team, the chain of authority, the clients, 
and so on. In short, there is no such thing as purely mechanical 
work’ (Dejours, 2006: 47, emphasis added). 
 
Dejours’s argument for the impossibility of ‘purely mechanical work’ 
shows us how actual human action in joint coordination supersedes and opposes 
prescribed human action, indicating an irreducible level of individual autonomy in 
all acts of work which cannot be controlled or eliminated by rule-based, 
Taylorised forms of work organisation. Dejours develops a triangular definition of 
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work which integrates the psychological, the technical and the cultural along three 
dimensions: 
 
Ego-real: the instrumental moment in which the act of work takes 
place which involves an encounter between the worker and the 
real. The real is whatever resists the activity of the worker, 
engendering a sense of frustration, powerlessness and 
disappointment. 
 
Real-others: the efficiency of the act which is also social because 
it is the product of social judgement guided by instrumental 
constraints and socially formed valuations of what makes an act 
of work efficient 
 
Ego-others: the cultural moment constituted by the inter-
subjective relation within the work collective (however that is 
structured) which enables the transmission of technique, the 
formation of judgements of value, and the social integration of 
the act of work into the division of labour (Deranty, 2009: 71ff). 
 
‘The Real’ element of work consists in ‘all elements of the concrete reality 
of work which cannot be anticipated, regulated or coordinated in advance’ 
(Dejours, 2009: 79), where ‘the real’ can be social as well as material. The real 
opens up a gap between the prescribed rules and the constraining conditions of the 
world, demanding that the active agency of the worker be applied to bridge the 
gap so that acts of work achieve their purposes. All work is therefore embodied 
rather than immaterial; simultaneously theoretical and practical, making 
subjective investment on the part of the agent unavoidable: ‘without subjective 
mobilisation, no production is possible’ (Deranty, 2009: 81). This means that, in 
order to complete tasks – which often involves unifying means and ends divided 
by the technical division of labour - workers must subvert rules in labours which 
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are rendered invisible by rule-transparent hierarchy (Deranty, 2009). Coming up 
against the resistance of the real creates a moment of potential self-formation, 
especially where there is cooperative working and recognition of the worker’s 
efforts, skill, and contribution. In the follow sections, I shall examine the 
intersubjective dimensions of skill and material objects, and of subjectivities and 
other persons, which allow us to see that intersubjective relations in work are not 
defined solely by the efficiency of the act, but that efficiency itself is a value 
which is subject to meaning-making, and therefore interpretive difference, 
drawing upon other values, such as well-being, caring, solidarity and usefulness 
(see Braybrooke, 1998c). 
 
4.1.1 Skill and Relations to Material Objects 
 
In the loss of autonomy argument, conditions of objective alienation are 
established through progressive deskilling. In Dejours’s ego-real encounters, 
however, workers must acquire and apply skill to overcome social, technological 
and material resistances in their environment. Green (2006) characterises skill as 
distinctively human: ‘the utilization of skill is an end in itself, with intrinsic value. 
Engagement in complex production processes, requiring both conception and 
execution of tasks in various measures, is the hallmark of distinctively human 
production activity, and is the means by which people have the potential for self-
fulfilment’ (ibid: 16). Skill formation relates us to the objects, technology and 
social systems which constitute part of the real or the total environment without 
which ‘the properly human cannot exist’ (Latour & Venn, 2002: 252). Latour & 
Venn (2002) argues that, along with morality, technology is a mode of existence, 
or ‘a particular form of exploring existence, a particular form of the exploration of 
being – in the midst of many others’ (ibid: 248). Material objects do not exist 
apart from us as inert objects which we make conform to our purposes; instead, 
they shape our cognitive and emotional capabilities as we learn to engage with 
them, and come to acknowledge the potentials and limitations they present to 
realising different modes of being (ibid: 251). Material reality is a structured set of 
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intersubjective relations between people, living beings, social systems and 
material objects which is not static, but is dynamic and mutually adjusting. 
Appadurai (1986) puts this in terms of ‘the social life of things’ where an object 
cannot be understood apart from ‘the analysis of the network this object or 
technique is part of’ (Faure-Rouesnel, 2001: 242). Material objects, bodies and 
space form part of a network of social relations, and indeed are constitutive of 
social relations: ‘their active participation in a process of social self-creation in 
which they are directly constitutive of our understanding of ourselves and others’ 
(Miller, 1987: 115). This means that our practical identities are shaped by our 
intersubjective encounters with materiality, forming or stunting our capacities to 
be producers of meaning. 
Thus, the loss of autonomy argument, based upon perceptions of 
deskilling, is weakened by alternative interpretations of what people actually do in 
work, which do not support a dualistic opposition between craft work and 
alienated work. Attewell (1990) suggests that Braverman’s deskilling thesis 
unfavourably links skill with control, such that lack of control must imply lack of 
skill, and that, in a rule-bound environment, all that workers require in terms of 
skills are basic abilities to read, write and follow instructions: ‘Rule-governed 
work [...] implies that work is completely predictable’ (Attewell, 1990: 442). But 
Attewell (2009) argues that this is to misunderstand the role that rules play in the 
experience of work: ‘rules – however authoritarian and detailed – provide little 
more than a schematic for work, a guide into which employees insert their 
abilities in classifying, choosing, interacting, persuading, and so on’ (ibid: 443). 
Workers operating within rule-bound environments are not unskilled, in fact they 
must employ a wide range of complex skills which are simply hidden from 
organisational view, undervalued and dismissed by those who believe they are 
entitled to appropriate the task of planning the organisation of work. Kusterer 
(1978) suggests that one reason for the devaluation of ‘unskilled’ work is that, if 
the work requires general skills which many people possess or can acquire, then 
the skills involved must be less important than the skills which are practised only 
by a few. Kusterer recorded the following interview with a machine operator: 
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‘‘I don’t know why you want to interview me. You don’t have to 
know anything to do my job.’ Three hours later, too exhausted to 
keep writing down all she knew, I brought the interview to a 
close. As I was preparing to leave, she told me something entirely 
different, and this too is typical. ‘This was real interesting. You 
don’t get to stop and think about things like this, usually...It really 
makes you think, all the things we do that we don’t even realize’’ 
(Kusterer, 1978: 187). 
 
Skill is constructed through our relations to material objects, and through 
our relations to others. Adler (2004), for example, identifies two components to 
skill: ‘mastery of the complexity of the tasks required of workers in their jobs, and 
mastery of the relations that coordinate activity across these tasks’ (ibid: 4-5). 
Thus, skills are not acquired and exercised in relational isolation, but are socially 
constructed, making the interpenetration of social relations with task content 
necessary for skill development (Littler, 1982). Wenger (2000) argues that to 
develop skill-based capabilities, we must belong to a social learning system which 
is constituted by three elements: firstly, communities of practice; secondly, 
boundaries between communities of practice; and thirdly, identity formation by 
participation in at least one community of practice. Institutions, practices and roles 
are sources of the intersubjective encounters through which we develop skill and 
competence. Wenger (2000: 229) says that communities of practice are containers 
of the competences that make up the social learning system where competence 
emerges out of a sense of joint enterprise, relations of mutuality which reflect 
interactions, norms of behaviour and expectations, and a shared repertoire of 
resources in the form of ‘languages, routines, sensibilities, artefacts, tools, stories, 
styles, etc.’ (ibid: 229). Boundaries, because they connect people to different 
practices, are sources of learning, innovation and identity formation, where 
practical identity is not simply consequent upon activities and relationships but is 
also constitutive of our knowledge and skill formation. Wenger (2000) comments 
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upon claim processors in an insurance company as follows: ‘I noticed that their 
knowing was interwoven in profound ways with their identities as participants in 
their community of practice’ (ibid: 238) in which ‘knowing too much or failing to 
share a crucial piece of knowledge would be a betrayal of their sense of self and 
of their community’ (ibid 239; Wenger, 1998).  Barley & Kunda (2001) 
characterise communities of practice as networks of practitioners in which 
knowledge is unevenly distributed, and where practitioners must actively mobilise 
the resources of the community to solve problems. In contemporary work, rather 
than deskilling leading to loss of autonomy and objective alienation, the 
increasing complexity of tasks and the broadening of necessary social relations 
points towards a general uplift in the content of skills requirements (Adler, 2004: 
2; 1990).  
In communities of practice, people exercise their meaning-making 
capabilities intersubjectively through practical encounters with material realities, 
generating different interpretations of their work, or ‘difference potentials’, which 
I argue can be articulated by and made expressive of the political mode of being 
when framed by democratic practices. Orr’s (1997) classic study of Xerox’s 
copier repair technicians shows how technicians make little reference to formal 
programs and documentation, but instead pass on knowledge to one another 
through ‘war stories’: ‘technical knowledge is encoded in and transferred through 
the narratives that technicians recount for themselves and one another’ (Barley & 
Kunda, 2001: 88). Commenting upon the continuing importance of Orr’s work, 
Barley (1996) says: ‘Orr documents and develops the important and 
counterintuitive notion that technical knowledge is best viewed as a socially 
distributed resource that is diffused and stored primarily through an oral culture’ 
(ibid: xiii). Knowledge and skill is constructed from intersubjective meaning-
making encounters which are framed by the norms, values and standards of 
communities of practice. Bechky (1998; 2003) in her ethnographical study of 
engineers, technicians and assemblers in high-tech manufacturing shows that the 
meanings that the work has for the worker shape the knowledge and skill they 
acquire. Consequently, the most basic means workers require to accomplish their 
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work – their knowledge, skill and sense of identity – is intersubjectively formed 
and reproduced through their relations with others in joint working. Marchand 
(2010) in his review of the literature on embodied cognition suggests that whilst 
cognition is individual, making knowledge is ‘a process entailing coordinated 
interaction between interlocutors and practitioners with their total environment’ 
(ibid: 2). In the concept of embodied cognition, mind and environment are so 
inextricably linked that cognition itself is emergent from their interactions: ‘our 
cognitive processes are constituted through our embodied engagement in the 
world and predicated on inter-subjectivity’ (Toren, 1993: 467, original emphasis). 
Drawing on Clark’s (1997) influential ‘extended mind’ thesis, Adenzato & 
Garbarini (2006) describe the mind as ‘an emerging property of the brain’ (ibid: 
748) where mind is grounded ‘in body experience and interwoven with action and 
interaction with other individuals’ (ibid: 748). They cite Ingold’s (2000) 
reflections upon apprenticeship which leads him to conclude that: ‘meaning is not 
the form the mind imposes onto the flow of purely perceptible data, through 
innate or learned schemas, but that it is continually generated in the relational 
involvement contexts that people pursue in their surrounding world’ (Adenzato & 
Garbarini, 2006: 753). Communities of practice structure our relations to others in 
the joint undertakings which require an investment of time, effort and subjectivity 
in order to develop the skills relevant to the internal goods embodied in the 
practice.  
Thus, the frustrations and struggles people experience when grappling 
with material realities stimulates differing interpretations of the meaning of their 
work. Although these difference potentials are often invisible and unarticulated, 
they provide a reservoir of knowledge, understanding and skill development 
enabling workers to bridge the gap between prescribed and actual work. I 
conclude, therefore, that such difference potentials are a rich source of values 
formation, challenging the hegemony of efficiency as the sole value determining 
action, and providing the material for political self-determination in work, when 
the conditions for democratic participation pertain. 
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4.1.2 Subjectivities and Relations to Others  
 
When people work together, they join their capacities with those of others 
in the shared production of knowledge and skill, which emerges from active 
meaning-making between participants embedded in a context, or ‘community of 
practice’, including ‘artefacts, tools-to-hand, and raw materials; space, place and 
architecture; paths and boundaries; time-frames and temporal rhythms; light, 
darkness, and weather’ (Marchand, 2010: 2). This is not simply a technical 
exercise of coordination, but demands intersubjective encounters with other 
persons, where the marshalling of one’s subjectivity through reflecting with others 
upon the meanings of values interior to the content of work is intrinsic to the work 
process itself. Such interactions shape our sense of self, making subjective 
formations vulnerable to recruitment by a management project which seeks to 
profit from the voluntary cooperation of workers by exploiting subjective affects. 
For example, networked forms of work organisation lacking a hierarchical 
structure to enforce involvement attempt to mould subjective formation (cf. Ezzy, 
2001), but, in the absence of opportunities for workers to deliberate over the 
framing rules which structure the terms of their cooperation, the participation of 
workers under such conditions cannot be considered ‘uncoerced’. But even though 
such organisations structure forms of compulsion, this does not mean workers’ 
subjectivities are co-opted without remainder into the management project. 
Indeed, the management of subjectivities argument overemphasises the ability of 
cultural engineering to align the individual self to organisational goals (Garrety, 
2007), because workers seek to exercise agency, and indeed they must exercise 
agency if they are to get the work done. The irreducible autonomy in every act of 
work challenges the idea that organisational control over the formation of the self 
can be absolute: organisational controls over the self are more or less effective, 
providing opportunities for resistance and alternative subjective formations, 
although I acknowledge that psychological costs and power asymmetries means 
that workers cannot always maintain internal autonomy over their true selves. But 
internal fragmentation, as a result of simultaneous resistance to, and 
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accommodation of, pressures to align self-conception to organisational purposes is 
not inevitable: Ashforth & Tomiuk (2000), for example, found that occasional 
acting did not alienate service workers who acknowledged an alignment between 
the requirement of their job and their sense of self. Rau (2011) proposes that 
psychotechniques do not necessitate oppression, but can instead form the basis of 
a psychopolitics of emancipation, where workers not only work on the self using 
defensive strategies of resistance, but also claim the subjective experience of work 
as a source of self-realisation. Thus, workers do not accept the management of 
subjectivity without awareness and protest: ‘workers do not simply acquiesce to 
engineered culture’ (Ezzy, 2001: 634): Kunda (1992) highlights how employees 
see themselves as engaged in a kind of game or role-play; Graham (1995) shows 
how new recruits manipulate the selection process so that ‘over a period of time, 
team members withdrew their active participation from company rituals and 
resorted to open acts of defiance and resistance against management and company 
philosophy’ (Graham, 1995: 117); McCabe (2007) identifies the resilience of 
unionism in an environment of radical restructuring around team-working 
designed to undermine collective action and the forms of identity upon which 
such action depends.  
A further compelling example of how interpretive differences feed into a 
psychopolitics of emancipation is provided by the activity of ‘job crafting’, which 
consists in ‘the physical and cognitive changes individuals make in the task or 
relational boundaries of their work’ (Wrezesniewski & Ditton, 2001). In job 
crafting, workers make ‘unsupervised, spontaneous changes in their jobs’ (Lyons, 
2008: 165) through actions which are hidden from organisational view, and which 
therefore avoid including management in decision-making about how the job is 
being altered. Documented acts of job crafting have been found to be motivated 
by the desire to achieve the purposes of the work to best effect, and to enable 
workers to experience a sense of enhanced personal efficacy: ‘job crafting seems 
to help individuals to be feel better about themselves and to enable them to 
perceive they have more control over what they do on the job’ (Lyons, 2008: 36). 
An important indicator of irreducible autonomy from the most recent research on 
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job crafting is that, rather than being marginal or the preoccupation of exceptional 
individuals, job crafting is both widespread and necessary to getting the work 
done (Berg et al, 2010).  
Weeks (2007), in an attempt to break down distinctions between 
reproductive and productive work, suggests that, rather than thinking in terms of a 
true versus an alienated self, we conceive of a potential self, where ‘the self at 
work could thus be judged in relation to a self that one might wish to become, and 
both work and non-work then could be accessed in relation to the possibility of 
becoming different’ (ibid: 246). Recognising different subjective formations in the 
creative process of becoming requires us to acknowledge the dialectical 
relationship between an inner self and a public self, opening up ‘a discursive 
space’ which operates between different action contexts and timespaces of work 
‘from which individuals can evaluate, resist and adapt’ (Garrety, 2007: 25). I 
suggest that discursive spaces mobilise intersubjective encounters with others 
from which interpretive differences over meanings, values and purposes of work 
arise, but that most of these interpretive differences will remain as pre-political 
‘difference potentials’, invisible, ignored, or perhaps appropriated into a 
management project of engineered selves, unless they given are voice through 
public evaluation structured by democratic practices. Aronson & Neysmith (2006) 
describe how the identities of care workers are put under strain by job description 
processes which render invisible, and therefore difficult to contest, the emotional 
labour which is central to effective home care. They also explore how displaced 
care workers who had been made redundant from their not-for-profit employer – 
which failed to compete in the creation of a new market for home care – were 
unable to protest effectively because, rather than locating the responsibility for 
their loss in government policy, they blamed themselves for lacking flexibility and 
sufficient self-interest. I do not think it is too small a step to imagine how 
democratic practices might have enabled them to mount a protest exposing the 
exploitative character of the structures of meaning governing their work, and thus 
to collectively sustain their identities based upon the value they placed upon the 
affective dimensions of their caring labour.  
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Furthermore, democratic practices are protective of workers’ interests in 
retaining control over the knowledge and skills inherent to difference potentials. 
Kocyba (2011) warns that making the processes and practices of work activity 
visible through ‘radical transparency’ means that workers’ efforts become 
vulnerable to expropriation. In some instances, making work visible can conflict 
with the internal goods of the practice, for example, caring for others sometimes 
involves making one’s activities invisible in order to secure the cared for person’s 
sense of autonomy. Thus, we should not aim at transparency without also aiming 
at the participatory consent of workers, upon whose skill, knowledge and 
capabilities for meaning-making the work of social cooperation depends. 
Additionally, when we create difference potentials we are exercising our status 
and capabilities as valuers, but this does not mean that difference potentials are 
automatically transformative of the interior content of work. To realise their 
emancipatory potential, interpretive differences must be brought into public 
discourse through the exercise of the political mode of being. Difference 
potentials, or diverse interpretations of the meanings, values and purposes arising 
from acts of work, indicate the presence of an immanent core of irreducible 
autonomy in work. And this core of irreducible autonomy grounds the possibility 
for personal autonomy at the level of the task, which, when brought into public 
deliberation at the level of the organisation through democratic practices, makes 
possible political autonomy as collective self-determination. Difference potentials, 
however, will remain pre-political until they are visibilised through public 
discourse at the level of the task and at the level of the organisation.  
In sum, autonomy in work is given by control, not only over the material 
dimensions of work, but also over the meanings of work, that is, the interpretive 
differences arising from the interactions with self-other-real which occur during 
the work of social cooperation. But to understand how we promote participatory 
practices which are productive of difference demands an appreciation of the 
relational dimensions of personal autonomy, where intersubjective encounters in 
the work of social cooperation must possess the relevant normative characteristics 
to encourage the equal participation of all meaning-makers. Interpretive 
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differences indicate that personal autonomy over meaning-making is a 
fundamentally relational capability – a capability which is a pre-condition for 
political self-determination in a system of workplace democracy which operates at 
the level of the task and at the level of the organisation.  
 
5.0.0 Rationality of Caring in the Value of Meaningfulness 
 
Interpretive differences remain as pre-political potentials until they are 
activated by democratic practices at the level of task, and this requires the exercise 
of the political mode of being. By enabling the political mode of being in work, 
we reconstitute both the content of work so that people gain discursive, embodied 
and practical control over the tasks they do and the purposes for which they do 
them, and the social bases for the constitution of selves by enriching the sources 
of identity formation and narrative possibilities which contribute to a life of 
meaning. However, in order to realise the emancipatory potential of irreducible 
autonomy, we need a fuller concept of personal autonomy than the pseudo-
autonomy offered by managerial practices of appropriation, one which enables a 
person to voice their differences and to add their capabilities to those of others in 
uncoerced joint action (cf. Pettit & Schweikard, 2006). I propose that applying a 
concept of relational autonomy to irreducible agency helps us to understand how 
invisibilised acts of work can be brought into the public domain through 
democratic practices which aim at developing the meaning-making capabilities 
essential to getting the work done. A relational concept of autonomy allows us to 
specify the normative dimensions of personal autonomy in work which is the pre-
condition for political autonomy in the democratic practices enabling all work to 
meet the threshold of sufficient meaning.  Mackenzie & Stoljar (2000) describe 
relational autonomy in the following terms: 
 
‘They point to the need to think of autonomy as a characteristic of 
agents who are emotional, embodied, desiring, creative, and 
feeling, as well as rational, creatures; and they highlight the ways 
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in which agents are both psychically internally differentiated and 
socially differentiated from others’ (ibid: 21). 
 
The formation and exercise of the capacity for personal autonomy is 
shaped by our relations to others; thus, activities rich in relationality are vital to 
being able to experience personal autonomy. But acts of work which are rich in 
relationality, if they are to produce intersubjective relations consistent with the 
bipartite value of meaningfulness, require the exercise of a rationality which 
exceeds technical reasoning. I propose that the particular kind of rationality which 
is conducive to experiencing the bipartite value of meaningfulness in work is one 
which arises out of our efforts to fulfil our responsibilities of care for the worthy 
objects we have appropriated to the meaning content of our lives.  
 
5.1.0 A Practical Rationality of Caring 
 
To discharge our responsibilities of care, and thus to be able to claim that 
we have legitimately appropriated worthy objects to the meaning content of our 
lives, requires the capability to exercise a rationality of caring, which takes the 
particularity of worthy objects, and how they structure the meaning content of our 
lives, into account. A practical rationality of caring is one where the ends are not 
specified in advance, but emerge out of the developing needs of the worthy object 
in question. To be able to exercise a practical rationality of caring, we must 
possess the capability to respond with intelligent feeling to an evolving situation, 
which demands experience, intuition, practical knowledge, as well as commitment 
to the standards determined by the relevant practice of care. Furthermore, when 
the worthy object is a person, a practical rationality of caring requires an 
engagement with the cared for, such that we do not assume we know in advance 
what their needs are, but negotiate an understanding of their needs through mutual 
interaction (cf. Fraser, 1989). Thus, a capability for intelligent feeling is not based 
upon obeying automatically rules of care, set out prior to action, but crafts caring 
relations attentive to the particular needs of worthy objects.  
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I suggest that a practical rationality of caring useful to realising the 
bipartite value of meaningfulness can be described using Dunne’s (1993) 
rationality of phronetic techne, which he draws out from Aristotle’s distinction 
between two different kinds of practical knowledge: poiesis (production) and 
praxis (action) (cf. Breen, 2011; see also Murphy, 1993). In an Aristotelian 
conception of action, poiesis is the mode of producing or making, in which the 
goal that is pursued is external to the action itself; and praxis is the mode of 
acting, in which there is no product and the action is meaningful in itself. Dunne 
(1993) unites the technical and pragmatic requirements of poiesis to the 
expressive valuing and judging of praxis in the rationality of phronetic techne, 
where techne is a person’s knowledge of the principles and techniques inherent to 
the practice in which they are engaged, and phronesis is the way in which that 
same person acquires understanding of how to live well ‘not in the making of any 
product separate from oneself but rather in one’s actions with one’s fellows’ (ibid: 
244). Dunne opposes ‘monopolistic reason’, which he defines as ‘masterful, 
autonomous, technocratic and logocentric’ justified by ‘materiality, contingency, 
vulnerability, nature, and embodiment’ (ibid: 355), to ‘phronetic techne’ where 
‘responsiveness to the situation is not fully specifiable in advance and which is 
experiential, charged with perceptiveness, and rooted in the sensory and emotional 
life’ (ibid.). Dunne says that production, governed by technical reasoning, has 
been the dominant rationality in the development of modern capitalist societies, 
giving rise to ambitions to control and master the contingencies of living through 
rigid specification of rules and the elimination of individual judgement. A 
technicist rationality aims ‘to construe specific tasks as value neutral and to 
immunize them [...] against the human condition’ (Dunne, 1993: 244). In contrast, 
the rationality of phronetic techne acknowledges the simultaneity of phronesis 
with techne, such that to be a person of practical knowledge, uniting the 
rationalities of techne and phronesis, is to be a ‘feeling, expressing and acting 
person’ whose ‘knowledge is inseparable from one as such’ (ibid: 358). This 
means that technical knowledge is not divorced from ethical thinking, but is 
instead constructed through ethico-political modes of interacting with others and 
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the material world. Dunne says that to act out of phronetic techne is to see oneself 
as immersed in networks of intersubjective relations, and to exercise efficacy as 
influence, rather than efficacy as efficiency; and especially to recognise one’s 
nonsovereignty in situations requiring us to respond with intelligent feeling (ibid: 
359). The necessity for responsive relationality in the successful practice of 
phronetic techne suggests that phronetic techne constitutes a pragmatic, everyday 
capability, which people already exercise in their ordinary activities in order to 
fulfil their responsibilities towards worthy objects – and is therefore susceptible to 
inclusion into a rationality of caring. If we conceive of a practical rationality of 
caring in terms of ‘phronetic techne’, we are directed beyond rationalities 
predicated upon an automatic response to pre-given technical determinants to a 
mode of reasoning requiring responsiveness to the situation, and evaluated against 
standards inherent to the community of practice in which the action is framed. 
Moreover, when we exercise phronetic techne in the intersubjective relations 
between self and other, and self and materiality, then interpretive differences 
arising from encounters with others and with material realities generates values, 
which are not simply read off from action, but are constitutive of action itself: 
 
‘Human behaviour is really human to the extent to which it means 
acting into the world. This, in turn, implies being motivated by 
the world. In fact, the world toward which a human being 
transcends itself is a world replete with meanings that constitute 
reasons to act and full as well of other human beings to love’ 
(Frankl, 2004: 93). 
 
Because phronetic techne does not rely upon pre-given technical solutions, 
but requires open-ended evaluation and judgement crafted to the demands of 
particular situations, then to exercise phronetic techne is to engage in meaning-
making, where meanings are created from the interpretive differences which arise 
from the work people do together to care for worthy objects. This requires, I 
suggest, a kind of authority in conceiving, speaking and negotiating which Tirrell 
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(1993) identifies as a form of ‘power of naming’ (Daly, 1973: 9). An authority 
which allows us to engage in ‘the distinctively human activity of defining, 
describing, and re-creating ourselves while simultaneously defining, describing 
and re-creating our social and material world’ (Tirrell, 1993: 2). In order to 
participate in activities of meaning-making which produce the world (including 
our selves), then we require ‘semantic authority’ which is ‘a matter of having a 
say (about something) that others recognize and respect; it is an important, 
perhaps necessary, element in constructing oneself as fully human’ (ibid: 16). 
Meaning-making is thus a distinctively human activity in which ‘I become a 
person and remain one only as an interlocutor’ (Taylor, 1985: 276). In fact, the 
extent to which I am a free person depends upon the degree to which I am 
included or excluded from the means to realise my status as a valuer, and to 
acquire the capabilities for valuing: ‘We are fully human only as creators (and 
inheritors) of values, as beings who make norms and to whom norms apply’ 
(Tirrell, 1993: 7). Tirrell argues that our ability to become valuers depends upon 
our membership of communities, because ‘our past actions and the actions of 
others establish a structure of significance’ (ibid: 13), and we depend upon 
communities to provide a structure of meaning, which ‘give our articulations 
‘uptake’’ (ibid: 15). Communities can embody oppressive intersubjective 
relations, but, as I have already identified in relation to a management ideology 
which seeks to impose a unilateral interpretation of meaning upon the 
subjectivities and actions of workers, no oppressive community is entirely 
successful in closing down on differences in meaning-making (ibid: 10). 
Interpretive differences can lie fallow, or they can be made part of a public 
discourse of sense-making and world-building when we join with others in 
deliberations and disagreements over the value of objects, and the importance they 
should have in our lives. Such joining together in deliberation over interpretive 
differences multiplies the range of positive values within a liberal perfectionist 
framework which can be made available for meaning appropriation, and also 
makes possible emotional engagement consistent with the subjective dimension of 
the bipartite value of meaningfulness. Furthermore, when we evaluate, judge, 
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accept, reject and create meaning out of interpretive differences through the 
application of a rationality of caring, then we are best placed to realise the 
bipartite value of meaningfulness in our lives. And being able to exercise a 
rationality of caring requires us to see ourselves as relationally situated in 
structures of meaning in which we see ourselves as having the status of co-
authorities in the realm of value, and where we possess the capabilities for 
meaning-making. 
 
6.0.0 Conclusion 
 
Simone de Beauvoir said ‘It is in the knowledge of the genuine conditions 
of our life that we must draw strength to live and our reason for acting’ (1948: 9). 
The everyday experience of work provides some of the most important action 
contexts from which we draw our reasons for acting, and for being. I argue that 
acts of work are not irretrievably degraded, devoid of the prospects for personal 
autonomy which is constitutive of meaningfulness, but are replete with 
interpretive differences, as a consequence of ‘the anticipation of the problems by 
workers, responsibilities that are very difficult to evaluate and supervise’ (Sitton, 
1998: 76-77; cf. Offe, 1997; 1985). Bringing the difference potentials inherent to 
the core of agency in every act of work into public discourse requires an 
understanding of the relational dimensions of autonomy, where each meaning-
maker is regarded as a potential or actual carrier of autonomy capabilities. This 
demands democratic practices at the level of the task. In work, to make such 
deliberative processes available to everyone requires, I argue, democratic 
participation at the level of the task and the level of the organisation. The active 
capacities which workers must employ to get the work done justifies their status 
as co-authorities able to edit (and revise) the rules and behaviours framing their 
activities. This means that their status as co-authorities is grounded not only in 
their human status as ends-in-themselves, but also in their activity which bridges 
the gap between prescribed and necessary/actual work. In order to make visible 
encounters with ‘the real’ – or the material realities and irreducible agency in 
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every act of work - workers need to be able to exercise the political mode of being 
in work. This requires a form of workplace democracy which acknowledges the 
realities and the responsibilities of work as they are experienced by workers. 
Deranty (2009) suggests: 
 
‘since the work process requires cooperation between workers, it 
functions best if the individualised forms of subjective investment 
that allow for the mastering of the task are confronted and 
discussed in a public forum, where a consensus can hopefully be 
found on the best way to realize the production’ (Deranty, 2009: 
83).  
 
We may, however, need something different from the consensus that 
Deranty is hopeful of. We may also require a new vocality, or means of 
expression, which will enable disagreement over the meaning of efficiency and 
productivity; challenging of rules and practices; a plurality of perspectives and 
subjective formations; and confrontation of managerial hierarchy based upon 
status and control over decision-making. I shall propose in Chapter Six that 
agonistic democratic practices have the potential to foster a form of workplace 
democracy which recognises the irreducible autonomy in every act of work by 
treating each worker as an irreplaceable contributor, imbued with the potential for 
expressive political agency. This amounts to a normative claim that ‘a just society 
has an obligation to promote autonomy by ensuring that its basic social, legal, 
political and economic institutions provide the recognitive basis for its citizens to 
realize their autonomy’ (Mackenzie, 2000: 524), where the basis for the 
realisation of autonomy in work is given by institutional guarantees of meaningful 
work for all. 
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Chapter Four 
Confronting Domination: Freedom and Democratic Authority 
 
1.0.0 Introduction 
 
The question I propose dealing with in relation to the constitutive value of 
freedom in meaningful work is the extent to which authority relations at the level 
of the organisation enable or disable our capabilities for meaning-making, and 
support or undermine our status as co-authorities in the realm of value. I answer 
this question by applying the republican concept of freedom as non-domination to 
the action contexts in which we cooperate with others to reproduce society. A 
person may be negatively free, because they experience non-interference in their 
choice of employment and positively free, because interventions have been 
conducted on their behalf to develop their capabilities, but still fail to be free in a 
republican sense, because they are subject to relations of domination in the 
interior content of the work they do with others. For this reason, I suggest we need 
to pay closer attention to freedom in work as non-domination, and I propose that 
we conceive of domination, not only in the neo-republican sense of being subject 
to the capricious will of another, but also as being excluded from participating in 
the framing of social structures which shape our subjectivities. I shall show that 
non-dominating intersubjective relations in the work of social cooperation are 
secured within coordinating authorities, which are legitimate when they are 
democratic authorities, and that realising the link between freedom as non-
domination and authority as democratic authority is part of what enables us to 
realise the value of meaningfulness in work. 
 
2.0.0 Non-Domination and the Value of Meaningfulness 
 
 I argued in Chapter One that, in order to experience the bipartite value of 
meaningfulness, we must develop the two capabilities for objective valuing and 
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subjective attachment, supported by our equal status as co-authorities in the realm 
of value. In the process of acquiring these capabilities we become valuers, able to 
make our contribution to the creation and maintenance of positive values within a 
liberal perfectionist framework. I went on to argue in Chapter Three that, in 
meaningful work, the constitutive dimension of autonomy as non-alienating work 
is grounded in the irreducible autonomy in every act of work, where a person’s 
ineliminable encounters with materiality and with others give rise to interpretive 
differences which have the potential to multiply the range of positive values, when 
they are brought to conscious evaluation in public deliberation. I identified how 
interpretive differences with the possibility of realising the emancipatory potential 
of work emerge from applying the rationality of phronetic techne to our 
responsibilities of care for worthy objects, through which we respond to the 
demands of particular situations, requiring the uniting of means and ends, by 
exercising our capacities for thinking, feeling and judging. And I proposed that we 
realise our autonomy in the meaningfulness of work when we act as valuers, as 
meaning-makers, by bringing interpretive differences into public deliberation 
through democratic practices at the level of the task, participation in which 
demands that we be able to experience certain kinds of supportive institutional 
and intersubjective conditions. Specifically, I suggest that to be secure in our 
capabilities and status, and thus to have the confidence to bring interpretive 
differences into public evaluation with others, each person must be able to 
experience the personal condition of non-domination in his or her most important 
relations in the work of social cooperation. This implies a broader understanding 
of freedom in work than would be offered by evaluating freedom in terms of 
negative and positive freedom alone (Berlin, 1969), since the possibility of any 
particular individual being able to realise freedom in their work does not depend 
solely upon forms of positive freedom such as experiences of expressive freedom 
in experiences of ‘flow’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 1991), or negative freedom such as 
being able to choose to enter into or exit from employment relations, but also 
upon his or her ability to resist the arbitrary use of power, which I understand in 
terms of Pettit’s (1997) neo-republican concept of freedom as non-domination.  
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I concentrate upon developing an understanding of freedom as non-
domination in my positive critical conception of meaningful work, because, where 
relations between persons are dominating, then the risk of capability deformation 
is high, and it is less likely that individuals will have the sense of worthiness as 
co-authorities to be able to bring interpretive differences into public evaluation, 
even when institutional procedures for deliberation are in place. In processes of 
meaning-making which generate interpretive differences, asymmetrical power 
relations can operate to suppress or distort the interpretations of some to the 
benefit of others. Pettit (1997) describes ‘being dominated’ as ‘occupying a 
position where another can interfere on an arbitrary basis in your life’ (Pettit, 
2002: 341; Pettit, 1999; see also Skinner, 1998), where ‘someone has an arbitrary 
power of interference in the affairs of another so far as they have a power of 
interference that is not forced to track the avowed or readily avowable interests of 
the other: they can interfere according to their own arbitrium or decision’ (ibid: 
342). Because the possibility of domination exists in the structure and character of 
the relations between two or more people, Pettit describes freedom as non-
domination as ‘social freedom’ (Pettit, 2007a), such that, ‘corresponding to social 
obstacles – obstacles generated by the power of others – there will be social 
freedom’ (ibid: 711). Furthermore, Pettit says that an individual’s personal 
freedom does not consist in his or her choices, but ‘in a standing capacity of some 
kind and his or her choices will count as free so far as they are exercises or 
manifestations of such an ability’ (ibid: 715). I take from Pettit’s understanding of 
freedom as non-domination that the capacity to resist dominating relations is both 
structural and individual, requiring equality of capability formation for meaning-
making, and equality of status when making claims for one’s own interpretations 
of meaning and value in deliberative encounters with others. 
  
3.0.0 Simone Weil: The Potential for Freedom in Work 
 
Simone Weil is one of the few theorists of work who combines 
philosophical reflection with phenomenological experience of everyday working 
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life (Weil, 1977 [1946]). Weil took work in Parisian factories, as a factory hand at 
Alsthom, a packer with Carnaud and a line worker at Renault, when the Taylorist 
technical division of labour had taken hold in the organisation of work (see also 
Ezzy, 1997). Weil observes two aspects of Taylorism which she argues makes 
work an experience of unfreedom: firstly, it results in modes of acing and being 
which distort capabilities for thinking and feeling, and secondly, such distorted 
modes of acting and being are permitted when there exist oppressive relations 
between persons, such as those which can occur between manager and worker in 
hierarchical organisations of work: ‘since orders are now the sole factor making 
for variety, to eliminate them in thought is to condemn oneself to imagining an 
unbroken succession of ever-identical movements, to visualising monotonous 
desert regions of experience that thought has no way of exploring’ (Weil, 1997: 
57).  
For Weil, Taylorised work is oppressive because ‘the act of working is 
performed out of fear, rather than within the framework of an awareness of the 
purpose and value of the task’ (Ezzy, 1997). But, despite the unpromising nature 
of the activities she found herself undertaking, Weil seeks to excavate from within 
her experience of factory labour an emancipatory form of action which is 
immanent to the interior content of work. Against the oppressions visited upon 
thought and action by the factory system, Weil sets out an ideal of freedom in 
work where ‘true liberty is not defined by a relationship between desire and its 
satisfaction, but by a relationship between thought and action; the absolutely free 
man would be he whose every action proceeded from a preliminary judgement 
concerning the end which he set himself and the sequence of means suitable for 
attaining this end’ (Weil, 2006 [1955]: 81). Thus, free work engenders an 
experience of true liberty when a person is able to exercise capabilities for judging 
and feeling through a social organisation of work which gives ‘a proprietary 
feeling to all men’ (Weil, 1977 [1946]: 62); overcomes a sense of homelessness 
(ibid: 64); and relieves the irritations and anxieties that arise from being subject to 
‘the boss’s unpredictable will’ (ibid: 57).  
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Weil’s experience of factory work is characterised by a relationship 
between manager and worker in which subjection to the will of another in 
hierarchical authority links two dimensions: firstly, the loss of a sense of future, 
which operates to extinguish the possibility of thought and action, and secondly, 
the impairment of the worker’s sense of worth as a person. For the person engaged 
in repetitive factory work, the anxieties and humiliations attendant upon having to 
respond to ‘someone else’s beck and call’ (ibid: 57) are exacerbated by ‘being 
forcibly reminded that the Boss’s orders are all that matter’ (ibid.). The result is 
that the factory worker’s capabilities for judging and feeling become stunted 
because, in order to protect himself from the harms of domination, he will avoid 
imagining the possibility of change; his ‘thought draws back from the future’ so 
that ‘this perpetual recoil upon the present produces a kind of brutish stupor’ 
(ibid.). The factory worker’s state is even worse than this, however, because 
thought cannot remain permanently withdrawn, but ‘is obliged to remain in 
constant readiness not only to follow the monotonous progress of movements 
indefinitely repeated, but to find within itself resources to cope with the 
unexpected’ (ibid: 59). The possibility of the work process going wrong puts the 
worker into a permanent state of anxiety, making him vulnerable to dependency 
upon others for the means to get his work done: ‘when, as is so often the case, one 
has to turn to someone else in order to get on with his work, someone like a 
foreman, a warehouse keeper, a straw-boss, the feeling of dependency, of 
impotence, of counting for nothing in the eyes of those upon whom he is 
dependent, can become painful to the point of making a man cry’ (ibid: 58). When 
the work itself is determined by the thoughts of those who plan the outcomes of 
the work, without reference to the worker’s needs for self-determination, for 
positive intersubjective relations, and for cognitive engagement with the tasks for 
which he has been made responsible, then the worker’s sense of worth, of his 
status as a person, is undermined. For Weil, the oppressions of work reduce 
finally to the conditions of servitude (Weil, 2006 [1955]: 90), which she 
understands in terms of how the ‘existence of other men’ press the worker into a 
relation of dependence, so that ‘his own life escapes not only out of his hands, but 
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also out of the control of his intelligence; judging and resolution no longer have 
anything to which to apply themselves; instead of contriving and acting, one has 
to stoop to pleading or threatening’ (ibid: 91). And she pleads for conditions of 
work which will ‘not render them docile, nor even to make them happy, but quite 
simply not to force them to abase themselves’ (Weil, 1977 [1946]: 72). 
 
3.1.0 Domination 
 
Weil’s insights into the experience of work expose how patterns of 
domination in intersubjective relations are given purchase by the institutional 
organisation of work. And she illuminates the extensive harms to human 
capability formation and a sense of worthiness which such relations of domination 
engender. In a recent account of the concept of domination, Lovett (2010) 
identifies both objective and subjective harms which can be mapped onto Weil’s 
capability and status distortions, where the objective material harms of domination 
give rise to exploitation and insecurity, and the subjective harms of domination 
give rise to damaged self-respect. Lovett says that domination makes a person 
vulnerable in areas of vital interest to them, either directly through forms of 
exploitation where material benefits are extracted from one person to benefit 
another without consideration given to the needs and interests of the dominated 
person in the relationship, or indirectly because the dominated person engages in 
‘strategic anticipation’ (ibid: 131), and voluntarily gives up valued goods in order 
to avoid the anticipated unpleasantness of being on the receiving end of the 
arbitrary use of power. The possibility that a person may, at any moment, be 
subject to arbitrary interference generates such a degree of insecurity that her 
ability to plan her own life is severely restricted. A permanent state of insecurity 
gives rise to pathological behaviours where an individual attempts to avoid social 
interaction, or simply becomes resigned to their circumstances. The possibility 
that objective conditions of domination will give rise to harm is strengthened by 
the subjective conditions of domination, because the subjective condition of 
distorted self-respect undermines a person’s ability to defend herself from the 
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objective conditions of material exploitation and insecurity. Lovett (ibid: 132) 
refers to Scott’s (1990) concept of the ‘public transcript’, which Scott uses to 
identify how domination involves symbolic structures of deference on the one 
side and dishonouring on the other. Public transcripts are used as part of the 
structure of ideologies which aim to shape the subjectivity of one person to the 
advantage of another, thereby making it less costly for the dominant partner to 
extract the benefits of the relationship. Objective structures and subjective 
formations can be made to work together to form a system of domination: Blaug 
(2007), for example, identifies how pathologies of cognition and subjective 
formations arise when dominating organisational structures foster the 
development of perverse capabilities such as obsequiousness, impression 
management, and co-dependency. He argues that strategies of objective and 
subjective domination deliberately exploit meaning-making capacities in order to 
support managerial ideologies, such as the natural superiority of hierarchical 
organisations of work, which means that ‘any democratization of organisational 
life is seen to turn on the capacity of participants to selectively use and manage 
hierarchy and to minimise its cognitive costs’ (ibid: 24). In order to allow some to 
extract the advantages of a system of domination, the objective conditions of 
domination are reinforced by subjective conditions of socialisation, adaptive 
preferences, and identity formations. McMahon (1994) shows, for example, how 
the directives of managers have the force of orders which are meant to pre-empt 
an employees’ own judgement upon how he or she should employ her time (ibid: 
188), and that the internalisation of organisational rules through forms of 
socialisation reduce the need for managers to add coercive force to their 
directives; instead, ‘subordinates are expected to be adept at reading the wishes of 
their bosses and putting them into effect without being told in so many words to 
do so’ (ibid.). Such dominating relations are more likely to take root in 
‘conditions where people have to live at the mercy of another, have to live in such 
a way that leaves them vulnerable and exposed to the arbitrary interference and 
imposition of the will of another’ (Alexander, 2008: 166). And these conditions 
pertain when the organisation of work thwarts capability formation by making 
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workers dependent upon the coordinating capacities of others in order to be able 
to get their work done. 
 
3.2.0 Free Work 
 
But Weil does not leave matters thus - she goes on to identify the ‘joys of 
work’ (Weil, 1977 [1946]: 59), of a ‘life spent among machines’ (ibid: 55), where 
‘any series of movements that participates of the beautiful and is accomplished 
with no loss of dignity, implies moments of pause, as short-lived as lightning 
flashes, but that are the very stuff of rhythm and give the beholder, even across 
extremes of rapidity, the impression of leisureliness’ (ibid: 61). Meaningful work 
is not work from which effort and hardship has been eliminated, but is work 
which presents to workers the possibility of a ‘completely free life’ as ‘one 
wherein all real difficulties present themselves as kinds of problems, wherein all 
successes were as solutions carried into actions’ (Weil, 2006, [1955]: 82). Free 
work requires a mode of thought and action combined such that: 
 
‘[...] the only mode of production absolutely free would be that in 
which methodical thought was in operation throughout the course 
of the work. The difficulties to be overcome would be so varied 
that it would never be possible to apply ready-made rules; not of 
course that the part played by acquired knowledge should be nil; 
but that it is necessary that the worker should be obliged always 
to bear in mind the guiding principle behind the work in hand, so 
as to be able to apply it intelligently to ever-new sets of 
circumstances’ (ibid: 90). 
 
 Workers are obstructed from being able to develop principles, adapt rules, 
respond to the variety of problems at hand – and thus, to integrate thought and 
action – by the specialisation of coordinative functions ‘which implies the 
enslavement of those who execute to those who co-ordinate; and on such a basis 
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one can only organize and perfect oppression, not lighten it’ (Weil, 2006 [1955]: 
41). Increasing complexity entails increasing needs for co-ordination (ibid: 62), 
and therefore presents ever more sophisticated and extended opportunities for the 
arbitrary interference of some into the actions of others, sanctioned by the 
relations of authority between management as co-ordinators, and workers as 
executors. In Weilian terms, creating work with the requisite structure for free 
action and freedom in the person will demand attention to the character of work 
(Dagger, 2006), for work which integrates thought and action, commands the 
respectful attention of others (Ezzy, 2001), and develops the capabilities and 
status necessary for resisting domination (Alexander, 2008). And this will require, 
I argue, subordinating the activity of coordination to a democratically authorised 
authority at the level of the organisation. 
 Weil’s vision of free work is one which secures a sense of rootedness, of 
being at home in the world, of usefulness (Weil, 2006 [1955]: 37), of imaginative 
horizons (Weil, 1977 [1946]: 70), and of ownership. For Weil, freedom of the 
person depends upon how social structures inhibit or extend freedom of thought 
and feeling, where freedom of thought and feeling is fundamentally relational and 
concerned with human dignity. And she gestures towards the republican ideal of 
the inter-relation between political self-determination and personal freedom when 
she says ‘as long as working men are homeless in their places of work, they will 
never truly feel at home in their country, never be responsible members of 
society’ (Weil, 1977: 64). The free person is one who has a share in the 
determination of the rules governing society, including those institutions in a 
system of complex cooperation of which she must be a member, if she is to 
exercise her entitlement to make her contribution. She must also be a co-authority 
in the determination of the scope and content of the ‘dispensation’ or ‘common 
domain of choice’ (Pettit, 2007a: 715) which determines how she may act, and 
how others must attend to her status as a free person. Weil’s concept of freedom 
diverges radically from Arendt’s (1977 [1954]) concept of freedom; for the latter, 
freedom as ‘the sheer capacity to begin’ (ibid: 167) is possible only within the 
sphere of political action, whereas for the former, freedom can be found within 
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work which integrates thought and action in relations of attentive respect. I argue 
that such work can be made widely available to the many, rather than the few, 
when there is co-determination, through joint action with others, of the production 
and maintenance of the principles and rules governing the sphere of action. 
Modern conditions of work, however, remain prone to relations of domination 
because of the necessity for coordination of (cooperative) activities, where 
coordination involves relations of power in which one person has the capacity to 
give directions and set purposes for another. But although I concur that complex 
co-ordination requires co-ordination, I argue that the activity of co-ordination is 
not automatically the preserve of a management elite. Instead, I make democratic 
co-ordinating authorities essential to freedom as non-domination where the 
principles and rules of co-ordination are legitimated through the authorisation and 
endorsement of those who will be subject to the rules governing thinking and 
acting, and the modes of being shaping intersubjective relations.  
 
4.0.0 Freedom as Non-Domination 
 
I argue that the neo-republican conception of freedom as non-domination 
helps us to understand Weil’s concern for unfree work which unites objective and 
subjective conditions of domination by creating a social organisation of work 
inhibiting feeling and thought, thereby undermining a person’s sense of self-
worth. Moreover, I claim that such a system of domination is bad because it 
diminishes possibilities for experiencing the bipartite value of meaningfulness. 
Where our capabilities for meaning-making are exploited, distorted or coerced, 
then the interpretive differences which arise from our attempts to fulfil our 
responsibilities of care for worthy objects are prevented from achieving their 
emancipatory potential, because even where deliberative procedures are in place 
our interpretations may be ignored, mocked, or otherwise rendered invisible and 
impotent. Young (1990) defines domination as a social system which constrains 
self-determination as ‘participating in determining one’s actions and the 
conditions of one’s actions’ (ibid: 38). She argues that a system of domination 
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enables the oppression of individuals by restraining capacities for self-
development as ‘developing and exercising capabilities expressing one’s 
experience’ (ibid: 38). Lovett & Pettit (2009) describe the converse of a system of 
domination as ‘an infrastructure of non-domination’ (ibid: 11) – and I argue that, 
in the work of social cooperation, this implies the need for a system of workplace 
democracy, where democratic practices at the level of the task are united to 
democratic authority at the level of the organisation. In such a system, personal 
freedom and political freedom are mutually implicated, because, in the absence of 
political freedom, our personal freedom to negotiate and make sense of our 
encounters with material objects and with others is constrained, and in the absence 
of personal freedom, the sources of pre-political interpretive differences necessary 
to enrich the political mode of being are impoverished. But when personal 
freedom and political freedom are united into an infrastructure of non-domination, 
then we create the possibility for any kind of objectivity at all. This is because our 
collective judgements upon what is worthy yields up objectivity, in the sense of 
stable, even if temporary, agreement, provided that we establish procedures of 
democratic deliberation in which equally situated participants advance their 
interpretive differences, and engage with one another in positive value formation. 
 
4.1.0 Personal Freedom 
 
I argue that we experience personal freedom in the work we do together 
when we are situated in relations to others which enable us to use developed and 
acknowledged meaning-making capabilities in the co-creation and co-
maintenance of positive values which we are then able to appropriate to identity 
formation. But subjective appropriation depends upon, not just meaning-making 
capabilities in the objective dimension, but our affective attachment to the value 
of worthy objects. Such affective attachment depends upon our being able to 
identify our actions and orientations towards worthy objects as being authentically 
our own, as well as being legitimate, in the sense that they issue in actions which 
are centred upon what is good for worthy objects. Pettit’s concept of personal 
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freedom provides useful support to my argument that free actions are those which 
are directed towards fulfilling our responsibilities of care for worthy objects. Pettit 
(2001) says that a free person is one who is ‘[...] fully fit to be held responsible’ 
(ibid: 4), one who sees their actions as essentially their own, so that they are not a 
‘mere bystander’, but ‘identify with what is done by their hands’ (ibid: 10), and 
are thereby ready to give public account for their actions. Moreover, in the 
republican account, being a free person depends upon our political freedom, or 
our collective self-determination, in the institutions to which we belong. Pettit 
specifies that the capacity for being a free person consists in: first, ‘a common 
domain of choice in which each is said to be free’ and second, the recognition by 
all that each person enjoys a ‘protected, empowered status’ (Pettit, 2007: 715). 
Furthermore, he makes our status as free persons dependent upon our having 
‘discursive control’ in which ‘when one is actively treated in a discursive manner 
by others, and thereby is recognised as a free person, one enjoys discursive 
authorisation or address’ (Pettit, 2001b: 77). Thus, to be able to enjoy discursive 
control requires the developed capabilities and status for being a free person in the 
midst of others, for which we need immunity from domination within a sphere of 
action where inter-subjective relations are normatively characterised by mutual 
recognition: ‘the free person will normally enjoy such protection and 
empowerment as a matter of common awareness, with everyone aware of the 
resources available to the person, aware that everyone else is aware of this, and so 
on’ (ibid: 716).  
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that spheres of action 
providing immunity from domination render us free from any kind of interference 
whatsoever. Some interferences are legitimate, provided that the interferer tracks 
the ‘common avowable interests’ of the interferee (Pettit, 1997), where common 
avowable interests are interests that the interferee would ‘adduce without 
embarrassment as relevant matters to be taken into account’ (Markell, 2008: 15). 
And it is possible for interferences to be legitimate at both the level of individual 
inter-relations and at the level of institutional rule-making. Thus, laws which we 
have a share in framing are not dominating, but constitute a sphere of action 
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allowing us to lead a life we have reason to value, provided that sphere of action 
embodies relations supportive of our equal human status. For example, in the case 
of the newly democratic state, interferences are not dominating when they secure 
freedom through strong laws, properly constituted institutions and embody 
distinctive ideals (Maynor, 2003: 75). And at the level of individual inter-
relations, we might allow interferences which support the development of 
individual capabilities for participating in rule-making, provided that there is an 
absence of threat in the case of failure to develop such competences. In the case of 
the benign slave master, for example, a state of domination exists, even when the 
master is unlikely to exercise his capacity to interfere – it is the state of threat, not 
the act itself, which constitutes domination as unfreedom: thus, a reduced 
experience of personal freedom is about ‘a life lived under the threat of 
interference or coercion’ (Honohan, 2002: 183). Such a condition is made possible 
when the subordinated person is constructed as incapable, inferior, a being of 
diminished human worth, lacking in the relevant capabilities and status to be 
counted as a member of the category of free persons. Taylor (1911), in his 
notorious comments upon the specialisation of pig iron, deconstructs the worker 
as a being incapable of autonomy and independent judgement in the following 
manner: 
 
‘Now one of the very first requirements for a man who is fit to 
handle pig iron as a regular occupation is that he shall be so 
stupid and so phlegmatic that he more nearly resembles in his 
mental make-up the ox than any other type. The man who is 
mentally alert and intelligent is for this reason entirely unsuited to 
what would, for him, be the grinding monotony of work of this 
character. Therefore the workman who is best suited to handling 
the pig iron is unable to understand the real science of doing this 
class of work. He is so stupid that the word ‘percentage’ has no 
meaning to him, and he must consequently be trained by a man 
more intelligent than himself into the habit of working in 
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accordance with the laws of this science before he can be 
successful’ (Taylor, 1911: 41). 
 
Such a radical reduction of capabilities and status renders silent and 
invisible every autonomous action and human feeling of the worker. And it is this 
condition that the constitutive value of freedom as non-domination in my positive 
critical conception of meaningful work seeks to illuminate and to remedy. 
 
4.2.0 Political Freedom 
 
Political freedom and personal freedom are mutually implicated, and it is 
one of the key insights of republicanism that the personal freedom of each person 
depends upon their political freedom because all are subject to common 
vulnerabilities which can be mitigated only through the participation of each in 
framing the rules of social engagement (Pettit, 1997; Honohan, 2002). In order to 
be able to identify with our own actions, to be capable of planning our lives (Wall, 
2001), and to be acknowledged as co-authorities with equal social standing, then 
we must have a share in determining the rules governing our acting and being. 
Furthermore, being able to make and carry through plans of living depends upon 
being able to access a range of worthwhile options, supported by adequate 
resources, where the kind and range of options depend upon the framing rules 
describing the limits to acting and being in the action contexts in which we 
participate. This means that the non-dominating res republica is ‘a shared political 
system in which there is no direct, personal rule of some people by others, but 
rather a condition of equal citizenship governed by the rule of law’ (Lovett & 
Pettit, 2009: 12). Honohan (2002) describes the concept of the common good 
which is central to republican politics as: ‘intersubjective recognition in the joint 
practice of self-government by citizens who share certain concerns deriving from 
their common vulnerability’ (ibid: 156). Consequently, for republicans, to be a 
free person means to be free under the law, within a state which does not subject 
citizens to ‘arbitrary caprice’ (Rogers, 2008: 802), and where the law governing 
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the state and its constituent parts is a common good, which each citizen subject to 
the law has had a share in producing and maintaining.  
Thus, being a free person depends upon the acknowledgement of others 
that we are co-authorities in the determination of the rules governing our common 
lives in a free state which ‘promotes citizens’ freedom from domination, without 
dominating them’ (Lovett & Pettit, 2009:12). This means that, in order to allow 
for inclusive and open-ended deliberation over the framing rules specifying the 
kinds of interventions we will authorise, non-domination must be structurally 
embedded both at the constitutional level of the state and at the intersubjective 
level of individuals. The aim is for each person to become a ‘full member of the 
human commonwealth’ (Pettit, 1997: 65) by securing their status as co-authorities 
and developing their participative capacities – which, in Pettit’s terms, are voice, 
standing, and claims to conversational attention (ibid) - through an institutional 
infrastructure of non-domination (Lovett & Pettit, 2009: 20). In a positive critical 
conception of meaningful work, I argue that political freedom as collective self-
determination requires democratic authority at the level of the organisations, as 
well as democratic practices at the level of the task. Furthermore, that political 
freedom as participation in rule-making is constitutive of the meaning content of 
work. Maynor (2002), for example, suggests that political freedom is not merely 
instrumental to realising personal freedom, but also provides an action context for 
developing and exercising a person’s capabilities for participation which is 
intrinsically valuable, where participation itself constitutes an element of what 
gives life value: ‘one’s identity as a republican and as a human being is bound up 
with realising a distinctive essence that can only be realised through one’s 
participating activities’ (Rogers, 2008: 801). 
 
4.3.0 The Organisation of Work 
 
It is possible to argue that the modern organisation of work secures 
personal and political freedom because the rules of bureaucratic organisation are 
non-arbitrary, derived from expert knowledge, and available for amendment 
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(Weber, 1970, 1978; see also Olsen, 2006). This means that, at the level of 
organisational rule-making, a Weberian ideal-type bureaucracy is non-dominating 
because relations between managers and workers are subject to procedures which 
prohibit and investigate dominating behaviours, and managers are required to 
track the common avowable interest of their subordinates, so far as their interests 
consist of being employees of the organisation. The status of managers as 
technical experts in the coordination upon which cooperation depends is used to 
justify the bureaucratic form as an integrative system of man, machine and 
organisation: ‘no longer was managerial power merely the blind, arbitrary, or 
wilful exercise of authority; it could be depicted as scientifically grounded and 
rationally, objectively judged’ (Miller & Rose, 1995: 432). Thus, the interference 
of a manager can be deemed to be non-dominating, because the system of rules 
determining interference derives its authority from impartial scientific principles, 
and aims at the common interest of efficient production. Workers have exercised 
their negative freedom and chosen an employment contract. Once inside an 
organisation operating according to such principles, then, although they must 
follow instruction, they are not coerced nor are they dominated. The rules apply 
equally to all. 
But, at the level of individual inter-relations, such a system may not 
alleviate an individual’s vulnerability to domination because the rules, even when 
transparent and made known to the employee, may be formulated to secure the 
self-interests of the interferer, and such rules may be changed without notice or 
consultation (see Wall, 2001). Rule-making to suit some to the detriment of others 
is a form of domination, because the one who is at a disadvantage can never plan 
their lives with security: ‘it reduces their freedom by frustrating their intentions 
and plans. It obstructs their ability to plan their conduct according to their view of 
what is worth doing’ (ibid: 227), where ‘freedom consists in the ability to act in 
accord with one’s plans and intentions’ (ibid: 228). Besides, although modern 
capitalism has produced a variety of new organisational forms, such as networked 
organisations and soft bureaucracies, in response to criticisms that classic 
bureaucratic organisations are inflexible, slow to innovate, and stifle the 
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development of human capabilities (Olsen, 2006), these new organisational forms 
continue to be prone to the temptations of dominated relations (Courpasson, 
2000). For example, McRobbie (2002) identifies how networks constitute a 
particular kind of potentially dominating infrastructure by: fostering exclusionary 
and discriminatory practices across age, gender and race, thereby ‘reproducing 
older patterns of marginalisation’ (ibid: 513); generating arbitrary ‘rule-making’, 
which is justified as freeing people from bureaucratic control; embodying modes 
of esteem-recognition which evade security of identity; encouraging overwork or 
‘speeded up’ work; and requiring a continual presencing and unrelenting self-
promotion. Thus, the need for democratic authority at the level of the organisation 
is not eliminated by new organisational forms, which often fail to re-define the 
terms of power in the relations between managers and workers. 
Furthermore, forms of empowerment freedom are deployed to make 
workers’ capabilities and subjectivities conform to organisationally defined needs 
for self-discipline and self-mastery, which Lukacs described as ‘objectified 
‘performance’’ (Lukacs, 1971 [1922]: 90). Willmott (1993), for example, traces 
the efforts of ‘corporate culturalists’ to ‘constitute a self-disciplining form of 
employee subjectivity’ (ibid: 523), where not only does the behaviour of 
employees become the target of cultural formation, but so do their thoughts and 
feelings, resulting in practical autonomy being extended to ‘colonising the 
affective domain’, and to ‘promoting employee commitment to a monolithic 
structure of feeling and thought’ (ibid: 517). And Miller & Rose (1995) 
demonstrate how early twentieth century interventions into the organisation of 
work had as their aim the optimisation of the ‘utility of the worker as a psycho-
physiological entity’ (ibid: 431), in which the scientifically efficient 
administration of work through Taylorism is supplemented by a psychotechnical 
project to integrate the expertise of the worker into the ‘norms of production, 
calibrated by tests and assessments in relation to such norms, and enmeshed in an 
array of calculative practices’ (ibid.).  When the objects of empowerment freedom 
– that is, the values constituting the subjectivities of being a good worker - are 
framed and defined by some, to be imposed upon others, then the category of free 
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persons is reduced to a vanishing minority. In hierarchical authority relations, 
managerial authority operates to define the good for all, with the result that ‘only 
the natural person or corporate actor at the top of the hierarchy is an undirected 
source of directives. The organization is thus a tool or instrument by means of 
which this person can achieve his, her goals’ (McMahon, 1994: 189).  
 
4.4.0 Meaningfulness in an Infrastructure of Non-Domination 
 
I argue that a system of domination operates to exclude (from rule-
making) and to subjectify (the experience of being), thereby making it easier for 
some to exploit the benefits of inter-relations with others, without having to take 
the interests of those others in account. Lovett (2010) says: ‘Domination is bad 
because, given the sorts of creatures we are, it presents a serious obstacle to 
human flourishing’ (ibid: 130). Domination inhibits human flourishing by 
distorting the intersubjective relations upon which we depend to be able to 
imagine and to act upon life options (Rogers, 2008: 803). The objective and 
subjective harms of domination lead Lovett to claim that we are all under a moral 
obligation to reduce domination wherever it occurs: 
 
‘[...] personal debasement not only hampers a person’s success in 
achieving his or her goals or aims, it also stands in the way of 
genuine fellowship or community with others, which at some 
level is predicated on a mutual recognition of personal worth’ 
(ibid: 133). 
 
A system of domination multiplies dominating relations by excluding 
some from the shaping of social structures and subjective formations, thereby 
enabling others to extract benefits without taking their vital interests into account: 
‘people live within structures of domination if other persons or groups can 
determine without reciprocation the structure of their lives’ (Young, 1990: 38). 
The result is that the intersubjective relations which ought to be a source of 
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solidarity are degraded into exploitative dependence of one person upon another, 
to which that person is forced to submit in order for her to secure her fundamental 
needs. In order to understand how systems of domination induce such a state of 
insecurity and dependency, I argue that the republican concept of domination 
must take into account, not only the framing rules governing action, but also the 
rules and norms governing the formation of subjectivities. In an elaboration of 
Pettit’s theory of domination as arbitrary power and dependence upon a master’s 
will, Thompson (forthcoming) proposes a three-fold concept of domination as 
coercion, authority and extraction, where Pettit’s conception of domination 
describes the dimension of coercion only. Thompson identifies the other 
dimensions of domination to be: authority, where organisational routines reinforce 
the perception that the authority relation is legitimate; and extraction, where the 
productive and reproductive activities of one person are secured as a source of 
benefit to another. In Thompson’s more expansive concept, domination does not 
reduce the arbitrary use of power to one dimension of coercion, but takes account 
also of ‘the ways the social architecture is constructed to allow individuals to 
develop the capacities for a free life’ (ibid.). Thus, domination is not described 
solely by arbitrary interference which fails to track the interests of the interferee, 
but also identifies how the capacity for domination is enabled by ‘the constitution 
of individuals’, where domination is a ‘general state where one’s acts, projects, 
wishes, labor, etc. are controlled, oriented, and shaped for the benefit of others 
irrespective of the effects on that agent being dominated’ (Thompson, 
forthcoming, original emphasis).  
The shaping of the lives and identities of some to the exclusive benefit of 
others engenders in the contemporary work of social cooperation a form of 
coerced participation, where domination is the ‘rule by another who is able to 
prescribe the terms of cooperation’ (Bohman, 2007: 9). Subjects are ‘produced in 
power/knowledge’, and subjectivity is ‘the experience of being subjected’ 
(Blackman et al., 2008: 6). To become a subject, we must all undergo the 
experience of being subjected, but prevailing norms and processes of 
subjectification leave little room for freedom in self-definition: ‘If the subject – 
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right down to its most intimate desires, actions and thoughts – is constituted by 
power, then how can there be a point of independent resistance?’ (Feltham & 
Clemens, 2003: 4). But, as I argued in Chapter Two, subjectification is never 
complete, it is always ‘unfinished, partial, non-linear’ (Blackman et al., 2008: 16), 
and grounded in everyday experience and local knowledge (Smith, 1987; Haug, 
1992; Rose, 1994). Potentially, therefore, subjectivity can be viewed as ‘an active 
agent that shapes and is shaped by prevailing social, cultural and political spaces’ 
(Blackman et al., 2008: 14). This means that it is possible for an infrastructure of 
non-domination to include procedures and practices enabling individuals to 
challenge the structures and norms of social interaction which shape the formation 
of their subjectivities.  
I take domination to consist both in the individual capacity for the 
arbitrary use of power, and in the social constitution of selves through structures 
and practices, where the formation of subjectivity reinforces the capacity of one 
individual to exercise power over another without reference to their welfare. I 
propose that an infrastructure of non-domination will enable personal and political 
freedom by securing institutional arrangements in which the normative relation 
between the value of meaningfulness and non-domination is specified by: (1) the 
condition of not being made vulnerable in the affective attachments to the worthy 
objects which constitute one or more areas of one’s vital interests essential to our 
being able to realise the value of meaningfulness in our lives; (2) where being 
made vulnerable is a consequence of intersubjective relations in which some have 
the capacity for arbitrary power over others, supported by the exclusion of those 
others from participating in framing the social structures which shape 
subjectivities and practical identities: (3) because a coordinating authority has 
the power to specify the terms of cooperation, then to be legitimate, such an 
authority must be a democratic authority. When one’s vital interests are 
threatened intense emotions can be aroused and adaptive behaviour can result in 
the withdrawal of affective attachment from worthy objects. Thus, to be 
affectively secure in our areas of vital interests, we must possess the necessary 
capabilities to resist domination, and to engage in the uncoerced participation 
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necessary for fulfilling our responsibilities of care for worthy objects. This means 
that we must be able to engage in non-dominating intersubjective relations, which 
to be consistent with the bipartite value of meaningfulness are characterised by: an 
acknowledgement of our mutual dependencies which makes us vulnerable in areas 
of vital interest; security of affective attachment to worthy objects we have 
appropriated to the meaning content of our lives; equal status of participation in 
the social structures and subjective formations which frame the circumstances of 
our inter-relations; being in possession of the capabilities necessary for resisting 
domination; and participating as a co-authority in defining the rules which frame 
action.  
 
5.0.0 Cooperation, Coordination and Authority Relations 
 
Much of the work of social cooperation is organised in hierarchical 
authority relations, but ‘since the quality of political and public life is affected by 
how people spend most of their working hours, the authority structures within 
which most people live is a matter of serious concern’ (Brenkert, 1992). In order 
to increase worker effort, many conventional capitalist firms use empowerment 
freedom, which operates to increase individual responsibility, but without 
instituting collective self-determination in decision-making. But Courpasson & 
Dany (2003) claim that ‘where empowerment systems apparently play a central 
role in the enhancement of cooperation, the issue of obedience to an authoritative 
centralised power deserves scrutiny’ (ibid: 1231). The impact that dysfunctional 
authority relations can have upon personal and political freedom is of sufficient 
moral concern for some critics of authority to agree with the anarchist account: 
that the displacement of one person’s judgement by another’s makes authority 
illegitimate under any circumstances (see Christiano, 2009). In the anarchist 
account, the value priority must be accorded to the exercise of personal autonomy, 
which requires that a person must always evaluate decisions and situations 
according to their own reasons. Submission to the reasons of another – whether of 
the state or of a manager - can never be right, even if the outcomes result in higher 
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welfare overall and the effective resolution of collective action problems, because 
it always compromises personal autonomy. In dominated relations where there is 
the arbitrary use of power, the judgement of the subordinated interactant is 
displaced, with the following potential consequences: her vital interests are 
ignored, her actions are structured to benefit another, and her identity is shaped by 
social structures and norms which she has had no share in creating. In sum, 
dominating authority relations are both morally disturbing and illegitimate 
because: firstly, any kind of one-sided submission to the will of another (Hsieh, 
2008) is inconsistent with autonomy and personhood; secondly, domination in the 
form of rule-based authority excludes many who are subject to those rules from 
the co-determination of rules and social structures which shape subjectivities and 
practical identities; and thirdly, dominating authority relations produce capability 
deformation, and undermine mutual respect. But mitigating against such harms 
requires, I argue, not the extinguishing of all authority relations upon which 
coordination depends, but a system of workplace democracy which legitimates 
authority relations when they are a democratically organised authority. 
 
5.1.0 Cooperation and Coordination 
 
I argue that cooperative joint working is both necessary and constitutive of 
the bipartite value of meaningfulness: cooperation generates solidaristic relations 
to which workers are affectively attached, and which are constitutive of the 
objective content of work, because they are essential to getting the work done. 
Such relations are themselves a source of positive values which can be 
appropriated to the meaning content of a life, when they are expressive of the 
‘democratic ethical life’ which is ‘the outcome of the experience that all members 
of society could have if they related to one another cooperatively through the just 
organizing of the division of labor’ (Honneth, 1998: 780). Cooperative inter-
relations foster acts of solidarity, where ‘solidarity requires that one enters into the 
situation of those with whom one is solidary’ (Freire, 1970: 31). In specifying the 
normative characteristics of cooperative relations in joint activities, Bratman 
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(1992) says that ‘shared cooperative activity involves appropriately interlocking 
and reflexive systems of mutually uncoerced intentions concerning the joint 
activity’ (ibid: 336), where cooperative activity is characterised by: mutual 
responsiveness; commitment to the joint activity; and commitment to mutual 
support (ibid: 328). He adds that mutual responsiveness occurs in circumstances 
where ‘I will be trying to be responsive to your intentions and actions, knowing 
that you will be trying to be responsive to my intentions and actions, and arises 
out of the commitment each has to the joint activity’. Commitment to the joint 
activity motivates each person to be mutually supportive of the other in ‘playing 
her role in the joint activity’ (ibid: 328).  
In his counter argument to the need for substantive normative inter-
relations to explain cooperative action, Kutz (2000) characterises Bratman’s 
account of collective action as appropriate only for ‘small-scale, inter-dependent, 
egalitarian activities’ (ibid: 1), and as ‘less useful in explaining the nature of 
collective action in larger or more diffuse social contexts’ (ibid). In contrast to 
Bratman’s thicker concept of cooperation, Kutz seeks a minimalist, anti-
egalitarian account of acting together which will explain collective action in 
hierarchies. He does so by grounding collective action in the instrumental 
intentions of individuals to play their part, even where they may not intend the 
overall outcome. Indeed, persons may be alienated from the end to which they are 
contributing because ‘of coercion, wilful ignorance, or moral qualms’ (ibid: 26). 
This means that in the hierarchical organisation of collective activity, an 
individual is not likely to intend the whole outcome, but they will have ‘a 
subsidiary, participatory intention, an intention to do their part of achieving the 
executively-determined goal. They may have an intention regarding the whole, 
but they don’t need such an intention to identify with and act for the sake of the 
main goal’ (ibid: 23).  
But, whilst Kutz is correct to establish the non-necessity for joint action of 
intending the overall goals of a large-scale, hierarchical organisation, this does not 
establish a normative basis for the kind of joint action which is conducive to the 
value of meaningfulness. His minimalist account describes how the work gets 
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done, but its tolerance of alienation, for the sake of describing the occurrence of 
instrumental participation, does not meet the requirements of a positive critical 
conception of meaningful work, in which affective attachment to worthy objects 
depends upon the appropriation of worthwhile goals to the meaning content of a 
person’s life. Kutz describes cooperative activity as ‘a condition of how agents 
conceive their own agency’ (ibid: 17), where cooperation is interior to the content 
of the activity, defining the activity and the relations between those engaged in the 
activity. Thus, minimalist joint action, if taken as a model, will shape the interior 
perceptions and expectations of individuals as to the nature of their agency, and 
their capabilities to be effective in the world. Whilst Kutz’s structure of joint 
action, by making a non-necessity of intending the whole outcome, helps to 
explain how much joint working takes place, such minimal conditions for 
securing joint action are not sufficient for realising the bipartite value of 
meaningfulness – and, indeed, are not even seen as sufficient by the large 
hierarchical organisations with which Kutz is concerned. Many of these 
organisations acknowledge the importance of intending the overall outcome for 
generating employee engagement, and they often undertake extensive 
communications and participation programmes, in the effort to foster employee 
commitment through enlarging their understanding of, and commitment to, the 
organisation’s purposes and goals (see Cox, Higgins & Speckesser, 2011).  
Although we cannot do without cooperation, we must elicit the 
cooperation of workers in a ‘moral way’ (Courpasson & Dany, 2003: 1232), 
which I argue means that cooperation must be characterised by substantive 
normative relations which are voluntary, foster mutual recognition, employ 
complex capabilities, and be directed at worthwhile purposes. Moreover, being 
cooperative is not just about obeying rules; it is also about joining our actions to 
others in a manner which enables us to fulfil our responsibilities of care towards 
worthy objects: ‘being obedient is not simply to fulful one’s duties. It is to act in 
conjunction and in convergence with the interests of others; it is to be a member 
of a community’ (Courpasson & Dany, 2003: 1257). Pettit & Schweikard (2006) 
evaluate the normatively ideal case of joint action in terms of ‘unforced 
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cooperation’ (ibid: 20) where cooperation means joining our agency to that of 
others in order to produce a shared outcome: ‘There can be nothing underhanded 
or overbearing involved in unforced joint action; people must voluntarily 
contribute whatever is required for the desired performance’ (ibid: 22). This 
means that joint action, when it is constituted by unforced cooperation, does not 
simply produce a joint effect from the sum of individual contributions, but is 
activity in which all persons involved are ‘acting jointly’ to produce an outcome 
for which they are ‘responsible together’ (Pettit & Schweikard, 2006: 19). 
Normatively satisfactory joint agency, characterised by the voluntary joining of 
one person’s efforts to another, requires attentive inter-subjective relations which 
exclude treating others as tools to secure our own advantage: ‘It might just be that 
we each thought that others were zombies who would automatically, as if under 
hypnotism, do what was required of them. It might be, in other words, that we 
thought of ourselves as the only properly intentional agent involved’ (ibid: 22). I 
argue, however, that such a nightmare of total domination, which thoroughly 
eliminates thought and feeling in the Weilian sense, can never fully successful, 
because there are always remainders and differences, giving rise to emancipatory 
potentials from within the structure of joint action itself. 
The realisation of cooperative relations between persons depends upon the 
coordination of joint activities, where the existence of a coordinative function 
implies the presence of a coordinating authority. I claim that, in a positive critical 
conception of meaningful work, this coordinating authority must be a democratic 
authority, because a democratic authority is more likely to be able to secure each 
person’s capabilities for objective valuing and subjective attachment, and to give 
her confidence in her equal status as a co-authority. Marx recognised the need for 
the coordination of individual actions, to make possible an increasingly complex 
system of cooperation which exceeded the capacities of self-organisation: 
 
‘All combined labour on a large scale requires, more or less, a 
directing authority, in order to secure the harmonious working of 
the individual activities, and to perform the general functions that 
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have their origin in the action of the combined organism, as 
distinguished from the action of its separate organs. A single 
violin player is his own conductor; an orchestra requires a 
separate one’ (Marx, 1978 [1867]). 
 
The bipartite value of meaningfulness is helpful in this respect because the 
basic obligation people possess is to fulfil responsibilities towards the particular 
worthy objects they have appropriated to the meaning content of our lives. It is the 
particular demands of the object in question which grounds responsibility, and 
being able to fulfil such responsibilities depends upon being able to participate in 
an extensive system of social cooperation, including legitimate authorities which 
have the capacity to exercise coordination. In order to decide and to act upon our 
judgements of how responsibilities towards worthy objects are to be satisfied, then 
we require the involvement of others – sometimes this involvement is extensive, 
such as the parent of a disabled child who must call upon the services of various 
medical and social agencies. Since cooperation requires coordination, which 
entails authority relations, a legitimate authority can be regarded as a good 
because it enables the coordination without which, in the general run of human 
affairs, any kind of cooperation necessary to our being able to fulfil our 
responsibilities towards worthy objects is exceedingly difficult to attain. But, to be 
consistent with constitutive dimension of freedom as non-domination in the 
bipartite value of meaningfulness, then a legitimate authority must be a 
democratic authority. 
 
5.2.0 Authority Relations 
 
Hierarchical authority is frequently justified on the basis that it is the most 
efficient way of securing the coordination of activities necessary to the work of 
social cooperation. But Marglin (1974) argues that the development of the factory 
system was motivated by capitalist attempts to take control of the process of 
production away from workers, and through the technical division of labour to 
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secure an indispensible role in coordination, thereby allowing capitalists to extract 
benefits from the resulting dependency of workers upon their coordinative 
mechanisms. The desire for control over coordinative mechanisms can be 
understood from inside the structure of joint action: we must all secure the 
cooperative involvement of others, if we are to make a success of our life plans, 
and to see ourselves as autonomous agents. Persuading and negotiating with 
others in order to secure their unforced cooperation is costly, so shapers of 
organisational life are motivated to construct conditions of subjective domination. 
But the desire to control coordinative mechanisms can result in a radical 
unfreedom which ‘distort the worker into a fragment of a man’ (Marx, 1867) 
through heteronomously conceived and imposed work in which the worker is 
constructed as an extension of the manager’s will – an instrumentum vocale, or 
‘ultimate human tool’ (cf. Patterson, 1982). Young (1979) characterises 
hierarchical organisation as a ‘system of perfect non-self-determination: all 
members of an organization, with the possible exception of those in top positions, 
are obliged to obey directives in whose formation they have no part’ (ibid: 34). 
For Young, the only free society is one which engenders ‘a situation of 
cooperation in which no persons have the right to determine the basic conditions 
of the actions of others without reciprocation’ (ibid: 40), although she does allow 
that some hierarchy may be necessary to ensure coordination and cooperation. 
Thus, it is only to the extent that authority relations must command coordinative 
mechanisms in order to secure our vital interests – and provided that we have 
agreed it is necessary for securing such interests - that it is a legitimate authority.  
If it is the case that we cannot avoid having some coordinating authorities 
– and this seems reasonable, given our understanding of how organisations work – 
then, in order to secure the value of freedom in the interior content of work, that 
authority must be legitimated by being subjected to processes of collective self-
determination. A coordinating authority can be organised more or less 
hierarchically and more or less cooperatively, but, in my positive critical 
conception of meaningful work, there can be ‘no authority without democracy’ 
(Sevenhuijsen, 2000: 8). In Raz’s service conception of authority, for example, an 
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authority is legitimate when, in its coordinative function, its aim is to secure and 
promote the vital interests of those who are subject to that authority (Raz, 1986; 
2006). Warren (1996) identifies how any social order is made up of a diversity of 
legitimate authorities, variously arising from: the internal goods of a social 
practice, a substantive identity from membership of a social group, collective self-
determination in deliberative contexts, or a coordinative function derived from a 
role in the division of labour held either by ourselves or another we have jointly 
authorised. In order to develop the relevant capabilities, and to be secure in our 
status as equal co-authorities, we must all have the opportunity to belong to and 
participate in at least one form of authoritative relation, such as a role, practice or 
institution, provided that authority is legitimate, that is, it fosters democratically 
determined intersubjective relations. Rothschild (2000) describes approaches to 
legitimate authority as ‘collectivist democratic’ in which ‘a decision is legitimate 
only if it reflects the will of the involved participants, and since the participants’ 
will can be known only through democratic dialogue, dialogue and consensus 
become the keys in this new form of organisation’ (Rothschild, 2000: 210).  
Warren (1996: 46) argues that there are many circumstances where 
authority may be necessary; authority may be functional in complex societies 
burdened by a vast increase in the number of difficult decisions, giving rise to 
specialised discourses closed to broad participation. In situations where 
deliberative decision-making is impossible, then we should prefer authoritative 
decision-making, but only if such decision making can be made subject to 
democratic accountability: ‘democracy is necessary to chasten authority, to limit 
its claims and dangers’ (Warren, 1996: 47). Thus, democratic authority is 
authority which is open to contestation, where deliberative procedures produce ‘an 
authoritative background of commitments and beliefs that both sustain and 
contain democratic challenges’ (ibid.). This type of authority requires subjects 
capable of autonomous judgements informed by beliefs and commitments (ibid: 
54-55). However, the development of this desirable form of subjectivity is 
hindered by oppressive structures of obedience: ‘democratic authority requires a 
context of critical challenge that is all too easily damaged by hierarchies of status 
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and inequalities of resource distribution’ (ibid: 56). The need to develop the 
subjectivities and capabilities for collective self-determination in a system of 
democratic authority means that all coordinating authorities, whether public or 
private, small or large, must be democratic authorities. Young (1979) argues that 
the principle of self-determination must be carried through into a society of 
democratically organised enterprises and collectivities at an increasing level of 
scale (ibid: 42), and that this precludes ‘the possibility that persons can form 
organizations of social cooperation possessing a hierarchical structure of basic 
decision-making’ (ibid: 43). 
 
5.3.0 Democratic Authority 
 
I have argued that all organisations must be governed by a democratic 
authority, however constituted. McMahon’s (1994) work, Authority and 
Democracy: A General Theory of Government and Management, remains an 
important and sophisticated account of managerial authority which focuses upon 
the ‘nature of the employment relation’ (Hsieh, 2007: 348), and ‘the moral limits 
to relationships that involve the submission of the will on the part of one person to 
another’ (ibid.). McMahon (1994) identifies how, in a subordinate relation, one 
person’s actions are controlled to some degree by another’s, their will is displaced 
by another’s: ‘the subordinate’s judgement of what the applicable directive-
independent reasons require is displaced from its normal action-inducing relation 
to his will by a directive’ (ibid: 30). He describes governmental and non-
governmental organisations as operating in a single social system of political 
authority, where government and management make up ‘two components of an 
integrated system of social authority that is essentially political in nature’ (ibid: 
3). Political authority arises out of circumstances in which fundamental 
disagreement over the common good is combined with the requirement to 
coordinate activities in order to promote general well-being. And management is 
analogous to government in that it is a public authority defined by coercive power 
where the legal right of some to control access to the resources necessary for 
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leading a decent human life enables them to force others, who have no such legal 
rights, to do as they demand (McMahon, 1994: 7): ‘If disagreement among people 
holding different substantive moral conceptions is the mark of the political sphere 
[...] nongovernmental organizations are as political as states’ (ibid: 22).  
Those persons, such as employees, who are subject to authority relations 
will judge whether the decisions that guide their actions are legitimate on the 
grounds of whether these decisions further their vital interests in fairness and 
welfare maximisation (where McMahon refers to fairness as the chance that one’s 
preferred policy will be chosen at some stage in the voting cycle, and welfare 
maximisation refers to what the majority would prefer). But, the existence of a 
plurality of conceptions of the good means that there is a good chance of 
employees being required to follow directives which conflict with their moral 
convictions. If we are to demand obedience to directives from those who are in a 
weak position to resist, then we need to develop persuasive normative reasons for 
the legitimacy of such directives. Coercive power cannot justify political authority 
– therefore, we need to find other reasons for why people may submit to the 
directives of another which does not depend upon any prior legal powers that an 
authority may possess. McMahon provides such reasons by defining legitimate 
management authority as democratic ‘reflexive authority’ (ibid: 12), where 
directives which carry with them the force of obedience must be generated by 
those who will be subject to them, on the basis that people have the right to 
participate in the decisions which will guide their actions.  
Legitimate authorities are not identical – there exists a plurality of possible 
legitimate authorities (Warren, 1996). McMahon distinguishes between three 
kinds of possibly legitimate authorities: E-authority, which is the authority 
ascribed to a person with expertise or special knowledge; P-authority, in which 
someone is recognised as an authority by another when a promise to comply has 
been exchanged which generates obligations upon the promisee; and C-authority, 
when the acknowledged ability of one to coordinate the cooperative activities of 
others generates compelling reasons for action.   McMahon argues that neither E-
authority nor P-authority are legitimate authorities from the perspective of a 
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person judging whether their vital interests have been advanced. The only 
legitimate authority which can be judged to be satisfactory against this 
requirement is a C-authority, where a C-authority enables ‘cooperation among 
people with conflicting views about what constitutes morally acceptable conduct 
in their working lives’ (ibid: 15). In the case of C-authority, the outcomes of 
cooperating must be more beneficial for those complying with the directives `than 
the outcomes from not complying (McMahon, 1994: 233). A C-authority is 
therefore ‘justified as facilitating mutually beneficial cooperation’ in which each 
person participates in order to realise her own moral aims. McMahon advances C-
authority as the form of morally desirable form of managerial authority when it is 
underpinned by the consent generated by a system of workplace democracy, 
because ‘considerations of fairness and welfare maximisation support the choice 
of an economic regime in which managers are democratically accountable to 
workers’ (Hsieh, 2007: 351).  
In my positive critical conception of meaningful work, the constitutive 
value of freedom as non-domination addresses how the potential for free work is 
constrained by institutional conditions which allow some to extract benefits from 
inter-relations with no regard for the other’s needs for welfare, meaningfulness or 
flourishing. Although in McMahon’s theory of legitimate authority the individual 
is the fundamental unit of moral concern, he does not provide a full account of the 
intersubjective dimensions of authority relations, and the intrinsic value of not 
being subject to the harms of dominating relations. In assessing McMahon’s 
theory, Hsieh (2007) argues that the normative reasons for compliance based upon 
fairness neglects relations where there is ‘one-sided submission of the will’ (ibid: 
355). Hsieh claims that ‘[...] being subject to authority is a relevant consideration, 
in and of itself, in grounding a claim in the part of workers to participate in the 
governance of economic enterprises’ (ibid: 354). Or as Raz puts it in his service 
conception of authority, the moral problem of how to make authority legitimate 
‘[...] is a problem of the relations between one person and another’ (Raz, 2000: 
16). Even in cases where contracts have been freely entered into, objections to 
‘one-sided submission to authority’ would count against consent alone (Smith, 
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2007). Furthermore, McMahon confines his normative argument for a legitimate 
coordinative authority to large non-governmental organisations, but I suggest we 
must think also about authority relations in the context of the broader system of 
social cooperation, because 96% of commercial organisations are small to 
medium sized enterprises (Spence et al, 2003), which are replete with authority 
relations, but often plead for exemption from regulation. Equally, voluntary 
groups and individuals in unpaid caring work are subject to authority relations 
sustained by social practices, networks and hierarchical organisation, and I would 
require coordinative authorities in such organisations and social systems to be 
democratic authorities.  
 
6.0.0 Conclusion  
 
Mill (1994 [1871]) wrote in the Principles of Political Economy: 
 
‘The form of association, however, which if mankind continues to 
improve, must be expected in the end, to predominate is not that 
which can exist between a capitalist as chief and work-people 
without a voice in the management, but the association of the 
labourers themselves on terms of equality, collectively owning 
the capital with which they carry on their operations and working 
under managers elected and removable by themselves’. 
 
Finding meaning in work is dependent partly upon finding rhythm in the 
interplay between working and living, where working is not a separate sphere of 
action from living, but is nested within activities of living, of being at home in the 
world. And here, Arendt (1977 [1954]; 1958) and Weil (1977 [1946]) are on 
common ground, because both acknowledge the ebb and flow between work and 
life, of exhaustion and recovery, of new beginnings and relations with others. The 
bipartite value of meaningfulness unites objective value to subjective 
attractiveness, and we experience the value of meaningfulness in our lives through 
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affective appropriation of worthy objects. Affective appropriation of worthy 
objects is fostered by the elements identified by Weil of possessing a proprietary 
sense of being at home in the world, supported by attentive intersubjective 
relations; whereas the objective value of work, she identifies with the unity of 
thought and action bent towards unexpected problems, requiring new solutions or 
the adaption of rules and principle, which themselves have been subject to co-
determination with others. Where freedom is constitutive of the meaning content 
of work, it enables us to both create, and fulfil our responsibilities towards, 
worthy objects through the Weilian dimensions of thinking and intersubjective 
relations required in our joint activities with others. Thus, to be a free person is 
not about the clearing away of obstacles or even about the expansion of choices, 
but about being able to act upon those obstacles with one’s human capabilities for 
action/thought in dignified and respectful relations with others. In the final count, 
freedom exists only in a quality of acting together. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Restoring Dignity: The Need for Social Recognition and Practical 
Identity Formation 
1.0.0 Introduction 
As human beings, we are ‘obligatorily gregarious’ (Cacioppo & Patrick, 
2008: 52), implying that we cannot evade our physical, social and emotional inter-
dependences, from which we derive many of our most important relationships, 
projects and sources of meaning. To be inescapably social means that, although 
we are separate individuals, we are not sovereign. We do not pick and choose our 
life plans from social materials which exist apart from us - instead, we are already 
constituted by our relations to others with whom we co-sustain and co-produce the 
meanings, norms and values of our intersubjective existence. This means that to 
experience our lives as meaningful, we require positive self-relations of self-
respect and self-esteem, which are intersubjectively shaped by our relations to 
others. But realising positive self-relations becomes problematic when our 
relations to others are such that our valued identifications are misrecognised, or 
when institutional norms and values make it difficult to achieve a sense of being a 
valued person. In the contemporary work of social cooperation, stable positive 
self-relations are increasingly difficult to experience, making the task of forming a 
practical self-identity a demanding project. I evaluate the limitations of the 
concept of self-respect in Rawlsian justice, and of the concept of self-esteem in 
Honneth’s theory of social recognition, both of which mediate recognition 
through individual achievement. I propose that we need a concept of positive self-
relations which is constitutive of the value of meaningfulness. To this end, I shall 
argue that uniting self-respect and self-esteem to a sense of dignity as particular 
persons, who bear responsibilities for the worthy objects we have appropriated to 
our lives, points us beyond the pursuit of individual achievement to worthwhile, if 
not completely stable, practical self-identities constituted by the values internal to 
caring for those worthy objects.  
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2.0.0 Our Need for Social Recognition 
 
Individual subjective formation emerges from a psychological process of 
increasing individuation through an intersubjective struggle, which arises in infant 
development and which Benjamin (2002) identifies as ‘thirdness’, or ‘the creation 
of something that no longer identifiably emanates from one person or the other but 
mediates between them’ (ibid: 49). In critical social theory, most notably in 
Honneth’s (1995) theory of recognition, this psychological process is translated 
into the political, cultural and economic domains in order to provide an 
explanation for individual motivation and societal change. Honneth (1995) uses 
Benjamin’s psychological theory of the formative development of the individual 
to support his ethical claim that individual self-realisation, and thus the possibility 
of social progress, depends upon the recognitive relations which arise out of the 
interactions between multiple subjectivities, where subjectivity is ‘the experience 
of being subjected’ or ‘the experience of the lived multiplicity of positionings’ 
(Blackman et al., 2008: 6). Since our individual subjectivities, or ways of being in 
the world, are formed through processes of feeling, thinking and acting (Taylor, 
1989) then our subjectivities are implicated with those of significant others, such 
as parents, colleagues, or fellow members of a community of belonging. In 
Honneth’s account, correctly structured intersubjective relations generate 
practices of social recognition, resulting in positive self-relations, in the form of 
self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem. Thus, self-realisation, or the 
development of our human capabilities, depends upon being able to experience 
positive self-relations, arising from correctly structured intersubjective recognition 
(cf. Honneth, 2004a).  
The inescapable necessity of social inter-relations for positive self-
relations means that recognition is ‘not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital 
human need’ (Taylor, 1992: 26). To be acknowledged, to be seen by others, is 
essential to human action, and to a stable sense of identity which supports the 
moral and psychological conditions for well-being: ‘We run to be seen, 
recognised, admired by some subset of the others. If local victories were not 
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possible we would all be in despair long before we were done’ (Walzer, 1983: 
255). When we lack social recognition, it is difficult to maintain the positive self-
relations essential to forming a self-conception of being efficacious and worthy 
persons to whom it is not legitimate to do certain things, and whose contributions 
are valued and welcomed by the society to which we belong: ‘having both no 
authority and no intrinsic value in the eyes of others on whose actions and 
decisions one’s life and future depends is a frightening vision for any rational 
person in any culture’ (Ikaheimo, 2007: 40). As a result of being deprived of 
positive self-relations, individuals experience an insecure sense of belonging and 
relatedness, and are made vulnerable to the harms of isolation, social exclusion, 
and dominating, exploitative relations to others. Thus, our need for social 
recognition grounds political claims that individual flourishing depends upon 
living in social arrangements which foster positive self-relations of self-
confidence, self-respect and self-esteem.  
Our legitimate need for social recognition, however, is increasingly 
difficult to satisfy in a contemporary organisation of work which mediates 
recognition though unstable forms of individual merit, thereby causing individuals 
to become subject to shifting terms in others’ valuations of them, thereby 
undermining the possibility of stable positive self-relations. Following Ikaheimo 
& Laitinen’s (2007) definition of recognition as ‘taking someone as a person, the 
content of which is understood and which is accepted by the other person’ (ibid: 
42), I argue that the value of meaningfulness provides some remedy to the 
insecurity of social recognition when intersubjective relations are suitably 
structured for securing positive self-relations in the form of a sense of one’s 
dignity as a particular person (cf. Noggle, 1999). In the bipartite value of 
meaningfulness, we advance our claims to recognition based upon our 
effectiveness in the practices of caring, respecting or promoting relevant to the 
worthy objects we have appropriated to the meaning content of our lives. This is 
because engaging in practices of care for worthy objects removes our attention 
from seeking social recognition for its own sake to what we must do or become in 
order to promote the good for worthy objects. But this does not imply that our 
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needs for self-care have no importance relative to caring for others; instead, care 
of the self becomes part of a constellation of appropriate attitudes towards worthy 
objects which we form through mutual intersubjective recognition of one 
another’s practical identities. I argue that both self-respect and self-esteem are 
necessary to a caring self which supports a sense of dignity as a particular person. 
Massey (1983) identifies that, for self-respect, a person needs both a subjective 
evaluation of himself, generating a ‘certain kind of favourable self-attitude’ (ibid: 
248), and an objective evaluation of himself, where he does not simply value 
himself but ‘properly’ values himself (ibid): ‘it is necessary but not sufficient for 
self-respect that a person believes he acts in ways that he believes are worthy. In 
addition, the person must have correct views about his worth and act in ways 
which are objectively worthy’ (ibid: 253). Engagement in the numerous practices 
of care for worthy objects satisfies Massey’s subjective and objective dimensions 
of social recognition because the achievement of practice standards requires other-
regarding actions which stabilise self-esteem, reassuring us that what we are doing 
is worth our effort.  
Wolf (2010) suggests that being involved in the practices framing 
worthwhile projects can be protective of the damage done to self-esteem 
consequent upon the failure of our plans, where self-esteem is protected by: mere 
belonging to communities and practices; subsidiary activities of the practice such 
as training and mentoring of others; and exercise of the virtues and talents 
required by the practice (ibid: 106-7). Simply doing the activities of a practice 
containing valuable internal goods can mitigate the personal consequences of 
failure and be protective of self-esteem, particularly where self-respect – our sense 
of our value and status as a person – is steady and well-grounded (ibid: 106). In 
addition, failure is an experience which can be retrieved by the learning and 
perspective that comes with the unfolding narrative of a whole life: ‘Learning 
from mistakes, failures and disappointments allows us to redeem periods of our 
lives that would appear as total losses if viewed in isolation’ (ibid: 107). Wolf 
claims that if the failed project has independent, objective value, then we can 
justifiably appropriate it to the meaning content of our life because putting forth 
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effort to make a contribution, as well as achievement, can enable us to experience 
the value of meaningfulness:  
 
‘something of value is achieved in the very commitment to that 
project and in the striving to pursue it, which can be a sufficiently 
intentional part of the agent’s activities and values to contribute a 
measure of meaningfulness to that period of the person’s life’ 
(ibid: 107). 
Thus, being able to acquire a sense of our dignity as particular persons 
through orientations of care, for ourselves and for other worthy objects which 
constitute our practical identities, meets both the subjectively psychological need 
for esteem recognition and the objectively ethical need for respect recognition. 
This is because seeking the good for worthy objects subjectively reassures us that 
there is meaning in our lives, that our lives are worth living, and objectively 
confirms that the value of those objects is worth our effort. In uniting self-respect 
and self-esteem in a sense of dignity, I address two concerns expressed by critics 
of the contemporary experience of work who claim that it is no longer possible to 
secure stable positive relations to the self. Firstly, self-respect is vulnerable to 
under-objectivity, because the modern organisation of work strips collective 
institutions and practices of their intrinsic goods, thereby removing a source of 
objective value capable of providing a sense of greater purpose consistent with 
our need to value ourselves as particular persons. Secondly, self-esteem is 
vulnerable to over-subjectivity, because it can become too dependent upon the 
opinions of others, so that our own evaluations of what is a worthy object, and 
what our attitudes should be towards those objects, become misdirected, causing 
us to appropriate to our lives values we would not fully endorse if our subjective 
evaluations of what is attractively valuable to us were uninfluenced by the need to 
pursue self-esteem. I evaluate the problems of over-subjectivity in relation to self-
esteem, and under-objectivity in relation to self-respect by drawing upon insights 
from empirical psychology and moral philosophy. In their well-known exchange, 
Fraser (2003) critiques Honneth (1995; 2003) for grounding his theory of 
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recognition in poorly substantiated and highly contested psychological theory. But 
Meyers (1995) proposes that we seek a mutual enriching, since each approach is 
incomplete without the other: ‘whereas the moral view insists that only the 
morally autonomous self and its good qualities can be respected, the 
psychological theory counters that any self together with its traits can be 
respected’ (ibid: 228). I argue that each approach contributes to the other in two 
respects: firstly, moral philosophy remedies an under-objectivity in psychological 
theory which takes no account of the value of the objects at which esteem 
recognition aims, and secondly, psychological theory addresses an under-
subjectivity in moral philosophy which lacks a complete understanding of how 
intersubjective relations are constitutive of the formation of positive self-relations.  
 
2.1.0 Self-Esteem: The subjective dimension of social recognition 
 
In psychological theory, social recognition secures self-esteem, where self-
esteem is necessary for satisfying three fundamental needs for belonging, 
relatedness and control (Crocker & Park, 2005). Psyszczynski & Cox (2004a; 
2004b) suggest that the motivation to pursue self-esteem may be hard-wired into 
human evolutionary psychology, because to lack self-esteem is to be in danger of 
social exclusion which is threatening to survival. In terror management theory, for 
example, self-esteem is essential to psychological health, because it protects the 
self from destructive anxieties and fear of mortality. In modern societies, 
however, our need for esteem recognition is vulnerable to exploitation: capitalist 
systems of production mobilise and exacerbate our need for self-esteem in order 
to secure our acquiescence to organisational controls aimed at pre-determined 
subjective formations, such as the enterprise self (du Gay, 1996; McNay, 2009; 
Garetty, 2007). But, over-stimulated hunger for esteem recognition directed 
towards inauthentic subjective formations is harmful to our ability to satisfy the 
fundamental human needs which depend upon positive self-relations. Crocker & 
Park (2005) conclude that fundamental human needs for autonomy, competence 
and relatedness remain unmet by our pursuit of contingent forms of self-esteem 
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which are dependent upon the approval of others, and therefore of standards and 
values which are not our own; in turn: autonomy, ‘the pursuit of self-esteem 
sacrifices autonomy’ (ibid: 399) because self-esteem is heteronomous, and when it 
becomes a higher order goal it displaces or inhibits other more autonomously 
conceived goals; competence, the pursuit of self-esteem inhibits learning and 
mastery because failure cannot be tolerated; relatedness, the pursuit of self-esteem 
focuses our attention upon ourselves at the expense of developing care, concern 
and meaningful relations with others. In the areas of life in which their self-worth 
is invested, people seek to have their abilities, goals and achievements validated, 
and can react to threats to success in destructive ways: 
‘They interpret events and feedback in terms of what they mean 
about the self; they view learning as a means to performance 
outcomes, instead of viewing success and failure as a means to 
learning; they challenge negative information about the self; they 
are preoccupied with themselves at the expense of others; and 
when success is uncertain, they feel anxious and do things that 
decrease the probability of success, but create excuses for failure, 
such as self-handicapping or procrastination’ (Crocker & Park, 
2005: 393). 
Rather than relieving existential pressures, the frantic pursuit of positive 
social recognition makes stable self-esteem difficult to achieve – any positive 
valuations are insecure, forcing individuals to seek continual reassurance of their 
recognitive status. The result of making individuals responsible for their 
recognitive condition, whilst simultaneously placing secure self-relations beyond 
reach, is increased anxiety, and proneness to psychological and physical ill health 
(Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). My proposal is that the search for esteem 
recognition does not have to be destructive, but that avoiding the excesses of 
esteem hunger means taking seriously the political project of reconfiguring the 
bases of social recognition to secure self-respect, as well as self-esteem, within a 
sense of our dignity as particular persons. For example, Roland & Fox (2003) 
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suggest that psychological approaches to self-esteem, understood as feeling good 
about oneself, fail to take proper account of self-respect as the ‘appreciation of 
being a person’ (ibid). Self-respect operates to mitigate high/low levels of self-
esteem, acts as a buffer against failure or excessive self-appreciation, and enables 
self-regulatory behaviour: ‘self-respect is the couch on which the cushion of self-
esteem resides’ and provides the ‘core of one’s psychological strength’ (ibid: 
271). Psyszczynski & Cox (2004a) propose that the pursuit of esteem recognition 
should be steered towards an autonomous, self-determined life, construed as 
‘meeting standards of value that have been freely chosen and thoroughly 
integrated into one’s self’ (Psyszczynski & Cox, 2004: 428). And Crocker & Park 
(2005) suggest that securing stable self-respect is more conducive to autonomy, 
competence and relatedness, because it assists in ‘shifting from superordinate 
goals concerned with self-esteem to superordinate goals that are not focused on 
self-esteem but are larger than the self or are good for others and the self’ (ibid: 
406). Self-respect draws our attention away from an over-emphasis upon the 
practices of self-esteem, such as self-presentation: ‘monitoring and the ability to 
alter one’s behaviour in order to bring it into line with one’s standards [...] self-
regulation or self-control is an integral part of a self-respect system’ (Roland & 
Cox, 2003: 273). Thus, self-respect has a vital functional role to play in the 
development of human capabilities for living a life of meaning: ‘the function of 
self-respect is to protect and nurture the human capacities necessary to know and 
navigate one’s world’ (ibid: 279). In sum, to secure a sense of dignity we should 
concentrate upon the development of the social conditions which ground self-
respect, rather than seeking to multiply possibilities for self-esteem, thereby 
fostering a sterile competition for esteem recognition in an economy of esteem in 
which public attention is an increasingly scarce resource (Brennan & Pettit, 2004). 
3.2.0 Self-Respect: The objective dimension of social recognition 
Moral philosophy makes clearer conceptual distinctions than does 
psychological theory between different forms of social recognition (Darwall, 
1977; Dillon, 1995). I shall be concerned in this section with how the concept of 
Ruth Yeoman                                        Meaningful Work and Workplace Democracy 
 
Page 191 
 
self-respect is necessary to secure the objective dimension of social recognition 
which is a more stable form of self-relation than self-esteem, and has a particular 
role to play in valuing objects in the objective dimension of the bipartite value of 
meaningfulness.  
‘Self-respect is something most of us want and need. Few things 
are as important to our well-being as a secure sense of our own 
worth, or as debilitating and disempowering as its lack. Deep and 
enduring shame and self-contempt, unremitting doubts about 
one’s worth, a tendency to see oneself as not quite as good or not 
quite as valuable as others: such things constrict and deform lives, 
frustrating the quest for self-fulfillment and self-realisation’ 
(Dillon, 1995: 290). 
I suggest that the objective dimension of social recognition is satisfied 
through: firstly, encounters with objects which we judge to be worthy of our 
efforts, and secondly, intersubjective relations of the right normative character, 
which contribute to sustaining a sense of dignity because they confirm we are 
correct in our evaluations of worthy objects, and give us information on how we 
are doing with respect to fulfilling our responsibilities of care.  
Firstly, encounters with worthy objects: if they are to support self-respect, 
recognitive encounters must be based upon goods which are worth recognising, 
because ‘to desire recognition is not normally to simply desire to be noticed, but 
to desire confirmation of the worth excellences independent of recognition. 
Recognition is parasitic on objective goods’ (O’Neill, 1997: 193). This means that 
social recognition in itself cannot add to the meaning content of a life, unless such 
recognition is consequent upon our engagement with objects we judge to be 
worthwhile. So, valuing the social recognition of others depends upon our being 
able to acknowledge the value of the internal goods upon which recognition 
depends. Social recognition of goods, values and identities that we do not endorse 
is misrecognition, which can occur, for example, when powerful others over-
identify us with our social roles, or when institutional rules and social norms 
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promote a personal identity which is at odds with our self-conceptions (cf. 
Deranty & Renault, 2007). Recognition of one’s proficiency in worthless, 
pointless or futile practices cannot add to the meaning content of a life, even if we 
enjoy doing them. Equally, recognition of one’s exceptional performance as a 
doctor or scientist cannot add to the meaning content of one’s life if one is 
yearning to be a potter. I argued in Chapter One that subjective discounting of an 
identity-constituting activity, such as one’s occupation, may not reduce the value 
of a life, but it does reduce the meaning of a life (cf. Arneson, 2000). The goods 
and the standards may be independently worthwhile in that they add value to the 
practice or contribute to some social good, but unless they are subjectively 
endorsed by the agent as valuable according to their conception of living, they 
cannot add meaning content to the agent’s own life.  
Second, intersubjective relations: respect recognition must do more than 
acknowledge us as a universal type. A sense of dignity is supported by being able 
to experience ourselves as particular persons, giving us confidence that ‘one’s life 
has value in all its everyday ordinariness – in the monotony, grime, inadequacy 
and despair as well as in the shining moments of achievement’ (Dillon, 1995: 
299). Thus, positive social recognition should enable an individual to arrive at a 
correct valuation of their particular selves, such that ‘the self-respecting person 
has a keen appreciation of her own worth’ (ibid: 292). When we possess positive 
self-relations, we see ourselves as distinct individuals, able to lay claim to the 
equal consideration and acknowledgement of others, not only because of our 
status as co-authorities and our capabilities for being a valuer, but also because we 
have our own projects and connections to others which constitute our sense of 
who we are as particular persons. But, to be able to evaluate ourselves in these 
terms, we need to acknowledge our ‘interpersonal reality’ (ibid: 300), where 
positive self evaluation is based upon ‘what we do, on communal activities and 
achievements, thus moving us toward more integrative and mutually supportive 
social arrangements’ (ibid.). This means that, if we are to develop the positive 
self-relations which secure the conditions for self-realisation, we must encounter 
one another in our daily activities as equal interaction partners, where equality 
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does not mean sameness, but is an equality based upon the particular ways in 
which we make our contribution to society, including the work of social 
cooperation, generating an entitlement to the acknowledgement of others because 
of our efforts to fulfil our responsibilities of care for worthy objects. 
I argue that to have a sense of our dignity as particular persons, we need 
social recognition of our practical identities, where practical identity formation is 
an intersubjective achievement requiring the appropriation of values through the 
exercise of meaning-making capabilities (cf. Korsegaard, 2009; see also Roessler, 
2011). A stable practical identity acts as a filter through which we make 
judgements, and in return receive judgements, about how well we are doing in 
relation to the orientations of care relevant to valuing worthy objects. 
Consequently, the formation of a self-conception, or practical identity, depends 
upon our self-attitudes, the beliefs we have about ourselves and the worthiness of 
the objects and values we have incorporated into our lives: ‘self-respect has to do 
with the structure and attunement of an individual’s identity and of her life, and it 
reverberates throughout the self, affecting the configuration and constitution of the 
person’s thoughts, desires, values, emotions, commitments, dispositions and 
actions’ (Dillon, 2010: 41)17. When we are affectively engaged with worthy 
objects, we establish orientations of care which enable us also to experience a 
sense of dignity as particular persons. The relevant practice of care depends upon 
the nature of the worthy objects, and how they enable us to affectively engage 
with the values we have appropriated to the meaning content of our lives, 
consistent with the objective goods which such values embody. In sum, our self-
respect is secured through our sense of how we are doing in relation to caring for 
worthy objects, which I propose provides a richer account of human action than 
individual achievement or excellence. 
 
                                                                
17
 Dillon (1995) distinguishes between recognition respect and evaluative respect. Recognition 
self-respect consists in ‘taking appropriate account of one’s own status as a person: appreciating 
one’s fundamental moral worth and behaving accordingly’ (Dillon, 1995: 293). Evaluative self-
respect ‘rests on an evaluation of oneself in terms of a normative self-conception – the view one 
has of the sort of person one ought to be or that it would be good to be, and of the kind of life such 
a person should live’ (Dillon, 1997: 23).   
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3.0.0 Rawls’s Respect Recognition and Honneth’s Esteem 
Recognition 
 
In this section, I evaluate the limits of Rawls’s self-respect and Honneth’s 
self-esteem as attempts to secure the conditions for self-realisation. I argue that, 
for different reasons, both theories are tied to a problematic ideal of individual 
achievement, which is increasingly difficult to realise in modern conditions of 
work, crowding out alternative values based upon solidarity and collective effort. 
 
3.1.0 The Limits of the Rawlsian Concept of Self-Respect 
 
 Rawls (1999 [1971] TJ) remains an important theorist of self-respect, 
because of the central role he gives to self-respect in the organisation of a stable 
society, in which the development of the individual is secured through a fair share 
of primary goods and a system of equal political and civil liberties. Rawls claims 
that self-respect is ‘perhaps the main primary good’ without which we may lack a 
sense of life being worth living, where self-respect is of such importance that 
justice requires ‘equality in the social bases of self-respect (ibid: 440) 18. Rawls’s 
concept of respect depends upon both status and capabilities because, to 
experience self-respect, we need: firstly, the status which gives us a sense of self-
worth and of the worth of our conception of the good (ibid.) and, secondly, 
developed capabilities to give us a sense of confidence that we are able to carry 
through our intentions (ibid.). Thus, Rawlsian respect consists of both an objective 
status dimension, which relies upon the worth of the person as the ‘self-
authenticating source of valid claims’ (Rawls, PL: 72) and a subjective individual 
dimension, where we judge ourselves to be more or less successful against a life 
plan, which contains activities of sufficient complexity to realise the Arisotelian 
Principle (cf. Zink, 2007). In Rawlsian self-respect, what social recognition aims 
at, and how social recognition is mediated, has a particular content which is 
                                                                
18
 Rawls does not clearly distinguish between self-respect and self-esteem, and uses the two 
concepts interchangeably: ‘self-respect (or self-esteem)’ (Rawls, 1999 [1971] TJ, 440). 
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necessary to Rawls’s scheme of justice, but which also exposes the limitations of 
his concept of self-respect for securing positive self-relations through the work we 
do together.  
 
3.1.1 The Aim of Social Recognition 
 
In Rawls’s theory of justice, social recognition aims at the self-respect 
necessary for securing a particular political conception of the person, which Rawls 
defines as ‘someone who can be a citizen, that is, a normal and fully cooperating 
member of society over a complete life’ (2005 PL: 18). A fully participating 
member of the polity is one who is capable of developing the two moral powers, 
or the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the good, 
in addition to developed capabilities for observing the terms of cooperation and 
for forming their own particular conception of the good (ibid; see also, Freeman, 
2007: 334). For Rawls, self-respect is important for supporting our status as 
democratic citizens: it does not aim at justifications for securing just socio-
economic conditions, such as ensuring that all work in the system of social 
cooperation is meaningful work. Even so, Rawls acknowledges two obstacles to 
realising the aims of social recognition: firstly, socio-economic inequalities and 
secondly, poor quality work. Thus, Rawls recognises that a sense of self-respect 
may depend upon socio-economic equality, where ‘to some extent men’s sense of 
their own worth may hinge upon their institutional position and income share’ 
(ibid).  But Doppelt (2009) argues that, by making equality in the social bases of 
self-respect essential only to democratic citizenship in the political domain, Rawls 
discounts inequalities in the socio-economic domain in a manner which cannot be 
justified by our everyday experiences: ‘Taken as an empirical claim, the 
dominance of democratic citizenship over other social positions in shaping the 
distribution of recognition-respect in modern liberal-democratic society is at best 
dubious’ (Doppelt, 2009: 138). Doppelt (2009) points out that harms to self-
respect as a consequence of socio-economic inequalities relate, not only to social 
status and differences in talent, application and achievement, but also to the 
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general kind of capability formation taken to be necessary for anyone whatsoever 
to be able to participate in society:  
 
‘[...] certain inequalities of class also impact recognition-respect 
as well because they are generally taken to signify the presence or 
absence of powers that all persons of sound body and mind are 
expected to bring to economic life [...] Modern society rests on 
the presumption that all normal adults possess the capabilities 
necessary to be productive members of society and gain 
recognition-respect as such’ (Doppelt, 2009: 139). 
 
 In our everyday lives, social recognition is to be found for most people, 
not in the experience of political citizenship, but in the experience of socio-
economic activity. Consequently, the social bases of self-respect cannot be 
guaranteed solely by equal democratic citizenship in the political domain. We 
need also equality in the social bases of self-respect in the economic and social 
domains, for which we must undertake an evaluation of how socio-economic 
inequalities undermine self-respect.  
Furthermore, self-respect depends, not only upon our socio-economic 
status, but also upon being able to engage in activities which meet the terms of the 
Aristotelian Principle (AP), where such activities satisfy our natural inclination for 
complex tasks enabling increasing mastery and excellence (cf. Moriarty, 2009. In 
the absence of such activities ‘human beings will find their culture and form of 
life dull and empty. Their vitality and zest will fail as their life becomes a 
tiresome routine’ (Rawls, 1999 [1971] TJ: 377). Work has the requisite structure 
for realising the AP when it is organised to allow people to ‘enjoy the exercise of 
their realized capacities (and their innate or trained abilities) and this enjoyment 
increased the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity’ (ibid: 
426). Moreover, Rawls acknowledges that self-respect is damaged by having to 
undertake poor quality work when he says: ‘Lacking a sense of long term security 
and the opportunity for meaningful work and occupation is not only destructive of 
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citizen’s self-respect but of their sense that they are members of society and not 
simply caught in it. This leads to self-hatred, bitterness and resentment’ (Rawls, 
2005 PL, lvii). But what matters in Rawlsian justice is not good quality work for 
its own sake, but the damage that poor quality work does to the self-respect 
necessary for securing our status and capabilities as democratic citizens in the 
political domain (Freeman, 2007: 330). Thus, harms done to self-respect by poor 
quality work register as a normative concern only to the extent that they manifest 
as distorted capabilities for exercising the two moral powers in the political 
domain.  
I argue that limiting the social bases of Rawlsian self-respect to those 
activities which meet the terms of the AP artificially narrows the range of values 
people may wish to appropriate to the meaning content of their lives because of 
the work they do. This has the consequence of excluding from the social bases of 
citizenship forms of contribution essential to the work of social cooperation, such 
as caring labour. Caring labour is complex and skilled (cf. Bolton, 2009), but the 
complexity or the skill of the work is not automatically the most subjectively 
attractive value to practitioners of carework (paid and unpaid), who may instead 
be motivated by values inherent to the practice of care, such as empathy, concern 
and usefulness. Therefore, I agree with Doppelt that making equal the social bases 
of self-respect will require more than the equalisation of income and status, it will 
also require a new culture in which we base respect upon ‘the capability of 
persons to perform socially useful work’; and in particular where we recognise 
that ‘the capabilities embodied in love, care, and nurture are reasonable social 
bases of recognition-respect’ (Doppelt, 2009: 145). In particular, this will require 
a social revaluation of low status work employing practices of care, which I 
suggest can be provided by extending an ethic of care to institutional maintenance 
and repair (see Spelman, 2003), thereby allowing us to see how engaging in 
practices of care underpins every person’s capabilities for acting as a participating 
citizen in the work of social cooperation. 
 
 
Ruth Yeoman                                        Meaningful Work and Workplace Democracy 
 
Page 198 
 
3.1.2 Mediators of Social Recognition: Achievement and Associations 
 
Rawls mediates social recognition through achievement and associations. 
But I argue that Rawlsian self-respect, by binding self-respect to the recognition 
of individual performance, narrows the possible range of values against which 
social recognition can be mediated.  Rawls acknowledges the importance of 
interaction with others for securing self-respect when he says that ‘we acquire a 
sense of that what we do in everyday life is worthwhile’ through forms of social 
recognition in which ‘our person and deeds appreciated by others who are 
likewise esteemed and their association enjoyed’ (Rawls, 1999 [1971] TJ: 440). 
This means that to be in a position to draw the interest and attention of others, we 
need to belong to a wide range of associations containing activities organised to 
enable the realisation of the AP: ‘what is necessary is that there should be for each 
person at least one community of shared interests to which he belongs and where 
he finds his endeavours confirmed by his associates’ (TJ, 442). Interaction with 
others is therefore vital and unavoidable, but interaction in Rawlsian respect is 
limited to display and response; it does not include an understanding of 
intersubjectivity where our inter-relations are constitutive of our practical 
identities, actively shaping our capacities for autonomous action, enabling or 
disabling our ability to appropriate worthy objects to our lives and to develop the 
relevant normative orientations towards them. Rawls does acknowledge an 
intersubjective dimension of shared working (see Gauss, 1981) when he evokes 
the importance of cooperation, and not just coordination. But shared working 
plays a limited part in Rawls concept of respect recognition because, for respect 
recognition to play the role Rawls gives it in his theory of justice, respect 
recognition must accrue to the individual, making the relevant dimension of 
interaction with others the performance of the individual, not the joint outcome for 
which no individual person alone is responsible. 
Rawlsian self-respect is, in essence, transactional: Rawlsian interactive 
encounters take place through our membership of associations, where other people 
provide an audience for our individual endeavours. Achieving self-respect 
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depends upon positive relations with others which support the conviction that we 
and our projects are of worth: ‘unless our endeavours are appreciated by our 
associates it is impossible for us to maintain the conviction that they are 
worthwhile’ (Rawls, 1999 [1971] TJ: 440). Such associations with others 
encourage us to believe that we are competent to carry through our plans: ‘to 
reduce the likelihood of failure and [...] provide support against the sense of self-
doubt when mishaps occur’ (ibid: 441). But the worth of our projects, if they are 
to attract the necessary respect recognition to secure self-respect, must be reduced 
to their value as vehicles for individual display, rather than for their value as 
activities of intersubjective co-production, or for the other-regarding care they 
may provide to worthy objects. With the currency of our individual performance, 
we trade with others for their recognition of us in an economy of social 
recognition which cannot properly value joint agency in cooperative work, 
thereby failing to give a public presence to the intersubjective dimensions of 
shared working. Other people contract us to fulfil roles in the division of labour 
which they have not the time, nor the inclination, to undertake themselves; in the 
process, they become spectators taking pleasure in, or expressing disapproval of, 
our performance. Thus, our potential partners in social recognition are turned into 
consumers of the products of our life plan, rather than persons who involve 
themselves in helping us achieve our life plans, and who are jointly responsible 
with us for co-production in a system of social cooperation. I would not deny that 
relating to others as consumers and spectators can be satisfying – the ethical 
problem lies in reducing all intersubjective relations to their value as mediators of 
individual achievement, rather than allowing social recognition to be mediated by 
a wider range of social values, such cooperation and solidarity. 
Our membership of associations provides the arena in which the audience 
for our performance is gathered. Rawls gives associations a functional role in 
ensuring that the basic structure embodies plural conceptions of the good, 
expressing a multiplicity of values. Associations fulfil their functional role – and 
satisfy the principle of neutrality - when they are allowed to express their ‘natural’ 
distinctiveness through their variation from the general principles of justice, 
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provided that they make certain adjustments required by the need to maintain 
background justice (ibid: 261): for example, ‘in a democratic society nonpublic 
power, as seen, for example, in the authority of churches over their members, is 
freely accepted’ (ibid: 221). Variations within the limits of justice are allowed 
because we are not bound to an agreement with one another as equals through our 
different roles in the communities and associations of the basic structure, but 
through our undifferentiated political status in which we are all assumed to have 
equal capacities (ibid: 258). Rawls gives two instances of legitimate variations - 
the authority structure of churches and universities, and the valuing of 
contributions that people make to associations - but he does not specify what 
adjustments such organisations are themselves to make in order to preserve 
background justice. Moreover, Rawls assumes that the internal organisation of 
such associations is incontestable, and that the basis for evaluating a person’s 
contributions to those associations is their ‘marginal usefulness to some particular 
group’ (ibid.). I suggest this is a bleak prospect for the majority of people who 
must compete for the appreciation of significantly placed others in the many 
associations organised hierarchically, and to the advantage of privileged groups, 
with the consequence that many forms of work, particularly work performed by 
undervalued groups, are misrecognised and hidden from public view. The 
marginal usefulness of low status persons, perceived in terms of how the value of 
the work they do is mediated through a status hierarchy laden with systemic 
disadvantage, is not likely to be sufficient for sustaining the positive self-relations 
upon which the formation of a practical identity depends.  
 I argue that differences from the general principles of justice must be 
removed from the presumptive designation of the ‘natural and necessary’, and 
made subject to deliberative democratic inquiry. This means that associations 
claiming that authoritarian leadership is necessary to preserve their character and 
ensure the widest possible range of values in society, must be subject to public 
evaluation of how their internal organisation may enhance or inhibit the respect 
recognition which underpins a person’s equal status as a worthy being, and how 
the measure of a person’s value to an association, by virtue of their achievements, 
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contributions, or efforts, enables or disables esteem recognition. This will require 
the political mode of being to be exercised in all the action contexts of 
associational life, directed towards on-going deliberations over the terms of 
cooperation in the associations which make up the basic structure (cf. Young, 
2006). And it implies establishing democratic practices, not only in the 
associations where we work but also, more broadly, in a participatory society to 
ensure that unpaid family and voluntary work is subject to a similar standard of 
public scrutiny. Hussain (2007), for example, argues that democratic corporatism 
is likely to be more stable for a Rawlsian scheme of justice than a property 
owning democracy, because democratic corporatism expands the sphere of 
political action by putting within the reach of everyone the possibility of 
expressing the political dimensions of their personhood, and thereby of achieving 
the widespread respect recognition necessary to the long term security of the 
social order. Furthermore, Hussain makes such participation intrinsic to the 
content of work:  
 
‘[...] work occupies a central role in the lives of individuals in a 
modern society. And unlike deliberations about laws and policies 
at the national level, deliberations about the structure of an 
industry bear directly on the shape of people’s work lives. This 
makes these deliberations continuous with the activities and 
concerns that occupy people at work in a way that national 
deliberations do not. This continuity suggests that the rate of 
participation in industry-level rule making will be higher, as 
people will see these activities as an aspect of their job or career’ 
(Hussain, 2007: 17). 
 
The aims of democratic participation are to reveal misrecognised and 
invisibilised work, to examine the extent to which misrecognition is based upon 
essentialist and naturalised assumptions of what work is suitable for certain types 
of people, and to challenge mediators of social recognition such as individualised 
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achievement which narrow the range of contributions which can be made subject 
to social recognition. In contrast to Rawls, Honneth (1995) makes social 
recognition constitutive of the interior content of work, and he takes seriously the 
need to bring the possibility for social recognition because of the work we do 
within the reach of every person. But, in reducing struggles over the meaning 
content of work to claims for recognition, Honneth elides the materiality of the 
interior content of work (Moll, 2009; Smith, 2009) where, through their struggle 
with the material conditions of work, workers form identities and ways of being in 
the world. By so doing, Honneth forgoes the possibility of securing stable positive 
self-relations based an organisation of the interior content of work which grounds 
political self-determination in the immanent potential of work, and which I 
described in Chapter Three using the Dejourian idea of an irreducible level of 
autonomy in every act of work. 
 
3.2.0 The Limits of Honneth’s Concept of Self-Esteem 
 
In Honneth’s (1995) critical theory of recognition, three dimensions of 
self-relations – self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem – are necessary to the 
developmental possibilities of self-realisation, which, given our inescapable need 
for social recognition, also explain the motivations driving social change. For 
Honneth, esteem-recognition plays a vital role in contemporary liberal egalitarian 
societies by ensuring that, through the division of labour, each person has access 
to resources enabling them to experience self-esteem. Esteem-recognition is vital 
to the possibility of self-realisation, and when structural or psychological 
distortions disable persons from achieving esteem-recognition for their particular 
contributions a struggle for recognition ensues, which can result in social change. 
We achieve esteem through intersubjective recognition of our traits and abilities 
(ibid: 121), where the bases for recognising traits and abilities are embedded in 
the norms, beliefs and institutions of the society in which we are situated. 
Therefore, to change the bases of esteem-recognition we must alter the norms, 
beliefs and structures of our society. Developmental progress in modern social 
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relations, for example, has been directed towards the steady dismantling of 
hierarchical status structures which value persons according to characteristics 
fixed by birth, class, social position and group identity. This is because traditional 
social structures are unable to provide the symmetrical recognition necessary for 
enabling each person to be equally esteemed for their abilities and achievements. 
The virtue of the modern division of labour is that it generates a progressively 
individualised, differentiated and pluralised environment for accruing social 
esteem to one’s person. In the division of labour we find a ‘framework of 
orientation’ (ibid: 122) or ‘community of value’ for social goals and values which 
‘provides the criteria that orient the social esteem of persons, because their 
abilities and achievements are judged inter-subjectively according to the degree to 
which they can help to realise culturally defined values’ (ibid.). The possibility of 
symmetrical recognition depends upon the ‘pluralization of the socially defined 
value-horizon’ which provides the value diversity necessary for each person to 
find a measure against which they can be esteem-recognised for their ‘personality 
ideals’ (ibid.).  
Thus, the modern division of labour is a great advance in social relations 
because, by continually diversifying and pluralising the source of values within an 
overarching value-horizon, persons have the opportunity to be recognised as 
individuals, detached from static features defining them by birth or fixed tradition:  
‘the subject entered the contested field of social esteem as an entity individuated 
in terms of a particular life-history’ (ibid: 125). For Honneth’s theory, there is 
much riding upon the developmental possibilities inherent in the division of 
labour. It must pluralise to such an extent that all persons can find within it a 
mode of self-realisation or form of living which will enable them to ‘earn’ social 
esteem, but, simultaneously, it must universalise to hold all persons within a 
cooperative effort that relates them to one another as equal interaction partners. 
People become distinguished as individual persons against an evolving backdrop 
of values which allows them to be recognised for their particular capacities 
developed over the course of a lifetime: 
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‘’Prestige’ or ‘standing’ signifies only the degree of social 
recognition the individual earns for his or her form of self-
realisation by thus contributing, to a certain extent, to the 
practical realisation of society’s abstract goals. With regard to this 
new, individualised system of recognition relations, everything 
now depends, therefore, on the definition of this value-horizon, 
which is supposed to be open to various forms of self-realization 
and yet, at the same time, must also serve as an overarching 
system of esteem’ (Honneth, 1995: 126). 
 
The potential for conflict over which values are to be publicly recognised 
and how they are to be assessed in relation to one another is ever present. The 
result is a ‘permanent struggle’ for recognition which cannot be avoided or 
ameliorated, and is an essential element in the process of turning universalised 
social goals into recognised forms of self-realisation which express different traits 
and capacities. ‘Secondary interpretative practice[s]’ (ibid: 126) mediate the 
process of recognising and valuing different modes of self-realisation: ‘the worth 
accorded to various forms of self-realization and even the manner in which the 
relevant traits and abilities are defined fundamentally depend on the dominant 
interpretations of societal goals’ (ibid.). Honneth uses the ‘seemingly neutral idea 
of achievement’ to mediate ‘societal goals’ so that they yield up ‘criteria of 
esteem’ (ibid: 126). The achievement principle is individualised, available within 
‘an open horizon of plural values’ (ibid: 126), and expressive of many, 
continuously diversifying forms of self-realisation. And it is dependent upon ‘the 
capacities developed by the individual in the course of his or her life’ (ibid: 125). 
The values against which individual achievements are measured depend upon the 
‘collective event’ of an agreed social goal, which operates to form a value-horizon 
within which people can earn esteem for their achievements against the values 
relevant to the activities (or ‘shared praxis’) necessary for achieving the goal: 
‘it is the all-dominating agreement on a practical goal that 
instantly generates an intersubjective value-horizon, in which 
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each participant learns to recognise the significance of the 
abilities and traits of the others to the same degree’ (Honneth, 
1995: 128). 
The target of symmetrical relations of esteem does not mean, however, 
that all contributions and achievements are valued equally (ibid: 130), in the sense 
of being quantitatively equivalent. Honneth defines symmetrical relations as the 
state where all persons are ‘free from being collectively denigrated, so that each is 
given the chance to experience oneself to be recognised, in the light of one’s own 
accomplishments and abilities, as valuable for society’ (ibid.). Esteem recognition 
picks out the distinctiveness of esteem within the realm of work and its relevance 
to individuated self-realisation, where our inter-dependence with others in the 
work of social cooperation underpins mutual obligations to give esteem where 
esteem is due. The modern conditions of work, however, makes individuated self-
esteem mediated by the achievement principle an increasingly remote possibility 
for many people.   
 
3.2.1 The Achievement Principle 
 
Honneth’s optimism that the achievement principle will pluralise the 
values against which we can secure esteem recognition for all has not gone 
unchallenged (Smith, 2009; Seglow, 2009; Roessler, 2007; Petersen & Willig, 
2004). Smith (2009) critiques Honneth for being ‘too sanguine about the 
integrative potential of social esteem based on individual achievement’ (Smith, 
2009: 57). In neo-liberal economies, the shackling of achievement to the 
production paradigm not only reduces the range of activities which can be 
recognised as socially valuable work, but constrains the variety of ways in which 
people can exercise their entitlement to make their contribution, leaving much 
potentially important work undone (cf. Gomberg, 2007). Furthermore, the 
solidaristic bases for the formation of collective coalitions capable of challenging 
the terms of recognition are undermined by the individualised allocation of 
esteem; at the same time, the sources of individual self-esteem are de-stabilised by 
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making the individual responsible for nearly all the risk of failing to accrue esteem 
recognition (Smith, 2009: 57; cf. Sennett & Cobb, 1972). 
 
‘These effects bear on the self, whose capacity for autonomy may 
seem like a curse in view of the responsibility it brings for non-
achievement or failure; and they bear on the social bonds, which 
are surely just as likely to be undermined as strengthened by the 
individualized competition for self-esteem’ (Smith, 2009: 57). 
Seglow (2009) identifies how, although Honneth mediates esteem 
recognition through individual achievement, he makes the challenge to 
recognitive practices dependent upon collective coalition-building. Thus, Honneth 
relies upon two potentially incommensurable norms: the meritocratic 
individualistic ethic of achievement and the communitarian, solidarity-based, 
ethic of contribution (ibid: 70). Seglow argues that, whilst we may applaud 
contribution and seek it as an ideal, we will struggle to establish contribution as 
the basis of social recognition because ‘there is not the public institutional 
structure for the matrix of respect to be embedded’ (ibid: 73). This means that we 
cannot multiply esteem based upon contribution whilst the majority of our 
institutions and structures are framed by the individualistic and competitive 
principles of merit and achievement, since these principles narrow the range of 
possible values to those against which we can measure merit-based performance 
and assign a monetary value for reward. Consequently, making values based upon 
individual merit-based achievement the basis for public recognition crowds out 
values based upon collective achievement, such as those eliciting from joining our 
agency to that of others in order to produce a shared outcome. 
When structured by the logic of individual merit-based achievement, our 
reasonable need for social recognition, instead of being a duty which we owe to 
one another because of our common willingness to make our contribution and 
take up our responsibilities for worthy objects, becomes a futile race by each 
individual alone for the devalued currency of esteem-recognition. In the 
contemporary organisation of work, the possibility of acquiring esteem-
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recognition is becoming increasingly elusive, because the pursuit of self-esteem 
turns ‘the individual into a greyhound chasing the rabbit without ever receiving 
sufficient recognition for the mile sprinted’ (Willig, 2009: 351). Economic 
insecurity, combined with rapid social and technological change, means that 
workers are finding it increasingly difficult to hold onto a stable sense of esteem-
recognition, limiting esteem only to those judged to be the most successful 
practitioners of a structured activity (Petersen & Willig, 2004: 344). The 
contemporary organisation of work mobilises and stimulates our need for esteem 
recognition through performance management practices which make the 
individual responsible for rendering their actions susceptible to recognitive 
practices, whilst at the same time reducing the individual’s influence over the 
terms of recognition. Realising stable esteem recognition is put beyond the reach 
of many individuals by the constantly shifting terms of cooperation, and the 
restriction of values and meanings which can be mediated by the achievement 
principle (cf. Willig, 2009). Moreover, meanings of work are appropriated by 
ideologies of productivity, which aim to recruit the effort of workers into the 
management project, but, in so doing, subvert those values, making them less 
employable for the crafting of positive meaning in individual lives. Usefulness 
becomes superfluousness in the form of unemployment; craftsmanship becomes 
alienation as autonomy and self-formation are frustrated in the technical division 
of labour; affective labour becomes commodified by the requirements to extract 
maximum value from the carer; and solidarity becomes the conscious attempt to 
use socialisation and the bonds between persons to promote the increase of profit.  
The achievement principle has become so constrained under the 
contemporary organisation of work, that it is ‘now too narrow to incorporate types 
of work which cannot be ascribed recognition value in the reproduction of 
society’ (Petersen & Willig, 2004: 341; 2002). But when people seek social 
recognition through work, they are not searching solely for recognition for their 
individual achievements as measured by financial reward; in many instances, they 
also, and perhaps primarily, seek inclusion, membership, belonging, and the 
recognition that comes through direct relations with colleagues, clients, customers 
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and patients (ibid; Perrons, 2000: 110; see also Roessler, 2007). The achievement 
principle fails to describe what is important about unpaid, underappreciated work, 
such as care work, friendship work, or civic work (Schwarzenbach, 1996). It is a 
weak instrument for bringing into public view invisibilised dimensions of work, 
such as emotional labour or the irreducible autonomy in all acts of work. When 
mediated by the achievement principle, even a substantially diversified and 
pluralised value horizon cannot plausibly create a sufficiently wide ‘esteem-net’ 
to capture all of the kinds of valuable activities we may wish to count as work, 
thereby failing to facilitate esteem recognition to as many people as possible, 
since not all work which contributes to the social product can be readily captured 
by a metric of ‘achievement’, however defined. Roessler (2007), for example, 
claims that family work ‘follows a fundamentally different logic, a fundamentally 
different rationality’ (ibid: 141) and therefore family work demands ‘a different 
form of social recognition than paid work; they should not be seen simply as 
equivalent forms of socially necessary achievements’ (ibid: 136). She argues that 
family work and contractual work must be distinguished because they accrue self-
esteem on a different basis due to the differing contribution they make to the good 
life for the individual (ibid: 153). Each kind of work shapes the development of 
the self in different ways, and the content of such labours will vary from context 
to context, such that contractual work with a substantive element of care will offer 
a different route to self-development than contractual work requiring only 
interaction with machinery or information technology. In sum, a principle 
mediating social recognition through an undifferentiating value of achievement 
will struggle to pick out what is objectively and subjectively worthwhile about 
each of these forms of labour.  
I suggest that a partial way through these difficulties is indicated by 
acknowledging the value of doing good work, where good work is worth doing 
because it has the interior structure for autonomy, freedom and dignified relations 
to others.  Doing work which is worth doing supports a sense of one’s dignity as a 
particular person, independent of the possibility of accruing individual esteem 
recognition. Thus, our normative concern for the content of work is not simply 
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whether it enables social recognition, but also whether it meets relevant criteria 
consistent with a positive critical conception of meaningful work – that is, it aims 
at caring for worthy objects, embodying subjectively attractive values which can 
be incorporated into a practical identity. Roessler (2007) points out that social 
recognition measured by achievement and financial reward tells us little about 
‘whether or not the achievement itself is satisfying’ (ibid: 160). An individual in 
receipt of a large financial reward may still fail to achieve subjective satisfaction 
if the content of her work misses something fundamental about her deepest value 
commitments and her understanding of her value as a human being. Work 
promotes a sense of dignity when it provides persons with ‘the opportunity to do 
something that they can do (well) and in which they have (at least minimal or 
basic) interest in its achievement, and under conditions that they normatively – at 
least partly or to a certain extent – want and are able to influence’ (Roessler, 2007: 
160). I propose that, in a positive critical conception of meaningful work, a sense 
of dignity depends upon being able to exercise practices of care towards the 
worthy objects we have appropriated to the meaning content of our lives, which 
implies that social recognition ought to be aimed at the practical identities we 
form from the extant values in the roles, practices and institutions to which we 
belong. Furthermore, I argue that democratic practices applied to the meaning-
making activities in the work we do together allows for the re-interpretation of 
existing values, and the creation of new values which can be publicly evaluated 
and made part of our practical identities, supporting a sense of our dignity as 
particular persons. 
   
4.0.0 A Sense of Dignity  
 
I would not deny that modern conditions of work, even where democratic 
participatory practices are widespread, are challenging for securing social 
recognition for the values and identities which make one’s life meaningful. But 
the difficulties of realising positive self-relations does not mean we can give up on 
our continuing need to be acknowledged, not just as place-holders in a hierarchy 
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of social functions, but as particular persons (Noggle, 1999). Ikaheimo (2007) 
identifies two dimensions of personhood we would want to recognise: firstly, ‘the 
interpersonal status of being respected as a co-authority’ and ‘psychological 
capacities for norm-administration’ (ibid: 36), and secondly, the values, relations, 
states of affairs such that ‘caring about the happiness or good life of oneself/others 
is a structuring principle’ (ibid.). In the bipartite value of meaningfulness, to have 
the status as a co-authority, and the capabilities for objective valuing and 
subjective attachment, is to have the capacity to become a valuer, and thus to 
experience a sense of dignity. Personhood is enabled by being a valuer (cf. Tirrell, 
1993), because valuing supports the formation of a practical identity, particular to 
our subjective appropriation of worthy objects. Being able to form a practical 
identity depends upon the capacity of persons ‘to freely constrain themselves to 
the terms of participation in the many social groups to which they belong.’ 
(Davies, 2006: 80-81), implying that each person needs to be a member of at least 
one social organisation. In order to secure a practical identity which is expressive 
of our particular personhood, I argue that we need to experience a sense of dignity 
which combines self-respect, as our sense of worthiness and capabilities to 
undertake right actions towards worthy objects, with self-esteem, as our 
judgements about how well we have engaged in the relevant practices of caring 
for worthy objects.  
Dignity points to something inherently valuable in the subject; in the 
Kantian formulation of dignity, it is the inviolable worth of our moral rationality: 
‘a human being regarded as a person, that is, as the subject of morally practical 
reason, is exalted above all price [...] as an end in himself he possesses dignity by 
which he extracts respect for himself from all other beings in the world’ (Kant, 
1983 [1797]). A sense of dignity is a vital signifier of our recognitive status, 
where we know ourselves to possess that inviolable worth in our person which 
specifies the limits upon how we can be treated by others, giving us the 
confidence that we can legitimately make claims upon others – including our 
entitlement to contribute to the work of social cooperation, and have that 
contribution recognised. When we possess a sense of dignity, we understand 
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ourselves to be of equal standing with others, and jointly obliged with them to 
ensure that each person in the community of belonging is afforded the status to be 
heard and the capabilities to act and to be. Threats to our dignity through 
mistreatment or misrecognition are frightening because they render us invisible as 
a human being with intrinsic value to whom it is illegitimate to do certain things, 
to humiliate, to ignore, to degrade, to exploit or whatever. And dignity can be 
undermined by humiliating institutions which fail to foster intersubjective 
relations of the right normative character for respect recognition and esteem 
recognition (Margalit, 1996). A characteristic of humiliating economic institutions 
is the manner in which they structure intersubjective relations so that it appears to 
be legitimate for some to treat others solely as the means to fulfilling their plans 
and projects:  
 
‘[...] they must never be treated merely as means, as things that 
we may use however we want in order to advance our interests, 
and they must always be treated as the supremely valuable beings 
that they are. Note that it is not wrong to treat persons as means to 
our ends; indeed we could not get on in life if we could not make 
use of the talents, abilities, service, and labor of other people. 
What we must not do is to treat persons as mere means to our 
ends, to treat them as if the only value they have is what derives 
from their usefulness to us. We must always treat them ‘at the 
same time as an end’’ (Dillon, 2010: 23). 
 
I suggest that establishing our equal status as co-authorities will require: 
firstly, evaluation of the internal organisation of the associations, practices and 
institutions to which we belong and secondly, widespread opportunities to 
exercise the political mode of being in the work timespaces of social cooperation 
– both of which require non-humiliating institutions. Non-humiliating institutions 
enable us to resist acquiescing automatically to another’s understanding of who 
we are, allowing us instead to enter into a relation with the recogniser where we 
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acknowledge their status as a recogniser, approve their competency to recognise 
us, and respect their judgements accordingly. Moreover, deliberative contestation 
of the social valuations of others, grounded in our equal status as co-authorities, 
opens up opportunities to challenge the terms of recognition, enabling us to 
express differences, ambivalences, incommensurables and obstacles in our efforts 
to advance the values we have appropriated to the meaning content of our lives.  
Furthermore, humiliating institutions are not good for any person who belongs to 
them: hierarchical authority, for example, undermines managers’ own interest in 
their personhood, because those situated in a favourable position within a 
hierarchical authority cannot respect workers as co-authorities. In evaluating 
within a Kantian framework the use multi-national companies make of sweatshop 
labour, Arnold & Bowie (2003) claim: 
 
‘[...] managers who encourage or tolerate violations of the rule of 
law; use coercion; allow unsafe working conditions; and provide 
below subsistence wages, disavow their own dignity and that of 
their workers. In so doing, they disrespect themselves and their 
workers’ (ibid: 239). 
 
Since subordinates in a hierarchy are not in the relevant category of 
authorisers of norms, they cannot give their superiors esteem-recognition which 
can only be provided by equal others (peers). Workers can give satisfaction to 
managers because of their submission or obedience, but they cannot give the 
satisfaction which comes from the esteem recognition upon which the positive 
self-relations constituting personhood depends. Thus, both groups have their 
potential as valuers distorted, because psychological capacities for valuing and 
recognising remain under-developed with consequences for all of their 
‘interpersonal status of being a person’ (Ikaheimo, 2007: 13). Humiliating 
institutions which reduce the value of usefulness to instrumental usage fail to 
respect both workers and those who employ workers under such conditions, 
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because, by supporting humiliating institutions, employers end up undermining 
the social conditions for their own recognitive relations. 
For a person to lack a sense of her dignity in the work she does with others 
is for her to be aware that her society does not value her sufficiently highly to 
afford her the kind of work which is worthy of her human status. Her society 
regards her potential human contribution as surplus to requirements, or demands 
only that part of her humanity which can be instrumentalised for profit. Such 
knowledge, when reinforced through everyday interactive encounters with 
significant others, erodes positive self-relations in the form of self-respect, self-
esteem and self-confidence. I propose, however, that self-respect and self-esteem 
can be united in dignified work, which is work capable of supporting us in 
becoming valuers, and is performed in non-humiliating forms of belonging. 
Therefore, being able to undertake dignified work in cooperative relations to 
others, where our intersubjective encounters support the development of positive 
self-relations, is indispensable for living a life we have good reason to value.  
 
4.1.0 Forming a Practical Identity  
 
Our sense of dignity depends upon being able to see ourselves as a 
particular person with a secure practical identity, where practical identities are 
formed through our intersubjective encounters in the roles, practices and 
institutions to which we belong in a system of social cooperation. Korsegaard 
(2009) defines a ‘conception of practical identity’ as ‘a description under which 
you value yourself and find your life worth living and your actions to be worth 
undertaking’ (ibid: 20; 1996). We act as individual autonomous agents when we 
engage in ‘an ongoing struggle for integrity, the struggle for psychic unity, the 
struggle to be, in the face of psychic complexity, a single unified self’ (ibid: 7), 
success in which depends upon our being able to find reasons sufficient to 
motivate us to act and to be (ibid: 23). Korsegaard says that reasons are derived 
contingently from the roles and obligations we acquire through living an ordinary 
human life. Such reasons are contingent because we can choose whether or not to 
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endorse them as part of our practical identity, as sources of meaning and value for 
us (ibid), but since we cannot choose not to have reasons then we must engage 
also in the task of ‘making the contingent necessary’ (ibid.). In terms of the 
bipartite value of meaningfulness, this means we must find some way of 
subjectively appropriating non-obligatory values to the meaning content of our 
lives, in the process acquiring obligations of care for worthy objects which 
embody those values. Indeed, Korsegaard steers close to the bipartite value of 
meaningfulness when she says ‘to have a personal project or ambition is not to 
desire a special object that you think is good for you privately, but rather to want 
to stand in a special relationship to something you think is good publicly’ (ibid: 
211). Our evaluations of how we are doing with respect to our actions and 
orientations towards worthy objects generates various kinds of self-regard which 
issue in a positive or negative reinforcement of our self-conception or practical 
identity: ‘you are faced with the task of making something of yourself, and you 
must regard yourself as a success or failure in so far as you succeed or fail at this 
task’ (Korsegaard, 2009: xii).  
Furthermore, Korsegaard (2009) says that ‘we owe it to ourselves, to our 
own humanity, to find some roles that we can fill with integrity and dedication’ 
(ibid: 24). Our roles support our dignified status in the midst of equally situated 
others by providing us with the social bases for positive self-relations. This means 
that, if we lack certain fundamental positive attitudes towards ourselves, then we 
will lack the essential conditions for regarding ourselves as the kinds of persons 
who have projects and plans for living which can legitimately command the 
attention and support of others. For Korsegaard, our many roles and sources of 
identity must be brought into a coherent whole in order to establish the basis of a 
unified self, which enables us to act as autonomous beings - and she makes 
coherence in our practical identity the marker for autonomy. But I suggest this 
makes the task of creating a practical identity too demanding, particularly in 
societies characterised by intersecting social structures of oppression which 
obstruct the goal of unity and coherence, rendering us vulnerable to heteronomous 
influence and control (Meyers, 2000: 152). In psychological theory, acquiring 
Ruth Yeoman                                        Meaningful Work and Workplace Democracy 
 
Page 215 
 
recognitive capabilities involves an unavoidable psychological struggle because 
each of us ‘must confront the difficulty that each subject has in recognizing the 
other as an equivalent center of experience’ (Benjamin, 1990: 34), and so there is 
always the possibility of less than total unity. Identities are always in flux, despite 
temporary settlements, because ‘subject positions are made available in a number 
of competing discourses [...] identity is thus of necessity always a project rather 
than an achievement’ (Knights & Vurdubakis, 1994). Furthermore, the process of 
identity formation does not consist only in internal identity formation, but depends 
also upon the range of ‘publicly available ‘personas’ or social-identities’ (Watson, 
2008: 127) – from the definition of which most people have been excluded. So 
rather than coherence as unity, I suggest we aim at coherence as a constantly 
adjusting balance of values, meanings and differences, using the concept of an 
intersectional self, where an intersectional self is always in the process of 
becoming: 
 
‘To define oneself intersectionally, one must activate 
competencies that mesh intellect and feeling in order to seek out 
and assimilate nonstandard interpretive frameworks. One must be 
introspectively vigilant, attuned to signs of frustration and 
dissatisfaction, attentive to baffling subjective anomalies, and 
willing to puzzle out gaps in one’s self-understanding’ (Meyers, 
2000: 167). 
 
Meyers (2000) understands an intersectional self to be imperfectly 
autonomous, but always progressing in self-knowledge and self-definition: 
‘intersectional identity is constituted in part through a process of self-definition, 
the authentic self is an evolving self that is not chained to conventional group 
norms’ (ibid: 153). The shifts in an intersectional self contrasts with Korsegaard’s 
basis for self-constitution, which is the independent action of the individual, 
where a good action is one that constitutes the individual person by moving her 
towards a unified, coherent self: ‘action is self-constitution’ (ibid: 25). Korsegaard 
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does not have an intersubjective conception of the joint action essential to the 
constitution of selves; for her ‘action is simply interaction with the self’ (ibid: 
204), which fails to illuminate the unavoidable social inter-dependency of human 
beings, particularly in relation to the work they do together in a system of social 
cooperation. Korsegaard says that ‘a good person is someone who is good at being 
a person’ (ibid: 26); if this is the case, then a good person is a social, inter-
dependent individual, situated in intersubjective relations, which enable the 
formation of capabilities and are constitutive of the meaning content of our lives. 
In fact, Korsegaard acknowledges something of this kind when she identifies the 
effort which is required for the continual formation and maintenance of practical 
identity, made up of many different identities, roles and forms of belonging, 
saying that ‘in the course of this process, of falling apart and pulling yourself back 
together, you create something new, you constitute something new: yourself’ 
(ibid: 214). Meyers (2000) proposes a competency approach to intersectional 
identity formation which would allow for less demanding criteria of unity and 
coherence in creating our practical identities, and which emphasises the process 
rather than the goal of self-constitution, concentrating instead upon the formation 
of the relevant skills necessary to engage in intersectional identity development: 
‘intersectional subjects analyze their position in social hierarchies, interpret the 
psychic impact of their social experience, and reconfigure their identities as 
members of social groups’ (ibid: 154). This makes practical identity dependent 
upon becoming a valuer, having the status as a co-authority, and the capabilities 
for objective valuing and subjective appropriation, which is achieved by 
understanding how we create ourselves from intersubjective relations in multiple 
forms of belonging. 
Forming the capabilities necessary for developing the practical identity of 
an intersectional self depends upon our active engagement with worthy objects. 
When we engage with worthy objects, interpretive differences over how to care 
for worthy objects give rise to a plurality of meanings. When they are made 
available for public deliberation, these meanings have the potential to multiply the 
range of values within a liberal perfectionist framework, which can then be made 
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available for the formation of a practical identity (Korsegaard, 2009; see also 
Roessler, 2011) capable of securing a sense of one’s life being worth living. 
Where the social goal is to widen the bases for experiencing the bipartite value of 
meaningfulness, then interpretive differences emerging from the application of 
phronetic techne in a rationality of caring are particularly productive, because 
these differences arise from our efforts to fulfil our responsibilities of care 
towards worthy objects, where the worth of the objects are subject to difference 
and deliberation. Thus, to engage with values through interpretive meaning-
making is to have the bases for self-respect and self-esteem, enabling us to form a 
practical identity which secures a sense of meaning. 
 
‘a (thickly) autonomous agent regulates her life on the basis of 
her values, where a person’s values are deep psychological 
features that ground emotions of esteem and thereby reveal the 
shape of her self-conception’ (Copp, 2007: 18). 
 
Meanings of work are understood to be: ‘the way in which workers bring 
significance and order to their experience of labour’ (Joyce, 1987: 7). A worker 
may find meaning in performing hard, menial, or dangerous work well: work such 
as coalmining, or fishing, for example, is embedded in a rich historical and social 
context, sustained by dense community relations (Antony, 1977: 286). Ashforth & 
Kreiner (1999) found that ’people performing dirty work tend to retain relatively 
high occupational esteem and pride’ (ibid: 413), where dirty work is 
conceptualised as any kind of work which carries with it some kind of physical, 
social or moral taint but which is not regarded by society as unimportant or trivial: 
for example, undertakers, careworkers, refuse collectors. Workers doing dirty 
work are aware of the stigma of dirty work, but can obtain identity support 
through ‘strong cultures of meaning making’ (ibid: 419) and various strategies of 
interpretation, the most successful of which is reframing. Reframing enables 
workers to transform the very meaning of the work they do using ‘ennobling 
ideologies’ (ibid: 428). Positive interpretive strategies can be encouraged by the 
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organisational environment in which the work is carried out. Salzinger (1991), for 
example, found that, in one cooperative of domestic services, the work was 
defined as low skilled and temporary, resulting in no training for staff; in a second 
cooperative, the work was organised in professional teams which offered training 
and participation in decisions: ‘The result was that members of the first co-op 
came to regard domestic work as unimportant, whereas members of the second 
regarded it as an inherently skilled occupation, deserving of respect, fair treatment 
and decent pay’ (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999: 431). Relational dimensions of work 
are fundamental to the formation of practical identity. Deliberative meaning-
making through the exercise of the political mode of being shapes the common 
horizon of value, thereby allowing us to offer ourselves and one another 
intelligible reasons for why a person, object or activity should contribute to the 
meaning content of our lives. Sluss & Ashforth (2007) identify how self-definition 
is affected by interpersonal relationships at work, both in terms of seeing oneself 
as a unique individual and in making interpersonal comparisons. Organisational 
life is held together by both cognitive and affective dimensions of working with 
others: ‘to work is to relate’ (Flum, 2001: 262). Relations are important for 
relational identity which describes how role occupants behave in their roles in 
respect to one another (for example, manager/subordinate or worker/co-worker) 
and for relational identification which describes the extent to which someone may 
define themselves by the standards and practices of the role they occupy (Sluss & 
Ashforth, 2007: 11). An agent may experience a relational identity by behaving 
according to role expectations but not experience relational identification because 
they reject a self-conception based upon the role they are performing. 
Identification with others through relational identity satisfies a vital human need 
for connection and belonging (ibid: 20), but resistance to personal identification 
with roles also expresses a vital need to have a sense of oneself as an active agent 
who reflectively endorses what elements of one’s work are to become part of 
one’s sense of who one is. 
In sum, it is the formation of an intersectional practical identity which 
ought to be the target of social recognition where the process of building a 
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practical identity, whilst never complete, nevertheless enables us to experience a 
sense of dignity as respected and esteemed persons who have a particular life of 
our own to lead. I do not claim that this resolves the difficulties of securing stable 
positive self-relations in the contemporary organisation of work, but I do suggest 
that the experience of work contains positive resources for securing a sense of 
dignity when interpretive meaning-making is organised along democratic lines. 
5.0.0 Conclusion 
Social recognition is a fundamental human need, which is constitutive of 
the meaning content of work. In the contemporary organisation of work, however, 
it is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain the positive self-relations which 
enable us to experience a sense of meaningfulness. I argue that neither Rawslian 
respect recognition nor Honneth’s esteem recognition are able to satisfy the 
ethical and psychological needs for social recognition. I propose that self-respect 
and self-esteem ought to be tied to our sense of dignity as particular persons who 
bear responsibilities towards the worthy objects we have appropriated to the 
meaning content of our lives. When we evaluate ourselves against the normative 
orientations relevant to the nature of particular worthy objects, then we find that 
practices of other-regarding care, which include the importance of self-care, are 
useful for directing our attention away from the frantic pursuit of self-esteem 
fostered by the contemporary organisation of work. A sense of our dignity as 
particular persons is dependent upon forming being able to form a practical 
identity. And I identify how the psychological process of intersubjectivity and the 
ethical requirements of self-constitution offer us an insight into the formation of 
our selves as particular persons with a life of our own to lead. 
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Chapter Six 
‘The Inner Workshop of Democracy’: Realising the 
Emancipatory Potential of Meaningful Work through Agonistic 
Workplace Democracy 
1.0.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, I argue that the emancipatory potential of the work people 
do together is realised by a politics of meaningfulness in work – a politics brought 
about by agonistic democratic practices at the level of the task which allow for 
contestation over the rules and modes of being framing action and subjective 
formations. And this makes democratic practices of intrinsic value, because, not 
only do they enable the political mode of being, but they are amongst the worthy 
objects and affective attachments constituting the value of meaningfulness. I 
proceed by examining standard arguments for workplace participation, concluding 
that they do not provide the resources for justifying democratic participation 
because it is intrinsic to the meaning content of work. I challenge the deliberative 
democrats who assume that, since the action contexts of work are characterised by 
hierarchical relations and instrumental rationality, then work timespaces lack the 
conditions of respect and fairness necessary for democratic deliberation, and are 
therefore inhospitable to the political mode of being. Instead, I argue for 
democratic authority at the level of the organisation and for participatory practices 
at the level of the task, which capture difference potentials arising from acts of 
work, making them available for public evaluation through democratic 
contestation over meanings and purposes. Because they unsettle assumptions that 
economic associations are sites of a unified consensus, and pluralise the range of 
values which are available for appropriation to the meaning content of a life, I 
argue that agonistic democratic practices have the potential to foster a politics of 
meaningfulness. Agonic democratic practices do not impose a permanent 
settlement, but are productive of difference by making closures always available 
for evaluation and contestation. Finally, I propose that in ‘the inner workshop of 
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democracy’ (Follett, 1998 [1918]), agonistic democratic practices capable of 
realising the emancipatory potential of positive critical conception of work are 
characterised by: association, contestation, ethos of enlargement and decision. 
 
2.0.0 Participation and Democracy 
 
I argue that workplace democracy is justified because democratic practices 
are constitutive of a transformatory experience of working (Hsieh, 2008), and are 
therefore intrinsically valuable, irrespective of outcomes, such as increased 
efficiency. In my positive critical conception of meaningful work, democratic 
practices are the means to realising the emancipatory potential of the experience 
of working, because, not only do democratic practices foster the proliferation of 
worthy objects, but they are, in themselves, among the worthy objects which 
people can affectively appropriate to the meaning content of their lives. I proceed 
by distinguishing between workplace democracy and economic democracy. 
Workplace democracy operates at the meso- and micro-levels of organisational 
life and is the ‘organisation of work such that employees working in each firm 
have a meaningful capacity to shape the conditions of work as well as to guide the 
strategic direction of the enterprise’ (Williamson, 2004: 2-3), whereas economic 
democracy operates at the macro-level of the political economy: ‘a functional 
economic democracy must create mechanisms allowing the public to make broad 
social choices, social choices which in turn constitute and affect the substance of 
daily life’ (ibid: 5). Workplace democracy can operate independently of a system 
of economic democracy; alternatively, workplace democracy and economic 
democracy can be made co-extensive, such that workplace democracy becomes 
necessary to a functioning economic democracy (ibid: 12-13). In my positive 
critical conception of meaningful work, the value of meaningfulness is realised by 
a system of workplace democracy, consisting of democratic authority at the meso-
level of the organisation, and by agonistic democratic practices at the micro-level 
of the task. Both are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for generating a 
politics of meaningfulness – the further condition of economic democracy at the 
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macro-level of society is also required because economic democracy pluralises 
positive values by proliferating the variety of associational forms along 
democratic lines (e.g. mutuals, credit unions, cooperatives, employee-owned 
enterprises). 
It is important to note that not all participation is democratic participation: 
simple participation, or having a share in a joint activity, can be distinguished 
from democratic participation, or having a share in control over decision-making 
through collective self-determination. Pateman (1970) distinguishes between the 
full democracy of authority, the partial democracy of influence and the pseudo 
democracy of appearance (ibid: 70-73), where full democracy implies a 
transformation of the authority structure in which each employee has equal 
decision-making power; partial democracy describes participatory practices which 
confer influence but not power over decision-making; and pseudo democracy 
describes management strategies of communication which generate the illusion, 
rather than the substance, of democratic control. Cathcart (2009) identifies how 
employee voice is often instituted as consultation rather than a share in decision-
making, in order to secure ‘harmonious and less conflictual relations with the 
workforce’ (Gollan & Wilkinson, 2007: 1136), where structures designed to 
represent employee voice are dependent upon the good will of managerial 
authority. Thus, there is a distinction to be made between having a share in 
participation, as simply taking part in an activity such as consultation, and having 
a share in power, as having a degree of influence over an activity (Heller, 2003). 
And I argue that to realise the intrinsic value of the political mode of being in 
meaningful work requires each person to have a share in power as control over 
decision-making, because such is required to secure our status as co-authorities in 
non-dominated relations to others, and to develop the capabilities for judging and 
feeling necessary for uniting the objective and subjective dimensions in the 
bipartite value of meaningfulness. 
An example of the difference between democratic participation and simple 
participation is provided by recent UK regulations, established in response to the 
EU Directive on Informing and Consulting Employees, and applicable after 2008 
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to enterprises with more than 50 employees, which were anticipated as a 
‘realignment of institutional arrangements to enable workers to have a voice’ 
(Dundon & Gollan, 2007: 1183). But, case studies of attempts to implement the 
regulations show that the dimension of ‘voice’ is often constrained to influence 
and appearance, rather than joint authority over decision-making: ‘responsibility 
for decision-making ultimately remains with management’ (Gollan & Wilkinson, 
2007: 1138; see also Wilkinson et al, 2007). Such forms of pseudo-democracy 
fuel criticisms of ‘participation as a gloss on the biased structures of capitalism’ 
(Beirne, 2008: 679; Clarke, 1977), where the objective of participation initiatives 
is to promote the aims of management, rather than to realise the transformation of 
authority relations (Harley et al, 2005), or the creation of decent work (Ghai, 
2003). Team-working is often invoked as a positive example of an autonomy-
promoting strategy, but such practices can be made to serve organisational 
purposes: Ezzy (2001: 634) identifies how team-working is used to ‘appropriate 
workers’ solidarity and support’ and encourage them to ‘identify their interests 
with the company’s’, and Marsh (1992), in a review of the data on Japanese 
manufacturers, concludes that ‘systems of participatory decision-making in Japan 
have not led to workplace democracy’ (ibid: 250), because firms appropriate 
workers’ ideas and suggestions without giving them authority over decision-
making. Hodson (2002b) identifies how the self-disciplinary character of work 
teams results in the coercive extraction of higher levels of discretionary effort by 
increasing competition amongst co-workers, monitoring and reporting of peers, 
and fostering interactive behaviours designed to humiliate, criticise and ostracise: 
‘Team based organisations of work can thus provide the basis for an even tighter 
control of work life than management systems based on bureaucratic control or 
supervisory fiat’ (Hodson, 2002b: 496; see Barker, 1999). Hodson (2002b) 
concludes that such participatory schemes cannot be considered democratic forms 
of participation, they are not ‘real industrial democracy wherein workers and 
managers share profits, ownership and high-level governance of firms’ (Lincoln & 
Kelleberg: 1990). Furthermore, Brogger (2010), in discussing the conditions for 
democratic dialogue in a Norwegian retail chain, concludes that, whilst ‘structure 
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and action are critical conditions for cooperation’, what is also required is 
‘institutional support in the form of concrete bodies, procedures and arenas to 
make employee participation part of legitimate, everyday organizational routines’ 
(ibid: 477). This means that enterprises with the greatest success at protecting and 
promoting good quality work, as well as at securing efficiency and productivity, 
are those which have ‘comprehensive direct employee involvement systems in 
partnership with the representative channels of labour’ (Tuselman at al., 2007: 
163). Enterprises which lack such structural features are ‘bleak houses’, because 
they are characterised by ‘hidden conflict, instability and authoritarianism’ 
(Brogger, 2010: 479; see also, Wilkinson, 1999). Research on employee-owned 
enterprises shows that there are more likely to be positive effects upon the quality 
of work people do when ownership is combined with both control participation at 
the level of the task and indirect representative mechanisms at the level of the 
organisation (Kaarsemaker & Poutsma, 2006; see also Whyte & Whyte, 1991). 
Kaarsemaker & Poutsma (2006) argue that the empirical research indicates two 
conditions for successful employee ownership: firstly, the organisation of work 
must be guided by a shared philosophy of work in which employees are treated as 
worthy of being co-owners (ibid: 680), and secondly, the institution of a set of 
core practices including ‘participation in decision-making, profit sharing, 
information sharing, training for business literacy and mediation’ (ibid.).  
The assumption of management prerogative means that management 
intervention is usually required if workers are to secure any kind of participation 
in the workplace. But workplace democracy cannot realise the emancipatory 
potential of a positive critical conception of work if democratic practices remain 
within the gift of management: workplace democracy can be said to exist only 
where ‘the employees have a legal or habitual right to participate’ (Brogger, 2010: 
482), which I shall argue in Chapter Seven requires institutional guarantees for the 
Capability for Voice. The Scandinavian democratic dialogue tradition (Alasoini 
2006; Gustavsen, 1985; Qvale, 2002) provides an example of a society-wide 
attempt to create a habitual right to participate. In this context, practices of 
democratic dialogue are shaped by different and conflicting discourses concerning 
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the nature of organisational life which draw upon local knowledge and provide the 
material for the difference and contestation upon which the creation of political 
moments depends: ‘Within an enterprise, discourses are partly overlapping and 
partly disconnected. With proper channels and arenas for sharing between the 
different discourses, an enterprise has a capacity for generating a richer and more 
nuanced knowledge both of the ‘realities’ and their own learning processes’ 
(Brogger, 2010: 483; see Palshaugen, 2006). Beirne (2008) suggests that a 
generative approach to revealing and enabling different discourses requires micro-
emancipatory mechanisms and structures at the level of the task (Alvesson and 
Willmott, 2002) which release the autonomy potential of workers by building 
democratic practices out of the natural work groups, repertoires of local 
knowledge and established traditions developed by workers themselves (Beirne, 
2008: 688). Moreover, Beirne (2008) characterises such participatory practices as 
‘negotiated, contested and precarious’ (ibid: 682), which means that establishing 
publics for democratic practices at the level of the task require also a 
‘consolidated, independent source of influence and continuity’ (Brogger, 2010: 
491), or a system of independent institutions which can provide checks and 
balances within a pluralised system of democratic accountability. This implies 
that, to realise the full emancipatory potential of democratic authority at the level 
of the enterprise and democratic practices at the level of the task, requires a 
society-wide system of economic democracy. For example, the German system of 
co-determination, the Mondragon cooperatives of Spain, and the Emilia Romagna 
region in Italy are national and regional systems of economic democracies which 
combine different elements of ownership, and multiple channels for participation 
(indirect/representative and direct/individual) in a complex web of institutions and 
practices aimed at fostering the conciliation of difference for social co-operation 
(Frege, 2005; Crouch, 1993; Wiedermann, 1980).  
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3.0.0 Standard Arguments for Workplace Democracy 
 
I take democracy to mean that each person involved in the enterprise of 
collective self-determination has a share in decision-making. A workplace is 
democratic ‘when workers collectively exercise the final decisions over the most 
significant issues that affect the firm and their work lives’ (Schweizer, 1995: 367). 
Standard arguments for workplace democracy draw upon the concept of political 
autonomy to justify economic and workplace democracy, using the general 
principle that everyone engaged in a common activity ought to have the 
opportunity to participate in the decision-making affecting that activity (Dewey, 
1927; Dahl, 1985; Carter, 2003): ‘everyone should have the opportunity to 
participate in making economic decisions to the degree they are affected by those 
decisions’ (Albert & Hahnel, 2002: 20). ). I examine three standard arguments: the 
parallel argument (Dahl, 1985; cf. Cohen, 1989), the spillover argument (Pateman, 
1970), and the efficiency argument (Johnson, 2006). Standard arguments for 
workplace democracy, however, treat democratic practices as an instrumental 
good, where workplace democracy is valuable because it fosters beneficial 
outcomes such as legitimacy, accountability or efficiency, rather than being 
intrinsically valuable in its own right (Bowles & Gintis, 1993: 86). Since standard 
arguments do not take sufficient account of the intrinsic value of democratic 
participation to the interior content of work, I argue instead that democracy in 
work is justified because we each have a fundamental human need for 
meaningfulness, which, in contemporary societies, depends, to a large degree, 
upon the interior content of work being structured to realise the values of 
autonomy as non-alienation, freedom as non-domination, and social recognition as 
dignity. And at minimum, this requires institutional guarantees for democratic 
participation in work, secured by the Capability for Voice (see Chapter Seven). 
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3.1.0 The Parallel Argument 
 
The central claim in the parallel argument is that economic associations 
are similar to states, and therefore the rights of democratic participation which we 
enjoy because of our membership of political polities should be extended to our 
membership of economic organisations. Dahl (1985), for example, says that the 
characteristics of a democratic human association include: an ongoing need to 
agree collective binding decisions; such decisions are made by the people who are 
subject to them; each person is equally entitled to receive consideration; each 
person is equally well qualified to make decisions; and fairness requires ‘that each 
person’s needs or deserts be taken into account’ (ibid: 57-58).  In democratic 
associations people possess an inalienable right to self-government: ‘people 
involved in a certain kind of human association (one in which the process of 
government ought to meet democratic criteria) possess a right, an inalienable right 
to govern themselves by the democratic process’(ibid: 56-7). Dahl argues against 
a right to private ownership, which means that economic organisations meet the 
requirements for being amongst the kind of democratic organisations, and 
therefore the right to self-government applies. This means that the right of self-
government must extend to our membership of such enterprises, because, if 
economic organisations can be shown to be analogous to states, then the exclusion 
of democratic practices from economic activities cannot be justified: ‘If 
democracy is justified in governing the state, then it must also be justified in 
governing economic enterprises; and to say that it is not justified in governing 
economic enterprises is to imply that it is not justified in governing the state’ 
(ibid: 111). Furthermore, conventional systems of ownership and control in 
economic organisations unjustifiably limit the ability of most citizens to 
participate in how economic organisations are run: ‘internal governments of 
economic enterprises are flatly undemocratic, both de jure and de facto’ (Dahl, 
1985: 54-55). In the standard economic model of work, such inequalities of voice 
are taken to be acceptable, because the coordination activities of hierarchical 
management structures within free market systems are assumed to generate 
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efficiency and productivity gains which are generally beneficial. But if the 
coordination and efficiency benefits are in doubt, or if an alternative system can 
be shown to be just as efficient, then the moral complaint that undemocratic 
workplaces are unjustified because they undermine political autonomy cannot be 
so easily overridden.  
The parallel argument attracts two types of objections. Firstly, unlike 
states, membership of economic organisations is voluntary, which means that 
economic organisations do not need to attend to maintaining the consent of their 
members in order to legitimate authority. However, states must secure the consent 
of their citizens who find themselves members by accident of birth, rather than by 
choice, and therefore have little option but to submit to whatever authority 
structures pertain. Secondly, hierarchical authority is required because it is 
epistemically superior: worker decision-making risks poor outcomes, due to 
participants’ lack of information, understanding and judgement. Both of these 
objections, however, can be countered. In the first objection, the non-voluntary 
features of economic organisations make exit for employees far from costless and 
highly constrained: for example, firm-specific skills may not be easily 
transferable, and the necessity to earn a living makes exit highly problematic for 
most. Besides, the economic landscape is populated with conventionally 
organised enterprises, which means that, for most people, there is little scope for 
expressing preferences for democratically organised enterprises. In the second 
objection, the argument of epistemic superiority presents a false picture of the 
knowledge required to be a capable decision-maker. Workers would not be 
expected to be omni-competent in decision-making: ‘it is sufficient to believe that 
citizens are qualified enough to decide which matters do or do not require binding 
collective decisions’ (ibid: 118). Workers as citizens are capable of distinguishing 
between ends or general organisational purposes, and means which may require 
specialist technical expertise. Thus, both voluntary membership and superior 
decision-making do not hold up well as arguments for excluding democratic 
practices from the workplace.  But, the analogy of firms with states may still be 
‘too strong’ (Neron, 2010: 338; see Phillips & Margolis, 1999). Neron (2010) 
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suggests that, although firms are not states, they may be ‘some sort of political 
communities’ (ibid, original emphasis), perhaps more akin to cities which are 
‘created by entrepreneurial energy, enterprise and risk taking; and they too, recruit 
and hold their citizens, by offering them an attractive place to live’ (Walzer, 1984: 
295). And the kind of institutions which firms are puts them into the category of 
being political communities in this sense, because they too must hold their 
members to a cooperative endeavour, requiring from them personal effort and 
risk-taking. The risks and responsibilities which people take up in work precludes 
situating them in hierarchical relations which make them vulnerable to arbitrary 
interference, eroding their control over their own efforts, and subjecting them to 
misrecognition. This is not how citizens should be treated. Although economic 
organisations are not entirely the same as states, I conclude that we are right to be 
concerned that people to whom we are bound by common fate in a political polity 
are divided one from another by unaccountable structures of power and authority 
in the action contexts of social cooperation where they invest much of their time 
and energy. 
 
3.2.0 The Spillover Thesis 
 
 The central claim of the spillover thesis is that the loss of democratic 
participation in the public sphere can be compensated for by democratic 
participation in the private sphere of economic association, which, by stimulating 
the habits of participation, revitalises political life (Pateman, 1970). But by 
reconnecting them to sources of political solidarity which motivate political 
action, workplace democracy enables people to form the capabilities for political 
participation. Dahl (1985) expresses a version of the spillover thesis in the 
following terms: 
 
‘Workplace democracy […] will foster human development, 
enhance the sense of political advocacy, reduce alienation, create 
a solidary community based on work, strengthen attachments to 
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the general good of the community, weaken the pull of self-
interest, produce a body of active and concerned public-spirited 
citizens within the enterprises, and stimulate greater participation 
and better citizenship in the government of the state itself’ (ibid: 
95). 
Pateman (1970) criticises theories of democracy based upon competitive 
elites, such as Schumpeter (1943) and Sartori (1962), for accepting the low 
political participation of citizens as an unavoidable, if regrettable, part of the 
system. She argues that since workplaces structure our daily activities and 
experiences, they constitute a vital formative environment for generating the sense 
of political efficacy which will motivate workers to take up their duties as active 
citizens, provided workplaces can be democratised to overcome authoritarian 
decision-making: ‘Participation develops and fosters the very qualities necessary 
for it; the more individuals participate the better able they become to do so’ 
(Pateman, 1970: 42-3).  Unfortunately, Pateman’s spillover thesis attracts 
ambiguous support from the empirical literature (Carter, 2006). For example, 
Greenberg et al (1996) show only a weak association between workplace 
participation and political participation – workers in co-operative enterprises are 
not more likely to be involved in voting and party activities. Greenberg et al 
(1996) identify a more convincing link between long term membership of a co-
operative enterprise and greater community involvement (see also Godard, 2007). 
Adman (2008), however, finds no relationship between political activity and the 
practice of civic skills at work, such as communicative and organisational 
capacities. The only positive spillover effect Adman is able to identify is the 
possibility that political tolerance may be promoted because ‘exposure to differing 
political views is more common in working life than in voluntary organisations’ 
(ibid: 133-4).  The lack of evidence for a positive spillover effect may be because 
workers in democratically organised enterprises place are influenced by the wider 
democratic system of which they are a part. Schweizer (1995) suggests that 
empirical studies tend to conflate participatory (direct) with republican 
(representative) forms of democracy (ibid: 370): even where democratic 
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workplaces are successful in generating a sense of political efficacy, the 
institutional limitations of representative democracy and a bourgeois ethos 
encourages people to value their private lives over an active public life, and stifles 
political participation (ibid: 370-374). Republican government monopolises public 
spaces, and the delegation of political power to representative government reduces 
the incentive to participate. Workers whose preferences and capabilities for 
political activity have been formed by the experience of direct democracy in their 
workplaces are less likely to find engaging in the limited opportunities for 
political participation offered by representative government, such as voting or 
involvement in political parties, worthwhile (ibid.). This implies, I suggest, that a 
system of workplace democracy must operate within a deliberative society, in 
which opportunities for deliberative participation operate alongside representative 
democracy. 
 
3.3.0 The Efficiency Argument 
 
The central claim of the efficiency argument is that participation improves 
economic performance. Efficiency justifications (Bowles & Gintis, 1993: 89) rely 
upon the superior economic efficiency of democratic firms ‘in the static sense of 
maximising output per unit of inputs’ (ibid.), where workplace democracy is 
justified if it can be shown to make a positive contribution to organisational 
effectiveness in advanced technological societies (Johnson, 2006). The strains of 
global capitalism have created knowledge intensive, decentralised, flat 
organisations which are functionally flexible: ‘knowledge is no longer organised 
through task continuity’ (Johnson, 2006: 249). In such organisations, employees 
must collaborate across traditional functional lines, and this is impeded by 
hierarchies which have compliance and oppression built into them. Therefore, 
workplace democracy provides an efficient mechanism for facilitating autonomy, 
self-management and empowerment by holding managerial hierarchies to account, 
and subjecting them to democratic critique. For example, Bowles & Gintis (1993: 
92-4) identify the following efficiency gains from workplace democracy: firstly, it 
Ruth Yeoman                                        Meaningful Work and Workplace Democracy 
 
Page 232 
 
reduces employees’ alienation; secondly, it introduces a mode of coordination 
apart from the management hierarchy because employees monitor one another; 
and thirdly, it removes various costs. In addition, Block (1993) identifies the role 
that workplace democracy plays in identifying, creating and accessing new 
knowledge to increase innovative capacity. Cooperatives, for example, which 
combine both participation in economic returns and participation in organisational 
control, experience an enhanced level of productivity (Johnson, 2006: 257). But 
the empirical evidence for the superior efficiency of democratically run 
organisations is inconclusive. This may be due to claims to practices being 
democratic which are de facto forms of ‘pseudo-democracy’ (Pateman, 1970: 73) 
because they involve the appropriation of effort by organisations concerned to 
harness the positive benefits of participation, without changing the fundamental 
power relations: ‘some organisational procedures aimed at influencing behaviour 
so as to manufacture consent to managerially sanctioned norms and mores’ 
(Johnson, 2006: 254; Yates et al, 2001).  
To provide additional support for an efficiency based argument for 
workplace democracy, Johnson turns to the contribution democratic participation 
makes to the quality of decision making by critiquing the managerial claim to 
epistemic superiority (ibid: 260).  Johnson identifies three normative questions for 
workplace democracy at the micro-level of the organisation: what form should 
workplace democracy take; what is the scope and content of the decisions which 
will be subject to democratic control by employees; and what kind of employee 
ownership structure aligns with democratic control (Johnson, 2006: 254)? 
Democratic practices engender the capacity for critical reflection, which in turn 
requires a ‘critical democratic consciousness’ (ibid): ‘if communal practices are to 
overcome hegemonic relations, they must entail full participation in situated 
learning so as to ensure the development of mutual understanding and a discourse 
of critique’ (Johnson, 2006: 261; Gaventa & Cornwall, 2001). Good decision-
making depends upon widely accessible information and knowledge combined 
with capacities for critical reflection – and these capabilities are not naturally the 
sole province of a management class, but instead can be vested in workers who 
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apply their capabilities and knowledge to the framing rules. In my positive critical 
conception of meaningful work, there is the additional requirement of a sense of 
one’s worthiness to be a co-authority, and this, I argue, depends upon there being 
a general entitlement to the Capability for Voice. In the absence of such an 
entitlement, whether or not any particular organisation exhibits democratic 
features will remain subject to ‘enlightened management’, which means that, in 
many cases, the participation of some will be vulnerable to the appropriation or 
dismissal of others. 
 
4.0.0 The Marginalisation of Workplace Democracy in 
Deliberative Theory 
Deliberative democracy consists of a ‘family of views’ in which ‘the 
public deliberation of free and equal citizens is the core of legitimate decision 
making and self-government’ (Bohman, 1998: 401). It can be understood as a 
system of rule, where the ‘laws and policies result from processes in which 
citizens defend solutions to common problems on the basis of what are generally 
acknowledged as relevant reasons’ (Cohen & Fung, 2004: 26). To secure political 
autonomy as collective self-determination, a deliberative system operates against 
certain standards, which Mansbridge (2010) identifies as: respect among 
members; fairness in procedures; and ‘epistemic fruitfulness’ (ibid: 1). One 
example of the application of the standards of deliberative democracy to economic 
life is the Scandinavian model of democratic dialogue. This model incorporates 
insights from Habermassian discourse theory to generate a democratic dialogue 
which aims to overcome situated power-laden knowledge in order to encourage 
the self-reflection of an ‘ideal speech situation (Brogger, 483; cf. Habermas, 2002 
[1971]). The conditions necessary for realising the communication of an ideal 
speech situation are: freedom of entry and exit; equal rights of participants to say 
what they want; the truthfulness, comprehensibleness and sincerity of 
participants’ utterances; and ‘an absence of coercion’ (Habermas, 1993: 56). 
When such conditions are united with correctly designed procedures, then 
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participants will be brought into an ideal speech situation, which will cause them 
to recognise the ‘forceless force of the better argument’ (Habermas 1990: 23). 
But, the need for such pre-conditions, if an ideal speech situation is to pertain, 
casts doubt over the Scandinavian innovation. Since workplaces lack the pre-
conditions of equality, respect, and fairness, economic life is a sphere of ‘norm-
free sociality’ (Habermas, 1987: 171). This means that Habermassian discourse 
theory denies the possibility of an ideal speech situation in work from the outset. 
Technical-instrumental rationality, the imperative to maximise organisational 
efficiency, and the necessity for hierarchical co-ordination harnessed towards pre-
specified (market-given) goals, suffuse relations between workers, managers and 
other stakeholders, suppressing differences in the drive to realise a naturalised, 
uncritical unity. Disagreements may occur over external goods, such as pay, and 
accumulate into interest group politics, but internal goods, such as the 
organisation of work, are set by market-given goals and practices, and therefore 
are inevitable and unchallengeable. The result is that, despite an extensive 
empirical literature exploring participatory practices and worker-managed firms, 
deliberative political theorists have had little to say about workplace democracy. 
In deliberative democratic theory, the ideals of democratic deliberation – freedom, 
equality, and the exercise of reason – do not pertain in workplaces dominated by 
technical reason, governed by hierarchical authority, and divided by economic 
inequalities (Estlund, 2003: 131). Indeed, Bowles & Gintis (1993) describe the 
concept of economic democracy as ‘oxymoronic’, because ‘if the capitalist 
economy is a sphere of voluntary private interactions, what is there to 
democratise?’ (ibid: 97). Even participatory theorists who support workplace 
democracy are not immune to the naturalised view of economic organisations, 
allowing that the hierarchical authority necessary for coordination and efficiency 
may preclude democratic accountability: ‘there is something paradoxical in 
calling socialisation inside existing organisations and associations, most of which, 
especially industrial ones, are oligarchical and hierarchical, a training explicitly in 
democracy’ (Pateman, 1970: 45). 
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Such observations suggest that deliberative democrats concur with 
Habermassian discourse theory - that the immanent experience of working has 
been purged of contestation and difference. For deliberative democrats, this may 
be regrettable, but for proponents of the neo-liberal capitalist model, this is only 
how matters ought to be, since the demand for political freedom (the ‘freedom of 
the ancients’) is an unnatural intrusion into the affairs of organisations, which are 
properly understood to be outside the political sphere (Tully, 2002). Connolly 
(1995) argues that, after the retreat of substantive conceptions of the human good, 
we have been left with a ‘scaled down perspective of the world without intrinsic 
purpose, indifferent to human concerns, available for human disposition of it 
through technical organisation’ (ibid: 3). Deliberative democratic theory assumes 
that, whilst the realm of the political is radically plural, making the harmonisation 
of interests the inescapable problem of politics, the realm of the economic is 
radically unified, making politics not only impossible, but unnecessary (Honig, 
1993: 201). And in any case, participatory democracy, of which workplace 
democracy is cousin, is too inefficient and too costly to make available to mass 
populations. But Hauptmann (2001) points out that most deliberative democrats 
argue that ‘deliberation is a kind of participation, or somehow essential to it’ (ibid: 
408), which means that deliberative democratic theory, rather than being a fully 
developed and independent theory, is on closer evaluation a revision of 
participatory democracy. And in fact, deliberative democracy may not necessarily 
be an improvement upon participatory democracy, because deliberative democrats 
have settled for the more modest aim of producing improved decision-making 
procedures, abandoning the emancipatory ambitions of participatory democracy, 
and resulting in a cautious, pragmatic approach which ‘dulls the theory’s critical 
edge’ (ibid: 421).  
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5.0.0 Challenging the Separate and Homogenous Economy 
 
Constructing the economic as a norm-free action context encourages 
deliberative democrats to incorporate into their theories the assumption that the 
work people do together is governed by unitary interests and technical rationality. 
But this position has been challenged by empirical and theoretical literature from 
economic geography and feminist economics: ‘Empirical research indicates that 
real humans do not simply leave their needs for social relations, their values, their 
loyalties, and their creativity at the workplace door’ (Nelson, 2003: 92). For 
example, post-structuralist theorists concerned with ‘theorising the contingency of 
social outcomes, rather than the unfolding of structural logics’ (Gibson-Graham, 
2008: 615) argue persuasively that the economic can no longer be conceived of as 
a sphere separate from the social and the political. Instead, work timespaces are 
situated in diverse economies (Gibson-Graham, 2008); riven by conflictual 
purposes (Noonan, 2005); characterised by multiple rationalities (Ettlinger, 2004); 
and exhibit no unitary consensus (England, 2003; Nelson, 2003). This means that, 
far from being unified and homogenous, the work of social cooperation is already 
saturated with difference and contestation. I suggest this evidence allows us to 
agree with Gould (1996) that shared, everyday activities must be incorporated in 
the public sphere, because trying to keep these activities to separate spheres 
removes ‘not only difference but also the creativity that issues forth an 
imaginative critique and rejection of existing agreement and in the generation of 
new and unexpected frameworks for agreement’ (ibid: 173).   
Thus, the economy is not separate from other spheres of human action, nor 
is it a monological homogeneity, but consists instead of a plurality of overlapping 
action contexts in which generating and contesting plural meanings and 
interpretive differences is necessary to getting the work done. Rather than being a 
unified phenomenon, the economic is best conceived of as constituted by diverse 
economies, multiply interwoven into the political and the social. Political 
geographers and feminist theorists argue that there are hidden, alternative forms of 
economic exchange which, when brought into public view, enable us to ‘perform 
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new economic worlds’ (Gibson-Graham, 2008: 614) and to ‘repopulate the 
economic landscape as a proliferative space of difference’ (ibid: 615). Gibson-
Graham claim that such modes of exchange are not marginal economic practices, 
but are more extensive than conventional capitalist modes of exchange: caring for 
others, for example, contributes up to 50% of economic activity (ibid.). By taking 
a ‘whole economy’ approach to 120 households in a North Nottinghamshire 
locality, Williams & Nadin (2010) document a multiplicity of economic practices, 
ranging from ‘purely monetized to purely non-monetized economic practices’ 
(ibid: 56), including formal paid and unpaid work in the private, public and third 
sectors, informal employment, monetized community work and family work, gift 
exchange and self-provisioning. They describe ‘the economy as a ‘multiplex’ 
combination of modes, rather than as a dualism between market and non-market 
forms’ (ibid: 28). And they argue that, not only are economic practices fluid and 
‘seamlessly intertwined together’ (ibid: 57), but that economic inequalities spilled 
over into inequalities of participation in diverse economic practices. Formal 
private sector employment in everyday economies is confined to 20% of the 
deprived community and 50% of the affluent community (ibid: 60); people do not 
engage in formal volunteering in order to provide care for others but to participate 
in sports and social organisation, (ibid: 65); and people in the affluent community 
are able to engage in a wider range of economic practices than those in the 
deprived community. Williams & Nadin (op. cit.) conclude that ‘fostering 
development does not only concern fostering the formal market economy. It is 
also about nurturing participation in the full range of economic practices that are 
variously used to secure a livelihood’ (ibid: 66). 
But Gibson-Graham (2008) warns against opposing a diverse alternative 
economics to a monolithic, undifferentiated capitalist economics, arguing instead 
that we need to understand, not only how ‘diversity exists not only in the domain 
of non-capitalist economic activity’ (ibid: 624), but also how ‘capitalist enterprise 
is itself a site of difference’ (ibid.). Diverse economies are ‘openings, to provide a 
space of freedom and possibility’ (ibid: 619), already present in conventional 
economies, which, if brought into public view, provide a rich field of values for 
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appropriation to the meaning content of a life. They overturn assumptions that the 
economic is homogenous and autonomous from the political and the social, 
showing that the separate spheres thesis has little basis in lived reality. In a further 
example, Lee (2006) says that the economic is ‘an integral part of everyday life, 
full of the contradictions, ethical dilemmas and multiple values that inform the 
quotidian business of making a living. In short it is ordinary’ (ibid: 414). And, 
Ettlinger (2004) defines a context as a symbolic space which is ‘present in many 
localities yet connected across space, through practices, discourses, and networks’ 
(ibid: 32), which usefully identifies how work timespaces cannot be fixed, except 
temporarily through the meaning-making capacities of those who act in and 
through them. Thus, individual persons are:  
 
‘concurrently members of multiple social networks across 
different spheres of life (work, residential  community, leisure-
related communities), suggested that people unconsciously 
interweave multiple logics, that is, modes of thought and feeling 
associated with different spheres of life and different social 
networks’ (ibid: 32). 
 
In the end, there is no separate sphere of the economic. Instead, there is an 
interlacing of action contexts between which people move, taking with them the 
values and practical identities they have formed from their experiences of 
production and reproduction, and through which they engage with others in the 
co-creation of meanings. Movement between action contexts and encounters with 
others gives rise to ‘cognitive dissonance’ which ‘reflects multiple logics that 
derive from experiences in different contexts, challenging presumptions of 
ultimate or inevitable conformity’ (Ettlinger, 2004: 29). I argue that such 
cognitive dissonance is a potential, already available, source of the interpretive 
differences, which will remain as pre-political differences unless brought into 
public evaluation by democratic practices.  
 
Ruth Yeoman                                        Meaningful Work and Workplace Democracy 
 
Page 239 
 
5.1.0 Multiple Rationalities: From Natural Consensus to Contested 
Dissensus 
 
Dismissing political participation from ordinary working life allows 
economic associations to be characterised as legitimately unfree, closed, and 
homogeneous. Such assumptions promote arguments that democratic practices are 
redundant in economic organisations because the necessity for technical 
rationality compels a unity of interests and a homogenisation of ways of being 
human. The expulsion of the political from the economic is justified by claims 
that the coordination of activities enabling efficient economic functioning depends 
upon technical reasoning and a unity of interests. As a result, economic 
organisations encourage the flattening out of difference through the use of 
socialisation practices aimed at aligning workers’ subjectivities against ideal 
characteristics, such as those which make up ‘the entrepreneurial self’ or the 
‘flexible personality’: ‘Likeness is prized because it appears as the primary 
ingredient of unity’ (Wolin, 1996: 32).  
I argue that everyday work timespaces provide numerous possibilities for 
producing interpretive differences, particularly when people are guided, not only 
by technical rationality, but also by phronetic techne in a rationality of caring. 
Nelson (2003) identifies how, in conventional economic theory, economic 
organisations are imagined either as ‘separative’, that is, as autonomous, rational 
actors engaged in maximising their self-interest (i.e. profit), or as ‘soluble’, that is, 
subject to economic forces beyond their control (ibid: 81-2). Inside the firm, 
relations are assumed to be of three types: 
a. Separative-separative, when people who make up the firm 
are themselves considered to be self-interested 
autonomous agents; 
b. Soluble-soluble, when all are assumed to be in pursuit of a 
common goal; 
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c. Separative-soluble, when organisational issues are 
expressed simply as problems of designing the appropriate 
hierarchies of control (Nelson, 2003: 86). 
 
Unitarist assumptions of relations between persons in work foster concepts 
such as ‘responsible autonomy’ (Friedman, 1977) which characterise attempts ‘to 
meld the interests of workers and their employing organisations’ (Hodson, 2002: 
494). Nelson (2003) adds: ‘what is missing, clearly, in all these is any notion that 
firms might be active, connected, evolving organisations, or that they or the 
people within them have the capacity for acting in engaged, meaningful, and 
responsible ways’ (ibid: 92). According to conventional economic theory, the 
range of ‘motivations and relations’ within the unitary firm is narrow (ibid.), and 
of the soluble-soluble type: ‘the firm is just thought of as a unit, and it is simply 
presumed that all parts of it will work smoothly towards the goal of profit 
maximisation’ (ibid: 91). Democratic theorists take up this assumption 
uncritically, asserting that members of the firm lack the diversity which is a 
necessary pre-condition for deliberative democratic practices. This is because, 
where there is a naturalised consensus, then democracy as the contestation of 
differences and the formation of preferences through deliberative engagement 
with others is irrelevant.  
But I argue that the individual struggle to find meaning  in work has the 
potential to be conflictual, opening up cracks of difference in the presumption of a 
unified consensus, particularly at the ‘lower-levels’ of the organisational hierarchy 
where workers’ interests are often characterised as ‘soluble’, that is 
indistinguishable from the interests of the organisation. As people act within, and 
move across, different action contexts, they think and feel not simply within the 
dominant logic of the sphere in which they find themselves, but also actively 
attempt to link together diverse and conflicting logics across different contexts. 
Lee (2006), for example, suggests that multiple logics are ‘at work simultaneously 
within the various modes of social life’ (ibid: 420), giving rise to a ‘struggle to 
control what is and what is not of value’ (ibid: 416). This means that the values 
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inherent in the worthy objects which people may wish to appropriate to the 
meaning content of their lives do not have to be subject to permanent closure, but 
can be made available for difference and contestation. And in economic action 
contexts, the goal of productive efficiency does not have to automatically 
determine decisions and actions, without reference to external values. Noonan 
(2005), for example, identifies a fundamental clash between the value of ‘all 
round development of the individual’ and the value of efficiency (ibid: 102). In 
order to expose and conciliate value clashes in the economic, he argues for 
democratic practices which are ‘steered by a life-grounded value system’ 
(Noonan, 2005: 121), including normative evaluation of the interior content of the 
work people do. As a result, contestation over values, interpretive differences in 
meaning-making and interweaving of multiple logics of action opens out the 
economic space as ‘contingent,  historical and thoroughly social’, and thus replete 
with new possibilities, where ‘citizens are able not only to freely regulate and 
redesign existing economic practices, but also to create new ones’ (Swanson, 
2008: 56).  
In sum, work timespaces do not embody a unitary consensus which 
dissolves the interests of their members into the homogenous goal of maximising 
shareholder value, profit or national GDP. Rather, they are already loaded with 
affective relations, a diversity of interests, and ways of being human, thereby 
providing already extant opportunities for contestation and difference over 
contingent values. Furthermore, work timespaces constitute important webs of 
relations which contribute to meaning attribution by giving us the resources to 
claim the involvement of others in helping us to fulfil our responsibilities of care 
towards worthy objects. I argue that where workplace democracy takes the form 
of agonistic practices, then divergences and differences are made visible, 
encouraging ontological diversity and the pluralisation of values in the work of 
social cooperation. This is because, whereas deliberative democratic theory starts 
with the assumption of dissensus and aims at consensus, agonistic workplace 
democracy challenges assumptions of a pre-existing consensus by setting out to 
Ruth Yeoman                                        Meaningful Work and Workplace Democracy 
 
Page 242 
 
reveal submerged differences, using them to create spaces for acting in 
production.  
 
6.0.0 Agonistic Democracy 
 
I have discussed how workplace democracy is usually theorised within a 
corporatist or deliberative framework, where it is justified because it increases 
business efficiency or equips workers for the duties of citizenship. It is less 
common for workplace democracy to be theorised because it has intrinsic value. I 
propose, however, that workplace democracy can be re-imagined as intrinsic to 
the meaning content of work if we develop practices which reveal, through the 
exercise of the political mode of being, the irreducible autonomy in every act of 
work. In a positive critical conception of meaningful work, I argue that 
democratic practices are most likely to realise the immanent potential of work 
when they possess agonistic dimensions. This is because, by bringing into public 
view pre-political interpretive differences, contestation and deliberation aims, not 
at a unified consensus, but at the production of interpretive differences and the 
pluralisation of values. In agonistic democratic practices, the agon is ‘celebrated 
as a never-ending play of differences which resists the homogenising drive for 
social unity, enabling plurality to flourish’ (Schaap, 2009: 1). Connolly describes 
agonic democracy as: 
 
‘a practice that affirms the indispensability of identity to life, 
disturbs the dogmatisation of identity, and folds care for the 
protean diversity of human life into the strife and interdependence 
of identity\difference’ (Connolly, 1991: x). 
 
Connolly (1991) does not claim that agonic democracy constitutes a 
programmatic priority for society, but suggests, instead, that it works with existing 
democratic forms by ‘folding agonistic respect into identity\difference relations in 
a democratic state’ (ibid: xxv). Consequently, agonistic democratic practices are 
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not opposed to deliberative democratic practices, as a different form of 
democracy, but are the means to bringing into being the already existing 
emancipatory potential of deliberative practices (cf. Bachtiger, 2010).  
I suggest two ways in which agonistic democracy has the potential to 
multiply the range of positive values in a critical conception of meaningful work: 
firstly, by challenging technical rationality in deliberative procedures, and 
secondly, by proliferating the modes of being in work timespaces. Firstly, 
agonistic democratic practices challenge the assumption that technical rationality 
governs acts of work. Agonistic democracy advances a critique of deliberative 
democracy as the class of theories which assume that consensus on political 
questions can be attained by reasonable persons utilising a fair procedural system 
of decision-making, where rationality determines the legitimacy of the outcome. 
But agonistic democracy refuses ‘to equate concern for human dignity with a 
quest for rational consensus’ (Connolly, 1991: x). Agonistic theorists take 
deliberative democrats to task for generating rule-bound democratic practices 
which are ‘overly rationalist’ (Barnett, 2004: 5), and for failing to take account of 
how ‘the very essence of democratic politics lies in the constant contestation of 
the boundaries of the political’ (ibid: 4). The deliberative emphasis upon defining 
fair procedures generates exclusions and assimilations (Tully, 2002), which 
obscure the inescapably pluralist reality of political life; proceduralist liberalism, 
for example, leaves ‘precious little space for initiatory or expressive modes of 
political action’ (Villa, 1999: 108). Secondly, participating in agonistic practices 
enables people to express varieties of being and acting. Keenan (2003) claims that 
the central dilemma facing democratic societies is ‘how to create a vibrant sense 
of democratic community able to generate widespread and active identifications 
while also recognising and respecting the radical openness of any shared 
collective identity’ (ibid: 71). What modern circumstances demand, therefore,  is a 
practice of democracy which both recognises the existing diversity of identities, 
and acts as midwife to emergent identities as they struggle to raise themselves 
from ‘below the register’ (Connolly, 1995) of dominant practices of exclusion.  
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I argue that, although the management of subjectivity does not make every 
person identical since ‘everyone does not become the same in a normalising 
society’ (Connolly, 1995: 90), it does confine legitimate ways of being to a 
narrow range of categories and, by so doing, crowds out and renders invisible the 
many ways in which people are human at work: ‘normalising societies subjugate 
and deploy otherness without eliminating difference’ (ibid: 91). But since the 
formation of subjectivity is too important to be handed over without critical 
democratic evaluation to management ideologies, then we cannot leave the 
development of ontological diversity to a vacated public sphere, and a politically 
cleansed and homogenised economic sphere. Bowles (1998) identifies the 
importance of the economic sphere for the learning of general behaviours and 
competences: ‘preferences learned under one set of circumstances become 
generalised reasons for behaviour. Thus economic institutions may induce specific 
behaviours – self-regarding, opportunistic, or cooperative, say – which then 
become part of the behavioural repertoire of the individual’ (ibid: 80).  Not only 
are many ways of being de-legitimated, but the ones that remain are treated as 
essentialised ways of being human: ‘a normalising society treats the small set of 
identities it endorses as if they were intrinsically true’ (Connolly, 1995: 89). 
Organisational hierarchies mediate the management of subjectivity, resulting in 
framing rules which are alienating, dominating and misrecognising, where 
experiences of self and other are ‘arrested by meanings which are imposed rather 
than mutually arrived at’ (Allen, 2006: 576).  
My point is not that we can, or even ought, to eliminate social formation of 
subjectivities, but that it matters who defines, and how they define, the structures 
and social processes through which the experience of subjectification takes place. 
Fossen (2008) says that ‘the proliferation of identities’ is a social good because it 
is ‘a necessary condition of human flourishing’ (ibid: 383), but that the range and 
kind of identities must be made susceptible to democratic evaluation. Kioupkiolis 
proposes that expressive freedom as ‘agonistic and creative self-definition’ 
(Kioupkiolis, 2009: 480) provides another dimension to the production of the 
subject (du Gay, 1995) through techniques of ideology and self-evaluation. 
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Agonistic democratic practices do not remove subjectification, but instead resist 
the reduction of modes of being to existing norms and rules by providing 
participants with the means to challenge and modify the rules framing action and 
the extant modes of being (cf, Allen, 2006). But, this does not mean that we aim 
for unlimited ontological diversity since not every kind of difference is valuable in 
itself, and agonistic democracy ‘does not entail the celebration of any and every 
identity’ (Connolly, 1991: 14). This means that defining the expansion of 
ontological possibilities within limits must be a political task, facilitated by an 
agonic politics of meaningfulness which will sustain and facilitate a ‘social 
pluralism’ as an ‘achievement to be protected’ (Connolly, 1995: xiv)19. In the 
action contexts of work timespaces, such a politics will take account of the social 
pluralism already immanent within the multiple economic practices which make 
up the work we do together. This is because agonic workplace democracy exposes 
the closures we impose upon one another, ostensibly because they are necessary 
for the coordination of the work of social cooperation, rendering them available 
for disagreement and renegotiation: 
 
‘This form of identification in turn opens the way for (and is 
strengthened by) a vision of democratic community that sees the 
fate of each tied to the fate of others, acknowledging our deep 
interdependence and commonalities, yet without seeing each as 
identical parts of a homogeneous whole’ (Keenan, 2003: 188). 
 
I make use of agonistic democratic practices to unsettle assumptions of a 
natural unity through the unfolding of difference and contestation over 
organisational purposes and the rules which frame action. In work timespaces, 
agonistic practices have the potential to challenge permanent closures by keeping 
open the possibility of contestation over goals and means, thereby engendering a 
politics of becoming through the fostering of an ontological diversity which is 
                                                                
19
 Connolly (1995: xiv) makes a distinction between ‘social pluralism’ as a social good and 
‘pluralisation’ as the unpredictable eruption of new identities which potentially threatens the 
achievement of social pluralism. 
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capable of challenging the management of subjectivities. By forging a politics of 
meaningfulness as ‘a struggle around the very process of constructing and 
contesting identity’ (Smith, 1994: 228), agonistic practices make practical identity 
formation dependent upon being able to participate in the interpretation and 
formation of the objectively worthwhile values which are available for affective 
appropriation. This enables agonistic practices to expose value-deprived work 
timespaces, opening them up to challenge and contestation over means and 
purposes, advancing new ways of organising the work around different values, 
and enriching ontological diversity. White (2003), in advocating a weak ontology 
which combines the generosity of Connolly’s agonistic ethos with the respect of 
standard liberalism (ibid: 220), suggests that what distinguishes human beings is 
their capacity for ‘coherence-making’ (ibid: 224) and for natality, or new 
beginnings, through political action (cf. Arendt, 1958). Coherence-making, or 
meaning creation, emerges out of agonistic activity between human beings who 
are ‘constitutively engaged with difference’ (White, 2003: 224). Thus, workplace 
democracy with agonistic dimensions has the capacity to resist the assumption of 
a natural unity of interests through a coherence-making ‘politics of becoming’, 
thereby cultivating the use of different rationalities and fostering different modes 
of being within the multiple work timespaces to which we belong.  
 
7.0.0 The Inner Workshop of Democracy 
 
I suggest that to experience agonistic democratic practices will require 
work timespaces to foster a different kind of group life - one in which the public 
expression of difference gives rise to new interpretive meanings, generating a 
pluralisation of positive values as a consequence of acting and being together. 
Follett (1998 [1918]) argues that the processes of a fully human group life are 
forged out of ‘the creative agonies of fellowship’ (ibid: 89) in the ‘inner workshop 
of democracy’ (ibid: 48). She claims that ‘democratic associations on which 
democracy should be based can maintain difference within unity, conflict within 
integration’ (Mansbridge, 1998: xxvii), where a group is ‘a community formed 
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through the interpenetration and integration of ideas, and emphatically not 
through the suppression of individuality and difference’ (ibid: xxvii). For Follett, 
this constitutes a moral, as well as a pragmatic, imperative to make the democratic 
group life an everyday experience in work and politics: ‘without this activity, both 
political and industrial democracy must be a chaotic, stagnating, self-stultifying 
assemblage’ (Follett, 1998 [1918]: 48). And I argue that this requires a politics of 
meaningfulness, stimulated by agonistic democratic practices in multiple and 
overlapping work timespaces. 
Bachtiger (2010) suggests that agonistic practices, rather than being an 
alternative and opposing model of democracy, are the means to realising the 
potential of deliberative democracy – and I apply his insight to the micro-level of 
the task in a system of workplace democracy. I propose that the already existing 
potentiality of work to exhibit the characteristics of the democratic group life is 
realised by democratic practices of agonistic inquiry, which Bachtiger (2010) 
identifies as questioning, disputing and insisting: ‘agonistic inquiry is a key 
deliberative technique which helps to unleash essential parts of deliberation’s 
normative potential (epistemic, ethical, inclusionary, and reflective-
transformative) while simultaneously counteracting unwanted aspects of 
deliberation’ (ibid: 3). The ideal deliberative process is characterised by  
‘reasoned, respectful, impartial, impassionate and truthful (or sincere) discussion’ 
(ibid: 2). This leads to the marginalisation and exclusion of the inarticulate, and 
the intuitive, or the ‘remainders’ (Honig, 1993) which lie outside deliberative 
discourse as reason-giving aimed at rational consensus formation. Instead, an 
agonic politics of meaningfulness remedies the exclusions and epistemic 
limitations of classical deliberation by fostering ‘cognitive diversity’ (Landsmore, 
2010; see also Manin, 2005), and bringing into public evaluation interpretive 
differences, excesses, remainders, cognitive dissonances. Bachtiger (2010) 
suggests that agonistic practices permit ‘tough questioning and radical argument’ 
(ibid: 21) when they are both situated within a system committed to ‘deliberative 
capacity building’ (Dryzek, 2007), and are guided by an ethic of respect, attention 
and care towards those advancing new and challenging perspectives, sometimes in 
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modes of articulation which are at odds with the emotion-free ideal of reasoned 
deliberative discourse. Moreover, such practices answer the search of 
meaningfulness which generates a demand to participate in the democratic group 
life (Braybrooke, 1998b), because of the desire ‘to play a recognised role in a joint 
human activity’ (ibid: 55) – a desire stimulated by feelings of alienation (ibid: 73), 
a need to be heard (ibid: 80), and the need to occupy worthwhile roles constituted 
by relations of mutual recognition (ibid: 74; ibid: 77). Thus, agonic democratic 
practices of questioning, disputing and insisting in work timespaces address the 
demand to have an equal share in the decision-making necessary to creating and 
reproducing the common life in the work of social cooperation, where such a 
demand arises from our fundamental human need for meaningfulness. 
Workplace democracy aims at a transformation of the interior content of 
work by creating public spaces for the political mode of being in everyday acts of 
work, where ‘the capacities for judgement necessary for participatory democracy 
then are always already a developmental potential of social interaction’ (Warren, 
1993: 218). Follett (1998 [1918]) makes political dialogue a ‘community process’, 
characterised by several features conducive to the opening out of public spaces 
expressive of the political mode of being. The dynamics of correctly structured 
group action, in Follett’s understanding of politics as community process, 
constitutes a kind of ‘governance from the ground up’ (Elias, 2008), where 
conflict and difference is revealed, deliberated, evaluated and integrated into 
enriched knowledge or creative decision. And as the cycle is repeated, it becomes 
a habit, changing each person’s understanding of the other, developing the skills 
for acting together, and providing for the development of political consciousness. 
Importantly, such a process depends upon local knowledge and practices, making 
it conducive to revealing the interpretive differences arising from our encounters 
with others and with materiality when we work together. I suggest there are four 
characteristics of distinctly agonic work timespaces which frame Bachtinger’s 
(2010) practices of agonistic inquiry in Follett’s democratic group life: 
association to create an inclusionary public; contestation to foster the generation 
of difference; an ethos of enlargement to support normative orientation; and 
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decision to secure temporary closure. Agonistic work timespaces with these 
characteristics are capable of challenging assimilation of subjectivities by 
contesting the narrow range of legitimate identities for the purpose of promoting 
ontological diversity; and challenging exclusion from democratic processes by 
opening out the spaces in which participants in the work of social co-operation 
can come together for contestation and decision-making (Tully, 2002). 
 
7.1.0 Association 
I propose that we conceive of work timespaces not as distinctly public or private 
spheres of action separate from the political but as arenas which, from one 
moment to the next, have the potential to become spaces for expressing the 
political mode of being. Estlund (2003) suggests that workplaces have a unique 
capacity to encourage cooperative relations, social ties and a sense of 
connectedness that transcends boundaries and social cleavages; the workplace is 
an action context in which ‘people find it necessary to get along and get things 
done with others with whom they would not otherwise choose to associate. They 
foster the connectedness which forms the background to a healthy democracy by 
constructing a ‘layer of public discourse’ (ibid: 123) from the multitude of 
everyday conversations. Workplaces supply ‘a place for the informal exchange of 
experiences and opinions and knowledge among people who are both connected  
with each other, so that they are inclined to listen, and different from each other, 
so that they are exposed to diverse ideas and experiences’ (ibid:123). Estlund 
(2003) identifies two features of workplace discourse which resonate with the 
values of democratic practices: firstly, conversations have a non-particularist, 
public dimension, because they take place between people who are not family 
members or friends; and secondly, they cut across lines of social, ethnic and 
gender divisions. Such features of everyday talk potentially enable people to not 
only explore their own needs and interests, but also to find the common ground 
upon which they can establish solidarity with others: ‘citizens deliberate with each 
other at work far more than in the fabled public square and far more than through 
voluntary civic organisations’ (ibid: 119). Economic necessity requires people to 
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take up work and then keeps them in relations with others in order to satisfy the 
need to earn a living (ibid: 103-4), and Warren (1993) suggests that the non-
voluntary character of work lends it a particular virtue in holding us to the 
requirement to engage with others not necessarily like ourselves: 
 
‘In workplaces individuals are likely to be thrown together out of 
need, selected by their skills, and related to one another through 
the division of labor. Here individuals are not necessarily drawn 
together by common identities or causes, so that a single 
organisation might be quite diverse in terms of lifestyle, gender, 
race, ethnicity, religious orientation and class, or at least more so 
than in a self-selected group’ (Warren, 1993: 228). 
The voluntary character and ease of exit which characterises self-interested 
groups make them too homogenous, self-selecting, and therefore strategic in their 
decision-making, for them to be effective discursive forums – and thus less likely 
to produce the autonomous selves which are valued by democracies (Warren, 
1993: 227). Workplaces, on the other hand, are relatively diverse, focus on 
common goals, and are part of the daily experience of most people: ‘as 
workplaces democratise, the structure of interests and identities is likely to 
produce imperatives for critique and discourse of a kind absent in most self-
organised groups’ (ibid: 228). This means that workplaces play a vital role in 
providing the background conditions to associational life: they are sites of 
discourse and deliberation, they build interpersonal connectedness, cultivate civic 
skills, and generate a sentiment of connection and of a common fate (ibid: 106). 
Importantly, by enabling the recognition of individuals through everyday 
cooperative relations which allow ‘individuals to get to know each other and to 
care about each other’ (ibid: 108), they are a vital source of the worthy objects and 
subjective attachments which are necessary to being able to experience the value 
of meaningfulness. This ‘fertile territory’ for association provides an enriched 
social setting for fostering the group life in which agonistic democratic practices 
can become productive of difference, increasing the possibility of the political 
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mode of being breaking out into everyday work timespaces, and resulting in the 
proliferation of positive values which can be appropriated to the meaning content 
of a life. 
 
7.2.0 Contestation 
The extent to which agonistic associations enable a politics of meaningfulness 
depends upon how such associations encourage or inhibit contestation and 
difference arising from the pre-political potentials brought into public evaluation. 
Agonic democratic practices in work timespaces foster interpretive differences by 
preventing a premature consensus which is ‘not based on the autonomy of 
participants’ (Warren, 1993: 229). Moreover, they allow workers to resist 
‘identities that undermine cognitive competence’ (ibid), because involvement in 
democratic discourse places greater cognitive demands upon employees through 
increasing work complexity, thereby protecting their interests in developing 
capabilities for reasoning and deliberation. Correctly structured association 
enables intersubjective contestation through which we ‘think together’ (Follett, 
1918: 29). And when we experience intersubjective encounters permitting 
difference and disagreement, we also generate the possibility for agonic group 
activity, which is ‘an acting and reacting in a single and identical process which 
brings out differences and integrates them into a unity’ (Follett, 1998: 33). Follett 
says: ‘Each must discover and contribute that which distinguishes him from 
others, his difference. The only use for my difference is to join it with other 
differences’ (ibid: 29). Indeed, for Follett, producing and expressing our 
difference is almost a duty laid upon those who find themselves involved in joint 
activity: ‘Give me your difference’ (ibid: 33). She adds ‘no member of a group 
which is to create can be passive. All must be active and constructively active’ 
(ibid: 29), and that in order to ‘think together’ then ‘each man must contribute 
what is in him to contribute’ (ibid.).  
But applying such an approach to the social organisation of work timespaces 
may be too risky, because the interjection of dissensus could undermine the co-
ordination and decision-making necessary for the maintenance of a complex 
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economic order. In the tightly bound webs of cooperation that constitute our 
modern economies increased democratic freedom of the kind advocated by 
agonistic practices will surely lead to a dangerous disunity: ‘the standard account 
is that increased democratic freedom over the rules of recognition and distribution 
is the cause of disunity’ (Tully, 2002). But disunity is more likely to arise as a 
consequence of relations of exclusion and assimilation because the kind of 
solidarity required in modern societies is undermined when citizens are not 
afforded deliberative experiences of rule-making which in turn underpin 
democratic self-formation (Tully, 2002: 225). Conflict need not be destructive and 
damaging, provided it can be turned into a productive dissensus within the context 
of an agonic workplace democracy shaped by an ethos of pluralisation. Follett 
says in relation to conflict and diversity: 
 
‘What people often mean by getting rid of conflict is getting rid 
of diversity, and it is of the utmost importance that these should 
not be considered the same. We may wish to abolish conflict, but 
we cannot get rid of diversity. We must face life as it is and 
understand that diversity is its most essential feature [...] Fear of 
difference is dread of life itself. It is possible to conceive conflict 
as not necessarily a wasteful outbreak of incompatibilities, but as 
a normal process by which socially valuable differences register 
themselves for the enrichment of all concerned’ (Follett, 1930 
[1924]: 300) 
 
7.3.0 Ethos of Enlargement 
Contestation which is productive of difference depends upon an ethos of 
imaginative enlargement, supported by the virtue of agonistic respect: ‘the virtue 
of agonistic respect requires openness to those who are excluded; and this ethos 
itself is predicated on the idea that such boundaries are never fixed, but contingent 
and revisable’ (Howarth, 2008: 188). Connolly suggests that pluralistic 
democracy requires two civic virtues: firstly, ‘agonistic respect’ between 
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opponents who radically disagree, and secondly, ‘critical responsiveness’ – an 
attitude of careful, attentive listening to the demands and claims of others. 
Agonistic respect recognises ‘already crystallised’ identities, whereas critical 
responsiveness operates where identities are emerging ‘from an obscure or 
negated place below the register of legitimate identity’ (Connolly, 1991: xxviii). 
These virtues underpin the possibility of maintaining a permanently open-ended 
agreement which retains awareness of the alternatives not chosen, of continued 
dissent, and of the possibility of revision. The struggle for emergence entails a 
‘politics of becoming’ which Connolly expresses as ‘that recurrent, fugitive 
politics by which a new constituency or event surges into being from below the 
threshold of tolerance, justice or legitimacy’ (ibid.). Keenan (2003) suggest that 
the compassion and generosity needed for an ethos of pluralisation might draw 
upon our ‘shared suffering’ as: 
 
‘[...] fluid, open, internally complex beings inevitably trapped 
(although to different degrees) in more or less fixed identity 
‘scripts’ or self-images. It recognises that suffering comes both 
from the constraints of identity and from our being radically open 
and indebted to each other even in our mutual otherness. We 
depend upon each other, both materially and for the stories that 
tell us who we are – even as we don’t naturally fit together and 
are constantly called into question by each other’s differences’ 
(ibid: 188). 
 
Therefore the practice of agonic work-place democracy involves a politics 
of becoming which fosters emergent ways of being, where workers and managers 
recognise one another as ‘fellow sufferers’, in which the management of 
subjectivity is not only recognised to be a necessity, but also subjects 
organisational processes of self-formation to permanent openness and 
contestability. Our stance towards co-workers becomes one of reflexive 
evaluation of the ways in which our working identities are managed through 
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mechanisms of exclusion and difference, and compassionate generosity towards 
our own and one another’s limitations generated by the understanding that we 
require one another to adopt constricted forms of identification which are 
incapable of fully expressing our multifaceted individuality. Thus, the 
inescapability and necessity of difference for identity requires an ethical 
orientation of agonistic respect towards others which generates a particular kind of 
bond, based upon gratitude and wonder at the diversity of human being, between 
those who would generally be thought of as locked into irreconcilable conflict, 
where this ethical bond forms between contending constituents ‘engaged in 
intensive relations of interdependence and strife’ (Connolly, 1995: xviii).  
 To create social roles enabling individuals to take up their responsibilities 
of care for the worthy objects they have appropriated to the meaning content of 
their lives requires not only participating in existing structures but also 
participating in reframing the rules of engagement in which participants call 
‘something into being which did not exist before, which was not given, not even 
as cognition or imagination, and which therefore, strictly speaking, could not be 
known’ (Arendt, 1954 [1977]: 151). In order to do the best we can towards worthy 
objects, we must all have a share of political autonomy: that is, the participation in 
the collective self-determination necessary to bringing pre-political interpretive 
differences into public deliberation and thereby to have our part in the decision-
making framing our orientations to worthy objects.  Inkeles & Smith (1974) 
observe that factory work ‘increases the tendency to hold opinions and the 
tendency to tolerate or even value the opinions of others’ (ibid: 24): to both hold 
an opinion and to value the different opinions of others is the essence of ‘agonistic 
respect’, and to be able to collaborate under conditions of contingency is to learn 
to appreciate the abundance of life which cannot be constrained within totalising 
identities which deny the differences upon which they depend. It is also to be in 
possession of the resources for dissensus and debate which, if enabled within a 
practice of agonistic democracy, would facilitate the conditions for ontological 
expressiveness.  
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7.4.0 Decision 
To critics of agonism, it can sometimes seem that this model of democratic 
participation is fixated upon endless disagreement in which nothing can actually 
get done, therefore not taking us much beyond simple conflict. This means that 
room must be made for the temporary closures of decision. Follett (1998 [1918]), 
commenting upon democratic decision-making in the group process, talked about 
integration or interpenetration, rather than ‘aggregation, compromise or 
concession’ (Mansbridge, 1998: xxiii), where her idea of interpenetration is a 
deeply inter-subjective, Hegelian-inspired ideal for a process of ‘related 
difference’ (Follett, 1998 [1918]: 33). Follett says that ‘unity, not conformity, 
must be our aim. We attain unity only through variety. Differences must be 
integrated, not assimilated, nor absorbed’ (ibid: 39), where purpose are not pre-
determined but created through intersubjective encounters, framed by the aim of 
‘coadaptation’ or ‘creating ever new values though the interplay of all the forces 
of life’ (ibid: 93). Thus, ‘it is man’s part to create purpose and to actualize it’ 
(ibid: 58). Moreover, we relate to one another through our differences, and in the 
act of relating, we initiate acts of creation (ibid: 63). Although the moment of 
decision describes the closures around purpose and identity which enable 
cooperative action to take place, in an agonistic framework these can never be 
permanent closures, but must be always available for contestation and revision. 
The political mode of being remains an ever present potential, but the activation 
of expressive political agency will depend upon the moment and the nature of the 
task. Follett (1998) suggests there is an alternative to both domination, and 
consensus in collective life, and that is a dialectical impermanent integration 
which is: 
 
‘a harmonious marriage of difference which, like the nut and the 
screw or the parts of a watch, come together in a way that 
produces a new form, a new entity, a new result, made out of old 
differences and yet different from any of them’ (ibid.) 
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Decision describes the closures around purpose and identity which enable 
co-operative action to take place. In an agonistic framework these closures can 
never be permanent, but must be always available for contestation and revision. 
But this should not be mistaken for a simple unity of interests: the result is not a 
balance of power or aggregation of interests or elite domination, but the creation 
of new values, the introduction of something expressively original from the old 
materials. In sum, the aim of agonistic practices in work timespaces is to forge a 
particular kind of decision from within the inner workshop of democracy, a 
decision in which all can be satisfied, but from which differences are not 
eliminated, excluded or dissolved because they remain ever present, if dormant, 
seeds, already available to stimulate the next political moment.  
8.0.0 Conclusion 
 
Agonistic democracy applied to economic associations opens out public 
spaces in spheres of human activity which have been presumed to be legitimately 
excluded from representative or deliberative democratic practices, and certainly 
from claims to plurality. In addition, the ‘all affected principle’, if valid for 
economic associations, requires the inclusion of outsiders within a stakeholder 
model of agonistic democracy. A political mode of being structured by agonistic 
democratic practices aims at overcoming exclusion and assimilation in 
intersubjective relations - enabling workers to reveal and to articulate their acts of 
agency and develop the relevant capabilities and sense of status. Workplace 
democracy becomes constitutive of the meaning content of work because it 
situates individuals in a setting which is rich in potential encounters with worthy 
objects and for forming the relevant capabilities, where being able to exercise the 
political mode of being is in and of itself one of the worthy objects. The individual 
worker is re-presented as an irreplaceable contributor situated in cooperative 
relations with others, and imbued with expressive political agency. Consensus-
based democratic practices which fail to allow for the contestation of ultimate 
purposes, the revision of rules, or the expression of difference are perhaps 
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particularly susceptible to being used in this fashion. But workplace democracy 
structured by agonistic practices might offer us something a little different – 
something interior to the experience of work, making work valuable for its own 
sake, because, by making visible the essential agency of workers, it first, 
establishes the status of workers as ends-in-themselves and as co-authorities, and 
second, enables learning and freedom by giving voice to experiences which have 
been rendered speechless by the assumptions of a unified consensus. 
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Chapter Seven 
Towards a Politics of Meaningfulness: Capability Justice and the 
Capability for Voice 
 
1.0.0 Introduction 
 
I have argued that, in order to experience the bipartite value of 
meaningfulness, we must possess the moral and practical orientations relevant to 
caring for the worthy objects we have appropriated to the meaning content of our 
lives. Legitimate appropriation of worthy objects implies taking up 
responsibilities relevant to caring for worthy objects, where caring is structured by 
a range of social practices enabling us to promote the good for those worthy 
objects we have chosen or affirmed as constituting the reasons we have to regard 
our lives as worth living.  This means that a politics of meaningfulness must 
address the institutional and social arrangements mediating our ability to create, 
recognise, and evaluate the objective worth of objects, and the values they 
constitute, within a liberal perfectionist framework. Furthermore, it must be 
concerned with, firstly, how we encounter subjectively attractive worthy objects 
and affectively appropriate them to the meaning content of our lives, and 
secondly, how we access resources to fulfil our responsibilities towards those 
objects. This means that we ought to ensure, not that people should actually find 
their lives to be meaningful, but that they should possess the capabilities for 
objective valuing and subjective attachment, supported by their status as equal co-
authorities. In work, this requires a system of workplace democracy, structured by 
democratic authority at the level of the enterprise and participatory practices at the 
level of the task. I argue that the crucial institutional guarantee is for the 
Capability for Voice, supported by two key conversion factors: mediating 
institutions in the form of a variety of organisational forms, such as co-owned 
enterprises and cooperatives, and a basic income guarantee in order to ensure 
capability security. Both measures require a social economy embodying a greater 
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diversity of values than is presently encouraged by standard economic models. To 
this end, I make use of Nussbaum’s partial theory of capability justice to promote 
a politics of meaningfulness, and to establish institutional guarantees for the 
Capability for Voice.  
 
2.0.0 Capability Justice: Principle of Egalitarian Meaning and 
Threshold of Sufficient Meaning 
 
Meaningful work has always existed, but in most societies it has been an 
ideal which aims at elite meaning, or the maximal degree of meaningfulness for a 
few. Instead, I argue that we should aim at egalitarian meaning, or a satisficing 
level of meaningfulness for all, where the goal is not to guarantee that everyone 
will find their lives to be actually meaningful, but that social arrangements will 
provide the relevant capabilities for the functioning of meaningfulness. 
Consequently, I propose that justice in work (Muirhead, 2008) requires 
meaningful work for all, according to two principles: the principle of egalitarian 
meaning, where all persons are equally entitled to work which has the requisite 
structure for meaningfulness, up to the threshold of sufficient meaning, where the 
threshold is specified by freedom as non-dominated work, autonomy as non-
alienated work, and social recognition as dignified work.  
Firstly, a principle of egalitarian meaning requires that each person 
possesses, in equal measure, the capabilities to appropriate meaning to their lives 
and to realise the functioning of meaningfulness. In order to satisfy the principle 
of egalitarian meaning, the range of activities recognised as work in a system of 
social cooperation must be broadened so that society is expanding rather than 
limiting opportunities for capability development. Gomberg (2007) argues that 
market societies limit artificially the opportunities for capability development, 
constraining the efforts of some individuals and groups to participate in 
worthwhile activities which contribute to sustaining a cooperative social order. 
Many are excluded from making their contribution; certain groups are favoured 
with the most desirable forms of participation; and other groups are socialised to 
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accept poor quality work. As a matter of justice, we should not limit opportunity, 
but should make it possible for everyone to contribute: ‘it is unfair to deprive so 
many of the opportunity to contribute complex abilities’ (Gomberg, 2007: 42). 
And I argue that these contributive activities must be structured by the value of 
meaningfulness, if a scheme of capability justice is to be able to make provision 
for all persons to form and exercise the relevant capabilities within a liberal 
perfectionist framework, meaning that whilst ‘the capability to engage in good 
human activities should be provided to all; the individual is free to decide which 
activities to pursue’ (ibid: 46). In addition, Gomberg suggests that a theory of 
contributive justice will require an adjustment to the capabilities approach where 
‘a good society should distribute widely the contribution of complex abilities’ 
(ibid: 130), by promoting a general complex functioning consisting of 
‘participation in the economic life of one’s society in a way that confers dignity’ 
(ibid: 131). I interpret this general complex functioning in terms of a capability for 
the functioning of meaningfulness in work, which requires the capabilities for 
objective valuing and subjective attachment, supported by our status as co-
authorities. 
Secondly, a threshold of sufficient meaning is provided by the constitutive 
values of meaningful work, which are autonomy as non-alienation, freedom as 
non-domination, and social recognition as dignified work. I claim that the 
threshold of sufficient meaning is a modest standard, based upon the contribution 
that ordinary activities make already to a life of meaning. It does not require that 
lives as a whole be fully meaningful, but simply that important aspects of our 
lives, such as the work we do, are structured so that they contain goods and values 
sufficient to give us good reason to find our lives worthwhile. Huseby (2010) 
defines the threshold of sufficiency as follows: ‘the maximal sufficiency threshold 
equals a level of welfare with which a person is content’ (ibid: 181), where being 
content means ‘not the absence of any desire to further improve one’s lot, but 
rather satisfaction with the overall quality of one’s life’ (ibid.). When applied to 
the value of meaningfulness, I suggest this yields a threshold of sufficiency where 
one is not merely satisfied, but convinced that one’s life contains objects of value 
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giving one a compelling reason to live. I use the term ‘convinced’ in order to 
capture the sense in which the value of meaningfulness requires objective reason-
giving as part of an individual’s affective attachment to objects of value – reason 
and feeling work together to create a security of attachment to worthy objects 
which is supported by social as well as individual endorsement. 
I suggest two institutional guarantees are required to satisfy the principle 
of egalitarian meaning and the threshold of sufficient meaning: a basic income 
guarantee and a workplace democracy guarantee. A basic income guarantee 
operates to promote the principle of egalitarian meaning by ensuring the social 
recognition of a wide range of activities in a system of social cooperation. A 
workplace democracy guarantee operates to promote the threshold of sufficient 
meaning by enabling a plurality of mediating institutions organised along 
democratic lines which are conducive to fostering agonic democratic practices at 
the level of the task, and democratic authority at the level of the organisation. 
Together, the basic income and the economic democracy guarantees constitute the 
conversion factors for realising the Capability for Voice in a system of workplace 
democracy, where voice is understood as what is needed for an individual to have 
a share in the co-decision necessary for functioning as an equal co-authority in the 
creation and maintenance of values which inhere in worthy objects.  In a politics 
of meaningfulness, a Capability for Voice supports the development of the 
capabilities for objective valuing and subjective attachment, enabling us to 
become valuers capable of evaluating what is worth doing and being, and of 
incorporating these valuations into practical identities which give our lives a sense 
of meaning. Following Sen’s Capability Approach, I shall show that a Capability 
for Voice consists of both an individual and social dimension (cf. Bonvin & 
Farvaque, 2006). The individual Capability for Voice is constitutively 
intersubjective, that is, dependent for its formation and exercise upon our inter-
relations to others in the groups to which we belong. The social dimension of the 
Capability for Voice is provided by a multifunctional landscape of economic, 
social and political organisations embodying a plurality of positive values. 
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3.0.0 The Capability Approach 
 
In arguing for the applicability of capability justice to the formation of a 
social organisation of work with the capacity to foster meaningful work for all, I 
make use of Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach to identify what is required to 
realise the Capability for Voice. Although Nussbaum’s CA is not a full theory of 
justice, I draw upon her specification of the central human capabilities for 
functioning which ought to be constitutionally guaranteed to argue that the 
capabilities for the functioning of meaningfulness in work require institutional 
guarantees for: firstly, a system of workplace democracy at the levels of the task 
and of the organisation, and secondly, a basic income. A basic income guarantee 
meets the requirements of the Principle of Egalitarian meaning by allowing a 
wider range of activities to be publicly recognised as work, thus expanding the 
range of positive values we can incorporate into our practical identities because of 
the work we do. A workplace democracy guarantee, by providing the context for 
collective self-determination, will ensure that work has the requisite content 
necessary to meet the Threshold of Sufficient Meaning. Since to realise both 
guarantees would require considerable social transformation, good justificatory 
reasons must be advanced, which I argue are provided by understanding that 
meaningful work is a fundamental human need. Moreover, the need for the 
interior content of work to be structured by autonomy, freedom and social 
recognition is required from within Nussbaum’s capability approach itself. This is 
because the capabilities for meaningful work promote ‘fertile functioning’, that is, 
they provide a productive context for the development of other related 
functionings (Wolff, J. & De-Shalit, A., 2007). In sum, if work lacks the requisite 
structure for meaningfulness, then a person’s ability to achieve all the other 
capabilities will be disabled. 
Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capability approaches, although closely related, 
have distinct intellectual histories, theoretical underpinnings and practical 
implications for social policy. By identifying the evaluative space of capabilities 
for functioning, Sen has made room for a metric judging how well a society is 
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doing which is more information rich than the standard econometrics of levels of 
income and wealth
20
; whereas Nussbaum’s normative justification of the 
capabilities for living a human kind of life generates both principles and 
implications for institutional guarantees in the form of a core list of central human 
capabilities for functioning. Sen does not claim that his Capability Approach is a 
theory of justice, because, in his terms, a theory of justice must contain 
aggregative as well as distributive considerations, and these are absent from his 
theory (Robeyns, 2004: 6). Nussbaum, however, describes her Capabilities 
Approach as a partial theory of justice, because it picks out certain invariant 
features of what it means to live a life that is worthy of a human being: ‘We must 
ask which things are so important that we will not count a life as a human life 
without them’ (Nussbaum, 1992 HF&SJ:10). But, although capability justice 
using Nussbaum’s capabilities will not yield a complete theory of justice, it is still 
able to provide principles, rules and metrics to guide social policy where ‘the 
object of public action can be seen to be the enhancement of the capability of 
people to undertake valuable and valued ‘doings and beings’’(Crocker, 1992: 
587).  
 
3.1.0 Sen’s Capability for Functioning 
 
At the core of Sen’s Capability Approach is a critique of tendencies in the 
discipline of economics towards value monism, which leads to a failure to take 
account of values other than efficiency and models of the person other than the 
individual as utility maximiser, resulting in an ‘engineering approach’ to 
economics dominating over approaches based upon ‘the ethics-related view of 
motivation’ (Sen, 1987: 4). He argues that theories of justice are subject either to 
the limitations of welfarism or of resourcism, such that welfarism, by subsuming 
well-being into a totalising measurement of utility, fails to differentiate between 
                                                                
20
 Robeyn (2004: 11) notes that Sen and Nussbaum use the term capability in slightly different 
ways. In Sen, capability is singular and refers to the capability set which consists of the 
combination of potential and achieved functionings; in Nussbaum, capability is a plural, and refers 
to a number of different capabilities which include potential functionings. 
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different modes of human well-being, whereas resourcism, exemplified by the 
distribution of primary goods in Rawls’s Theory of Justice, fails to take account of 
differences between individuals. For Sen, Rawlsian justice suffers from three 
weaknesses. Firstly, Rawls does not take account of individuals who differ from 
the norm; for example, applying the principles of justice to severely disabled 
people is unsatisfactory because the difference principle determines how well-off 
somebody is in terms of income and wealth only, and would not justify any 
redistribution to a disabled person on the grounds of his or her disability. 
Secondly, the use to which Rawls puts the primary goods does not take account of 
relevant differences between people: people have ‘very different needs, varying 
with health, longevity, climatic conditions, location, work conditions, 
temperament and even body size’ (Sen, 1980: 215-216). Thirdly, because of inter-
individual differences, people possess differing levels of ability to convert the 
primary goods into what they are able to do and to be in their lives.  
Sen argues that Rawls is mistaken in using primary goods to make 
comparisons between persons because, since primary goods are means and not 
ends, they are unable to take account of human diversity because simply being in 
possession of the primary goods is not sufficient for people being able to convert 
them into equal amounts of human well being (Sen, 1980, 1992: 81-87; 2004: 
332). Although we may be able to count what resources an individual possesses, 
this does not tell us whether that individual is able to use her resources to achieve 
her preferred functionings - for this, we need also to know specific information 
about the individual and her circumstances. This is because, in order to equalise 
well-being, people may need differing amounts and types of goods (e.g. food). So 
to understand what any individual may actually be able to do and to be, we must 
distinguish between means (primary goods and similar bundles of resources), and 
ends (functionings). Furthermore, goods are valued differently in a capability 
framework: in conventional economics, goods are valued when they can be 
exchanged for money, or if they can be made subject to rules of fair distribution, 
but in capabilities for functioning, goods are valued because they promote human 
flourishing. For example, a car is not simply an object with design specifications, 
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but is valued because it enables the functioning of mobility which contributes to a 
fully human life. However, the functioning of mobility need not be satisfied by 
possession of a car; in particular cultures or circumstances a bike may do as well, 
or even better. Thus, the CA can be made sensitive to a diversity of cultures, 
circumstances and individual characteristics of person, taking it beyond the 
aggregative principle of conventional neo-classical economics, and orientating us 
to the different ways in which goods are valued by agents, according to their 
needs and circumstances.  
In order to provide us with information about how any individual is doing, 
Sen (1979; 1990; 1992; 1993a) develops the concept of a capability set which 
operates as an intermediary step between resources and functionings, where an 
individual’s capability set consists of enablements from which she chooses her 
beings and doings, and functionings are her achievements in the form of what she 
actually does or becomes: ‘the capability of a person reflects the alternative 
combinations of functionings a person can achieve and from which he or she can 
choose one collection’ (Sen, 1993b: 31). Capabilities are what people are 
effectively able to do and to be: without capabilities there can be no functionings - 
the beings and doings of human well-being. Thus, functionings are achievements 
and ends, whilst capabilities are freedoms or choices from which people can select 
in order to realise their conception of the good. Sen argues that being human 
consists of both agency (what we can do) and well-being (what we can be), but 
that welfarism neglects the ‘agency aspect’ of persons: ‘humans are not only 
experience or preference satisfiers; they are also judges, evaluators and doers’ 
(Crocker, 1992: 600). Sen re-inserts agency by making freedom dependent upon 
choosing between the functionings, the doings and beings we want our lives to 
express. This means that capabilities rather than commodities express the extent 
of the effective freedom (in a positive sense) that a person possesses: 
‘Commodities are no more than means to other ends. Ultimately the focus has to 
be on what life we lead and what we can or cannot do, can or cannot be’ (Sen, 
1985b: 16). Hence, Sen (1979) claims that his CA is an improvement upon simply 
counting resources, such as measuring wealth or satisfaction of preferences in 
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conventional economics. This is because capabilities for functioning provide a 
richer information base for evaluating what is normatively significant about inter-
individual difference, and for assessing the real opportunities individuals have 
available to them (Robeyns, 2004: 6). But Sen’s capability approach, by relying 
upon a conception of the valuable ends of life in the form of agency and well-
being, would seem to contain a comprehensive notion of the good which is 
incompatible with liberal neutrality. Sen responds (1992: 82-83) to this critique by 
putting the focus upon the combination of capabilities that a person can access - 
that is their capability set - which ‘stands for the actual freedom of choice a person 
has over alternative lives that he or she can lead’ (Sen, 1992: 114), and not upon 
achieved functionings, which would require the specification of a thick theory of 
the good. This move allows Sen to claim that his CA is not perfectionist because 
his employment of actual freedoms, rather than commodities, does not presuppose 
a particular comprehensive conception of the good (Crocker, 1992: 597): 
‘capability reflects a freedom to choose between alternative lives (functioning 
combinations), and its value need not be derived from one particular 
‘comprehensive doctrine’ demanding one specific way of living’ (Sen, 2009: 
117).  
So, Sen’s CA is a way of evaluating ends, that is, the human functionings 
which contribute to well-being, rather than a way of evaluating the distribution of 
means in the extent to which everyone has an equal or fair share of commodities. 
In Sen’s CA, functionings are the extent to which people have the opportunity 
freedom in the form of capabilities to employ means to achieve valuable 
functionings of being and doing, such as working, resting, being literate, being 
healthy, being respected, being part of a community (Robeyns, 2004: 6). Sen 
proposes that we evaluate valuable doings and beings through agency freedom 
and well-being freedom, giving rise to two dimensions of what people are actually 
able to do and to be, measured by agency achievement and well-being 
achievement. Sen emphasises a person’s positive freedom to act in the choice that 
they make to select actual functionings from their available capability sets. Real 
freedom of choice consists in a person’s actual ability to choose from existing 
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valuable options, provided that the condition of both genuinely valuable options 
and the condition of being obtain. Sen specifies two aspects of freedom relevant to 
developing any particular capability: opportunity and process, where opportunity 
refers to the ability of the individual to achieve valued functionings and process 
refers to the ability of the individual to demonstrate their agency in influencing 
processes and rules (Bonvin & Farvaque, 2005). Sen regards his concept of 
capability to be more suitably applied to the opportunity aspect of freedom: 
 
‘While the idea of capability has considerable merit in the 
assessement of the opportunity aspect of freedom, it cannot 
possibly deal adequately with the process aspect of freedom, 
since capabilities are characteristics of individual advantage, and 
they fall short of telling us about the fairness or equity of the 
processes involved, or about the freedom of citizens to invoke 
and utilize procedures that are equitable’ (Sen, 2005: 155). 
 
But, by placing the emphasis upon the opportunity aspect of freedom, 
rather than the process aspect of freedom, Sen’s theory elides an account of 
democratic participation: ‘one of the approach’s relatively empty boxes is called 
democracy’ (Gasper, 2007). Democratic participation is not straightforwardly a 
capability for functioning which we choose or not according to our individual 
conception of the good life, but is foundational to living with others as a citizen of 
a democratic society. Consequently, the potential of Sen’s CA as a ‘theory of 
social change’ (Dean, 2009: 9) is constrained, because, without the capabilities for 
the functioning of democratic participation, individuals are excluded from the 
means to bring difference and contestation over the values embedded in the 
framework which guides action into public evaluation. In a politics of 
meaningfulness, the result is that individuals are marginalised from the possibility 
that their interpretive differences will be acknowledged and taken up by others in 
the collective evaluation of worthy objects, making it less likely that they can, 
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with confidence, incorporate the values arising from interpretive differences into 
their practical identities.  
 
3.2.0 Nussbaum’s Partial Theory of Justice 
 
I make use of Sen’s CA to identify the opportunity and process dimensions 
of a Capability for Voice, but I set the Capability for Voice in Nussbaum’s partial 
theory of justice in order to identity the relevant institutional guarantees. 
Nussbaum is in broad agreement with Sen’s critique of welfarism and resourcism, 
but her capabilities approach is normative in a way which makes her theory 
distinct from Sen’s capability approach. Whereas Sen’s proposal advances a more 
sophisticated and nuanced approach to measuring the state of persons in order to 
improve approaches in the discipline of economics, Nussbaum employs a neo-
Aristotelian argument to extend the CA into a normative account of human 
flourishing, resulting in a partial theory of justice: ‘Sen has focussed on the role of 
capabilities in demarcating the space within which quality of life assessments are 
made; I use the idea in a more exigent way, as a foundation for basic political 
principles that should underwrite constitutional guarantees’ (Nussbaum, WHD 
2000: 70-71). As a result, Nussbaum specifies a list of central human capabilities 
which she proposes constitute the fundamental entitlements to be guaranteed by 
every state at a constitutional level. Nussbaum describes her CA as a thick, vague 
theory of the good: the thickness deriving from a substantive understanding of the 
good, and the vagueness from subjective understandings of the good (ibid; see 
also Dzur, 1998: 679). However, in order to allow for a plurality of 
interpretations, Nussbaum emphasises the process dimension of deliberative 
inquiry, making the capabilities which have a place in the core list of guaranteed 
human capabilities subject to democratic deliberation.  
Nussbaum’s list of central human capabilities consists of: living a life of 
normal length; being in good health and receiving adequate nourishment; freedom 
of movement and freedom from physical assault; being able to use one’s senses, 
imagination and thought in a ‘truly human way’; being able to have emotional 
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relationships to people and attachments to things, including loving and grieving, 
and freedom from excessive fear or anxiety; being able to form one’s own 
conception of the good (practical reason); being able to live in co-operative 
relations with others which include being treated in ways which are non-
humiliating and which afford self-respect (affiliation); being able to play and 
engage in recreational activities; and being able to participate in forms of political 
and property relations which promote autonomy (Nussbaum, 2000 WHD: 78-80). 
Nussbaum specifies two thresholds, one for basic functioning and another for 
good human functioning: ‘a threshold of capability to function, beneath which a 
life will be so impoverished that it will not be human at all, and a somewhat 
higher threshold, beneath which those characteristic functions are available in 
such a reduced way that although we judge the form of life a human one, we will 
not think it a good human life’ (Nussbaum, 1992 HF&SJ: 221). The different 
elements of the central capabilities are irreducibly plural (Nussbaum, WHD: 81), 
because we ‘cannot satisfy the need for one of them by giving a larger amount of 
another’ (ibid.). 
Nussbaum specifies further features of her CA (Nussbaum, 2000 WHD: 
84-85). Firstly, the realisation of central capabilities depends upon the progressive 
combination of three kinds of capabilities – basic, internal and external. Basic 
capabilities are those we are born with - they are innate but rudimentary and 
consist of capabilities such as being able to see or hear. Internal capabilities are 
the trained, developed and mature capacities and powers which place a person in a 
position of readiness to convert capabilities into functionings. Combined 
capabilities are internal capabilities united to the external conditions which allow 
the actual exercise of a human functioning, where Nussbaum’s central human 
capabilities are a list of combined functionings. Secondly, Nussbaum gives two 
capabilities – practical reason and affiliation – a particular place of importance: 
they are architechtonic (Nussbaum, 1992 HF&SJ: 222) because they ‘organise and 
suffuse all the others, making their pursuit truly human’ (Nussbaum, 2000 WHD: 
82). This means, for example, that ‘the functioning of performing a job becomes a 
truly human activity only when the employee is given the opportunity to exercise 
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her practical reason and to form it with and towards others’ (Alexander, 2002: 12). 
The architechtonic capabilities are not, however, ends which reduce other 
capabilities to means, but special capabilities which make the exercise of all the 
others distinctively human: ‘all items should be available in a manner which 
involves reason and affiliation’ (Nussbaum, 2000 WHD: 82). All the central 
capabilities have the potential to be exercised with human distinctiveness, 
underpinning the normative claim that the object of political action and public 
policy ought to be the development of these capabilities for every person, 
including the social conditions for their exercise: ‘The basic intuition from which 
the capability approach begins, in the political arena, is that certain human 
abilities exert a moral claim that they should be developed’ (Nussbaum, 2000 
WHD: 83). 
In sum, Nussbaum’s CA is susceptible to being extended to take account 
of the bipartite value of meaningfulness, because her approach is attentive to the 
situation of individuals within a liberal perfectionist framework. This allows not 
only for a wide range of expression, but also for the establishment of institutional 
guarantees for the capabilities necessary for experiencing the value of 
meaningfulness in the work we do together, in particular, the Capability for Voice 
in a system of workplace democracy. 
 
4.0.0 Capability Justice and the Principle of Individual 
Development 
 
I argue that Capability Justice requires institutional guarantees for a 
Capability for Voice. A theory of justice is specified by principles (what values 
should guide the institution of justice), rules (how the goods relevant to realising 
the principles of justice are allocated) and metrics (what goods are subject to the 
rules of allocation) (Anderson, 2010). The moral object of capability justice is the 
individual who needs to experience her life as worth living, rather than collectives 
such as groups, organisations or states: ‘the flourishing of individuals taken one 
by one is both analytically and normatively prior to the flourishing of groups’ 
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(Nussbaum, 1999: 62). Since, in Nussbaum’s capability justice, the individual is 
the fundamental unit of concern, then every individual person must be brought 
over the threshold, otherwise justice has not been satisfied. She upholds the equal 
value of each person in the ‘principle of each person as end, articulating it as a 
principle of each person’s capability […] the ultimate political goal is always the 
promotion of the capabilities of each person’ (Nussbaum, 2000 WHD: 74): 
 
‘(a) The promotion of individual capabilities necessarily involves 
the promotion of non-individualised social goods, (b) The human 
person is not a location of self-interest and maximisation of utilities 
but an individual whose innate powers and capacities should be 
nurtured towards human excellence or virtues, and (c) Human 
beings could flourish better as free and responsible agents under 
proper institutional support.’ (Alexander, 2002: 3). 
 
Thus, the central human capabilities for functioning describe what is 
sufficient for living a worthwhile human life: they ‘represent a threshold below 
which a human person could not be considered as living in a truly human way’ 
(Alexander, 2002: 9), and they are what satisfies the political objective of bringing 
everyone over the threshold into secure functionings.  
Individual flourishing is the central purpose of capability justice, making the 
governing principle that of individual development – that each person is entitled 
to the central human capabilities for functioning. Nussbaum’s capability justice is 
grounded in a conception of the person as an individual possessed of interior 
potentialities, situated within a social reality which operates to suppress or support 
the development of those potentialities. The principle of individual human 
development in capability justice draws upon an ontological ideal of what it 
means to be human which Giovanola (2005) identifies as one which is based, not 
just upon diversity between individuals, but also upon the interior diversity within 
the individual, such that all human beings are ‘pluralistic entities’ characterised by 
‘an internal multidimensionality and plurality which intrinsically characterises 
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each person and that every society should guarantee or at least promote’ (ibid: 
250). Since, the ‘constitutive plurality’ (ibid: 261) of complex persons cannot be 
reduced to one kind of functioning, and therefore capability justice must be 
concerned with flourishing in ‘different life-dimensions’ (ibid: 260), which I take 
to include the plurality of work timespaces to which we belong: ‘human richness 
in the sense of each individual’s interior diversity seems to be the possibility for 
each and every human being of realizing him or herself through a dynamic 
process that involves people’s activities (capabilities to do) and their capacities to 
be’ (ibid: 264). Moreover, individual capability development is not just about 
striving to become a fully realised individual, it is also about being related to 
others through continuing and mutually beneficial bonds: ‘the highest richness for 
each human being is other human beings and such a richness is felt in the form of 
a need’ (Marx, 1844). But, relations which simply secure respect are not sufficient 
because ‘every person is intrinsically related’ and the ‘internal plurality and 
multidimensionality’ of each person is constituted by their ‘connection with other 
human beings’ (Gionavola, 2005: 263). This implies a strong normative 
relationality, where no individual can experience full human flourishing in the 
absence of constitutive intersubjective relations. 
 
5.0.0 Nussbaum’s Capabilities and the Need for Meaningful 
Work 
 
Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach draws upon Marx’s proposition that 
human needs proliferate in developed societies, as advancing social conditions 
bring people to an awareness of their inner potentialities, stimulating demands that 
society be organised to enable the realisation of human capacities. Marx said: 
 
‘It will be seen how in place of the wealth and poverty of political 
economy come the rich human being and the rich human need. The 
rich human being is simultaneously the human being in need of a 
totality of human-life activities – the man in whom his own 
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realization exists as an inner necessity, as need’ (Marx, 1844, in 
Nussbaum, 1987: 45). 
 
Nussbaum’s principle of individual development is grounded in Marx’s 
maxim of individual self-realisation in association with others where ‘the free 
development of each is the condition of the free development of all’ (Marx, 
Communist Manifesto, Chapt 2). She acknowledges her closeness to Marx when 
she argues that ‘the basic intuitive idea of my version of the capabilities approach 
is [...] a life that has available to it ‘truly human functioning’ in the sense 
described by Marx’ (Nussbaum, 2006: 74-5). For Nussbaum, the task of societies 
is not simply to keep people alive by providing enough food, shelter, or paid 
work, but to secure their capabilities for living a life worthy of a human being, 
where human needs are expressed and fulfilled in ways consistent with their 
humanity. Thus, we do not fulfil ‘perceptual needs in a mechanical way, 
producing a seeing eye, a hearing ear, etc’ but rather ‘make it possible for people 
to use their bodies and their senses in a truly human way’ (Nussbaum, 1987: 183). 
When individuals experience the plurality of their human potential as an urgent 
need, then a politics of meaningfulness emerges which stimulates the development 
of society by bringing to public awareness the human need for meaning, provided 
that we foster democratic deliberation over what institutional forms and what 
human capabilities are required to satisfy this need. Radin (1996: 77) identifies 
‘the human need to construct a narrative for ourselves’, where the need to be able 
to narrate something substantial and worthwhile about our lives is a fundamental 
and universal human concern. Braybrooke (1998d) says that to experience a 
richness of need is evidence of an advanced condition of human development, 
which obliges society to secure the development of human capabilities for all: ‘the 
multiplication of desire needs in the successor society will accompany an 
expansion of human powers’ (ibid: 22). As more individuals experience the need 
for meaningfulness as an interior, urgent and fundamental need to live a fully 
human life, then the desire for interesting work becomes, not just an elite 
preoccupation, but an indication of normal functioning: ‘Functioning with normal 
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health and alertness as a citizen and worker may require in the successor society 
that people have interesting work’ (ibid: 26). It is important to note, however, that 
there are limits to any one person’s capability development set by the egalitarian 
principle that all should be able to experience the development necessary to meet 
the threshold for human flourishing to a satisfycing level. This means that no-one 
should be living a meaningful life through unfair acquisition of the capability for 
the functioning of meaningfulness, such as: exploiting the capabilities of others to 
enable one’s own functioning; or valuing only those capabilities of others which 
serve the meaning content of one’s own life; or stunting the development of the 
capabilities of others through disproportionate command over the resources and 
means to realise functionings.  
Although human beings have always thrived on meaningful work, and 
suffered from its lack, its scarcity in contemporary societies constitutes a 
peculiarly modern kind of deprivation. This is because contemporary societies 
demand that all persons acquire advanced capabilities for normal functioning, 
participation and belonging – capabilities which are formed and exercised through 
work with the requisite content. And when meaningful work is constructed as a 
fundamental human need, a general and unavoidable need which is felt as an 
interior lack, then individuals are more likely to suffer harms to their capability to 
experience human flourishing: ‘Without food, human beings perish. Without 
labor, they falter in development; and in functioning, once development has 
proceeded that far’ (ibid: 25). But, in contemporary societies, the demand to 
acquire and to exercise such capabilities as a condition of social and economic 
participation has not been matched by the supply of work which is organised to 
form complex capabilities. So, if meaningful work is a need, then it is an unmet 
need. I argue that the need for meaningful work is a need which meets Wiggins’s 
criteria for a basic need which is both absolute and entrenched (Wiggins, 1998): it 
is absolute because it is an invariant fact about human beings that they need 
freedom, autonomy and social recognition, needs which if they remain unmet 
mean that a person will suffer harm, and it is entrenched because the centrality of 
work in contemporary societies means that it is difficult for people to avoid the 
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harmful consequences of being deprived of meaningful work. Wiggins (1998) 
says ‘freedom, choice and autonomy are themselves vital human needs, and are 
candidates for precisely the kind of protection that is accorded qua needs to other 
real needs’ (ibid: 327). As I argued in Chapter One, the presence of inescapable 
human interests in autonomy, freedom and social recognition implies, in modern 
societies, a fundamental human need for meaningful work, which is no longer an 
elite concern, but necessary for leading a human life of equivalent functioning to 
each other individual. Alkire (2003) links basic needs and capabilities in the 
identification of a ‘capability to meet a basic need’; thus, the need for 
meaningfulness in work is met through the relevant capabilities, where the 
relevant capabilities are the capability for objective valuing and the capability for 
subjective attachment. I propose, however, that, in a politics of meaningfulness, 
these capabilities for meaningfulness are not guaranteed directly, but indirectly by 
securing the Capability for Voice through the conversion factors of a basic income 
and an economic democracy guarantee. Thus, capability justice with respect to the 
meaningfulness of work is promoted when the principles of egalitarian meaning 
and threshold of sufficient meaning are realised through institutional guarantees 
for a basic income and a system of workplace democracy. 
 
5.1.0 Work in the Capability for Control over Our Environment 
 
Nussbaum (1995) situates work in the central human capability of being in 
control over our own environment (ibid: 42; 2000: 79-80), which she describes as 
follows: 
 
‘A. Political – being able to participate effectively in political 
choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political 
participation, protections of free speech and association. 
B. Material – being able to hold property (both land and 
moveable goods), and having property rights on an equal basis 
with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal 
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basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search 
and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human being, 
exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful 
relationships of mutual recognition with other workers’ 
(Nussbaum, 1995: 42). 
 
The architectonic capabilities for practical reasoning and affiliation imply 
that work must be activity of the requisite content, so that it supports cooperative 
relations, affords social recognition, and enables the exercise of practical 
judgement. But Nussbaum’s specification of work in the material requirement of 
‘being in control of our environment’ is not entirely satisfactory because, firstly, it 
does not specify the interior content of the work people do together, consistent 
with a positive critical conception of meaningful work and, secondly, it separates 
work from its political basis.  
Firstly, for work to be meaningful, we need to experience cooperative 
relations in the interior content of work which are more substantive than 
coordinative relations. But Nussbaum’s capabilities approach has been criticised 
for its individualism (Held, 2006: 13), neglecting the intersubjective dimensions 
of belonging necessary to the group life, from which we appropriate values 
enabling us to form a practical identity: ‘the priority is individual liberty, not 
social solidarity; the freedom to choose, not the need to belong’ (Dean, 2009: 5). 
Stewart (2005) argues that groups are not instrumentally important only for 
extending individual capabilities, but are ‘a direct source of well-being (or indeed 
ill-being), as a mechanism for the enlargement of individual capabilities, and as a 
dominant influence over preferences and values helping to determine which 
capabilities individuals value’ (ibid: 185). Groups are constituted by the roles and 
practices, and these embody values, where values in shared social practices (Raz, 
2003) are ‘irreducibly social goods’ (Taylor, 1995), because they are 
intersubjectively created and sustained through ongoing relations with others 
which promote our moral orientations for what it means to care well for worthy 
objects. Thus, we need to belong to a wide variety of structures containing roles, 
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practices, and institutions which Williams (2008) describes as the ‘self-reflexive 
web of institutions’ (ibid: 465), making up the overlapping practices of social 
cooperation in complex modern societies. Furthermore, Sciaraffa (2011) argues 
that we have an obligation to participate in institutional maintenance (ibid: 122), 
in order to ensure that institutions embody social roles which are ‘sufficiently rich 
and complex to sustain the goods of meaning and self-determination’ (ibid: 123). 
A rich plurality of goods, in the form of positive meanings and values, are more 
likely to be maintained in work organised along democratic lines, that is, in 
enterprises governed by democratic authority which encourages affective 
attachments to worthy objects, because, by having a share in the rules shaping 
ways of being and acting, we increase our sense of responsible ownership and 
worthiness to act with others.  In order to make this experience available to as 
many people as possible, we must encourage a plurality of democratic 
associations, from cooperatives, employee-owned businesses, mutuals and social 
enterprises to conventional economic organisations (see Restakis, 2010). 
Secondly, Nussbaum does not define the range of activities to be counted 
as work, whereas, I take the work of social cooperation to be concerned not only 
with paid work, but also with unpaid labour, which means we must take account 
of how work is organised across overlapping action contexts. This means that 
work must be situated in both the material and the political bases of having 
control over one’s environment, where the material and political are not separate 
spheres, but implicated within one another. In this respect, workplace democracy 
recognises the political basis of work in a system of social cooperation. In fact, 
Nussbaum links the content of work to the need for social transformation when 
she says that ‘some forms of labor are incompatible with good human 
functioning’ (Nussbaum, HF&SJ, in Radin, 1996: 73), and calls for ‘a searching 
examination of the forms of labor and the relations of production, and for the 
construction of fully human and sociable forms of labor for all citizens with an 
eye to all forms of human functioning’ (ibid: 74).  This suggests that, for 
Nussbaum, the content of work must consist of activities which are undertaken in 
a humanising manner: ‘some forms of labor simply are mindless and exhausting 
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enough to make it impossible for the worker to lead a fully human life and the 
worker himself becomes a commodity’ (Radin, 1996: 74). And in order to secure 
work of the requisite content for all persons, then the institutional arrangements 
and resources of the polity must be structured so that ‘everyone can cross the 
threshold into capability to choose well’ (Radin, 1996: 72-73). Nussbaum 
proposes: 
 
‘The idea is that the entire structure of the polity will be designed 
with a view to these functions. Not only programs of allocation 
but also the division of land, the arrangements of forms of 
ownership, the structure of labor relations, institutional support 
for forms of family and social affiliation, ecological policy and 
policy towards animals, institutions of political participation, 
recreational institutions – all these, as well as more concrete 
programs within these areas, will be chosen with a view to good 
human functioning’ (Nussbaum, in Radin, 1996: 240). 
 
Thus, Nussbaum includes the transformation of the institutional and 
economic arrangements which structure work within her partial theory of justice. 
And this implies that the object of justice, informed by a politics of 
meaningfulness in work, must be to ensure ‘work regimes’ which ‘enlarge and 
assure particular human capacities that can be seen as universally essential for 
those who labour in a civilized society’ (Pocock, 2006: 1). This requires us to 
consider the prospects for a socialised economy, where democratically organised 
enterprises able to support the development and exercise of the Capability for 
Voice are widely available.  
 
5.2.0 Democratic Equality 
 
I have argued that the emancipatory potential of a positive critical 
conception of meaningful work is realised when individuals express the political 
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mode of being through democratic practices at the level of the task and of the 
organisation. This requires an approach to capability development which is 
grounded in the political basis of economic life. For example, Anderson (1999; 
2010) argues that society ought to secure the formation of the capabilities 
necessary for an individual to function as a democratic equal, including what is 
necessary for democratic equality in the work she does: ‘citizens have a claim to a 
capability set sufficient to enable them to function as equals in society’ 
(Anderson, 2010: 83). In the relevant capability set for democratic equality, 
Anderson specifies those capabilities necessary to participating in a system of 
social cooperation, implying that an individual’s social and political participation 
depends upon a capability for work – which, I argue, must be a capability for 
meaningful work:  
 
‘To be capable of functioning as an equal participant in a system 
of cooperative production requires effective access to the means 
of production, access to the education needed to develop one’s 
talents, freedom of occupational choice, the right to make 
contracts and enter into cooperative agreements with others, the 
right to receive fair value for one’s labor, and recognition by 
others of one’s productive contribution’ (Anderson, 1999: 318). 
 
Given how democratic participation enables individuals to experience the 
value of meaningfulness in the work they do, this means capabilities must be 
developed to the extent that they satisfy the threshold standard specified by 
democratic equality, where a threshold of sufficiency in democratic equality is 
given by the opportunity and process dimensions of a Capability for Voice. For 
each person to be able to function as an equal requires that each person possess, 
not only the capabilities for political citizenship, but also the capabilities for 
participating as an equal in the associations of civic society, including economic 
associations. Anderson (1999) proposes that to be able to see one another as a 
participant of equal standing in the work of social cooperation requires a 
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particular attitude to how we generate goods, where ‘people regard every product 
of the economy as jointly produced by everyone working together’ (ibid: 321). 
Such a system of cooperation implies unavoidable inter-dependencies where we 
effectively ‘commission’ one another to undertake the tasks we are unable to 
undertake on our own behalf (ibid: 322). This includes all the many kinds of 
unpaid labour for which the market will not pay, but which are nonetheless 
essential to the reproduction of a cooperative social order. Although Anderson 
does not extend her theory of democratic equality to specifying the content of 
work, she does indicate the necessity for internal and external goods of a 
particular character when she says: ‘Society may not define work roles that 
amount to peonage or servitude, nor, if it can avoid it, pay them so little that an 
able-bodied person working full-time would still lack basic capabilities’ (ibid: 
325). However, her concept of the content of working is under-developed because 
of her thin understanding of joint working: Anderson conceives of the work of 
social cooperation in terms of a chain of remote interactions, and she does not 
discuss the possibility of capability deformation in the technical division of 
labour. Despite these elisions, I think it is plausible to suggest that Anderson’s 
concept of democratic equality, by pointing us towards the material basis of 
democratic participation, helps us to understand what is required to fill out the 
satisficing level of meaning in the threshold of sufficient meaning.  
 
5.3.0 The Capability for Voice 
 
Democratic equality, and thus being able to achieve a satisficing level of 
meaningfulness in work for all, depends upon the realisation of the Capability for 
Voice in a system of workplace democracy. And the Capability for Voice depends 
upon opportunity and process, where opportunity is made up of both an individual 
and a social dimension: 
 
‘In the capability perspective, capability for voice, which requires 
all persons concerned actively to participate in the policy process, 
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is the very condition of the legitimacy of any individualised social 
intervention. Capability for voice of course depends upon 
personal characteristics such as discursive competences or self-
confidence, but it more deeply relies on the social and 
institutional environment and its ability to listen to the concerns 
voiced by the persons involved [...] the essence of the capability 
approach is procedural in the way defined above: it does not 
impose from the outside substantial solutions (e.g. moral 
behaviours) on job-seekers, but requires that a list of valuable 
functionings be determined through social choice or deliberation’ 
(Bonvin & Farvaque, 2006: 135). 
 
Bonvin & Farvaque (2006) describe a capability for work as ‘the real 
freedom to choose the work one has reason to value’ (ibid: 126), implying that 
since there are some forms of work which we do not have reason to value,  then a 
capability for work depends upon being able to distinguish between valuable and 
nonvaluable work: 
 
‘The capability approach requires that all people be adequately 
equipped to escape from the constraint of valueless work, either 
through the real possibility of refusing such a job (with a valuable 
alternative, be it a financial compensation or another job), or 
through the possibility of transforming it into something else one 
‘has reason to value’. Thus capability for work implies either a) 
capability not to work if one chooses (via a valuable exit option); 
or b) capability to participate effectively in the definition of work 
content, organisation, conditions, modes of remuneration, etc. 
(the voice  option)’ (Bonvin & Farvaque, 2006: 126, original 
emphasis). 
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But the ‘capability for work’ is not simply about being employable, it is 
also about being able to participate in the ‘shaping of the social context in order to 
make it more professionally and socially inclusive’ (Bonvin & Farvaque, 2006: 
127). Bonvin & Farvaque employ Sen’s distinction between agency and well-
being to explicate the ‘substantial content of capability for work’ (ibid: 127), 
where well-being in work is linked to material factors such as income and non-
material factors such as self-fulfilment and a sense of belonging; and agency in 
work is linked to actual doings or participation in activities of work: ‘Capability 
for work is not identified as the mere possibility of getting an adequate wage: it 
focuses on the agency dimension, on the capability of participating in society’ 
(ibid: 128). Well-being and agency in work, however, do not operate as 
independent dimensions, but are mutually implicated, so that aspects of agency in 
work, such as an individual being able to form and hold to values relies upon 
aspects of well-being, such as job security, being satisfied (Lutz, 2008). 
Democratic participation which aims at involving people in the framing rules 
shaping their subjectivities and action contexts is thus inherent to a capability for 
work which is worth doing, and which supports the development of human 
capabilities relevant to economic participation over the life course – and this 
requires the Capability for Voice in the work one does with others, thus 
integrating the material and political dimensions of Nussbaum’s capability for 
control over one’s environment.  
The Capability for Voice is ‘the ability to express one’s opinions and 
thoughts, and to make them count in the course of public discussion’ (Bonvin & 
Farvaque (2006: 127), where the concept of capability combines individual 
agency or ‘what the individual is able to do’ with social agency or ‘what 
opportunities are open to him’ (Bonvin, 2003). De Munck (de Munck & Ferreras, 
2004) specifies three aspects to the Capability for Voice: firstly, it is a constitutive 
element of ‘Freedom of Choice’, because, in a fair society, each person ought to 
have the opportunity to publicly deliberate over the opportunities for acting and 
for being which society makes available to her; secondly, it is grounded in the 
plurality of individual abilities, but enabled by social conditions, such as 
Ruth Yeoman                                        Meaningful Work and Workplace Democracy 
 
Page 283 
 
information, collective support, communication, being listened to and understood 
by others; and thirdly, it is dependent upon social institutions, such as rights 
(freedom of speech) and social conversion factors to convert the capability into 
valuable functionings. Bohman (1996) specifies three conditions for achieving a 
genuine Capability for Voice: firstly, equality of access must be guaranteed, 
which goes beyond formal equality to the real ability to access public debate, to 
express one’s views and to be listened to; secondly, the publicity of the debate 
avoids the discretionary use of decision-making power, including access to 
independent courts of appeal; and thirdly, freedom of speech for all involved. In 
Sen’s CA, the Capability for Voice requires both individual abilities and social 
agency: individual abilities to express rational arguments, to influence and to 
persuade others, and social agency, such as a supportive legislative framework, 
including avenues of appeal. This means that a full and equal Capability for Voice 
requires a transformation of the interior content of work, such that the capability 
for work itself must be reformed, if it is to realise the bipartite value of 
meaninfulness.  
As I have already discussed, there is a difference between having a share 
in participation, as taking part in an activity, and having a share in power, as 
having a degree of influence over an activity (Heller, 2003). And in order for the 
Capability for Voice to be realised as having a share of power in decision-making, 
then the structure of the Capability for Voice must follow Sen’s Capability 
Approach in having both an opportunity dimension and a process dimension: 
Opportunity is ‘the extent to which the actors possess the means, 
instruments or permissions to pursue what they would like to do; and are actually 
able to do things they would value doing’ (Sen, 2005: 153, my emphasis). It is 
concerned with the equity and efficiency of the means, instruments and resources 
the institutional framework provides to workers to pursue what they consider to be 
valuable, and the extent to which it enables them to actually pursue what they 
value. Having a share in power or ‘influence-sharing’ depends upon both social 
agency and individual agency. Social agency is concerned with the institutional 
mechanisms at the micro, meso and macro levels of economic democracy which 
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address the workers’ interest in the actual means they have to pursue what they 
value, and how they make use of such means (Deakin & Koukiadaki, 2009: 25). 
Individual agency is concerned with the abilities and basic capabilities of the 
individual, which combined with social agency, create the combined capability for 
functioning. In the case of a basic Capability for Voice this requires: personal 
competence in handling information, cooperating and influencing others, a 
democratic consciousness, trust and confidence in others. When individual 
ableness is combined with social mechanisms and opportunities for participation 
in decision-making, then we have to hand the opportunity dimension of the 
Capability for Voice. 
Process identifies what procedures exist to structure decisions and create 
the conditions for consultation, negotiation and decision-making. In a system of 
workplace democracy, process highlights how social dialogue between 
management and workers takes place (ibid: 30). People define, in situ, the criteria 
for decision-making processes and collective choices, requiring the development 
of institutional mechanisms and cultural support for collective decision-making. 
(Deakin, S. & Koukiadaki, A. 2009: 6). The extent of decision-making capability 
is defined by the degree of control workers enjoy over decision-making, the range 
of issues over which they exercise control, and the organisation level at which 
control is exercised. And this requires there to be in place procedures for decision-
making, given by consultation, deliberation, negotiation and agreement. 
Furthermore, full equality of participation requires the group life to be organised 
to make visible the agonistic dimensions of the discursive interactions between 
individuals. Gustavsen (1992) suggests that a process of ‘democratic dialogue’ 
will have the following characteristics: it must be possible for all concerned to 
participate; not only must everybody participate, but each person must be active; 
everybody has an obligation, not only to put forward his or her own ideas, but also 
to help others to contribute theirs; each participant must accept that other 
participants can have better arguments; and finally the dialogue must continuously 
produce agreements that can provide platforms for practical action.  
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In his evaluation of societal systems of economic democracy, Brogger 
(2010) identifies two forms of participatory engagement: firstly, social dialogue, 
or collective bargaining between employees and management, and secondly, 
human resource management practices (HRM) which aim at the raising the 
involvement of the individual employee. However, Brogger (2010) suggests that 
the Scandinavian tradition of ‘democratic dialogue’ is distinctive because it steers 
a course between collective bargaining and HRM approaches, where democratic 
dialogue is ‘a praxis informed by sociotechnical, psychosocial and discourse 
perspectives, developed along with the national systems of industrial relations’ 
(ibid.). Moreover, Brogger argues that, although arenas and procedures for 
participative decision-making are necessary, they are not sufficient, because what 
is also required is a ‘consolidated, independent source of influence of continuity’ 
(ibid: 491), or an institutional support system which provides employees with 
autonomy from the hierarchy and a basis for collective action. Thus, the 
Capability for Voice needs, in addition to opportunity and process which are 
internal to the organisation of work, external conversion factors in the form of 
mediating institutions and a basic income for all within a socialised economic 
system. 
 
6.0.0 Conversion Factors for the Capability for Voice 
 
The conversion of capabilities into functionings depends upon resources, 
favourable background conditions, and human activity. Robeyns (2003) identifies 
three kinds of conversion factors influencing the transformation of resources into 
capabilities – personal, social and environmental. Conversion factors are both 
context- and individual-dependent: for example, the ability to participate in 
training opportunities for any particular individual may depend upon company 
policies (environmental), individual ability to use informal organisational 
resources (personal), and access to childcare (social) (Bartelheimer et al, 2009): 
‘this concept of situatedness is at the very centre of the capability approach’ 
(Bonvin & Thelen, 2003).  For successful conversion and development of 
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capabilities for conversion, individuals need to be situated in a ‘capability-friendly 
social context’ which enables the individual to ‘enjoy the real freedom to convert 
her command over commodities into valuable beings and doings’ (Bonvin & 
Farvaque, 2006: 124). This means that for any particular individual to be able to 
experience the functioning of a Capability for Voice two kinds of conversion 
factors are required: mediating institutions, and a basic income. 
 
6.1.0 Mediating Institutions 
 
 Institutions are accumulations of the roles and practices which are sources 
of internal goods and the means for self-development. Hodgson (2009) defines 
institutions as ‘systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure 
social relations’ (ibid: 2). They operate to enable and to constrain what people can 
do through established rules and habits: ‘institutions work only because the rules 
involved are embedded in shared habits of thought and behaviour’ (ibid: 6), where 
habits are ‘the constitutive material of institutions, providing them with enhanced 
durability, power, and normative authority’ (ibid: 7). Hodgson identifies how 
habits are the key mechanism for transforming individual behaviour, because they 
influence the range and extent of human ambition, both as individuals and as 
members of a collective (ibid: 7). Moreover, Hodgson identifies how institutions 
are dependent upon individuals for their continued existence and renewal, both 
through the dispositions of individual persons and through the structured 
interactions between persons: ‘institutions are simultaneously both objective 
structures ‘out there’ and subjective springs of human agency ‘in the human 
head’’ (ibid: 8). Thus, persons and institutional structures are ‘connected in a 
circle of mutual interaction and interdependence’ (ibid). In a capability 
framework, because they structure our practices, and roles (Williams, 2006: 210), 
institutions determine the opportunity dimension of the capabilities for objective 
valuing and subjective attachment in a politics of meaningfulness. They are 
accumulations of the positive values which society makes available for 
appropriation to the meaning content of our lives. And they enable us to fulfil our 
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responsibilities towards the things we value (Williams, 2006: 209), because they 
distribute resources, provide us roles through which we can claim the involvement 
of others, and constitute the public arenas where we can deliberate with others 
over standards of care. In institutions, we encounter worthy objects, and form the 
ongoing commitments and attachments which structure our lives as a whole: 
‘people live their lives amid complex, networks of overlapping institutions’ 
(Williams, 2006: 207). Williams identifies how ‘technologies of organisation’ 
(ibid: 2008) have produced varied roles in a system of social cooperation which 
give us ‘the freedom to participate in ways that are meaningful by one’s own 
lights’ (ibid: 209), and which enable our deliberations over values to become 
reflexively related to our affiliations and activities. Institutions provide vital 
resources for the development of attachments which enable meaning attribution 
because, firstly, the roles generated by institutions structure our activities and our 
evaluation of our activities in morally important ways (ibid: 210); secondly, 
institutions provide for the legitimate allocation of power and responsibility by 
enabling a ‘background working consensus to mediate disagreement’ (ibid: 212), 
and, by mirroring the liberal notion of ‘divided powers’, facilitating accountability 
and trust; and thirdly, institutions provide sites for individual recognition and a 
minimal level of social solidarity which are vital to the development of personal 
identity: ‘our interactions are structured in ways that lead us to recognise others as 
fellow participants in many different spheres of life’ (ibid: 215).  
Furthermore, Williams (2006) identifies the importance of institutional 
variety in providing for the individual recognition which is a ‘crucial condition for 
moral agency’ (ibid: 215). A ‘plurality of institutions’ engenders ‘infrastructures 
of responsibility’ (Scheffler, in Williams, 2006: 214); they enable us to express 
the various roles which form the vital basis of our self-conception. Much of the 
work we do is therefore concerned with the maintenance and development of the 
social institutions constituting our common life, which reflects Arendt’s 
exhortation that we should have a ‘care for the world’ (Arendt, 1958), or the 
fabricated world of structured relations which enable us to lead a fully human life. 
Out of our experiences of belonging to institutions structured by common 
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activities, we form the particular attachments to worthy objects; and having access 
to institutional membership enables us to fulfil our responsibilities towards those 
worthy objects, thereby imbuing our acts of work with expressive meaning and 
purpose.  
But, not all institutions contain normatively positive arrangements of roles, 
practices and common activities, making it necessary for us to specify the 
democratic character of institutions which are conducive realising the value of 
meaningfulness. Democratic organisations are a reliable social conversion factor 
for the Capability for Voice, activating individual agency by providing people 
with the opportunity to participate in collective decision-making. Bernstein (1976) 
distinguishes participatory mechanisms along three dimensions: degree of control 
employees enjoy over decision-making; range of issues over which they exercise 
control; organisational level at which control is exercised. These are necessary, 
but not sufficient, for ‘the bare structure of participation to become an on-going 
self-reinforcing system of employee power’ (ibid: 497), and he adds several 
additional components: employee access to and sharing of management 
information; guaranteed protection of the employee from reprisals for voicing 
criticisms (plus other rights); an independent board of appeals to settle disputes 
between managers and those being managed (separation of powers), a particular 
set of attitudes and values (political consciousness); ‘frequent return to 
participating employees of at least a portion of the surplus they produce’ (above 
their regular wage). Moreover, ‘for maximum benefit to the collective there is a 
particular mix of management authority and democratic control, the precise 
proportions of which have to be found by each case through its own experience’ 
(ibid: 498). Thus, democratically organised enterprises possess identifiable and 
coherent features which foster the Capability for Voice. Most importantly, 
democratically organised enterprises change the basis of ownership and 
governance, underpinning our sense of worthiness to act and to speak which 
secures our equal status as co-authorities in the realm of value. 
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6.2.0 Basic Income 
 
A basic income guarantee supports autonomy, freedom and social 
recognition in the interior content of work, because, when it is at a sufficient level 
to secure material independence, people are more likely to possess the real 
‘capacity for making choices in all domains of life with the security that [...] 
nobody will have the remotest chance of arbitrarily interfering in their individual 
life plan decisions’ (Casassas, 2007). Casassas says that an unconditional BI 
grants individuals ‘bargaining power’ (ibid: 4), and I suggest that this supports the 
Capability for Voice in the interior content of work, as people bring interpretive 
differences into public deliberation through democratic practices at the level of the 
task. A BI is one of the conversion factors for realising agonistic engagement with 
fellow workers in one’s chosen sphere of activity, supported by shared ownership 
rights in the organisations to which one belongs, and upon which one depends to 
fulfil one’s responsibilities to the worthy objects which make one’s life worth 
living.  
Van Parijs (1995) defends ‘real libertarianism’ which he proposes is 
realised in a social order ‘that could afford, and would actually implement, the 
highest sustainable unconditional income, subject to the constraint that everyone’s 
formal freedom should be protected’ (ibid: 1). The Principle of Egalitarian 
Meaning is satisfied when there is the widest range values which people can 
choose to appropriate to the meaning content of their lives. In the work of social 
cooperation, this requires an expansion of the activities which are recognised as 
work, in the sense that there are a plurality of activities, both paid and unpaid, 
which contribute to the reproduction of society. In a politics of meaningfulness, an 
unconditional basic income is the means to secure a plurality of values in the work 
of social cooperation, bringing to light values and meanings of work which have 
been rendered invisible by the standard economic model. Of the values 
constituting caring work, Pateman (2007) says that,  in contrast to normal 
arguments for a basic income grounded in the value of reciprocity, those engaged 
in caring work are not motivated by an ‘immediate reciprocal contribution’, but by 
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affective attachments (ibid: 3). She suggests that the value of a BI lies, not in 
immediate mutual reciprocity, but in the opportunity it affords citizens ‘not to be 
employed’ (ibid: 5) because ‘employment is undemocratic, a vast area of 
hierarchy and subordination within supposedly democratic societies’ (ibid: 4). 
Furthermore, the pluralisation of values is encouraged by the role basic income 
plays in capability security, which directs public policy to what is required to 
ensure that people can rely upon their capabilities into the future. A basic income 
means that no person need be forced to neglect or pass up on chosen functionings, 
or be forced by necessity to pursue functionings they do not value. Where there is 
an unconditional basic income up to the highest sustainable level, no person need 
do degraded work in order to avoid immiseration; it also affords society as a 
whole an opportunity to evaluate the ‘undemocratic character of employment’ and 
‘the meaning of work’ (Pateman, 2007: 5).   
 Securing the material basis for the requisite content of work through a 
basic income guarantee ought not to be implemented in the absence of a critical 
evaluation and reform of the present organisation of work, in particular, the 
gendered division of labour. Robeyns (2001) warns that simply applying a basic 
income with no regard for the position of individuals may do more harm than 
good. She argues that paying some women a basic income, without altering 
systemic disadvantage and discrimination in the division of labour, would end up 
‘sending women back home and tempering emancipation’ (ibid: 103; cf. Orloff, 
1990). The unequal distribution of labour in the home, replicated in the structure 
of the labour market, is unlikely to be altered through an increase in women’s 
bargaining power without a corresponding change in the structure of paid and 
unpaid work. Robeyn’s critique implies that a basic income must operate within a 
system of capability justice, where the position of the individual with respect to 
her ability to convert innate capabilities into combined capabilities, and then into 
the functionings of her choice, is what counts in considerations of justice. Where 
the purpose of a basic income is individual self-determination (Pateman, 2004), 
then a basic income is a means to ‘the creation of a more democratic society in 
which individual freedom and citizenship are of equal worth for everyone’ and to 
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expanding women’s freedom (ibid: 90). Pateman says that ‘individual self-
government depends not only on the opportunities available but also on the form 
of authority structure within which individuals interact with one another in their 
daily lives’ (ibid: 91). Some commentators are concerned that a basic income 
would undermine participation in paid work, which they see as formative for 
cultivating the virtues of citizenship (Sandel, 1996; Dagger, 2006): ‘basic income, 
according to this view, is a direct subsidy of civic vice’ (White, 2007: 5). This 
would imply that a just society must be concerned with the boundaries between 
different kinds of work (Young, 2006) –who does what, when and where. In this 
way, a basic income guarantee can secure the Principle of Egalitarian Meaning 
only in combination with the Threshold of Sufficient Meaning, where the 
threshold is specified by democratic equality in the interior content of work. 
 
7.0.0 Conclusion 
 
Some commentators have suggested that the capability approach does not 
directly address the relations of production and domination which stunt human 
capabilities (Bagchi, 2000), but when the capability approach is applied to the 
interior content of work by recognising in work both the political and the material 
basis of control over our environment, then we have to hand the means to remedy 
capability inequalities. In order to satisfy the Principle of Egalitarian Meaning and 
the Threshold of Sufficient Meaning, however, we will need to address the 
patterns of inequality across the division of labour, in particular, the way in which 
work occurs in multiple formal and informal timespaces. Young (2002) identifies 
that a concern for any theory of justice must be how our involvement in a 
diversity of relationships which generate simultaneous demands should make us 
ask ‘what are the principles that ought to guide the relationship between out-of-
home work and work at home in order to encourage and enable everyone to 
participate in both on roughly equal terms.’ (ibid: 77) Structural relations 
(organisations, rules and practices) in one sphere shape our relations and 
capabilities for action in other spheres, therefore we must ask, ‘Does the theory of 
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democratic justice have a place for normative principles to guide the structural 
intersections of institutional spheres, or is this theory restricted to principles to 
regulate the rules and relations within institutions only?’ (ibid: 77). Enhancing 
human capabilities will strengthen the resistance of individuals to domination, 
provided that the basic structure of society contains non-dominating, capability-
enhancing work timespaces, thus enabling the widespread availability of work 
structured by the value of meaningfulness. A society based upon respecting equal 
human worth requires that market efficiency be defined by the extent to which the 
economic system supports the development of central human capabilities, 
including the capability for meaning attribution. Non-alienating, non-humiliating 
work must therefore be accessible through a plurality of micro-structures of 
belonging; such work is defined by positive promotion of human capabilities 
(Gould, 1985), and negative protection from arbitrary interference (Hsieh, 2008). 
In sum, by requiring the end to de-humanising, alienating, and autonomy-
depriving work, capability justice addresses how we will secure the social and 
political institution of meaningful work for all.  
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Conclusion 
 
My aim has been to establish that the concept of meaningful work 
deserves wider intellectual and political attention. Although we are now exhorted 
to find satisfaction and self-fulfilment in consumption, Morris’s call for dignified 
and humane labour retains a toehold in our imaginings of what a flourishing 
human life ought to look like. Indeed, Morris’s following comment upon the 
purchase of goods, ‘Tis the lives of men you buy’ (Morris, 1884), indicates a 
direction of inquiry for linking the moral and political dimensions of consumption 
and production. This is because if we acquire goods from the oppressions of 
others then we compromise the possibilities for our own life - if one life can be 
made vulnerable because of the work he or she does, then so can the life of any 
man or woman. Consumers can be satisfied even where producers are exploited, 
alienated, or otherwise harmed, but consumers are also producers with interests in 
not being exploited, alienated, or subjected to undignified work. This provides us 
with common cause with respect to ensuring that all work is constituted by the 
values of autonomy as non-alienation, freedom as non-domination and social 
recognition as dignified work. I argue, therefore, for a set of institutional 
guarantees which includes an entitlement to democratic participation in 
determining the purposes, means and circumstances of the work one does through 
the Capability for Voice. In proposing that institutional guarantees are necessary 
to ensure that the principle of egalitarian meaning and the threshold of sufficient 
meaning are secured in all the work we do together, some further comments are 
warranted: firstly, I am not suggesting we attempt to guarantee that all persons 
should actually find their lives to be meaningful; secondly, neither am I 
suggesting that we try to guarantee meaningfulness in every dimension of human 
living, at every moment in time and across the whole of a lifespan; thirdly, the 
threshold does not guarantee that any particular individual will find any particular 
work activity or social role meaningful; but I do claim that, fourthly, the 
inescapable interests met by the fundamental human need for meaningful work 
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entails that all persons are equally entitled to find their lives to be meaningful 
because of the work that they do.  
I have described the outlines of a politics of meaningfulness which has the 
realisation of a positive critical conception of meaningful work in its sights. 
Furthermore, I have established that, in contemporary societies where work is a 
central activity, meaningful work is not a preference in the market, but a 
fundamental human need. In my positive critical conception of meaningful work, 
the conceptual content of meaningfulness is given by Wolf’s distinct bipartite 
value of meaningfulness, which unites objective valuing to subjective attachment. 
In her construction of the value of meaningfulness, Wolf is seeking to respond to 
Frankfurt’s (1988) question of what we should care about; to which his reply is 
that what you should care about is ‘what it is possible for you to care about (Wolf, 
2002: 227). Having things we can care about is vital to a flourishing life, but since 
‘it is not so easy for most of us to find things we are capable of loving’ (Frankfurt, 
1998: 94), Frankfurt suggests that we choose the objects of our care according to 
our ability to undertake the relevant activities of care. And moreover, we must 
choose something to care about because otherwise we will lack the motivational 
sources for any kind of acting at all: 
 
‘It seems that it must be the fact that it is possible for him to care 
about the one and not the other, to care about the one in a way 
which is more important to him than the way in which it is 
possible for him to care about the other [...] The person does not 
care about the object because its worthiness commands that he do 
so. On the other hand, the worthiness of the activity of caring 
commands that he choose an object that he will be able to care 
about’ (ibid.). 
 
Wolf is concerned that to simply care ‘about what you can’ (ibid) fails to 
take account of what is worth caring about (Wolf, 2002: 227). Instead, she seeks 
to establish an inescapable relationship between the objective and subjective 
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dimensions of meaningfulness, such that when something is worthy of love or 
affinity then our involvement with those objects contributes to the meaningfulness 
of our lives. She does not allow that this implies we should care about persons, or 
even objects, only if they possess worthy qualities, such as intelligence or beauty 
(ibid: 230), but it also does not imply that there is no connection between care and 
worthiness: ‘worth figures in, somehow, to what is desirable to care about, but not 
exclusively or perhaps decisively’ (ibid: 231). We want our lives to have positive 
connections to objects which are independently valuable, so that ‘meaning in life 
arises when affinity and worth meet’ (ibid: 237), and when the focus of our efforts 
lacks worth, then our lives also lack meaning. Responding to Wolf’s critique, 
Frankfurt replies that his concern is to establish the importance of the activity of 
loving to a person’s life (Frankfurt, 2002: 245), and that ‘since loving as such is 
valuable, it is reasonable to desire it for its own sake’ (ibid.). Thus, no matter the 
worthiness of the object, a person’s life is made better for him or her, just so long 
as he or she is engaged in practices of care. Hitler, for example, cared deeply 
about the success of Naziism, and his life was enhanced by having such profound 
concerns (ibid: 246): ‘an enthusiastically meaningful life need not be connected to 
anything that is objectively valuable, nor need it include any thought that the 
things to which it is devoted are good’ (ibid: 250). Frankfurt makes the important 
point that it is the activity of caring, itself, which creates value and meaning: 
‘meaning in life is created by loving’ (ibid). The activity of care, itself, generates 
worthy objects, and forms us as creators of value – in the process, rescuing us 
from the frustrations of having to find sources of independent value: ‘locating the 
source of meaning in the activity of loving renders opportunities for meaningful 
life much more readily accessible’ (ibid: 250). Rather than starting out from 
worthy objects to which we attach ourselves, we start by engaging in acts of care 
towards whatever objects it is possible for us to care about, acts which establish 
the value of the objects of our attention, because we make them worth caring 
about through the exercise of our meaning-making capabilities – and in the 
process, we form ourselves as worthy objects by become creators of value.  
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There is much to be sympathetic with in this account, and I have made use 
of it in my incorporation of an ethic of care into the value of meaningfulness, 
arguing that meaning in life depends upon our becoming valuers with the status 
for being co-authorities, and the capabilities for objective valuing and subjective 
attachment. But Frankfurt’s concern centres too much upon the caring person 
whose life is made better by engaging in care, taking insufficient account of the 
effect that person’s concerns or actions may have upon the object of care, or upon 
the wider society in which that person is situated. So, Hitler’s caring may have 
been of benefit to his own life, but he transferred the terrible costs of his caring 
onto the lives of others, and this transgresses the commitments of an ethic of care 
which focuses our attention upon what is good for the worthy object, and how our 
activities of care impact others and society at large.  
This means that others have an interest in, not only what we care about, 
but also what we do about our caring. And these interests are given voice through 
public meaning-making in the form of deliberative democratic evaluation of the 
worthiness of objects and the place they ought to have in our lives. At this point, 
Wolf provides us with a useful corrective to Frankfurt’s concentration upon the 
caring person, because she situates her objective valuing in a pluralistic 
framework ‘against the background assumption that the facts about our value are 
likely to be highly pluralistic and complex and that in consequence our approach 
to questions of objective value should be tolerant and open-minded’ (Wolf, 2002: 
237). The presence of background assumptions opens up the possibility for 
contestation and challenge as to what constitutes such values, and what impact 
they have upon the objects of care and society at large. Thus, securing the 
dimension of objectivity in the value of meaningfulness does not mean a 
narrowing of the range of values, but instead requires a broadening out of what is 
means to be a valuer, because objectivity demands an active engagement with the 
background assumptions and a shifting of perspective from the carer to the cared 
for. In this sense, establishing objectivity is a practical and intersubjective process, 
requiring moral judgement including both reason and emotion, and is concerned 
with relevance rather than impartiality (Wallace, 1993): ‘objectivity in morality 
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has to do with identification and assessment of what is relevant to a moral (or 
legal) verdict’ (ibid: 63). I suggest this approach to establishing the content of 
objectivity allows us to use an ethic of care to determine what is relevant to a 
situation requiring objective judgement, because an ethic of care requires us to 
consider, not only the carer, but also the cared for, where all the worthy objects in 
a situation must be given proper attention, not just those which are relevant to the 
caring person. And this demands an intersubjective, deliberative engagement with 
differences in needs and values interpretation – an essentially political process, 
requiring the exercise of the political mode of being. 
I suggest that bringing the formation of objectivity into the hustle of 
everyday life, and uniting it to each person’s experience of subjectivity in the 
bipartite value of meaningfulness, requires capabilities for a particular kind of 
rationality. I have begun to explore this rationality in terms of phronetic techne, 
opposing it to the pre-giveness of technical rationality, which simply does not 
stand up to what we know about the ordinary experience of ‘lay normativity’ 
(Sayers, 2011). I argued that a rationality of care based upon phronetic techne is 
key to realising the transformative potential of interpretive differences which arise 
from intersubjective encounters between self, others and materiality at the level of 
the task. But, further research needs to be done on how the experience of 
phronetic techne can be theorised within the work that people do together. One 
possible avenue to exposing and evaluating the irreducible autonomy in every act 
of work is to adopt what Reason & Torbert (2001) call ‘the action turn’, which 
aims to integrate first person (inquiry into our own actions and beings), second 
person (collaborative inquiry with others) and third person (developing inquiring 
communities) critical inquiries into a transformatory social science, for the 
purpose of increasing the validity of local knowledge and responsiveness to 
evolving situations. The aim of such inquiries is to generate forms of knowledge 
and understanding which transcend positivist paradigms, and connect practices of 
critical reflection and participation to decisions about what are we to do and to be 
in this particular situation: ‘How am I to act in a timely fashion now?’ (ibid.). 
Furthermore, critical inquiry into the decisions we must make about how we are to 
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act and to be in order to be attentive to needs and demands of the situation is 
potentially transformatory of social and political practices and structures, because 
it ‘affirms the basic human right of persons to contribute to decisions which affect 
them and to knowledge which concerns them and purports to be about them’ 
(ibid: 8; cf. Heron, 1996). The three dimensions of inquiry contribute to a ‘critical 
subjectivity’ in which ‘we do not suppress our primary subjective experience, that 
we accept our way of knowing is from a perspective; it also means that we are 
aware of that subjectivity, and of its bias, and we articulate it in our 
communications’ (Reason, 1994: 327, original emphasis). Where critical 
subjectivity in first person inquiry is allied to co-operative inquiry with others, 
then the possibility emerges for democratic dialogue (Toulmin & Gustavsen, 
1996), which I suggest will become productive of difference through the exercise 
of agonistic democratic practices, if it is to be fully enabling of emancipatory 
possibilities in a positive critical conception of meaningful work. 
To be able to engage in, and become proficient in, agonistic democratic 
practices at the level of the task requires us to have an understanding of ourselves 
as capable valuers, that is possessing an equal status as co-authorities in the realm 
of value. Effective participation depends upon our having a sense of our worth as 
co-authorities, entitled to generate interpretive differences and to bring them into 
public deliberation. This begs the question of the nature of authority in democratic 
participation. I have argued that a system of workplace democracy will combine 
democratic participation at the level of the organisation with participatory 
practices at the level of the task, and that at the level of the organisation this 
requires an authority which is a democratic authority. An important argument in 
favour of management authority is its epistemic superiority – managers are best 
placed to make decisions because they possess the expert knowledge and 
information necessary to resolving complex situations; the local knowledge of 
workers may make a useful contribution to management decision-making, but 
their partial understanding can never place them in the position of epistemic 
equality necessary for effective democratic participation. So, for efficient and 
effective decision making we ought to accept a ‘technocratic model of expert 
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authority’ (Moore, 2011), even though this must require from workers a surrender 
of their judgement, because technocratic expert authority, by its nature, excludes 
workers from independently evaluating and forming judgements upon the 
information and criteria for decision-making. By contrast, democratic authority 
demands the taking up, not the surrender, of judgement, which submits expert 
authority to wider practices of scrutiny and accountability. Fraser (1990), for 
example, proposes that we open up public spaces based upon ‘subaltern counter-
publics’ which ‘invent and circulate counter-discourses’ and ‘formulate 
oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs’ (ibid: 57). 
Bringing out the agonistic dimensions of interpretive differences which arise from 
the work we do together links our status as co-authorities at the level of the task 
with mechanisms for democratic authority at the level of the organisation. 
This demands a politics of meaningfulness which takes account of the 
different ways whereby it is possible to conceive of our economic life. To see 
ourselves as equal co-authorities we must possess a sense of both our epistemic 
equality and our capability equality: epistemic authority because we have 
knowledge and understanding acquired from the roles we occupy in the work of 
social cooperation to be able to contribute as co-authorities in the realm of value, 
and capability equality because we are situated in democratically organised 
structures which require the formation of abilities and competences necessary to 
being a participant. Through a politics of meaningfulness, we can multiply the 
range of positive values in a liberal perfectionist framework, provided that we 
ease up on commitments to liberal neutrality for the sake of a fundamental human 
need for meaningfulness. In the process, we will likely develop a far more 
nuanced understanding of our economic life. Gibson-Graham (2003) argue for 
seeing economic life as diverse, and our roles as multiply interwoven in complex 
relations which transgress traditionally conceived boundaries. They suggest that 
rather than opposing already existing capitalism to an alternative, we envision 
how diverse modes of exchange and cooperation are already implicated in the 
standard economic model, so that the task is to strengthen already present 
tendencies in the existing system towards ‘non-capitalist economic processes’ 
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(ibid: 157). Examining the Mondragon regional system of cooperation, they 
observe that there is no specialisation of product, function or organisational form, 
but a knitting together of the ‘regional economy as a complexly differentiated and 
networked whole’ (ibid: 142): ‘in the mind of the co-operator is the idea that 
future society probably must be pluralistic in all its organisations, including the 
economic’ (Arizmendiarrieta, in ibid: 127). 
Such a differentiated and variegated landscape of organisational forms is, I 
argue, essential to a politics of meaningfulness which aims at pluralising the range 
of values within a liberal perfectionist framework. Nussbaum’s partial theory of 
justice, based upon her central human capabilities, allows for the political aim to 
be substantive, targeting what is needed for living a life which we have reason to 
value. Even so, Nussbaum places the emphasis upon individual choice of which 
functionings a person will realise from her capability set. If an individual can 
choose or not to realise the functioning of meaningful work, then Nussbaum’s 
capability approach would appear to be little different from Arneson’s meaningful 
work as a preference, to be selected according to individual taste, provided that 
the conditions of market socialism pertain. But Nussbaum’s capability approach is 
liberal perfectionist in a way which Arneson’s approach to meaningful work as a 
preference is not – it allows for individual choice from a range of values, but 
within certain constraints. Nussbaum suggests that the objectives of a decent 
capability-promoting social order are to avoid humiliating its members and to 
respect their human dignity. I conclude, therefore, that my argument for 
meaningful work as a fundamental human need, requiring institutional guarantees 
for its promotion, can be supported by resources from Nussbaum’s theory of 
justice, based upon her central human capabilities.  
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